Inside the Flames – Two Years of Civil War in Sudan
Introduction
Since 15 April 2023, Sudan has been in a state of ruthless civil war, which the U.N. Secretary General António Guterres described as an “utter humanitarian catastrophe.” This essay highlights how this war came about, what has transpired over the past two years, and where the conflict is headed. The map (see Figure 1) shows the location of Sudan within eastern north Africa. The large battle-rich province of Darfur is in the east, and despite endemic violence, remains a part of the larger nation. Many may remember the genocide which occurred between 2003-2005 in Darfur with nearly 400,000 people killed – carried out by Janjaweed militias and the Sudanese government against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa peoples. Of consequence, to the south, the region of South Sudan fought two wars for independence from Sudan, one from 1955-1972 and another from 1983-2005. South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, only to embark on its own civil war from 2013-2018. The situation in South Sudan remains tenuous and unstable contributing to the instability in Sudan.
Figure 1. Map of Sudan, 2025 (source/Creative Commons)
Sudan gained independence from the joint British/Egyptian government in 1954. Ever since, the military has played a major role in the domestic political system, which has led to four major coups. Of these Omar al-Bashir held power the longest from 1989 to 2019. After months of protest and civil disobedience by large numbers of Sudanese who were fed up with the dictatorship and desired democracy, the Sudanese Armed Forces under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized control in 2019 and then imposed a coup in 2021. Of the many armed factions in Sudan, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (typically called Hemedti) more power, leading to the civil war in April 2023.
Understanding the Dynamics of an Unstable Nation
Sudan is made up of multiple ethno-linguistic populations with a history of in-fighting. In terms of ethnic diversity, the nation is 157th of 189 countries or 83% compared to the world average. About 70% can be described as Sudanese Arabs, with the other minority groups including Fur, Beja, Nuba and Fallata. In language variety, Sudan is 167th of 200 or 83.5% in comparison to others. The major languages match the ethnic groups described previously. The religious gamut remains average at 98th of 215 or 45.6% with most adhering to Sunni Islam. As a qualifier, a long history of trade, migration, and intermarriage across the Sahel has molded a complex map of human geography and does not easily fit within the strict molds described. Simultaneously, each identifiable community generally arms and maintains their own militias to preserve their security and interests from the other groups.
Weak state systems of governance and climate change have acerbated the tensions between the many Sudanese populations. The Fund for Peace’s 2024 Fragile State Index (which accounts for societal cohesion, economic stability, political legitimacy, and human security) ranks Sudan as the second most fragile in the world, or 2nd out of 179 countries (or 1.12% comparatively). Sudan’s geographic boundaries in the African Sahel make it extremely vulnerable to climate change, which the 2022 Notre Dame Global Adaption Initiative ranks Sudan in poor readiness to address the ill effects of change threats at 177th of 192 (or 7.81% ready). Meanwhile, the World Bank has thoroughly detailed the failing governance of Sudan since 2013 to 2023. Current ratings include 5.88% in accountability, 1.9% in stability, 2.36% in effectiveness, 4.72% in regulations, 4.25% in rule of law, and 4.25% in corruption. Averaging the resilience factors of Sudanese governance equally, it sits at 4.04%. The following figure (see Figure 2 compares Sudan’s resilience with other nearby bordering African states with the state fragility index score highlighted. Identified in red, Sudan, Chad, and South Sudan currently wield unsustainable systems of governance.
Figure 2. Resiliency Comparison of Governance in Sudan, Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt (source/author)
Resistance Energy
As exhibited by several indicators, the resistance energy in Sudan remains seismic. The country has one of the largest unregulated shadow economies. A new economic report indicates that the national gross domestic product in 2023 was $38.1B, while the estimated shadow economy generated was $13.2B. The illicit trade leaves 39.4% of the economy unregulated and untaxed, allowing transnational criminal organizations to thrive. Perceptions of corruption abound regarding Sudan which is ranked 170th of 180 nations, or 94.44% comparatively. Correspondingly, the 2023 Global Crime Index ranks Sudan as 33 of 193 nations in terms of criminality (or 82.9%). Lack of freedom contributes to high levels of resistance to authority. Freedom House ranks Sudan very low in terms of political rights with a -3 out of 40 possible score. It also ranks it 5 out of possible score of 60 in civil liberties. Vision of Humanity publishes the 2024 Global Peace Index which utilizes two dozen indicators and ranks Sudan as the second most unpeaceful place on earth – 162 of 163 nations (or 99.39%). Two other points of resistance energy include gender inequality and lack of human development, which the United Nations ranks as 158 of 170 (92.49%) and 176 of 193 (91.19%) respectively. Finally, Sudan has high levels of food insecurity, ranked by the Economist as 105th of 113 evaluated (or 92.92%). The following figure compares the resistance capacity in Sudan to its neighbors. The dominant indicator remains the lack of political rights in each nation. Meanwhile, all three countries of Sudan, South Sudan, and Chad exhibit explosive levels of resistance energy.
Figure 3. Resistance Energy Comparison of Sudan with Chad, South Sudan, and Egypt (source/author)
The two major combatants in this struggle over control and future governance of Sudan include the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Hemedti. Unlike most civil wars, neither the SAF nor the RSF are generally considered the rightful government. Al-Burhan maintains he has the right to rule. However, while the SAF maintain a seat in the United Nations, the African Union does not recognize al-Burhan as the legitimate ruler. Meanwhile, Hemedti recently established his own contending administration in eastern Sudan called the Government of Peace and Unity, which the African Union equally does not acknowledge.
The two parties have undoubtedly engaged in a fierce struggle, and the specifics of the violence have caused considerable confusion among analysts regarding the intricacies involved. The size of the SAF varies depending on the source, but Al Jazeera estimated it at 200,000 soldiers in 2023. The RSF likely boasts about half that many combatants. In general, over the past two years, the SAF controlled the eastern side of the country, including the lucrative port of Sudan. Meanwhile, Hemedti and his RSF controlled the western half, including Darfur (although many of the peoples in that province oppose him). A significant portion of the fighting between SAF and RSF has occurred over control of the capital in Khartoum. Essentially, the central regions of the country remain contested. Casualties incurred between both sides remain uncertain. The Armed Conflict and Location Event Data has catalogued over 40,000 fatalities in the conflict, but this number is likely higher. Additionally, the complexity of resistance in Sudan includes other organizations than SAF and RSF, with over a hundred other armed groups, as well as nonviolent protest movements.
The major factions resembling an insurgency (based on size and activity) include those associated with the term Janjaweed, referring to Arab nomads in the Sahel. These include the two organizations named the Darfur Arab Militia and the Darfur Communal Militia. The other factions include Al Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, Darfur Joint Forces, Justice and Equality Movement, Revolutionary Awakening Council, Sudan Liberation Movement, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, and Sudan Shield Forces.
Tribal militias in a state of rebellion against centralized authority (also prioritized here based on size and violent activities) include the Beni Halba, Habbaniya, Hamar, Kawahala, Kordofan, Masalit, Misseriya, Ngok, Nuba, Nuer, Salamat, Titweng, Twic, and the Zaghawa. Most of these groups wield significant armed components, numbering in the tens of thousands.
In addition to armed insurrection, large numbers of protesters have demonstrated or rioted nearly three-hundred times in the past two years around the country. These include labor groups, students and teachers, women’s rights groups, ethnic minority groups, and health care workers.
Figure 4 illustrates these resistance groups along a continuum from nonviolent protest on the left and progressing through rebellion, insurgency, and civil war on the right.
Figure 4. Resistance Continuum in Sudan, 2025 (source/author)
The Humanitarian Disaster
The pervasive fighting in both Sudan and South Sudan has led to the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. As of the end of 2024, 12.9 million people have been displaced (11.5 million from Sudan and another 1.4 million from South Sudan). These numbers include displacement of people from their original residences within the country, as well as those who left Sudan to find shelter in other nations – including Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan. As indicated previously, both Chad and South Sudan have extremely weak governance structures and the added burden of caring for millions of internally displaced persons contribute to added instability. The following figure illustrates the people displaced from Sudan’s eighteen states, demonstrating how pervasive and merciless the destruction has been. Additionally, Yale has estimated civilian deaths at over 60,000 convincingly, but most sources indicate far larger numbers. Researchers remain frustrated by the lack of documentation.
Figure 5. Internally Displaced Persons from Sudan by State, 2024 (source/UNHCR)
External Actors
The SAF and RSF have attracted the support from several state and nonstate actors. Three states with open support to SAF include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Russia. Of note, Russia switched its support from the RSF to the SAF in mid-2024. China primarily supports the SAF through economic investment and loans. Other states supplying the SAF with weapons and equipment include Iran, North Korea, and Turkey. Although, Turkey has been accused of supplying both sides with weapons.
The RSF has quite a few important supporters. The first is the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE trades weapons to the RSF in return for gold, which Hemedti mines in the Jebel Mer mountains of Darfur. The western border of Chad and Darfur share many ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa, Masalit, Maba, Arabs, and others, making cooperation with RSF a logical choice in maintaining peace. The neighboring country of Chad also supports RSF. To the north, the nonstate actor Libyan National Army supports the RSF with weapons and political backing. Other non-state actors supporting Hemedti include the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (which previously supported that SAF).
The rest of the world’s economies provide another important actor in supporting the SAF and RSF through a particular Sudanese monopoly in gum arabic. Sudan produces between 70%-80% of the world’s supply, which is used to emulsify, stabilize, and as a binding agent in numerous products – ranging from sodas to candy. While most of the gum arabic is transported through SAF controlled Port Sudan, the traders of the product are taxed along the roadways all the way to the coast, including RSF areas. This makes gum arabic an important source for financing the violence.
Progressing Forward
The Sudanese Civil War remains very dynamic and anticipating where it is headed problematic. In April 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on SAF for their use of chemical weapons on the RSF. At the same time, the RSF declared a parallel government to the SAF to establish civil governance functions in the territories it controls. This proves significant, as previously the paramilitary organization had generally raped and looted territory it conquered. The new RSF government however could spell another geographic split of Sudan into eastern and western sections, the boundaries of which depend on the trajectory of the conflict. Simultaneously, the SAF has recently gained an upper hand in the fighting. In late May, it finally took back the capital from the RSF. Control of Khartoum further legitimizes the SAF and could lead to increased operational momentum, including the band-wagoning of other insurgent and ethnic groups to a growing coalition aligned against RSF. Unfortunately, while the United Nations and the African Union both warn about the humanitarian crisis, there appears no substantial plan to address the root factors of Sudan’s instability.
