From Ambiguity to Flexibility: Reframing U.S. Taiwan Policy
Strategic ambiguity has become a liability for U.S. policymakers. Though merely an informal shorthand, it is commonly treated as official policy in media and among national security professionals. This framing reduces U.S. decision-making to a false binary between war and inaction, obscuring a spectrum of options and overlooking legal commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. With Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth warning that Chinese aggression could be “imminent,” Washington should recalibrate perceptions of U.S. Taiwan policy to strengthen deterrence and make its commitments and options unmistakably clear to Beijing and Taipei.
Rather than abandoning strategic ambiguity outright, U.S. officials should steer discourse toward flexibility as a defining feature of U.S. Taiwan policy. Flexibility avoids the binary trap by rejecting both indifference and rigid clarity. Instead, it rests on the presumption that the United States will respond to Chinese aggression, while preserving discretion over how — emphasizing optionality to employ varied and scalable instruments of power, with or without military force. Crucially, this narrative shift requires no change in policy or disavowal of strategic ambiguity. It simply reframes how existing policy is communicated and understood, offering a more credible and adaptable approach to managing the growing risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Reassessing the Role of Strategic Ambiguity
Though often linked to the U.S. One China Policy, the term strategic ambiguity does not appear in the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, the Six Assurances, or any other law, regulation, or formal policy directive. It emerged as an informal concept in the mid-1990s when Joseph Nye, then Assistant Secretary of Defense, used the term in Congressional testimony and subsequent interviews. Pressed by Chinese officials during a visit to Beijing, Nye told his hosts, “We don’t know what we would do, because it’s going to depend on the circumstances, and you don’t know what we would do.” Former Secretary of Defense William Perry later said Nye’s comments “perfectly” captured U.S. policy.
Nye’s framing reflected the geopolitical realities of the time. Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, was dismantling martial law-era structures and promoting democratic reforms, culminating in Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996. Sensing its leverage waning, Beijing launched missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, triggering the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. As Nye later explained, strategic ambiguity served a dual deterrent function in this period: to discourage Taipei from “pressing the envelope of independence” and to signal to Beijing that “any unprovoked attack in the Taiwan Strait would have very grave consequences.”
But what began in the mid-1990s as a flexible heuristic has since ossified into orthodoxy in U.S. Taiwan policy discourse. Commentators have reacted with alarm to perceived deviations, from President Bush’s 2001 “whatever it takes” remark to President Biden’s repeated pledges to defend Taiwan. In such moments, the mistaken belief that U.S. leaders abandoned a fixed tenet of U.S. policy has inadvertently reinforced Beijing’s narrative that Washington is shifting toward support for Taiwan independence, providing rhetorical cover for Chinese escalation. Yet while these statements draw scrutiny for seeming too committal, there are no clear examples of U.S. leaders explicitly stating that the United States would not defend Taiwan. This asymmetry underscores the distortion that ambiguity introduces — inviting speculation at both ends of the spectrum without offering reliable insight into actual policy.
Today, strategic ambiguity has become a flashpoint for policy debate. Some argue for strategic clarity; others advocate retrenchment. Either way, the growing threat to Taiwan demands a clear-eyed reassessment of strategic ambiguity for what it is: an informal shorthand, not formal policy. Like any heuristic, it remains open to recalibration. Just as it was conceived in the mid-1990s to fit the geopolitical moment, it should now be reframed to reinforce deterrence while emphasizing flexibility. Indeed, China’s growing assertiveness suggests that the dual deterrent logic described by Nye no longer carries the same strategic coherence — at least not for Beijing. Left unexamined, entrenched perceptions of strategic ambiguity risk emboldening Chinese escalation and blunting the credibility of statements like Secretary Hegseth’s warning that Chinese aggression would result in “devasting consequences.”
SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE – MAY 31: U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth speaks in the first plenary session entitled “United States’ New Ambitions for Indo-Pacific Security” during the 22nd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue at the Shangri-La Hotel on May 31, 2025 in Singapore. Organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the annual conference brings together senior defense officials to debate and discuss current and pressing global and regional security challenges. (Photo by Yong Teck Lim/Getty Images)
Breaking The Binary Trap
Debate on strategic ambiguity frequently traps U.S. decision-making in a false binary: will the United States defend Taiwan or not? This all-or-nothing framing obscures an array of calibrated options short of full-scale war, from cyber operations to sanctions and intelligence sharing. It can also fuel anxiety over two worst-case scenarios: great-power war with China and abandonment of Taiwan to a Chinese takeover. Boxed in by this framing, policymakers, commentators, and observers alike might rush to a premature zero-sum judgment or default to indecision, where strategic ambiguity becomes a convenient escape hatch — a means to defer, rather than define, what is required for credible deterrence.
This binary logic also overlooks key provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act (hereafter, the Act), which effectively rules out passivity as a viable legal option. Notably, the Act requires the United States to maintain the capacity to resist Chinese coercion or aggression and provide Taiwan with arms and services for its self-defense. It also directly links Taiwan’s security to U.S. interests by describing any effort to determine Taiwan’s future by non-peaceful means as “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific” and “of grave concern to the United States.” If these interests are endangered, the Act obligates the President and Congress to determine appropriate action in accordance with constitutional processes — not necessarily military action, but action nonetheless.
While the Act forecloses strategic indifference, it also constrains unqualified strategic clarity. Its requirement for executive-legislative consultation reinforces Congress’s check on presidential powers, underscoring the likely need for a congressional authorization before any protracted commitment of U.S. forces to conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Like U.S. defense treaties, the Act avoids automatic commitments to use force yet still conveys serious obligations (see Table for a comparison between the Act and U.S. treaties with Japan and the Philippines). One of the Act’s principal architects, the late Senator Jacob Javits, described it as “functionally equivalent” to a treaty. In effect, both the Act and U.S. defense treaties enshrine legal commitments while preserving flexibility in how those commitments are fulfilled.
The binary trap diverts attention from the Act’s concrete statutory obligations, centering discourse on whether the United States will or will not intervene militarily to defend Taiwan. Yet as long as the Act remains binding U.S. law, the central question should focus on how the United States may choose to fulfill its commitment to support Taiwan’s defense if China uses force. This reframing aligns with Secretary Hegseth’s recent remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by repositioning discourse to focus on flexibility in response options. It rejects both indecision and unqualified clarity, instead preserving space for tailored responses shaped by the circumstances of a given contingency — responses that may vary widely in scale, scope, and risk, and may or may not involve committing U.S. forces to combat.
Toward Strategic Flexibility
The evolution toward flexibility should begin by correcting the misperception that strategic ambiguity is fixed U.S. policy — narrowing the gap between official commitments and informal narratives to reduce the risk of miscalculation and foster an information ecosystem more conducive to effective U.S. signaling. Rather than openly disavowing strategic ambiguity, which could prompt Chinese escalation, U.S. officials should highlight the clarity of commitments under the U.S. One China Policy, as guided by the Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and Six Assurances. These commitments, reaffirmed across multiple administrations, should be presented as clear and consistent pillars of U.S. policy — anchoring a strategy that deters aggression through credible resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
In parallel, U.S. departments and agencies should institutionalize updated Taiwan policy training across professional education programs. Such training should aim to deepen expertise on the subtleties of U.S. Taiwan policy across the U.S. government. Bilateral and multilateral forums provide key venues to reinforce the message of flexibility, helping reassure partners and prevent discourse from collapsing into the binary trap. To further shape informed views among domestic and international audiences, U.S. leaders should focus strategic communications on the continuity and adaptability of U.S. Taiwan policy.
Ultimately, recalibrating perceptions of U.S. Taiwan policy toward flexibility can restore initiative to U.S. policymakers. Rather than framing U.S. policy around a speculative yes-or-no question about military intervention, flexibility steers debate toward a spectrum of response options informed by context, including the character of Chinese aggression, the degree of allied support, and the broader geopolitical environment. Like Nye’s original articulation of strategic ambiguity, flexibility preserves U.S. discretion, but it also counters contemporary misperceptions by grounding that discretion in longstanding U.S. policy and legal responsibilities — reinforcing deterrence through clarity of commitment, not specificity of action.
Flexibility can also support reassurance — not just deterrence. It signals to Taipei that U.S. support is enduring, but strongest when paired with Taiwan’s continued investment in its own defense. At the same time, it communicates to Beijing that while war is not inevitable, aggression will not go unanswered. Rather than encouraging premature judgments shaped by binary pressures, flexibility promotes forward-looking investment in capabilities, partnerships, and posture.
Crucially, this recalibrated approach aligns with Secretary Hegseth’s recent remarks. Viewed through the lens of flexibility, his statement that Chinese aggression toward Taiwan would bring “devastating consequences” can be seen as part of a broader messaging strategy — one that communicates resolve while preserving adaptability. Flexibility offers the perceptual scaffolding needed to integrate such language into a more credible and coherent deterrent posture.
Conclusion
Strategic ambiguity, long a hallmark of informal U.S. policy discourse, has evolved into a potential constraint for U.S. policymakers. Misperceptions obscure response options, perpetuate a false binary, overlook legal commitments, and complicate signaling at a time when precision and adaptability are paramount. Flexibility offers a more effective framework for understanding and communicating U.S. Taiwan policy — one grounded in law, aligned with U.S. strategic objectives, and better suited to managing the escalating risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The United States should embrace a conceptual recalibration — not by expressly abandoning ambiguity, but by reclaiming flexibility.
(The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policies or positions of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.)
