New FM 3-05 Delivers on the Promise to Streamline & Integrate the U.S Army Special Operations Imperatives
The Special Operations (SO) Imperatives just received a much-needed overhaul. These important U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) cultural artifacts changed relatively little over the past 35 years, but change has now arrived. The United States (U.S.) Army recently published the latest version of Field Manual (FM) 3-05, Army Special Operations. This long-awaited update to FM 3-05 (dated 26 June 2025) supersedes the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era iteration published on 09 January 2014. The following article briefly explores the new age of the SO Imperatives and revisits aspects of the recent conversation within ARSOF organizational culture that led to a more streamlined, integrated, and user-friendly list.
The legacy (pre-2025) SO Imperatives fell into obscurity throughout the GWOT years. A central problem was that the unwieldy list of 12 imperatives remained ambiguous or unapplicable to many end-users at the ground level. Additionally, the GWOT ending and shifting contemporary strategic environments forced organizational change across the U.S. Army. Some final precipitating factors for reforming the SO Imperatives occurred when FM 3-0, Operations, introduced U.S. Army-centric tenets and imperatives in 2022. Meanwhile, the pervasive influence of multidomain operations (MDO), large-scale combat operations (LSCO), and irregular warfare (IW) further contributed to the push for change. Uncharacteristically rapid updates to FM 3-0 in March 2025 by the U.S. Army provided the final guidance necessary for doctrine developers to complete and publish FM 3-05.
Figure 1. Original U.S. Army Imperatives (2022) compared to Legacy Special Operations Imperatives
The revised doctrine continues to highlight principles, tactics, and procedures employed by U.S. Army leaders and planners executing special operations and related activities. Even more importantly, (in accordance with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-01), FM 3-05 reiterates that special operations continue to exist as one of the five core U.S. Army competencies. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 defines special operations as “activities or actions requiring distinct modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training, often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically or diplomatically sensitive environments.” As with all warfare, the principles, tactics, procedures, tenets, and imperatives of special operations require constant review and adaptation.
Figure 2. U.S. Army Core Competencies
FM 3-05 arrives at a pivotal junction and provides important updates to maintain consistency with U.S. Army and Joint Force (JF) doctrine as ARSOF evolves to operate across the modern competition continuum. Phenomenological research from 2022 to 2023 on the leadership and management strategies that U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) senior noncommissioned officers used to be successful during the GWOT instigated an interesting dialogue concerning the SO Imperatives. The research and dialogue produced enlightening ARSOF perspectives on the SO Imperatives and their relevant application in future conduct of IW and LSCO. This prompted a revisiting of SO Imperatives’ importance to ARSOF doctrine and the implications of the U.S. Army’s 2022 introduction of overarching imperatives in FM 3-0, Operations. Creating these explicit U.S. Army imperatives, with notable similarity to the traditional SO Imperatives, produced an inflection point for ARSOF.
The May 2024 article in Special Warfare, “Revisiting the Special Operations Imperatives for Future Irregular Warfare Conflicts,” explored that inflection point and helped find ways to effectively streamline and integrate the SO Imperatives with the U.S. Army tenets and imperatives introduced in the 2022 FM 3-0. The article indicated that the SO Imperatives require constant, careful analysis and would benefit from closer examination to reveal imperatives crucial, memorable, and distinct to the conduct of special operations. The article also highlighted specific feedback from ARSOF senior leaders about which imperatives might be well-suited for integration with the overall U.S. Army imperatives. The new list of SO Imperatives in FM 3-05 appears to reflect many of the suggestions that stemmed from the outside research, professional ARSOF dialogue, and careful analysis by the Joint Army doctrine developers.
The current SO Imperatives have been pared down from 12 to five more concise and less redundant guiding directives.
Figure 3. Revised List of SO Imperatives in FM 3-05 (2025)
They have now been referred to as ‘additive’ imperatives to the U.S. Army’s list. Some might argue that this erases an important piece of ARSOF organizational culture and subordinates special operations to a more nebulous and overarching set of U.S. Army imperatives. Realistically, the SO Imperatives needed an update for quite some time. FM 3-0 revisions, in 2022 and then 2025, merely provided the final impetus to remove redundancy and irrelevance from the list.
Figure 4. Revised List of U.S. Army-centric Imperatives in FM 3-0, Operations (2025)
Many ARSOF leaders had already identified that some of the SO Imperatives were ambiguous or had become redundant, self-explanatory, and unnecessary. Others discussed how most soldiers in ARSOF only remembered the first SO Imperative (Understand the operational environment), and that the list would be more powerful if limited to five points, like the SOF Truths. This constructive criticism highlighted the potential to streamline, combine, or carefully revise FM 3-05 to be more in line with U.S. Army MDO (FM 3-0). In this regard, the new ARSOF capstone doctrine has accomplished its mission to better integrate with the U.S. Army’s current operational framework.
Specifically, FM 3-05 (2025) succeeds in streamlining and integrating the SO imperatives into the overarching U.S. Army’s tenets and imperatives. Simultaneously, the new list notably preserves the original intent of the SO Imperatives. The current FM indicates how the U.S. Army imperatives “are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at acceptable cost.” Meanwhile, the SO Imperatives remain the basis for “planning, preparing, executing, and assessing [special operations] missions.” Importantly, alongside thoughtful improvements and changes, the revised SO Imperatives did not abandon the central focus on how ARSOF should think about its tasks and missions. Considering ARSOF’s role in the overall U.S. Army and the JF, the revision helps solidify special operations as one of the U.S. Army’s core competencies.
The new SO Imperatives illustrate an aspect of ARSOF’s capacity to rapidly learn and adapt to the complexities of the modern conflict landscape. Challenging entrenched institutional practices or culture is never an easy task. Nevertheless, the revised FM 3-05 has presented a concise and less redundant list of imperatives for ARSOF to carry forward into the IW and LSCO realm. Always recognize political implications, engage the threat discriminately, anticipate information’s psychological effect or impact, operate with and through others, and ensure long-term engagement (the hallmark of ARSOF). Nested within the overarching U.S. Army imperatives, this new language helps highlight ARSOF’s value proposition across multiple operating environments and phases of conflict. After all, the intent was to help ARSOF find balance with the U.S. Army’s newly chartered course and describe how ARSOF contributes to MDO. The recent revision of the SO imperatives represents an integral and successful part of that effort.
(The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official U.S. government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.)
”Original” Imperatives in 2022? The original imperatives were created by then-LTC Glenn Harned and published in the 1990 version of FM 31-20 Doctrine Special Forces Operations.(Access HERE). I have pasted the original 1990 SO Imperatives below the article.
As I recall the story, (And I am sure COL(RET) Harned will correct me) General Barratto wanted the SF equivalent of the Principles of War but of course said the only principles of war are the Army’s principles of war. So COL(RET) Harned interviewed the SF collective brain trust and developed the Special Operations imperatives. I think these have stood the test of time and I worry that “streamlining” them will mean they are watered down and will lose some of the intellectual rigor behind them. SOF operators and planners should not need anything dumbed down.
That said, I like a lot of what the authors have done with FM 3-05 and it will be a valuable contribution if military personnel other than SOF read this doctrine. It seems that the author believes the target audience for FM 3-05 should include non-SOF personnel – I do hope non-SOF personnel read it and internalize it, i.e., special operations (afterall it is one of the five Army core competencies and therefore all Army personnel should be well versed in this core competency. I just hope our SOF personnel can develop greater intellectual rigor by recalling, internalizing the original SO imperatives. Perhaps all SF operators should be required to read and study the original FM 31-20 from 1990. It remains as relevant today as it was in 1990.
Lastly I would argue that the SO imperatives but the intellectually rigorous version and the new streamlined version are applicable for military (and political military operations) beyond SOF. Like so much of special operations equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures, they can be adopted by regular forces and applied in a wide range of situations and conditions. That alone should be the reason why non-SOF personnel should read FM 3-05.
The Five Army core competencies:
SO Imperatives
While the principles of war characterize successful SO, the SO imperatives discussed below prescribe key operational requirements. SOF commanders must incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution if they are to use their forces effectively (Figure 1-6).
Understand the Operational Environment
SOF commanders cannot dominate their environ- ment. They must assess and understand all aspects of the environment-political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military-before act- ing to influence it. The conditions of conflict can change based on military successor defeat, a change in hostile strategy or tactics, or fluctuating levels of US support. They must know who the friendly and hostile decision makers are, what their objectives and strategies are, and how they interact. They must influence friendly decision makers to ensure they understand the implications of SO mission re- quirements and the consequences of not adequately supporting them. SOF commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing realities. They must anticipate these changes in their environment to exploit fleeting opportunities. They must also assist their supported indigenous military
forces to adjust their strategy and tactics.
Recognize Political Implications
SOF commanders must not anticipate a conventional battlefield environment where military concerns dominate. The role of SOF infrequently a supporting one that creates the conditions for decisive non- military activities to occur. Whether conducting SO independently or in coordination with conventional military operations, SOF commanders must consider the political effects of their military activities.
Facilitate Interagency Activities
When participating in an interagency and often combined effort such as SO, commanders must strive for unity of effort (synchronization), but recognize the difficulty of achieving it. They must anticipate ambiguous missions conflicting interests and objec- tives, compartmentation of activity, and disunity of command. Lacking unity of command, SOF com- manders must facilitate unity of effort by—
Engage the Threat Discriminately
SOF commanders have limited resources they cannot easily replace. Their missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, SOF commanders must carefully select when, where, and how to employ SOF (Figure 1-7).
Consider Long-Term Effects
SOF commanders must place each discrete problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context. They must then develop a long-term approach to solving the problem. They must accept legal and political constraints (such as less than optimal rules of engagement [ROE]) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF commanders must not jeopardize the success of national and theater long-term objectives by their desire for immediate or short-term effects. SO policies, plans, and operations must be consistent with the national and theater priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can lead to a loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.
Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of SO
There are significant legal and policy considerations to many SO, particularly in conflict situations short of war. In modem conflict, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. Without this support the United States cannot sustain its assistance to a foreign power. The concept of legitimacy is broader than the strict legal definition contained in inter- national law. The concept also includes the moral and political legitimacy of a government or resistance organization. Its legitimacy is determined by the people of the nation and by the international community based on their collective perception of the credibility of its cause and methods. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the support of foreign indigenous elements, the US population, or the international community. SOF commanders must ensure their legal advisors review all sensitive aspects of SO mission planning and execution.
Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
All SO have significant psychological effects. Some may be conducted specifically to produce a desired psychological effect. SOF commanders must inte- grate PSYOP into all their activities to control these effects.
Apply Capabilities Indirectly
Whenever participating in combined operations, the primary role of SOF is to advise, train, and assist indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The supported non-US forces then serve as force multipliers in the pursuit of US national security objectives with minimum US visibility, risk, and cost. SOF commanders must avoid taking charge when supporting a foreign government or group. ‘he foreign government or group must assume primary authority and responsibility for the success or failure of the combined effort. All US efforts must reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the supported foreign government or group.
Develop Multiple Options
SOF commanders must maintain their operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. They must be able to shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.
Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
SOF are currently engaged in protracted conflict around the world. They must prepare to continue this effort for the foreseeable future. The US response to conflict varies from case to case. Resourcing of any particular US support effort may also vary. SOF commanders must recognize the need for persis- tence, patience, and continuity of effort. They should not begin programs that are beyond the economic or technological capacity of the host nation (HN) to maintain without US assistance. US funded programs can be counterproductive if the population becomes dependent on them and funding is lost. SO policy, strategy, and programs must therefore be durable,
consistent, and sustainable.
Provide Sufficient Intelligence
SOF normally cannot infiltrate denied territory and develop an ambiguous situation. They do not have the combat power or the reinforcement and support capabilities of conventional forces to deal with unanticipated hostile reactions. The success of SO missions often depends on the executors receiving detailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligence products. This need for national and theater intelligence at the tactical level is unique to SOF. SOF intelligence requirements (IR) impose great demands on supporting intelligence capabilities. SOF commanders must identify their IR in priority. They must note which are mission essential and which are just nice to have. Without realistic priorities to guide it, the intelligence community can quickly become overcommitted attempting to satisfy SOF IR.
Balance Security and Synchronization
Security concerns often dominate SO, but compart- mentation can exclude key personnel from the planning cycle. SOF commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will almost always cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination.