Negoitiating with the Taliban

Conflict resolution and peace negotiations will be highlighted over the coming months as the United States begins a shift in President Obama’s comprehensive counterinsurgency plan towards transition. Here is one empirical study that is of significant note.

Negotiating with the Taliban: The Timing and Consequences of Settlements in Foreign Power COIN Wars

by Andrew J. Enterline and Joseph Magagnoli

The emergence of a negotiated settlement as the goal of the American-led allied military mission in Afghanistan raises several questions: How likely is a negotiated settlement with Taliban insurgents? How long will it take to conclude negotiations with the Taliban? What is the likely long-term byproduct of negotiating with the Taliban? How close will the post-settlement facts on the ground be to American goals in Afghanistan? How will the recent strategy change in OEF influence negotiations and the resulting short- and long-term consequences? We investigate these questions by exploring patterns of negotiations between foreign powers and insurgents in COIN wars during the twentieth century. Our analysis serves as a probe of the aforementioned policy questions, such that we are merely querying the historical record to gain an understanding of how counterinsurgent armies fared in negotiations with insurgents. This probe provides a foundation from which to develop a theory of COIN negotiations that we intend to pursue subsequently.

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