Five Takeaways from a Decade of War
11.08.2013 at 04:11pm
Five Takeaways from a Decade of War by James Kitfield, Defense One.
… three senior retired generals offered their own thoughts on battlefield lessons. Here are five takeaways from the discussion by Gen. James Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Peter Chiarelli, former vice chief of the Army; and Gen. Ronald Fogleman, former chief of staff of the Air Force…
Based on the 5 Take-Aways, should we look at:
– Information Age war: More information available to more levels, including lower levels like “the strategic corporal” means the ability to reduce overhead and get rid of more general officers and their headquarters, flatten organizations and decision-making capabilities, which may allow for more rapid responses given the decreased number of overseers, yes?
– New jointness: This synergy can be seen in Village Stability Operations (VSO) where SOF elements are augmented by general purpose forces (GPF) in what is traditionally an SF/ SOF mission set. Based on this and other examples of GPF/ SOF cooperation, should we standardize the concept of GPF (mainly squads and platoons) augmenting ODAs and other SOF elements and train like this?
– Al-Volunteer Force: It takes time to expand and lots of money to maintain and care for (medical, retirement health benefits) meaning we have to maximize their capabilities while we also husband this limited asset. Should we look at increasing the use of contractors, perhaps even issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal to private military companies (PMC) for specific and limited engagements; or organize and field a limited numbers of units led by US military leaders but manned by foreigners (at reduced but tax-free pay)? Politically questionable certainly but more cost-effective in the long-run, yes?
– Precision strike: More information made available at greater speed resulting in more rapid decision-making coupled with weapons of incredible precision = smaller forces with greatly increased ability to create a decisive outcome. Does this justify even greater reductions in forces (manpower) in exchange for more spending and increased reliance on precision weapons and other high-tech?
– COIN: We don’t like it and our enemies know this so they will choose this when engaging us. As this requires a whole-of-government approach, is a new organization needed (like the recently proposed Office of Contingency Operations)? Does our PME need to include a heavy dose of non-military related instruction and/ or emphasis on civil governance (read “How to run an occupied country with a military government”)?
Well, that was disappointing. Three senior generals, and their top points are all procedural or tactical.
I wonder if any have any thoughts as to why, despite all of the hard work of the servicemembers under their respective commands, that the best we were able to achieve were temporary, tactical suppression of the symptoms of deeper problems either unleashed or caused by our actions. What did they learn about the nature of the conflicts they commanded in, what are their thoughts as to why our efforts are failing and what we should either do, or not do, in the future to advance/secure our interests without such a long, bloody, expensive, and ultimately failed, response?
What did they learn strategically about the fundamental nature of these conflicts we unleashed, stirred vigorously, suppressed temporarily, and then left to their own devices once we declared victory and went home?