Book Review: Leon Panetta’s ‘Worthy Fights’ (Updated)
Book Review: Leon Panetta’s ‘Worthy Fights’ by David Ignatius, Washington Post
Maybe President Obama should have asked his Cabinet secretaries to sign book-royalty agreements when they took their oaths of office, so he could share in the spoils. Too late now: Here’s Leon Panetta, former defense secretary and CIA director, publishing the third memoir by a top foreign policy official while Obama is still in office.
“Worthy Fights” is Panetta’s addition to the Cabinet bookshelf, and it’s very readable, with the frank descriptions of personalities and events that distinguish this genre at its best. There’s no point in writing a cautious memoir, after all; Panetta’s candor matches that of Robert M. Gates, his predecessor as secretary of defense, and he’s a good deal franker than former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, who is presumptively running for president and still has to be nice to people…
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Ex-Pentagon Chief Criticizes Obama's Mideast Military Policies
Voice of America
A former U.S. intelligence and defense chief says President Barack Obama "lost his way" in setting the country's military policies in the Middle East in the past few years.
In a new book published Tuesday, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace, Leon Panetta faults the president as too often relying "on the logic of a law professor rather than the passion of a leader."
Panetta led the Central Intelligence Agency and then the Defense Department between 2009 and 2013.
Panetta praised Obama for authorizing the raid that killed al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. But Panetta said the U.S. president made several mistakes in setting policy in Iraq and Syria, which he says contributed to the Islamic State takeover of vast swaths of land in both countries in recent months.
White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Monday that Obama is continuing to assert his leadership in the Middle East with the U.S.-led airstrikes against Islamic State militants.
Panetta's memoir has drawn the ire of the White House, with Vice President Joe Biden saying it is "inappropriate" for former officials to write books about their accounts of Washington policy disputes so soon after leaving their jobs and while presidents whom they served are still in office.
In the book, Panetta faulted Obama for not pushing former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to allow the United States to keep a residual force in the country when the U.S. withdrew its combat troops in 2011 after a nearly nine-year war.
The former official also criticized Obama for rejecting his advice and that of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to train and arm Syrian rebels in 2012 in their fight to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a tactic that Obama only recently adopted.
In addition, Panetta said Obama should have attacked Syria when it crossed his self-described "red line" and used chemical weapons against opposition forces, rather than seeking congressional approval, which never materialized.
In interviews about the book, Panetta said the U.S. leader now has made "the right decisions" on U.S. strategy in the Middle East. But he says the policies should have been carried out two years ago, and that Obama should not have ruled out the use of U.S. ground troops in fighting Islamic State militants.
“Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.”
There is no monopoly on big egos and big mistakes in Washington. Nor, apparently, the desire to cash in following government service with tell-all, blamethrower books.
I have not, nor will I, read this book. Did Citizen Panetta happen to high light his own strategic insights and successes?? I would be curious to see what those were (beyond the host of leaders grabbing claim to some part of the tactical raid to kill bin Laden).
The world is changing, and we must change how we think about the world, ourselves, and how we approach being ourselves in this changing world. We will make mistakes in the course of this transition – but the biggest mistake of all would be to simply cling to the status quo and expend our national strength and reputation seeking to prop up situations that have been bypassed by the march of history.
Oh, I’ll read it because there is nothing I love more than making fun of the typical DC insider book. By the way, while we were busy with Worthy Fights since about 1990:
China Just Overtook The US As The World’s Largest Economy
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/china-just-overtook-us-worlds-090801574.html
Every time some retired-and-connected Colonel or General on American television makes fun of the American civilian because we don’t understand how IMPORTANT the mideast or Europe are, I just think of these trend lines….
And the EU has what collective GDP compared to the US?
The next time some NATOist cries out for Americans to do more, just remember, they have the best intentions….
How do they do it? The long-term DC insider survivors? Whether intentional or not, the misdirection is always there , isn’t it? And so the conversation continues, on drones, on torture, on COIN, etc., all very important conversations, but not the only conversations of importance.
The Army gets all the attention (well, some within asked for it quite explicitly, and so institutional fortunes rise and fall with the attention) but the CIA always gets more money, and officials keep official-ing….
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43413019/ns/us_news-security/t/linchpin-hunt-bin-laden-back-al-qaida/#.VEPVWjn4bC4
Forget any one specific country and think about the CIA, its institutional habits, and what is rewarded monetarily:
https://www.emptywheel.net/2014/02/25/is-john-brennan-shaping-pakistans-new-counterterrorism-program/
That part of the world has always been very good for various DC institutions, military or non-military, civilian aid and military aid, retired lobbyists, and both American right and left are so busy with their own preferred narratives that anything that skips between the two is down-played. I remain fascinated by what must have happened between the Kabul side and the Islamabad side for our own western intelligence agencies. The bigger institutional fish–and the long-time connections, for better or for worse–is always on one side versus the other?
I remain a skeptic of drones, but not for the reasons most give to be skeptical, it’s too close to the patterns of our support for the Mujahideen in the 80’s, the play and counter play of poorly understood factors, the working at odds within the soup of various intelligence agencies, the various American factions grand-standing for and against for many personal reasons (it’s good funding for lots of people, both pro and anti drone), the press for enlarging the program in order to remain relevant and funded, the neglect of the Afghan side in order to pursue the Pakistan side in “AfPak.” All the same patterns, again and again.
What happened in those early years on the Kabul side and how did the CIA itself view that institutional “fish” versus the traditionally more lucrative one on the other side of the border? I always get the idea that there was tremendous frustration on the Kabul side, but my imagination is a vivid one and I don’t really know what it is that I am looking for:
The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service By Henry A. Crumpton
http://www.amazon.com/The-Art-Intelligence-Lessons-Clandestine/dp/1594203342
Perhaps I am looking for a novel way to look at the roots of insurgency and options in counterinsurgency, on the nature of building state institutions, or the emotional and intellectual support (and, well, clientelism) that comes from being attached to a particular country or capital.
Panetta had his earliest roots in the Nixon administration, and I’ve noticed that all former Nixon officials carry a certain reflexive attitude toward South Asia, one in which the only options to work through are almost always the same old-same old from the period, and even if there is an interest to expand those options, the patterns remain weirdly the same.
This joint interview by Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta on the State Department site is very important, especially in light of some of his latest comments on Iraq and Syria and the nature of credibility, and messages and signals sent by key leaders to partners, allies and adversaries:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/08/170611.htm
Hubris? Check.
Know-it-all-ism? Check.
I know what’s good for you even if you don’t (very Hillary Clinton): Check.
Lack of self-awareness? Check.
Lack of seriousness, or projection of lack of seriousness? Check.
Too hard on them? Probably, but it’s a pattern, and a deep one, with our Afghanistan campaign. We ignore the concerns of others, are sure we can change their minds, are dismissive of anyone else as an ally or adversary, play to the media at home, and give off conflicting signals. It’s serious enough for war, but not serious enough to understand signals sent….
How do readers or lurkers think others view this interview or its attitudes?