“You Sunk My Fishing Ship” – A Comparison of the Australian Border Force & US Coast Guard’s Strategies to Combat Illegal, Unreported, & Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
A recent Australian Border Force (ABF) press release proudly displays pictures of a burning Indonesian-flagged fishing vessel suspected of illegally fishing in Australia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Quoting the commander of ABF’s Marine Border Command (MBC), Rear Admiral Mark Hill, the press release states “Globally, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a significant environmental issue and threat to sustainable fisheries. Our message to illegal foreign fishers in Australian waters is simple: we will target you and intercept you. You will lose your catch, your equipment, and possibly even your vessel.”[1] To date, several coastal States confiscate, destroy, and sink vessels engaged in IUU fishing, including Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Palau, and the United States.[2] Few, however, openly advertise this policy through providing graphic imagery of burning boats, or even using explosives to blow up boats, in their coast guard or maritime police’s press releases. This paper will explore potential hypotheses explaining why Australia has chosen to implement this strategic messaging policy using a comparative approach. As global ocean fish stocks dwindle, States are continually looking towards more innovative solutions to both deter foreign-flagged fishing vessels from harvesting their marine resources and protect their maritime sovereignty.
Origins of the Burn-Boat Policy
The Indonesian government recently gained notoriety for dramatically blowing up foreign fishing vessels suspected of illegally fishing in it waters. To address its growing IUU fishing threat, which represented an estimated annual loss of four billion US dollars, Indonesia created a task force consisting of its navy, marine police, coast guard, and attorney general’s office in 2015. Task force members worked together to capture illegal foreign fishing vessels, deporting their crews, and “cut, torched or dynamited holes in the bottoms of the boats” to sink the offending vessels.[3] The special advisor to the Indonesia Presidential Task Force to Combatting Illegal Fishing stated, “We sank 363 illegal fishing vessels to send a signal of strong enforcement and to create a deterrent effect.”[4] There is nascent empirical evidence that this policy is having a positive effect on reducing fishing vessels operating in the area which could help fish populations rebound, and other neighboring nations such as Malaysia appear to be adopting the “burn-boat” policy.[5] However, what is less well known is that this burn-boat policy originated in Australia in the 1990s primarily against Indonesian-flagged fishing vessels illegally fishing in Australian waters. Then Australian Minister of Defense, Senator Robert Ray, remarked:
The boats themselves are deliberately of a very low quality so that when they are seized they cannot be sold. About the only fate for them is an annual burning and the sending of photos back to Indonesian fishing villages as a warning.[6]
In the past 30 years, the Australian government has continued to confiscate and destroy foreign vessels found to be illegally fishing in its EEZ, an area within 200 nautical miles from the coast of a country. In a five-year period, the number of vessels Australian forces confiscated and presumably destroyed steadily increased from 23 in 2000 to 327 in 2005.[7]
It is only very recently that the ABF has included photographic evidence of burning Indonesian vessels in its press releases. In contrast, while the US Coast Guard (USCG) destroys vessels, including those confiscated while illegally fishing in US waters, it does not publicize this destruction. Specifically, Title 14 U.S.C. 88 authorizes the USCG to “destroy or tow into port sunken or floating dangers to navigation,” and officers must consider other circumstances of the situation before doing so, including “safety, environmental issues, permit requirements (as appropriate), the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and its Protocol, domestic legislation (including, e.g., the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act), claims for damage, and actions that may be taken short of destruction.”[8] In the past, the USCG has consulted with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on environmental concerns and the US State Department on diplomatic concerns prior to sinking foreign vessels.
It is important to note that this controversial policy may counter international maritime law, although my intention is not to perform a legal review evaluating the legality of the burn boat policy. Rather, my intention is to draw attention to the international legal debate over its legality, as this leads to the natural question—why is the Australia government actively advertising its use of this controversial policy? According to Article 73 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State:
- The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
- Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security.
- Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.
- In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed. [9]
Opponents argue the burn-boat policy runs counter to the mandate that “arrested vessels […] shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security” and violates Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”[10]Furthermore, while the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruled in 2015 that countries can be held liable for not taking necessary measures to prevent IUU fishing operations by their vessels in the waters of other countries, there is currently no standard interpretation of “necessary” measures to ensure compliance, nor has the court ruled on the destruction of confiscated suspect IUU fishing vessels.[11]
These legal constraints offer limited options for maritime law enforcement organizations charged with protecting their natural resources. Reviewing several historical Australian court cases, Lugten concludes that inadequacies in UNCLOS and international law provide “no deterrence value” to prevent IUU fishing.[12]Additionally, Lugten finds Australian court proceedings did not deter future IUU fishing attempts in that “particularly in stopping the beneficial owners of the IUU industry” and that the court-order fines “do not reflect the value of the illegal catch.”[13] For instance, the master of a Togo-flagged fishing vessel that Australian law enforcement officers caught illegally fishing Patagonian Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) with an estimated value of $1.5–1.6 million Australian dollars (116 tons) in 2001 received a $136 dollar fine while a bond could not be set for the beneficial owner of the vessels, whose identity was “not divulged by lawyers.”[14] In lieu of these issues, Baird describes the Australian government’s installation of an “automatic forfeiture regime” which was amended in 2007. Foreign vessels suspected of illegally fishing are automatically detained and forfeited, along with their gear and catch, to the Australian government. Proponents of the policy allege “that the concentrated efforts of Australian authorities to apprehend, seize and destroy the illegal fishing vessels has led to a marked decline in fleet numbers” of foreign-flagged fishing vessels encroaching on the Australian EEZ.[15]Baird, however, criticizes the policy and questions its legality under UNCLOS, as it “leaves a significant discretionary power in the hands of the fisheries officers onboard patrol vessels,” noting that “most forfeited vessels are intended for destruction” and even that burning “hundreds of Indonesian fishing vessels” contributes to rising levels of air pollution in Australia.[16]
Securitization of Fisheries
A growing body of literature argues that States are increasingly viewing environmental degradation issues such as IUU fishing as national security threats, a concept referred to as securitization, particularly in Asia and the Pacific and Africa.[17] Building on concepts developed by Buzan, Waever, and Wilde; Kilroy claims States that “perceive threats to national security will ‘securitize’ those sectors by taking measures to enhance their security, often without public debate and democratic process.”[18] These measures can also “involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against nonmilitary threats.”[19] Particularly salient to this research question, security is not simply defined by what States do, but rather what States say they do when addressing political, societal, and environmental concerns.[20] Moreover, van Munster states the following criteria must be met to consider an issue “securitized”— an actor must 1) claim a resource is “existentially threatened,” 2) demand the ability to take “extraordinary countermeasures” to address the threat, and 3) convince a population that “rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified.”[21]
As the preponderance of literature on the phenomenon of securitization of fisheries is currently based on countries located in vicinity of the South and East China Seas, including China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines; one cannot exclude the underlying maritime territorial sovereignty dispute in the area playing a large causal factor in these countries’ efforts to increase the strength and capabilities of their coast guards and other naval forces. For instance, Mitchell empirically shows that maritime areas in which natural resources such as fish stocks are important have become more violent and “paradoxically” between “highly developed, democratic states.”[22] Mitchell’s research is concentrated, however, on disputed maritime area claims, not explicitly the fish and other resources found in these areas, limiting the article’s applicability to this research question. Likewise, Morris notes a rise in the use of coast guards in East and Southeast Asia as “blunt defenders of sovereignty” acting more like traditional navies, specifically through using aggressive use of force techniques on other States’ fishing vessels.[23]
Removing maritime sovereignty as the principal driver, governments’ reactions to dwindling fish stocks offer another potential explanation as to Australia’s actions. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has warned the global level of overfished or maximally fished stocks has continued to increase since 1974, leaving only 64 percent of the world’s fish stocks at a biologically sustainable level.[24] In reaction to dwindling marine and terrestrial wildlife populations, Duffy et. al. describe a rise in “more forceful or armed forces of conservation” and the “development and application of military style approaches” against poaching as the militarization of conservation.[25] These approaches are “becoming institutionalized and normalized in a growing number of places,” as proponents view “use of more forceful approaches can reduce poaching leading to growing wildlife numbers” and are “the only effective solution in an urgent situation.”[26] Ultimately, the authors argue that policymakers have rushed to incorporate these militarized strategies without considering potential consequences and long-term implications.
Information Operations Theory
Securitization theory by itself, however, does not explain Australia’s actions, as the country first deployed its burn boat policy decades prior. Rather, the change under examination is the Australian government’s recent decision to openly discuss the existence of this policy with the media and include evidence of fishing vessel destruction in press releases. While one might look to the literature on crime prevention publicity campaigns based on criminal deterrence theory to explain Australia’s actions, this approach is insufficient in explaining recent observations in global fisheries enforcement actions. In both specific and general deterrence, respective rational past and future criminals refrain from committing criminal acts for fear of apprehension and punishment; however, the “punishment” with which this body of literature refers is the result of a legal prosecution and not a byproduct of a maritime interdiction. [27] Moreover, the maritime organizations States are using to address IUU fishing are not exclusively constabulary organizations. Rather, these coast guards generally fall under Scobell and Hammitt’s definition of paramilitary forces, which “fall between that of the regular police and that of the regular armed forces,” and which Beede notes countries and international organizations have been increasingly relying upon to carry out peacetime missions.[28]
Thus, information operations theory offers a more appropriate perspective to study this phenomenon. Originating with military theorist Sun Tzu’s strategies of winning without fighting, Dunn defines information operations in modern warfare as the “ability to influence the enemy’s information or the attitudes of the civilian population in theaters of conflict” and further claims this military doctrine is a “tool for international politics detached from military battlefield operations” that is “directed at civilian targets at the physical, psychological, and virtual levels.”[29] Military doctrinal analyses often explore information operations in contrast to other post-Cold War instruments of national power such as through the acronymic DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) model.[30 Available literature on asymmetric and irregular warfare suggests State and non-state forces that are weaker militarily or economically often prioritize use of information to achieve their political goals.[31]
Under the overarching concept of securitization of fisheries enforcement, Australia’s decision to release dramatic pictures and publish stern warnings indicate a concerted effort to influence the information environment. Thus, their actions and associated press releases may be part of a strategic communications campaign, or information operation, meant to deter future Indonesian fishing incursions. Armistead argues that information is an instrument of power that should be used in conjunction with other political, economic, and military actions.[32] Reviewing Australia’s information operations doctrine and practice through two recent case studies in East Timor and Papua New Guinea, Armistead concludes Australia’s approach to information operations has largely been effective, albeit in “fairly unsophisticated, low intensity operational environments.”[33] Moreover, specific to projecting deterrence, Barnett explains that information operations “requires both capability and will,” noting that “will is communicated in a number of ways,” often “by the overt use of the capability.”[34] Quite simply, the ABF’s press releases reflecting burning seized Indonesian-flagged fishing vessels illustrates both their capability and willingness to follow-through.
A Comparative Approach to Understand Divergent Fisheries Enforcement Policies
Based on the available literature, this paper aims to (1) determine whether Australia’s decision to openly advertise its burn boat policy in the media serves as an indication that Australia’s fisheries have been securitized, and (2) under that premise, further explore the Australian government’s strategic decision to use information operations as a preferential instrument of national power to deter IUU fishing. I use a comparative approach to probe this issue by comparing the ABF with the USCG, as the United States does not destroy suspect IUU fishing in the same public manner as Australia. This paper uses a matched-case method to compare the systems, methods, and tools employed by the ABF and USCG.[35] In particular, I compare internal capabilities and external influences on each maritime force to uncover possible explanations as to why the ABF has adopted its burn-boat strategic messaging policy using document analysis of each countries’ government reports including service doctrine, fisheries management descriptions, and IUU fishing strategy documents. Ultimately, I contrast each countries’ overall strategies to combat IUU fishing, understanding that these strategies are likely a product of the identified external and internal factors.
These most-similar cases are appropriate for comparison to address the specific research question. Both Australia and the United States are relatively wealthy democracies and former British colonies considered part of the Global North.[36] Moreover, these are both cases of States using maritime paramilitaries to address IUU fishing in non-territorial sovereignty disputes. Other cases of States using burn-boat policies against foreign flagged fishing vessels located in vicinity of the East or South China Seas may do so not only to protect their fish populations but also to assert authority over a disputed maritime territorial area. Neither Australia nor the United States, however, have any direct territorial claims in this area, which eliminates a potential additional causal factor that would unnecessarily complicate the research question. It is worth noting, though, that both Australia and the United States have allies in the region that do have direct maritime territorial claims, and both countries are geographically located adjacent to the disputed region, albeit separated by the vast bodies of water.
Australian Border Force (ABF)
The ABF was created under the Border Force Act of 2015, combining two existing organizations, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. ABF operates under the Australian Department of Home Affairs, which governs immigration and customs border policy. To address IUU fishing and other civil maritime security issues, ABF formed a joint task force called the Maritime Border Command (MBC). Interestingly, an Australian Defence Force (ADF) rear admiral, a senior officer from Australia’s naval power, leads MBC but is “also a sworn ABF officer.”[37] However, the ABF explicitly does not respond to “conflict, or state-based security threats against Australia in its maritime jurisdiction,” which is the exclusive responsibility of the ADF. Of note, while ABF is charged with enforcing fishing regulations on foreign IUU fishing vessels operating within the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ), which refers to Australia’s combined EEZ and territorial seas, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is the “lead agency for regulating all foreign and Commonwealth managed domestic fishing activities within the AFZ.”[38] The Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA) further describes this arrangement—when a MBC asset encounters a foreign vessel suspected of illegally fishing while conducting surveillance patrols, MBC coordinates with AFMA to respond, typically by “intercepting, boarding, apprehending illegal foreign fishing vessels (FFVs); transporting foreign fishers ashore where they are detained by ABF to facilitate investigation by AFMA; towing or escorting vessels to designated ports where AFMA has disposal sites, or destroying these vessels at sea in accordance with Australian law.”[39]
- Internal—IUU Fishing Enforcement Capabilities
According to the ABF’s public website, the service only has two of its own cutters and makes use of ADF’s additional eight patrol boats.[39] While the Australian Border Force Cutter (ABFC) Ocean Shield is relatively large at 330-ft long with a reported range of approximately 120 nautical miles at 20 knots, the ABFC Thaiyak is much smaller at only 120-ft with a reduced maximum speed of only 12 knots. The ADF’s patrol boats have a much larger range of 4,000 nautical miles, and all eight (in addition to the ABFC Ocean Shield) are equipped with two deck-mounted .50 caliber machine guns that could be used to disable vessels.
- External—Threat of IUU Fishing
According to the FAO, Australia has the third largest EEZ in the world spanning over six million square nautical miles, trailing behind Russia and the United States.[40] Interestingly, despite its large size, Australia does not even make the list of the top 64 countries in the world for annual fish capture production.[41] Total capture production of fish, crustaceans, and mollusks in 2013 was approximately 150 thousand tons, while about 75 thousand tons (one third of the total) were produced not by conventional fishing, but aquaculture. According to the organization’s 2022 report, the annual total value of commercial landings under the AFMA’s jurisdiction (excluding state and territorial waters) was roughly 260 million US dollars (400 million AUS dollars).[42] In total, Australia’s main species for export include rock lobster (Panulirus cygnus), southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii), abalone (Family Haliotis), scallops (Pecten fumatus), shrimps (Paratya australiensis), and prawns (Family Penaeus) . The value of fishery imports and exports were roughly the same in 2014, with imports valued at 1.7 billion US dollars and exports valued at 1.1 billion.[43] In 2011, there were just over two thousand fishing vessels working in the fishing industry. Recreational fishing, however, contributed more to the Australian economy than commercial capture and aquaculture production combined—in 2013, recreational fishing represented 2.5 billion Australian dollars while commercial fishing represented 2.4 billon.
Based on the literature and ABF press releases from the past few years, it appears that the Australian government is most concerned with Indonesian-flagged vessels illegally fishing in Australia’s northern waters where Australia’s EEZ is directly adjacent to Indonesia’s EEZ. According to a joint ABF-ADF press release, MBC reportedly interdicted 85 vessels (12 of which were subsequently destroyed) illegally fishing in Australia’s EEZ for species including trepang or sea cucumber (Holothuria scabra) and various species of shark and fin fish in Australia’s 2021 fiscal year.[44] In the first half of fiscal year 2022, however, the number of interdicted foreign fishing vessels (29 of which have been destroyed) had risen to 231, predominantly in a national protected marine park off the coast of northwestern Australia called Rowley Shoals [45]. State authorities in Western Australia have expressed concerns over the impact on charter boat tourism. Specifically, representatives from the local tourism industry are worried about Indonesian fishers “netting, walking on the reefs, collecting trepang, harvesting shark” and “taking the giant clams, which take years and years to grow.”[46]
To address these issues, the Indonesian Coast Guard (BAKAMLA) and the Indonesian Directorate General of Surveillance for Marine and Fisheries Resources (PSDKP) agreed to work with the ABF in 2018 to periodically conduct a series of joint patrols along the Indonesian-Australian maritime border to deter illegal fishing.[47] In November 2021, the Indonesian government threatened to suspend these joint operations after the Australian government ordered the destruction of three Indonesian-flagged fishing vessels caught illegally fishing off Rowley Shoals; however, the countries appeared to come to a détente after the Australian government announced it would donate over 7.5 million coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccine doses to Indonesia.[48]
US Coast Guard (USCG)
Similar to the ABF, the USCG was formed through the combination of the Revenue Cutter Service, which was first created in 1790, with the U.S. Lifesaving Service in 1915 and the Lighthouse Service in 1939. Currently under the Department of Homeland Security, the USCG falls under the U.S. Navy in times of war. However, the service is “simultaneously and at all times a military force and federal law enforcement agency dedicated to maritime safety, security, and stewardship missions.”[49] Much like ABF’s relationship with the AFMA, the USCG is the enforcement arm for IUU fishing violators, while NOAA serves the as lead agency to manage fisheries in the United States.
- Internal— IUU Fishing Enforcement Capabilities
In contrast to the Australian Border Force, as of October 2023, the USCG reportedly has 174 cutters that could serve as likely platforms for fisheries enforcement, consisting of 9 National Security Cutters; 22 Medium Endurance Cutters; 53 Fast Response Cutters; and 90 Patrol Boats.[50] Additionally, the USCG has a large fleet of approximately 1,700 small boats ranging in lengths less than 65 feet for use in near shore maritime enforcement operations. USCG cutters range from 418 to 110 ft long and are considerably better armed than Australia’s vessels. For instance, in addition to four .50-caliber machine guns, the National Security Cutters are equipped with Mk. 110 57 mm gun (also used on US Naval littoral combat ships); Phalanx 20 mm close-in weapon system; and Mk. 53 decoy launching system (NULKA).[51] Even the Medium Endurance Cutters, which are comparable in size to ADF’s patrol boats, are equipped with one Mk. 75 76 mm gun and two SRBOC (Super Rapid Bloom Offboard Countermeasures Chaff and Decoy) launchers in addition to their two .50-caliber machine guns. While the US EEZ is slightly larger than that of Australia, the USCG has over 15 times the number of available maritime platforms to patrol it in contrast to ABF.
- External—Threat of IUU Fishing
With the largest EEZ in the world at just over eight million square nautical miles, the United States’ total annual capture of fish has hovered around 5 million tons, consisting predominantly of Alaska pollock (Gadus chalcogrammus), caught in the Pacific, and Gulf menhaden (Brevoortia patronus) caught in the Atlantic Ocean for the past several years.[52] According to NOAA, the total value of commercial landings for 2020 was just over 4.8 billion US dollars, which is substantial larger than that of Australia.[53] In contrast, US aquaculture production is a much smaller percentage of total fish production when comparted to Australia—annual aquaculture production has remained around 400 thousand tons for the past decade, which represents a fraction of the total. Unlike Australia in which fishery imports and exports are roughly the same, in the United States the majority of seafood consumed is derived from imports. In 2017, the USA was the leading importer of fish products, with imports valued over 21 billion US dollars and the fifth major exporter, with exports valued over 6 billion dollars. Finally, the number of US commercial fishing vessels licensed to operate in the country’s EEZ is approximately an order of magnitude higher than that of Australia at just over 25 thousand in 2019.
Similar to Australia, the United States’ primary concern with respect to foreign vessels illegally fishing in the US EEZ is with a neighboring country—Mexican fishing lanchas in the Gulf of America (also known as the Gulf of Mexico) where US and Mexican EEZs meet. According to NOAA’s 2023 Report to Congress on Improving International Fisheries Management, the USCG interdicted a total of 321 lanchas from 2020 to 2022, the annual number of which has steadily increased over at least the past five years.[54] The 2021 report states that many detained fishers were repeat offenders, some of whom had been detained more than 25 times.[55]In particular, USCG officers accuse Mexican fishers of using gill nets to illegally harvest red snapper (Lutjanus campechanus) in US waters off the coast of Texas, incidentally in the vicinity of the Padre Island National Seashore, a protected 66-mile barrier island national park, not unlike the situation in Western Australia.[56]USCG and Texas state game wardens have recovered these illegal gill nets, which can span up to three miles long, and found multiple dead protected species including sharks, sea turtles, and dolphins.
As of February 2022, NOAA responded to these increasing incidents and repeat offenders by declaring port restrictions on all Mexican vessels that fish in the Gulf of America.[57] Furthermore, despite noting an increase in Mexico’s prosecutions and implementation of fines on Mexican fishers found guilty of illegally fishing in US waters, NOAA cited concerns over the four million kilograms of fresh and frozen snapper (worth over 33 million US dollars) the United States imported from Mexico in 2018, which may have included illegally harvested fish from US waters. Additionally, unlike Australia’s agreement with Indonesia to conduct joint fishery enforcement patrols along the Indonesian-Australian maritime border, the USCG and Mexican Navy (SEMAR) have yet to conduct joint fisheries patrols in the Gulf of America.
Discussion
To better understand the ABF’s choice to feature its burn-boat policy in strategic communications, we must first satisfy the necessary condition as to whether Australia has securitized its fisheries. Using van Munster’s criteria for securitization, respective strategy documents for both Australia and the United States seem to indicate that IUU fishing poses an “existential threat” to global economic and food security—Australia’s 2014 Second National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishingaccuses the practice of risking “millions of dollars of investment and thousands of jobs” and causing “serious environmental impacts” for Australian fishing communities, while the US National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing for 2022-2026 claims the practice “threatens ocean ecosystems and sustainable fisheries” in addition to jeopardizing “critical” natural resources. [58] From an economic standpoint, IUU fishing negatively impacts both countries, albeit in different ways. In contrast to the United States, which imports proportionally more seafood than it exports, Australia’s seafood trade is balanced, meaning that IUU fishing could hurt the value of Australia’s exports. The overall value of commercial wild capture fisheries in the United States, however, is much larger than that of Australia, which IUU fishing compromises. Moreover, the vast number of commercial fishers in the United States, in comparison to Australia, are better poised to launch complaints over the negative effects of IUU fishing to their government representatives.
The second necessary condition that affords organizations the ability to take “extraordinary countermeasures” to address the threat is where the two countries’ attitudes seem to diverge with subsequent strategies. While the ABF’s 2020 GAMSA explicitly discusses the ABF and AFMA’s coordinated efforts to destroy IUU fishing vessels “at sea in accordance with Australian law” to protect Australia’s northern waters from “foreign operators” whose “destructive fishing practices or pollution” threaten fish stocks, the marine environment, and the “livelihoods of Australians through the potential introduction of biosecurity risks,” such disposition instructions are notably absent from the USCG’s 2020 Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook and 2021 Implementation Plan [59].
The final required securitization criterium, as per van Munster, of convincing a population this “rule-breaking behavior” is “justified” requires more analysis regarding which population or populations. Contrasting the potential threats IUU fishing pose to local fish populations and maritime economies for Australia and the United States, it appears the target population for justifying the ABF’s behavior is not just the potential Indonesian fishers, but also the Australian population. Australia and the United States have both reacted to recent IUU fishing incidents in very different ways. As previously noted, the specific kind of economic damage inflicted by illegal fishing in each country’s waters differs. For Australia, recreational fishing and tourism play a larger role than commercial fishing, especially in the Rowley Shoals area. In fact, a recent Australian state media report alleged that Western Australian residents felt ABF law enforcement efforts in November 2021 were “too slow and only came after commercial fishers and charter operators approached the media” about the increasing illegal fishing incidents, which prompted the MBC commander to formally state he was “disappointed” that citizens believed the “response time to the increasing activity at the Rowley Shoals was slow” and that “sometimes, just by virtue of geography, it takes some time to move a ship from one point around the coast to another.”[60] It is entirely possible that the ABF now favors including pictures of burning illegal suspect vessels in their press releases to visually reassure the Australian public that ABF is actively doing something to prevent IUU fishing incidents. For the United States, illegally harvesting red snapper predominantly hurts commercial fishing, and to my knowledge, the US public has not questioned the speed or voracity of the USCG’s responses to IUU fishing.
Having met the necessary conditions suggesting Australia’s fisheries are securitized, I will now explore potential reasons why the Australian government decided to include its burn-boat policy in strategic messaging against IUU fishing. One possible explanation is policy transfer—Australia considered including graphic imagery of burning boats in ABF press releases after seeing the success Indonesia experienced in doing so. While the Indonesian government officially ended its burn-boat policy in 2019, the policy was reportedly “domestically popular.”[61] In addition to policy transfer is the idea of reciprocity—Indonesia started exercising a burn-boat publicity policy, so Australia may have responded accordingly. Both Australia and Indonesia are experiencing the negative effects of IUU fishing orchestrated by foreign vessels (Indonesian vessels illegally fishing in Australian waters and Vietnamese and Chinese vessels illegally fishing in Indonesian waters), and both nations have adopted the aggressive burn-boat policy against offenders. In contrast, while the United States is experiencing EEZ incursions from Mexican lanchas, to my knowledge Mexico has largely been spared from the foreign fishing fleet incursions. Hence, the United States and Mexico lack the underlying conditions for a similar reciprocal policy transfer.
As discussed, the literature suggests States and non-State actors often prioritize information over other forms of power when they are weaker militarily or economically. The ABF, then, may be highlighting its burn-boat policy due to its smaller size and limited capabilities. In incorporating the burn-boat policy in information operations, the Australian government likely hopes foreign fishers will see the cost of losing their ship as greater than the benefit of illegally fishing in Australian waters. In comparison to the USCG, the ABF projects a much less intimidating picture in terms of sheer number of ships and armament. This could help explain why ABF chooses to use alternative “deterrence” actions at their disposal such as burning and destroying IUU fishing vessels.
In contrast, while Indonesian fishers may very well fear the cost of losing their vessel, Mexican fishers may not. According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Gulf Cartel has been using Mexican fishing lanchas to smuggle cocaine and other illicit drugs across the US-Mexico maritime border for years, suspecting the cartel also takes a proportion of the illicit snapper trade. If true, the Gulf Cartel more than likely supplies replacement boats to Mexican fishers who have had theirs confiscated and destroyed by the USCG.[62]Moreover, as recent research out of the Brooking Institute suggests, over the past several years organized criminal groups have “sought to monopolize both legal and illegal fisheries along the entire vertical supply chain” in Mexico, including in the Tamaulipas and Quintana Roo regions within the Gulf of America.[63]Mexican fishers may very well fear the repercussions of failing to obey Gulf Cartel leadership more than any penalty the USCG can lawfully wield, including the loss of their fishing vessels.
Policy Considerations: Information Operations for Fisheries Enforcement
Most importantly, however, is the question of efficacy—how has Australia’s burn-boat strategic messaging policy directly affected IUU fishing in its EEZ? Military decisionmakers have long struggled with evaluating efficacy of information operations; however, if the Australian government were willing, sharing information with larger audiences including academia and international partners could help the global community better understand the role of strategic messaging in addressing IUU fishing. Of note, Australia appears to be balancing the ABF’s negative press releases heeding warnings and featuring graphic imagery of burning boats with AFMA’s positive press releases. In addition to lauding success through in recent joint maritime operations with Indonesia, the Australian government has launched a public information campaign in collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries targeting Indonesian fishers to educate them about the consequences of illegal fishing. [64] Additionally, AFMA provides detailed information explaining pertinent rules when fishing in Australian waters, including an informative video, in Bahasa Indonesian.[65]
In contrast, there is a decided lack of evidence the United States is engaged in any kind of information operation, either one intended to deter or educate, targeting Mexican fishers illegally fishing in the US waters of the Gulf of America. For instance, neither the USCG’s publicly available 2020 IUU Fishing Strategic Outlooknor its companion Implementation Plan even mention Mexico, despite the fact that the Interagency Working Group identified “Gulf of Mexico IUU Fishing” as one of five priorities under the Maritime SAFE Act.[66]Similarly, the White House’s 2022 Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses simply states the government’s desire to collaborate with Mexico to “prohibit the importation of goods, including seafood, produced in whole or in part by forced labor,” without drawing attention to the direct threat Mexican fishers’ pose to US fisheries.[67] Even if IUU fishing from Mexico is lower priority than other matter related to maritime security, the USCG could learn from ABF in using information operations to influence Mexican fishers in the future. In this “new era in which information is now the most fungible of powers,” as Armistead aptly points out, creating a coordinated information operation may prove to be a vital “force multiplier” not only in the USCG’s efforts to reduce Mexican fisher EEZ incursions but also in the fight against global IUU fishing.[68]
More research focused on fisher perceptions, however, is necessary to determine how threats of destroying vessels may ultimately change their behavior. While Australia and others likely hope that the burn-boat strategic messaging policy will deter IUU fishing, these messaging efforts could lead to increasing non-compliance during fisheries enforcement inspections if fishers fear the loss of their boats so much that they react violently. Over the past decade, there has been several instances of non-compliant altercations between IUU fishing vessels and coastal States’ maritime forces resulting in death and damage or destruction of civilian fishing vessels. For instance, in 2016, Argentina’s coast guard open fired upon and sank a Chinese-flagged fishing vessel, which “performed maneuvers designed to force a collision with the coast guard, putting at risk not only its own crew but coast guard personnel,” upon which the coast guard deployed disabling fire.[69] In 2021, five Indian fishers were reportedly killed in altercations with the Sri Lankan Navy, which has been enforcing the country’s fishery regulations by destroying fishing gear, charging at vessels, and firing shots.[70]Negative strategic messaging campaigns could inadvertently contribute to similar unanticipated consequences.
Conclusion
If other nations see Australia’s burn-boat strategic messaging policy as an effective tool in preventing IUU fishing, we may see other nations adopt this policy in the future. This cursory study elicits many follow-on questions regarding differences in coastal States maritime enforcement branches and respective use of force policies. For instance, in contrast to Australia, why does the United States have such as large, well-armed coast guard? Arguably, the USCG has been integrally involved in “fighting” the “war on drugs” for over 30 years, whereas Australia has only recently been experiencing issues with maritime cocaine smuggling.[71]Further research should be conducted on the influence of the “war on drugs” in increasing nations’ maritime law enforcement capabilities and how that might, in turn, further influence nations’ approaches to “combatting” other issues such as IUU fishing. Along those same lines, it may prove valuable to study heterogeneity amongst coastal States’ threats (and perception of threats) to maritime security. Naturally, States that confront multiple competing maritime threats, including piracy and other maritime crime, irregular maritime migration, marine pollution and illegal dumping, in addition to IUU fishing and illegal drug smuggling; must face hard decisions on how best to prioritize these maritime governance issues and allocate limited resources. The United States’ perception of IUU fishing perpetuated by Mexican fishers could very well be low in comparison to other maritime threats to the country.
Endnotes
The views expressed herein are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, or any other US Government agency.
[1] “Australian Border Force targeting illegal foreign fishing in Australia’s Northern waters,” 2021, https://www.abf.gov.au/newsroom-subsite/Pages/targeting-illegal-foreign-fishing-8-11-21.aspx#.
[2] Brian Wilson, “Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement.” Stanford Journal of International Law. Vol. 52, no. 2,July 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820578.
[3] Michael Tennesen, “Blowing Up Illegal Fishing Boats Helps Indonesian Fishers,” 2018, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/blowing-up-illegal-fishing-boats-helps-indonesian-fishers/.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Reniel B. Cabral, Juan Mayorga, Clemence Michaela, John Lynham, Koeshendrajana Sonny, Muawanah Umi, Nugroho Duto, Anna Zuzy, Mira, Ghofar Abdul, Zulbainarni Nimmi, Steven D. Gaines, and Christopher Costello, “Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing,” Nature Ecology & Evolution. Vol. 2, no. 4: pp. 650–658. April 2018, http://doi.org/10.1038/s41559-018-0499-1; Nadirah H. Rodzi, “Malaysia turns up the heat, sets foreign boats ablaze for illegal fishing.” Straits Times. 30 August 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-turns-up-the-heat-sets-foreign-boats-ablaze-for-illegal-fishing.
[6] Natasha Stacey, “Australian Maritime Expansion.” Chapter in Boats to Burn. Canberra: ANU Press, 2007, pp. 83–11.
[7] Rachel Baird, “Australia’s Response to Illegal Foreign Fishing: A Case of winning the Battle but losing the Law?,” International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law. Vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 95–124: 2008, http://doi.org/10.1163/092735208X272292 .
[8] Op. cit., Wilson at Note 2.
[9] “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” 1982,https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf .
[10] Op. cit., Wilson at Note 2.
[11] “Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC),” 2015, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion_published/2015_21-advop-E.pdf .
[12] Gail Lugten, “Big Fish To Fry—International Law and Deterrence of the Toothfish Pirates,” Current Issues in Criminal Justice. Vol.16, no. 3, pp. 307–321: 2005, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10345329.2005.12036327
[13] Ibid.
[14] Rachel Baird, “Australia’s Response to Illegal Foreign Fishing: A Case of winning the Battle but losing the Law?” International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 95–124, 2008, http://doi.org/10.1163/092735208X272292 .
[15] Ibid.
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[17] Jonathan Kelman, “Why Climate Change and State Subsidies Will Collide to Create Fishery Conflict.” Journal of Strategic Security. Vol. 13, no. 4. 2020, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1869; Richard J. Kilroy, “Securitization” in Anthiony J. Masys, Ed., Handbook of Security Science, pp. 1–19. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018.
[18] Barry Buzan, Ole Wver, and Jaap De. Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
[19] Op. cit., Kilroy, “Securitization”, at Note 17; Ibid.
[20] Rens van Munster, “Securitization.”, in International Relations, Oxford Billiographies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
[21] Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Clashes at Sea: Explaining the Onset, Militarization, and Resolution of Diplomatic Maritime Claims.” Security Studies. Vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 637–670: 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811458.
[22] Lyle Morris, “Blunt Defenders of Sovereignty–The Rise of Coast Guards in East and Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review. Vol. 70, no. 2, 2018, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/5.
[23] “The status of fishery resources.” The State of the World Fisheries and Agriculture 2022, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2022, https://www.fao.org/3/cc0461en/online/sofia/2022/status-of-fishery-resources.html.
[24] Rosaleen Duffy, Francis Massé, Emile Smidt, Esther Marijnen, Bram Büscher, Judith Verweijen, Maano Ramutsindela, Trishant Simlai, Laure Joanny, and Elizabeth Lunstrum, “Why we must question the militarisation of conservation,” Biological Conservation. Vol. 232, pp. 66–73: 2019, http://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2019.01.013
[25] Ibid.
[26] Thomas A. Loughran, Douglas B. Weiss, and Ray Paternoster, “Deterrence” in Alex R. Piquero, Ed., The Handbook of Criminological Theory, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015; Scott H. Decker, “Advertising Against Crime: The Potential Impact of Publicity in Crime Prevention.” Criminology & Public Policy. Vol. 2, no. 3: pp. 525–530, 2003, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2003.tb00012.x.
[27] Andrew Scobell and Brad Hammitt, “Goons, Gunmen, and Gendarmerie: Toward a Reconceptualization of Paramilitary Formation.” Journal of Political & Military Sociology. Vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 213–227: 1998;Benjamin R. Beede, “The Roles of Paramilitary and Militarized Police,” Journal of Political & Military Sociology, vol. 36, no. 1: pp. 53–63, 2008, https://www.jstor.org/stable/45294198.
[28] Sun Tzu (trans. And Introduction Ralph D. Sawyer), The Art of War, New York: Basic Books, 1994: Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Information Operations: Trends and Controversies”,in Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Vol. 3, no. 34: May 2008, p. 3, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/55474/css_analysen_nr34-0508_e.pdf; Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, “Introduction: Information, Power, and Security: An Outline of Debates and Implications” in Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Victor Mauer, and Salfelicia Krishna-Hensel, Eds., Power and Security in the Information Age, pp. 1–18. London: Routledge, 2007.
[29] Robert David Steele, “Information operations: putting the ‘I’ back into DIME.” Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2006, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA444640.pdf.
[30] Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “Contemporary Asymmetric Conflict Theory in Historical Perspective.” Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 635–657: 2012, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700624; Max G. Manwaring, The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012; Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2009; David Kilcullen, “Irregular and Unconventional Warfare”, in Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare, Artur Gruszczak and Sebastian Kaempf, Eds.. London: Routledge, 2023.
[31] E. Leigh Armistead, Ed., Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Roger W. Barnett, “Information Operations, Deterrence, and the Use of Force.” Naval War College Review. Vol. 51, no. 2: pp. 7–19, 1998, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44638135.
[34] George M. Guess and Thomas Husted, International Public Policy Analysis, New York: Routledge, 2017.
[35] Heike M. Grimm, Ed. Public Policy Research in the Global South: A Cross-Country Perspective. Cham: Springer Nature, 2018.
[36] “Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements.” Australian Border Force. September 2020, https://www.abf.gov.au/what-we-do-subsite/files/gamsa-2020.pdf .
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] “Maritime Border Command: Our vessels.” Australian Border Force. 2022, https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/maritime/patrol-vessels.
[40] “FAO Yearbook. Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics 2018/FAO annuaire. Statistiques des pêches et de l’aquaculture 2018/FAO anuario. Estadísticas de pesca y acuicultura 2018.” Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2020, https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/c295e44f-0d66-4d6a-9ae4-4a65d81943d8.
[41] Ibid.
[42] “Australian fisheries economic indicators.” Australian Government. 2023, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/research-topics/fisheries/fisheries-economics/fisheries-economic-indicators.
[43] Op. cit., “The status of fishery resources,” at Note 23.
[44] “Australian Border Force targeting illegal foreign fishing in Australia’s Northern waters,” 2021, https://www.abf.gov.au/newsroom-subsite/Pages/targeting-illegal-foreign-fishing-8-11-21.aspx# .
[45] Erin Parke, “Piracy and illegal fishing concerns grow as foreign boats return to marine park.” ABC News. 18 December 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-12-18/illegal-fishing-by-indonesian-boats-in-australian-waters/100709288 .
[46] Ibid.
[47] “Australian Border Force targeting illegal foreign fishing in Australia’s Northern waters.” Australian Border Force. 8 November 2021, https://www.abf.gov.au/newsroom-subsite/Pages/targeting-illegal-foreign-fishing-8-11-21.aspx#.
[48] Karuni Rompies and Chris Barrett, “Indonesia backs down in row with Australia over torched fishing boats.” Sydney Morning Herald.10 Noivember 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/indonesia-backs-down-in-row-with-australia-over-torched-fishing-boats-20211110-p597t0.html.
[49] “U.S. Coast Guard History.” United States Coast Guard. N.D., https://www.history.uscg.mil/home/history-program/ .
[50] ,“Acquisition Directorate {Delivery Map, 2023].” United States Coast Guard. N.D. https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Delivery-Map/
[51] “The Cutters, Boats, and Aircraft of the U.S. Coast Guard.” United States Coast Guard. 2015–2016, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/CG_Cutters-Boats-Aircraft_2015-2016_edition.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-092150-230.
[52] “Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles–United States of America.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2019, https://www.fao.org/fishery/en/facp/usa?lang=en .
[53] “Fisheries of the United States.” NOAA Fisheries, (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) 2022, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/sustainable-fisheries/fisheries-united-states.
[54] “2023 Report to Congress: Improving International Fisheries Management.” NOAA Fisheries, (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) 2023, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/s3/2023-08/2023RTC-ImprovingIFManagement.pdf.
[55] “2021 Report to Congress: Improving International Fisheries Management.” NOAA Fisheries, (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) 2021, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/feature-story/noaa-issues-2021-report-global-iuu-fishing-and-bycatch-protected-marine-life-resources.
[56] John Burnett, “A Battle On The Gulf Pits The Coast Guard Against Mexican Red Snapper Poachers,” 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/07/18/1014782927/gulf-coast-guard-mexican-red-snapper-poachers.
[57] Op. cit., NOAA Fisheries, 2023 at Note 54..
[58] “Australia’s Second National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Australian Department of Agriculture. 2014, https://www.awe.gov.au/agriculture-land/fisheries/iuu/plans-of-action/plans; US Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, “National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 2022–2026.” NOAA Fisheries,(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) 2023, https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/international-affairs/us-interagency-working-group-iuu-fishing.
[59] “Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements: GAMSA.” Australian Border Force. September 2020, https://www.abf.gov.au/what-we-do-subsite/files/gamsa-2020.pdf; “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook.” United States Coast Guard. 2020,https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_2020_FINAL.pdf; “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan.” United States Coast Guard. 2021, https://www.uscg.mil/iuufishing/.
[60] Erin Parke and Ben Collins, “Boats Burnt, Seafood Seized in Crackdown on Illegal Foreign Fishing in Australian Waters.” ABC News. 7 November 2021, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-08/illegal-fishing-vessels-destroyed-seafood-seized/100597184 .
[61] “Australia is Sinking Indonesian Poachers’ Boats to Deter Illegal Fishing,” Maritime Executive. 23 October 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/australia-is-sinking-indonesian-poachers-boats-to-deter-illegal-fishing.
[62] John Burnett, “A Battle On The Gulf Pits The Coast Guard Against Mexican Red Snapper Poachers.” NPR. 12 August 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/07/18/1014782927/gulf-coast-guard-mexican-red-snapper-poachers.
[63] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China-linked Wildlife Poaching and Trafficking in Mexico.” Brookings Institute. March 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/china-linked-wildlife-poaching-and-trafficking-in-mexico/.
[64] “Indonesia and Australia conduct joint maritime cooperation, Operation Gannet 5.” Australian Fisheries Management Authority. 21 May 2021, https://www.afma.gov.au/news/indonesia-and-australia-conduct-joint-maritime-cooperation-operation-gannet-5; “Public Information Campaign–Rote, Indonesia,” 2022, https://www.afma.gov.au/news/public-information-campaign-rote-indonesia; “Australia-Indonesia partnership shares dangers of illegal fishing,\.” 11 July 2023, https://www.afma.gov.au/news/australia-indonesia-partnership-shares-dangers-illegal-fishing.
[65] The Australia-Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Operations of Indonesian Traditional Fishermen in Areas of the Australian Fishing Zone and Continental Shelf– 974 permits Indonesian fishers to legally fish in Australian waters in an area known as the “MoU Box” using strictly traditional methods; “Traditional Indonesian fishing in the MoU Box.” Australian Fisheries Management Authority. 21 May 2023, https://www.afma.gov.au/international-fisheries-management/enforcement-operations/traditional-indonesian-fishing-mou-box.
[66] The Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act of December 2019 (Maritime SAFE Act) directed 21 federal agencies to establish an Interagency Working Group on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing to serve as the central forum to coordinate and strengthen their efforts to counter IUU fishing and related threats to maritime security; US Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing “National 5-Year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing 2022-2026.” US Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing. NOAA Fisheries, (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) 2023, https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2022-10/2022_NationalStrategyReport_USIWGonIUUfishing.pdf; “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook.” United States Coast Guard. September 2020, https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_2020_FINAL.pdf; “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan,” 2021, https://www.uscg.mil/iuufishing/.
[67] “Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses.” The White House. 27 June 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/06/27/memorandum-on-combating-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-associated-labor-abuses/.
[68] Leigh Armistead, Ed., Information Operations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Power, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2004.
[69] “Argentina sinks Chinese fishing boat Lu Yan Yuan Yu 010.” BBC World News. 16 March 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35815444.
[70] Helen Weiffering, “Fights over illegal fishing lead to armed conflict, deaths,” Associated Press via Pulitzer Center. 31 March 2022, https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/fights-over-illegal-fishing-lead-armed-conflict-deaths.
[71] Carolina Sampó and Valeska Troncoso, “Cocaine trafficking from non-traditional ports: examining the cases of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay.” Trends in Organized Crime. Vol 26: pp. 235–257, Septemnber 2023, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-021-09441-y.
