Russia’s Selling, But Who’s Buying? Analyzing the Characteristics of PMC Clients in Africa

Origin of Research:

This work emerged out of related projects on Russia in Africa and in response to the proliferation of research and writing on Russia’s strategies and motivations in Africa which treat the concerns and motivations of African leaders and actors as tangential—rather than central—to the issue at hand. This project aimed to guide efforts to support Africa-focused policy and initiatives with Africa-focused data and analyses. This research was started in early 2023—before the death of Wagner’s founders and its reorganization into Africa Corps—and the results of the framework correctly indicated the vulnerability of Niger before Russian PMC presence was confirmed. Where possible, the authors have updated the data and analysis based on current events.

Introduction

Over the past several years, Russian state-linked private military companies (PMCs) have established a foothold in the force-for-hire market in Africa. Despite a demonstrated inability to degrade security threats; a litany of egregious human rights violations; and increasing sanctions against their founders, facilitators, and clients, Russian PMCs continue to find customers among conflict-ridden states and authoritarian-leaning leaders. In this report, we provide a preliminary analysis of the factors that might make an African government more amenable to receiving security service from a Russian PMC, like Africa Corps. Using qualitative case studies of 4 countries where Russian PMCs are (or were) confirmed to be active and 2 where they have not, we identify 12 characteristics associated with a state being both attractive and receptive to Russian PMC intervention. We then propose and apply a potential framework for identifying countries that could solicit or accept Russian PMCs in the future.

Russian PMCs operate in concert with the Kremlin and Russian state-owned enterprises to offer security services in exchange for deals in strategic fields like energy, hydrocarbons, and precious metals; military basing options; and bidirectional geopolitical influence and support. There are a handful of Russian PMCs operating in Africa, the most famous of which was the Wagner Group. Wagner gained notoriety for its role in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and its subsequent participation in conflicts in Syria and Libya. Wagner exemplified a Russian PMC that rapidly deployed armed personnel to challenge and influence events on the ground. The Syria deployment was an early example of a Wagner combat mission that was executed in direct coordination with, and received the support of, the Russian military. In Syria, its parastatal force structure and combat capabilities set it apart from other Russian PMCs. In 2018, Wagner made headlines following the assassination of Russian journalists in the Central African Republic (CAR), who were reporting on the group’s activities in that country. From 2018 to 2023, Wagner accumulated a number of additional African clients for its security services, such as Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan.

While Wagner operated as a private company, it functioned as a state proxy, offering the Russian government a veneer of deniability for pursuing its unofficial agenda in Africa. Wagner’s successful accrual of clients in Africa resulted in influence on the continent and wealth for the group, its leaders, and to some extent the Russian state—which has utilized Wagner gains from Africa to fund its war in Ukraine. Wagner also played a pivotal operational role in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which solidified the PMC’s domestic position. But the group’s growing influence—particularly that of founder Yevgeny Prigozhin—became a liability when he began publicly denouncing the Russian Minister of Defense and Army Chief in early and mid-2023. In June 2023, the Ministry of Defense sought to curtail Wagner’s independence by mandating all PMCs sign contracts with the Ministry. Prigozhin refused to acquiesce and led a mutiny against the Russian government on June 23, when several thousand Wagner mercenaries left western Ukraine and took over Rostov-on-Don, in southeastern Russia. From there, a Wagner convoy advanced to within 124 miles of Moscow, before reaching an agreement to end the uprising on June 24.

The terms of the agreement precluded prosecution for Prigozhin, but remanded him to Belarus, although he returned to Russia several days later to meet with military leadership. He was also photographed participating in sideline meetings at the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in late July. Following the mutiny, Wagner fighters in Russia and Ukraine were integrated into National Guard units or otherwise subordinated within official state forces. However, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to assert that Russian security assistance to African partners, including that provided through Wagner, would continue without disruption. On August 22, 2023, Wagner posted a video to Telegram, in which Prigozhin appeared to be in Mali as he announced that Wagner would focus on its activities in Africa, and in so doing make, “Russia even greater on all continents, and Africa even more free.” The following day—exactly 2 months after the mutiny—Prigozhin and his co-founder Dmitry Utkin died in a plane crash in Russia. While there is little confirmed information about the cause of the crash, early U.S. intelligence assessments pointed toward an on-board explosion, with widespread speculation that the Russian state orchestrated the crash.

Following its founders’ deaths, Wagner’s Africa portfolio was brought under the jurisdiction of the Russian Ministry of Defense and renamed the Africa Corps. Despite its recent formalization as an instrument of the Russian state, Africa Corps’ mission remains the same: secure influence and resources—preferably at the expense of Western powers, like France and the United States. There is less research, however, into the demand for these companies and services.

With the ongoing spread and lethality of violent extremism across the continent and both entrenched and emerging sub-state conflicts, the need for effective security assistance to Africa has never been greater. Despite their sales pitch, Russian PMCs’ track record combatting terrorism in Africa is dismal. In fact, they have worsened human security, exacerbated corruption, undermined democratic contests, shored up and accelerated authoritarianism, and subverted traditional multi- and bilateral security assistance. With such destabilizing first and second order effects, identifying where Russian PMCs may establish a foothold next can shape U.S. and other nations’ approaches to supporting African security needs in the near term.

In this report, we provide a preliminary analysis of the factors that might make an African government more receptive to overtures from a Russian PMC, like Africa Corps. Using qualitative case study analysis, we identify 12 characteristics associated with a state being both attractive and receptive to Russian PMC intervention. We then propose and apply a potential framework for identifying countries that could solicit or accept Russian PMCs in the future. Although we recommend the development of a more sophisticated model, our tentative findings suggest that countries exhibiting these characteristics, and therefore falling into an at-risk category, include Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan—many of which have been longtime U.S. partners in security. Russia’s successful leveraging of PMCs and the parallel benefits they offer to woo once-stalwart U.S. partners, such as Niger, to its hybridized model of security support should generate concern and caution, rather than confidence, about other U.S. partnerships in the region.

Demand for Russian PMCs in Africa

The private military and security sector in Africa is diverse, and includes companies based in the United States, UK, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Hong Kong, and Russia. PMCs offering combat and operational support recruit from all over the world, and they deploy in support of foreign governments, as contractors to non-governmental organizations, and as site and personnel protection units for private companies. In Africa, the return of PMCs to combat zones has followed the rise in Islamist-linked insurgencies across the continent. Budgetary and capacity shortfalls have rendered militaries under-resourced and, in some cases, under-prepared to address threats posed by sub-state conflict. For the last two decades, most security cooperation and support has come from Western countries, such as the United States and France. Following political and security failures in recent years, the West is facing pushback on the means and conditions of its security cooperation from African partners. While multilateral bodies, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), have deployed regional forces to some success, formidable security challenges remain. PMCs bridge capability gaps, as, for example, the South-Africa-based STTEP, which deployed successfully in 2015 against Boko Haram in Nigeria. PMCs are potentially quicker to field and more controllable than multilateral forces and have historically been more amenable to payment in kind for cash-strapped governments. But the increased privatization of the security sector has generated risks that new demands for regulation, transparency, and accountability at the United Nations (UN) and the AU are trying to mitigate.

The risks associated with Russian PMCs are specific and acute. Unlike fully privatized security contractors, Russian PMCs operate in close coordination with the state. While Russian PMCs provide security and military training and assistance to client states, they also establish and manage a collection of companies to provide other services for African government clients, such as electioneering and political consultation, information operations, and resource extraction, and to facilitate deals for Russian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in strategic sectors. These exchanges are attractive because the services are designed to enrich vested parties and insulate leaders from domestic and international recourse, by undermining democratic processes and  sanctions. In addition, Russian PMCs can also facilitate broader bilateral relations with Russia, and provide security services without the strings that so often accompany multilateral or Western assistance. The patterns in Russian PMC service provision in Africa indicates that there are specific characteristics that make certain states appealing clients for these PMCs, and vice versa.

We hypothesize that some of the factors that make a country more attractive to Russian PMCs include: the presence of extractive and strategic industries or lootable resources and the possibility for diplomatic alignment. We borrow the term “lootability” from the political-economy literature to characterize countries with high-value commodities with low or few barriers to market entry. For example, alluvial diamonds are more “lootable” than oil. The lootability of a specific country’s resources may also relate to market regulations and corruption. On the demand side, the factors that might increase a government’s receptivity to Russian PMCs include: active conflict or the presence of physical threats, regime insecurity, corruption, and weak or weakening bilateral and multilateral engagements. Russia may seek to prime states to these conditions using information campaigns—in fact, research indicates that Russia is specifically targeting countries receiving U.S., French, or UN security aid with propaganda. States without pressing security needs and where there are high levels of transparency and regulation around extractive and other strategic industries, active civil society, and strong international security partnerships are less likely to seek out PMC support in general—let alone from Russia.

To better identify trends in the characteristics of client states, we analyzed four countries with confirmed Russian PMC presence (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, and Sudan) and two countries without (Botswana and Kenya). We collected data around four factors hypothesized to impact a government’s receptiveness to Russian PMCs: governance, active conflict, resource lootability, and foreign relations, assessed in a simplified, baseline framework relying on 12 indicators (outlined in the table below). We pulled some of these data from existing annual indices, such as those released by the Global Terrorism Index, Freedom House, Transparency International, and Afrobarometer. Other indicators, notably those associated with foreign relations, required targeted open-source research. An overview of these data in relation to our four positive case studies for the year in which they received Russian PMCs is presented below.

Receptive Countries

While each of the receptive country cases is unique, there are some similarities: all are classified as autocratic regimes, rank high on the state fragility index, and are designated as not or partially free in terms of political freedoms and civil liberties. All four countries have extractive industries and rank high in terms of criminality and corruption. Of note, the changes in key indicators over time are also consistent—all four countries have experienced a decrease in democratic indicators over the past 5 years and positive, often significant, increases in mineral rents. All face active internal conflict, with three combatting violent extremist groups, and one engaged in civil war. As their conflicts intensified, Burkina Faso and Mali exited multilateral security bodies and rejected longstanding French and U.S. security assistance. Similarly, Mozambique resisted multilateral interventions and foreign security assistance at the outset of its insurgency, and only allowed a bilateral intervention from Rwanda, followed by a multilateral intervention from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) after multiple PMC contracts failed to improve security. Notably, Mozambique scores higher in terms of democracy and freedom, and lower in lootability—and it is the only contemporary case in Africa where a state terminated its contract with Wagner following the PMC’s poor performance. The Mozambique case may indicate that higher freedom scores and lower lootability provide some resilience against full receptivity toward or dependence upon Russian PMCs.

Our negative test cases, Botswana and Kenya—selected because neither has solicited nor received Russian PMC support, but also because they differ qualitatively from positive cases and from each other—demonstrate varying degrees of resilience (see table below). Botswana has little use for a PMC during peacetime, and it scores high in democracy, freedom, and peace indicators. Kenya ranks higher than our four receptive case countries in democracy and freedom, but lower than Botswana. Kenya also faces an ongoing threat from the Al-Shabaab violent extremist organization internally as well as at and across the border in Somalia. These factors suggest that Kenya may be more vulnerable than Botswana to Russian PMC solicitation, but overall, much less vulnerable than countries with more pronounced shortfalls in democracy, peace, and transparency.

Unreceptive Countries

Discussion

Based upon our analytic framework, we argue that that there are trends in the characteristics of countries that solicit or support Russian PMC interventions. PMCs generally go where the conflict is. But while active conflict or invasive security and political threats are significant drivers of demand for PMCs in Africa, they are not the only factors. Governments facing pressing security threats are more likely to seek out security assistance from a range of sources, and therefore may be more open to the overtures of groups like Wagner, now Africa Corps. Conflict can include civil and substate conflicts, as well as political violence.

Over the last decade, violent extremism has spread across the continent and poses significant threats to human security and political stability. According to the Global Terrorism Index, Sub-Saharan Africa “recorded the most deaths of any region for the seventh consecutive year, with an increase of 21 per cent compared to 2022.” Given the rapid and deadly escalation of VEO activity in the Sahel, the need for military assistance in the region is pronounced. Russian PMCs have rushed to provide this assistance, orchestrating anti-French propaganda campaigns to hasten the exit of French, AU, U.S., and UN-led counter-terrorism forces. It’s therefore no surprise that we see Russian PMC involvement in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and now Niger, as well as countries embroiled in civil war, like CAR, Libya, and Sudan. Other countries in sub-Saharan Africa currently facing territorial and human security threats from civil conflict and VEOs include: Benin, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Togo, and Uganda. Our methodology suggests that the presence of active conflicts makes these countries more vulnerable to the appeal of Russian PMCs.

Other characteristics shared by our receptive cases include poor governance indicators, such as democratic backsliding, state fragility, and corruption. And while Kenya shared many of these characteristics, it lacks a growing, lootable sector like mining to facilitate payment in kind. Countries and leaders facing international sanctions—for example, in response to a coup—are also more likely to engage a Russian PMC, both as a means to secure Russian diplomatic support against sanctions and to circumvent restrictions on weapons deliveries and funding. Countries likely to engage a Russian PMC tend to have pre-existing multi-sector ties to Russia. There also appear to be some warning signs that a country is already engaging with Russian PMCs, such as the presence of propaganda campaigns or information operations and withdrawal from or rejection of pre-existing security partnerships.

Based upon these findings, we apply a tentative framework to the other countries in Africa to assess their likelihood of PMC receptivity. Countries that are at highest risk have higher numbers of the identified risk indicators present. With the caveat that these results are based on the application of a tentative framework, we assess that Somalia and the DRC are most vulnerable to Russian PMC solicitations, followed by countries including Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and South Sudan.

The DRC, for example, is engaged in a protracted civil war, ranks high in state fragility and corruption, and has a robust lootable extractive sector. The Congo asked the UN mission (MONUSCO) and an associated East African force assisting in its fight against the M23 rebel group to leave the country by the end of 2024, after 20 years. While Congolese officials deny that Russian security arrangements will replace these multilateral forces, Russian media reported that Moscow and Kinshasa are already developing a cooperation arrangement. Coupled with the presence of ongoing Russian information operation campaigns, and reports that other private security firms are active in or vying for contracts in eastern Congo, the DRC is exhibiting all the warning signs that Russian PMC operatives are already there and at work.

Other high-risk countries indicated by this framework, notably Cameroon, Chad, and Somalia, maintain security relations with the United States, France, and other international partners, like Turkey. While strong, formalized foreign security relations have previously served as a bulwark against Russian PMC incursion, regional trends indicate that governments may turn to Russian PMCs for more than just security assistance—to bolster their domestic political position and establishing non-traditional models for exploiting natural and mineral wealth. Furthermore, Russia’s success in enticing long-standing U.S. partners into opaque, hybridized security arrangements poses a significant threat, particularly in the Sahel, where countries have one-by-one replaced multilateral or Western-backed security arrangements with contracts with Wagner, now Africa Corps. In light of the Russian PMC’s inability to degrade threats or establish peace, human security and democracy are eroding across the region. This domino effect makes the announcement earlier this year that the U.S. would execute a partial withdrawal from Chad, while the country undergoes a review of security cooperation, alarming.

In Chad, mixed indicators for governance and a historically strong U.S. security relationship correspond to some resilience. However, high levels of state fragility and democratic backsliding are inauspicious. While Chad’s mining sector is under-developed mining sector, it does have strategic minerals, like gold and uranium, as well as hydrocarbons. Russian SOEs are well-placed to assist Chad in harnessing and exploiting these resources, particularly to the benefit of the Chadian and Russian states—both of which face mounting pressure from the international community. The current head of Chad’s Transitional Military Council, Mahamat Déby (son of the former President), is demonstrating openness to Russian collaboration, including by attending a high-level meeting with Putin in January 2024 and welcoming Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to N’djamena in June, where bilateral collaboration on security matters was discussed. Déby has also resisted pressure to return the country to democratic rule.

Outlets are already tracking Russian information operations in Chad, and with elections scheduled for late spring 2024, we expect to derive more data from the types of Russian narratives that crop up. Reports indicate that Wagner operatives based in CAR may have supported a 2023 coup plot against Déby in an effort to gain Chadian support for its agenda in CAR—although U.S. intelligence’s support to Chad in identifying this threat may engender goodwill.  Nevertheless, Déby may be motivated to co-opt Russian PMC support to his own cause in an effort to coup-proof his regime, to hedge against the risk of Russian PMCs funding or training Chadian rebels, to more firmly establish political power, or to grow his personal wealth. A permanent or complete U.S. withdrawal announcement would almost certainly portend the imminent arrival of Africa Corps.

The tentative framework also indicated that a number of countries are at moderate risk, including Ethiopia. Over the last 4 years, Ethiopia’s multiple civil conflicts, and simmering border issues with Somalia and Sudan, have intermittently resulted in sanctions and monitoring from international bodies. Russian PMCs may provide a means of circumventing sanctions to secure restricted weapons and resources. In 2021, while other countries were pressuring leadership in Addis to allow for humanitarian assistance to enter Tigray, Russia signed a bilateral agreement with Ethiopia for cooperation in intelligence and security. In 2019, prior to the outbreak of its civil war, Ethiopia imported some 69 weapons from Russia.  Ethiopia has also experienced democratic backsliding under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who has pulled back from the West and rekindled bilateral relations with Russia—for example, by attending the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit. Confusing reports of Ethiopian veterans lining up to volunteer to fight for Russia in Ukraine in 2022 also signal the possibility that Ethiopians are open to working with and for Russian paramilitaries. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s mineral sector is anchored in gold mining. It is currently under-developed, meaning that while mineral rents are low, there is significant potential for exploitation. Should negotiations with Somalia or other issues push Abiy’s government further away from the international establishment, it may have the need or motivation to turn to Russian partners to capitalize on its golden potential. Nevertheless, lower levels of corruption and a relatively robust civil society and diaspora may incentivize Ethiopia to resist further or more targeted overtures by Russian PMCs.

Due to the proliferation of conflict and insecurity in Africa, there are a number of countries that are seemingly in need of external military support. Through an understanding of both the attractiveness of PMC partnership from a host country standpoint, and the factors that make a country more or less resistant to PMC overtures, the international community is better positioned to support vulnerable countries and prevent further Russian PMC predation. Addressing the vulnerabilities to Russian PMC expansion will not only lead to better outcomes for peace in conflict-afflicted regions, it will also cut off unmonitored sources of income to Russia. While our six case studies relied on both quantitative indicators and in-depth qualitative contextual research, our application of the tentative framework indicates that a more fine-tuned quantitative assessment of the variables associated with receptivity to Russian PMCs for countries at high or moderate risk is possible, and could allow the United States and our allies to identify specific domains and modes of support to our partners in Africa—and other regions—to increase their resilience, before they open the door to Russian PMCs.