A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare | Institute for the Study of War

A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare By Nataliya Bugayova and Kateryna Stepanenko | Institute for the Study of War Press, Institute for the Study of War

June 30, 2025

Executive Summary

Understanding cognitive warfare is a national security requirement for the United States.[1] Cognitive warfare is a form of warfare that focuses on influencing the opponent’s reasoning, decisions, and ultimately, actions to secure strategic objectives without fighting or with less military effort than would otherwise be required. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea increasingly use cognitive warfare against the United States in order to shape US decision-making. Cognitive warfare can be defeated. The United States and its allies can neutralize adversaries’ cognitive warfare through systematic awareness and by exploiting the weaknesses that drive US adversaries to rely on cognitive warfare in the first place. Cognitive warfare is much more than misinformation or disinformation. It uses an array of tools, including the use of selective and partial truth in messaging, often integrated with economic, diplomatic, and military action up to major combat operations. Cognitive warfare is distinguished by its focus on achieving its aims by influencing the opponent’s perceptions of the world and decision-making rather than by the direct use of force.

Russia is a key player in the cognitive warfare space and a model for China, Iran, and North Korea. Russia has effectively used cognitive warfare to facilitate its war in Ukraine, shape Western decision-making, obfuscate Russian objectives, preserve Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, and mask Russia’s weaknesses.

Cognitive warfare is Russia’s way of war, governance, and occupation. The goals, means, and effects of Russian cognitive warfare are far greater than disinformation at the tactical level. Russian cognitive warfare is:

• The way of war: The Russian way of war is centered on the notion that wars can be won and lost in the opponent’s mind. The Kremlin’s main effort is shaping its opponents’ decisions to achieve aims unattainable through Russia’s physical capabilities alone. The Russian strategy that matters most is not its warfighting strategy, but rather the Kremlin’s strategy to cause us to see the world as Moscow wishes us to see it and make decisions in that Kremlin-generated perception of reality.[2]

• The way of governance: The Kremlin has been waging an information war inside Russia and on territories that Russia illegally occupies in order to maintain the regime’s control and stability. Russia’s internal and external information operations, while distinct from one another, interact and cannot be understood in siloes. The Kremlin’s domestic information control helps it generate resources for Russia’s military efforts abroad.

• Born out of need: Russia is not weak, but it is weak relative to its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to close gaps between its goals and its means. The main purpose of Russia’s cognitive warfare is to generate a perception of reality that allows Russia to win more in the real world than it could through the force it can actually generate and at a lower cost.

• Targets reasoning: The primary objective of Russian cognitive warfare is to shape its adversaries’ decision-making and erode our will to act. The Kremlin aims to decrease US and allied will and capability to resist Russia to lower the barrier to achieving its aims. Russia needs its opponents to do less so that Moscow can achieve more of its goals. The Kremlin uses cognitive warfare to create a world that would simply accept, and not fight, Russian premises and actions.

• Beyond media: Russia uses all platforms that transmit narratives — media, conferences, international frameworks, diplomatic channels, individuals ­­— as tools of its cognitive warfare.

• Beyond informational means: Russian cognitive warfare is supported by physical activities. These physical tools include military exercises; sabotage; cyber-attacks; combat operations, and exaggerations of Russia’s military capabilities and battlefield progress.

• Cross-theater and multigenerational: Russian information operations span decades and geographies. The effects of Russian cognitive warfare may occur years after Russia launches information operations. Russia selectively activates and deactivates a set of narratives over decades to adapt them to the Kremlin’s evolving requirements.

• Effective, but only to a point: Cognitive warfare allowed Russia to make some gains that would have been impossible with conventional forces alone. Russian cognitive warfare is not always effective, however, as Russian information operations regularly succeed only partially, fail, and even backfire.

• A constant pursuit: Russia is always fighting for the initiative in the information space. The initiative is not permanent and can be contested.

• A vulnerability: The Kremlin is overly dependent on cognitive warfare. The Kremlin’s ability to achieve its objectives abroad critically depends on the West’s acceptance of Russia’s assertions about reality. Putin’s presidency also depends in part on his ability to maintain a perception that an alternative to his rule is either worse or too costly to fight for.

• Predictable, hence targetable: Russian cognitive warfare supports the Kremlin’s strategic aims, which have not changed in years. This fact presents opportunities for defense and offense. The Kremlin also relies on a set of predetermined messages, making it hard for the Kremlin to rapidly pivot to new information operations.

The United States should not counter Russian cognitive warfare symmetrically. The key to defending against Russian cognitive warfare is doing so at the level of strategic reasoning while resisting the urge to chase Russia’s tactical disinformation efforts. Debunking individual false narratives only grapples with the tactical level of Russian cognitive warfare and is insufficient for countering Russian cognitive warfare. The United States and its allies should understand what premises the Kremlin wants us to believe at any given time and over generations, which decisions of ours it is trying to shape, and in support of which aims. The United States and its allies can then defend against Russian cognitive warfare by rejecting the very premises the Kremlin is trying to establish in its effort to have us reason from those premises to conclusions that benefit Russia.

Section 1: Historical Context

Section 2: Intent

Section 3: Scope

Section 4: Effects and Vulnerabilities

Conclusion