How We Won in Iraq
How We Won in Iraq by General David H. Petraeus, Foreign Policy.
The news out of Iraq is, once again, exceedingly grim. The resurrection of al Qaeda in Iraq — which was on the ropes at the end of the surge in 2008 — has led to a substantial increase in ethno-sectarian terrorism in the Land of the Two Rivers. The civil war next door in Syria has complicated matters greatly, aiding the jihadists on both sides of the border and bringing greater Iranian involvement in Mesopotamia. And various actions by the Iraqi government have undermined the reconciliation initiatives of the surge that enabled the sense of Sunni Arab inclusion and contributed to the success of the venture. Moreover, those Iraqi government actions have also prompted prominent Sunnis to withdraw from the government and led the Sunni population to take to the streets in protest. As a result of all this, Iraqi politics are now mired in mistrust and dysfunction…
Not so sure we “won”—if won is defined as a way to ease out of the country and having not to fight our way out then it was “won”.
If one defines “won” as meaning AQI/ISIS was defeated to the point that regardless of how the current Shia government badly messes up AQI/ISI is ineffective then we lost badly.
The win was nothing more or less a way to withdraw and declare victory—but what was left was in fact the seeds for a total failure and those seeds are now blooming. In fact had we declared victory upon arriving in Baghdad in 2003 and then immediately withdrawn —the same results would have also occurred as they are today.
We did not see the Sunni/Shia conflict through the eyes of the Iranian green crescent Silk Road containment wall.
Iraq is now at a point not seen since 2008 and the complexity of the AQI/ISIS attacks exceeds anything BCTs saw up through their withdrawal and all the new helicopters and F16s Iraq wants will not change the current AQI/ISIS ground fight.
A victory it was not regardless on how we spin it.
Agree with Outlaw. Considering that close to 450,000 Iraqis were killed during the 8.8 years of American occupation, the General’s assertion that we “won” is, to put it mildly, fantastic.
I wonder if the Iraqi people would agree that the General and his surge “won.”
Moreover, this piece is one more perfect summation of the counterinsurgency narrative from the pen of David Petraeus.
I’m not sure an assessment of win/lose can be made without knowing what the directed end state of the national command authority or the CJCS was. While I understand the Gentile/Petraeus arguments, it is difficult to make an assessment of what sort of strategy is required when the dear civilian leadership fails to provide clear objectives.
Laying the blame at the feet of COIN and petraeus is disingenuous. The failure was strategic and a result of poorly framed national strategy. Operationally the surge achieve its limited objectives given its limited resource and poor strategic guidance.
Iraq was a strategic failure that started at the very top. Not sure why we continue to blame COIN; the anger is misplaced.
More broadly the national security enterprises failure to effectively defeat Islamist Extremism is a result of a failure in strategy that see’s the U.S. continue to attack the operational COG(the actual terrorist) and not the strategic COG (the legitimacy of the ideology).
The people at the top continue to push a big “M” approach to national security as opposed to a more nuanced strategy that uses all the tools of national power.
The National Security Act is screaming for reform. The current NSA was developed during a time when the strategic environment was significantly different than what it is today. Our existing NSA biases strategy to the use of the big M. This bias is a result of Cold War cultural artifacts as well as failures in policy and appropriations (focus on DoD and not DoS) all driven by our archaic NSA.
I just wish there would be some intellectual honesty about speaking truth to power.
1. How does Gen. P adjust his comments on the statement recently attributed to an advisor close to President Bush who stated we simply wanted to kick someone’s butt. Over 7K in KIAs in both events and literally thousands wounded—and it was all about kicking someone’s butt?
2. Gen P should thank the AQI/ISIS for giving him the surge but he and others need to really look at why the AQI surge went first followed by ours —in fact AQI and the other leading Sunni insurgent groups namely IAI were “winning” by their definition.
I really do think that the staff actions taken by Gen. Casey in 2006 were setting the stage for a Army drawdown-especially around the reshifted BCT AORs that allowed for the trimming of one to two BNs per deployed BCT.
AQI was not the dumb learners we thought them to be–they were really astute in their observation skill sets—they had observed these shifts and rightly assumed the drawdown was coming and they counter effort was to freeze us in place to have an opponent for their fight so they could declare victory over the greatest field power in the ME.
If one looks at why the AQI forked the Sunni insurgency and pushed ethnic violence—it in fact did freeze us in place.
I really wish that in the face of all the costs both in manpower and to US taxpayers we could see some truth to power being spoken by Gen. P and others.
Rob H:
Fair points, and overall I agree with you that the explanation for America’s problems in Iraq rest with strategy and policy. I don’t blame Coin for that, but what I do argue is that a hyper-focus on tactics and operations–aka the surge triumph narrative, of which Gen Petraeus in this piece conforms perfectly to–prevents us from seeing the larger picture.
Or in other words, why has so much ink been spent touting the so called accomplishments of Petraeus and the Surge if in the end they didn’t work (and by work I mean achieving strategic and policy ends at a reasonable cost in blood and treasure)?
Gian
Once upon a time, Iraq was a firm and independent buffer sitting on the key terrain between the Turkish, Syrian, Iranian and Saudi spheres of influence. We did not like their leader, and there was no AQ there.
Then we took out that leader, destroyed that buffer, and opened the door to AQ’s massive UW operation in support of the Sunni resistance, bringing all manner of material support and foreign fighters recruited from communities with suppressed insurgencies across the greater Middle East.
Effective CT efforts suppressed AQ and their Foreign Fighters. Giving the Kurds some lesser form of sovereign control over their lives caused them to give up their resistance. Giving the long suppressed Shia population effective control over Iraqi governance caused them to give up their revolution. Buying off Sunni tribal leaders and promising them a place in the future of this new Shia dominated Iraq convinced them to give up their resistance as well.
The surge and the military operations of “protecting the population” were never more than a supporting effort; a highly visible, politicized and publicized side show given credit for effects it did not create.
The primary winner in Iraq was Iran. With the buffer to access to this traditional center of Iranian influence Iran moved quickly to extend their influence across Iraq and through Syria to the Med. The door was now wide open to implementation of the revitalization of Iranian influence and the containment of their existential Sunni threats – primarily to the south in the Arabian Peninsula, but also to the north in Turkey. This is not of necessity a bad thing, but it is certainly not the thing we either wanted or intended, and it certainly in those terms was not “winning.”
Now that Sunni Iraqis realize the big lie of what they were promised, or at least the inability of the Americans to deliver on that promise, and now that the money the tribal leaders were paid has been spent, the result is both natural and predictable. The outbreak of revolutionary insurgency against the Shia dominated government by Sunni Iraqis, and the return and revitalization of AQ to conduct UW in support of that insurgency. AQ hopes certainly to stem the expansion of Shia influence, but as importantly they seek to advance their own interests.
With strong bases of support in both Iraq and Yemen, AQ has the Saudis in a vice. Ironically, Iran sees a similar opportunity. Shared enemies make for strange foxhole mates.
The Saudis feeling secure in their ability to effectively suppress internal insurgency are also partnering with AQ in Syria to attempt to block Iran’s containment operation. A Hitler-Stalinesqe relationship to be sure. Once Syria resolves these two will be back at it with gusto, and I frankly would not be surprised if the KSA fires their current security partner and hires a far more predictable (and equally far away) partner in China. Won’t that make policy heads spin.
Meanwhile Israel and Jordan sit in the midst of this, and I suspect are none too happy at what their great Ally, the US, has stirred up for them. If they play this smart (and both are smarter at this than we are) they should be ok, but it is a dangerous game.
It is all very interesting to watch, but if this is “winning” I am not sure we can sustain too many more such victories. The miltary did not open Pandora’s box, but neither did they discourage the opening. The military did not “win” the conflicts this has unleashed either. The game is afoot, and it is a much larger game than a little “Clear-Hold-Build” in Anbar.
Bob
General Petraeus reiterates some factual assertions in this article that I have started to question. These assertions are integral to the accuracy of the history of “the Surge” and its interpretation.
In this article, Petraeus asserts that the most important aspect of the Surge was the “surge of ideas,” the most important of which was the need to shift from handing off responsibility for security to the Iraqis and focus on protecting the Iraqi people. He takes credit for changing this priority:
“[I]mproved security could be achieved only by moving our forces into urban neighborhoods and rural population centers. In the first two weeks, therefore, I changed the mission statement in the existing campaign plan to reflect this imperative. As I explained in that statement and the guidance I issued shortly after taking command, we had to “live with the people” in order to secure them. This meant reversing the consolidation of our forces on large bases that had been taking place since the spring of 2004.”
He asserts that “this change in approach necessitated the establishment of more than 100 small outposts and joint security stations, three quarters of them in Baghdad alone.”
He assigns credit for the joint security stations to “then — Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and his staff developed and oversaw the execution of these and the other operational concepts brilliantly. Indeed, in anticipation of the new approach, he ordered establishment of the initial joint security stations in the weeks before I arrived.”
The problem with this lies in the account of planning the Baghdad Security Plan provided by General George Casey in his de-facto memoir, Strategic Reflections, published by National Defense University in 2012.
Casey credited the idea for the joint security stations to the Iraqis. On or about 15 November 2006, Casey ordered then MNC-I commander LTG Peter Chiarelli and the incoming MND-B commander, MG Joseph Fil, to work with the Iraqis to develop a new plan to secure Baghdad in the wake of the failure of Operation Together Forward II that autumn. (pp. 129-130)
According to Casey, during these planning sessions, ”The Iraqis also perceived a need for more joint operations—coalition, army, police—as a means of building trust between the Iraqi army and police forces and suppressing the likelihood that any Iraqi forces would succumb to sectarian influences. They suggested joint security stations across Baghdad, located in selected local police stations, where coalition, Iraqi army, and police forces would be based and operate out of to bring security to the surrounding areas.” (p. 131)
This planning resulted in a concept called the Baghdad Security Plan, which “called for five additional brigades to be moved to Baghdad (three Iraqi and two coalition) and the execution of a phased effort to establish long-term security. In the first phase, 35 joint security stations would be established and occupied by Iraqi and coalition forces. This was a significant logistical and construction effort that we estimated would take around 6 weeks to complete. Inplace Iraqi and coalition forces would continue their security efforts to sustain pressure on the extremists during this phase. Then areas would be cleared, expanded, and held by the joint forces, and, over time as violence lessened, the ISF would assume full responsibility for the security of their capital.” (p. 132)
This plan was briefed to and approved by Prime Minister Maliki on 23-24 December 2006. (p. 133)
LTG Odierno did not take command of MNC-I until 14 December and GEN Petraeus did not replace Casey at MNF-I until February 2007. Casey oversaw the initial implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan.
Of course, the Baghdad Security Plan was not the only operation in the Surge, and Odierno did oversee the doubling of the number of joint security stations from the original 35. (However, Casey did state that 35 stations were planned initially, implying that more would be constructed later.) But a simple examination of the timelines suggests that Petraeus and Odierno are being credited with ideas and plans developed under Casey. Casey may be exaggerating his role and the ideas he is claiming credit for, but that should be easily substantiated or refuted by his staff and subordinates and by the documentary record. If Casey is accurate, however, it would seem at the least that there is a lot more continuity between his tenure and that of Petraeus’s, as has been argued by several people, including COL Gentile. And that should raise questions about the veracity of GEN Petraeus’s account of the Surge.
Should we consider the issues of strategy, COIN, “victory,” etc., in these terms:
” … remove a despotic dictator as part of a broader plan to create a regional environment more conducive to stable democracies and open societies.”
” … regime change in Baghdad as part of a plan to spread democracy around the region and isolate those states resistant to fundamental political change … ”
” … the last three years in the Middle East indicate that the United States is in the midst of redefining its strategic objectives in the region. It is no longer satisfied with the status quo and preserving historical relationships based primarily on access to energy and stability in world oil markets.”
” … Embracing the idea of using force to spur political transformation also means accepting the idea that ‘stability’ per se in not necessarily a pre-eminent strategic objective.”
(These selected excerpts taken from the following 2005 paper):
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/people/biolinks/russell/CCAM%2018-2%20Russell.pdf
Thus in rendering our verdicts, are these the parameters that GEN Petraeus might say we need to consider, understand, acknowledge and focus on, to wit:
a. That the intent of our national leaders was/is to destroy — not preserve — the status quo.
b. That our national leaders accepted that, in doing this, they would knowingly and willingly sacrifice the degree of “stability” that had been provided by the status quo.
c. That our national leaders had determined that these measures, risks and losses of stability were necessary to achieve our new political objective, which was/is (1) to create a regional environment more conducive to stable democracies and open societies and (2) to isolate those states resistant to fundamental political change. And
d. That regime change and follow-on measures — in Iraq and Afghanistan — would ultimately come to be undertaken by our national leaders, through their various agents and agencies, with this new political objective and these new understandings in mind.
Thus, these matters (those noted at “a” – “d” immediately above) providing the framework — the parameters — within which we, like GEN Petraeus, must discuss such things as strategy, COIN, the Surge, “victory,” etc.?
My experience in Baghdad from 2005 through the summer of ’06 in Baghdad is that units, at least at the battalion level, were asking to construct COPs and live closer to the population. The “commute to work” took too much time out of each day, too much information (and arguably intelligence) was being missed, the population was clearly oppressed by the tit-for-tat killings taking place, and we had the resources to construct facilities in the AO.
For whatever reason, we seemed to need permission from some level to do that and we weren’t recieving the permission, at least through the summer of ’06 in my old AO.
Edit: This was supposed to be a response to Yaderne’s comment, below.
This is an interesting comment made by an SOF operator on Tom Rick’s blog site that even applies to Iraq and is something Gen. P can comment on because we were seeing much of the same things in 2006 through 2010.
As much as I hate to admit this, the parallels between the Vietnam conflict and this war are killing me:
Leadership micromanagement from the TOC vs. the same in Vietnam, just better tech now. UAVs vs. Helos and Blue Force Trackers vs. Radio Check in or in addition to Check ins, etc…
Lack of sharing of burden by that same leadership.
Lack of a consistent long-term strategy.
Lack of holding officers accountable at the senior level.
Rotations in and out of theater instead of consistent presence.
Restrictive ROEs (not just CAS).
Misuse of SOF.
Media driven.
Lack of will by any administration to be honest with the public on how long and why how long a commitment would be.
And of course, blatant fibbing by the brass to the guys on the ground, apparently VSO and our efforts have already worked, despite it being a 10-year program, must have missed the memo on that. I think the Afghans missed it too.
The news out of Iraq is indeed grim. Insurgency violence is greater over the past few months than we have seen in a number of years. I was there in 2005-06 and again in 2008-09 and really felt that we were making a difference for the better, and I still do.
However, I think we’ve missed the point on insurgencies, in general. In an insurgency, the end state can never be stated as won or lost. Insurgencies, by their very nature, quell when the local population has a “Cause to Live for that is Greater then their Cause to Die for.” This is not to say that military force and security are not helpful in advancing to the end-state conditions, but any insurgency where warlords are at the center of the chaos will only be eradicated when the population becomes disenfranchised with the “warlords and power brokers” and demands change. We (the outside world) harm this progress by saying things like, “Al Qaeda in Iraq is growing or foreign fighters are coming in from Syria, or Sunni are striking against Shite….” This only creates an “external locus of control” (The belief that events in one’s life, whether good or bad, are caused by uncontrollable factors such as the outsiders, other people, religious zealots, or a higher power) and redirects the blame to a “boggeyman.” In an insurgency this is simply not the case. The insurgents in Iraq are local criminals operating locally out of self-interest and primal motivations–money, power, control but these warlords gain great power when we, the outside world, supports their claims for legitimacy. You see a criminal gains few followers if their activities are seen as criminal, but they can gain many followers if their cause can be made to look like it is “Just”–a Jihad, or a sectarian response to injustice.
If we call the warlords–criminals, thugs, gangsters and thefts then we take away their power and local support. And as a result, peace can move quickly. It usually occurs shortly after a leader or leaders of the warlords (insurgency) are harvested, and when the government strategically and quickly reacts with essential services for life. In essences, provides the “Cause to Live For.”
In Iraq, there is still a great deal of unemployment and war age men 18-38 have not been integrated well into the work force yet. Until unemployment drops to below 15%, the environment will be ripe for the insurgency.
What is the answer then? The answer aligns well with the British economist John Maynard Keynes in which he looks at the “productive capacity of society,” the full employment output. Keynes would argue that the insurgency continues because neither the population nor businesses have an incentive to spend. After all why should a legitimate company spend money to increase production in this wartorn area, when no one has enough money to pay for their products or services. How can unemployed consumers spend money they don’t have. In short, the only way to get the economy functioning and the work force growing is for the government to spend rebuilding their local communities brick by brick and block by block using local labor…. The warlord power in Iraq is growing again but we can help quell it by resisting the urge to call it something that it is not. It is not Al Quaeda, not sectarian, and not a rebellion. It is local and primal in every sense of the word.