Plan B: A Service-framed Examination of Economic Warfare | Marine Corps University Press

Plan B: A Service-framed Examination of Economic Warfare is published by the Marine Corps University Press (2025)  and is Book I of their Marine Corps Futures Monograph Series.

Foreword:

This publication, Plan B: A Service-framed Examination of Economic Warfare, written by the Commandant’s Office of Net Assessment (CMC ONA), is proffered by Marine Corps University as a step in the right direction and in keeping with this institution’s vision to explore history’s lessons and foster strategic thinking about future challenges. This work is neither a comprehensive examination of all aspects of economic warfare, nor does it explore every single possible military mission related to inflicting economic costs on a potential adversary. Plan B is an effective bracketing salvo to further professional discussion among Marine Corps leaders and other professionals about what possible maritime interdiction operations or interactions with critical maritime terrain might arise in a future crisis or conflict.

The U.S. Marine Corps continues to invest in advancing a tradition of study and innovation to ensure the individual Marine is best equipped to be the most important weapon system of our arsenal. Marine Corps University will continue to examine potential missions, military challenges like conducting a blockade, to anticipate future roles for the Service. Conducting or responding to a blockade harkens back to the Marine Corps’ birth and is reflected in our hymn. In 1801, the interruption of free trade and commerce provoked a military response. The Marine Corps was part of this country’s response to the interruption of commerce, and we conducted punitive expeditions to retaliate and end the threat. Should the United States choose to enforce maritime sanctions, exert pressure on a potential adversary to deter or punish acts of aggression, or attempt to bring war termination through the conduct of a blockade, the adversary will likely retaliate with military force. Maritime interdiction is not an administrative action or routine task to be taken lightly. Instead, Marine leaders should actively discuss the probability and challenge of such missions. If leaders decide that this mission set has a high probability, then we should begin to actively explore and develop techniques, tactics, procedures, technological innovations, and creative approaches to ensure future success.

The Commandant’s Office of Net Assessment surveyed the literature, engaged with subject matter experts, conducted a series of workshops and wargames, including the adjudications and insights of economic experts in their white cells, as well as examined critical maritime terrain chokepoints in detail for planning considerations. CMC ONA also explored how protracted conflict might generate these missions and how the Marine Corps might contribute to the Joint Force in their execution.

CMC ONA offers some assertions they label “iron laws” about blockades, which Marine Corps University suggests deserve continued examination, challenge, research, professional discourse, and thinking by not only our students and faculty, but by all military professionals.

• A nation, or coalition, implementing a blockade should first assess the ability to impose one and their adversary’s susceptibility to blockade.

• Blockades have a cost, usually paid in part by the blockading power’s allies and partners. This aspect must not be overlooked and failure to mitigate will result in failure.

• A blockade’s effectiveness will be challenged by an adversary’s adaptation, expedients, and substitution.

• Blockades, often seen as low-risk approaches, drive adversaries to high-risk strategies.

• The economic effect of blockade translates very slowly into battlefield advantage, but also eventually yields decisive, long-term strategic effects enduring even after the conflict’s end.

Plan B is a worthy read that should be incorporated into course curricula regarding the topic, and it will be a good starting point to ensuring the Marine Corps is prepared for this mission. While CMC ONA deliberately chose not to examine questions about whether the Marine Corps should or could conduct these missions, those are appropriate questions to be examined by students, faculty, and others. Proceeding from the assumption that the Marine Corps might be asked to conduct these missions is also appropriate and, if we are candid about our thinking, also a likely prospect. CMC ONA highlights three contributions the Marine Corps can make: serve as boarding forces, enable a blockade through land-based seapower, or conduct a blockade in the littorals as part of a Joint Force. They suggest a “small ecosystem” of investments to ready our Corps intellectually and materially for this mission. In my view, this is only a beginning, and I challenge readers to continue the examination and engagement on this subject.

Matthew W. Tracy

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding General, President

Education Command, Marine Corps University