Strategic Folly? Why India and Pakistan Should Not Go to War
India and Pakistan have little strategic incentive to go to war, while the cost of going to war is overwhelmingly high for each side.
India and Pakistan have de-escalated a near-war crisis after their militaries struck each other for days. As I previously explained in an article published on Small Wars Journal, the crisis unfolded with India targeting multiple sites inside Pakistan, following a Kashmir attack that New Delhi blamed on Islamabad. Pakistan responded fiercely by targeting Indian military installations, bringing the two countries close to a nuclear catastrophe. A ceasefire announced by U.S. President Trump has averted a full-scale war for now, but the risks of committing strategic folly in the future loom large.
India and Pakistan, considered arch-rivals in the South Asian region, have fought four wars since their independence in 1947. They have frequently experienced crises marked by bilateral tensions flaring up to the point where war seemed a stone’s throw away. But are there concrete reasons for India and Pakistan to go to war? I contend not. The dramatic de-escalation following the latest military confrontation underlines an idea often forgotten amid jingoism and tactical brinkmanship: India and Pakistan have little strategic incentive to go to war, while the cost of going to war is overwhelmingly high for each side.
I will explain in this article that the risks of a catastrophe are too high for a war to be fought between the two sides, primarily because of nuclear weapons and security dilemmas that heighten the chances of their use. Such a catastrophe will not be confined to one state. A full-scale war will be costly for both and can potentially destroy them. As the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation indicates, even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million people within a week. The total casualties are likely to be much higher, with 50 to 125 million potentially dying and millions getting injured, as another study estimates. A nuclear winter could be created, due to which around two billion people could die of starvation. One can assume that in case nuclear weapons are used, the devastation will not be local but also regional and even global.
The costs are not the only factor due to which India and Pakistan should not go to war. There are limited objectives that the two countries can achieve through war. If anyone can learn anything from history, one lesson is conspicuous: Neither India nor Pakistan has achieved meaningful objectives through war, even before the achievement of nuclear deterrence, which makes decisive victory over the antagonist virtually impossible. In 1947-48, both sides sought to acquire all of Kashmir – a goal that was not achieved. The war divided Kashmir and locked the two countries in an inescapable conflict trap. The 1965 war could only be ended through a ceasefire following a stalemate. The 1971 war dismembered Pakistan, but that happened mainly due to an intense insurgency in then-East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), geographically separated from then-West Pakistan (now Pakistan) by more than a thousand miles. Since then, wars and crises between the two countries have only created an impasse, especially because the nuclear deterrent prevents either side from inflicting any serious harm on the other.
High Nuclear Risks
The development and testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 made achieving war objectives more difficult than ever, and war a perilous proposition. It makes the cost of going to war “frighteningly high,” a phrase used by Kenneth Waltz, for both India and Pakistan. It is thus no coincidence that India and Pakistan have not waged a full-scale war since becoming nuclear weapon states. As the nuclear arsenals of the two countries grow in size, lethality, and sophistication, the risks and costs of going to war will continue to rise. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) says that India and Pakistan have been enhancing their nuclear arsenals. According to the Arms Control Association, “Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country.”
Though India and Pakistan are not transparent about their nuclear weapon program, the two states are believed to have around 170 nuclear warheads each. This is enough to destroy each other, and much beyond. The delivery systems developed by India and Pakistan amplify the risks of a nuclear catastrophe. Both India and Pakistan have short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons by aircraft and land-based missiles to each other’s territory. India can also strike Pakistan by sea. India has long-range ballistic missiles, while Pakistan is also believed to be developing long-range systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
Even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million people within a week… A nuclear winter could be created, due to which around two billion people could die of starvation.
Since India has a conventional advantage over its adversary, Pakistan is likely to use nuclear weapons in case its traditional warfare capabilities are significantly strained in a conflict. Pakistan has made it clear that it does not adhere to a No First Use policy. Maintaining strategic ambiguity allows Pakistan to deploy nuclear weapons at any stage of a conflict. Whenever Pakistan perceives that its interests and security are gravely jeopardized, it can potentially use nuclear weapons. In such an event, India can be expected to follow suit. As recently as 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi downplayed the threat of nuclear weapons use by Pakistan, asking: “Is Ours for Diwali?” His remarks were not just dismissive but rather indicated that India would not refrain from using nuclear weapons if Pakistan initiated a nuclear strike.
Recent history proves that the use of nuclear weapons is a real possibility in a war situation between India and Pakistan. One need not look far into the past to understand this. In 2019, when India and Pakistan were embroiled in a military confrontation, the risk of a nuclear conflict was alarmingly high. At that time, the U.S. officials had detected disturbing information about the movement of nuclear weapons by both countries. The U.S. mediation de-escalated the conflict, but Mike Pompeo, in his memoir, later revealed that India and Pakistan were “too close” to a nuclear confrontation. The situation was so volatile and precarious that Pompeo had to be awakened in the middle of the night, a night he recalled as one he would “never forget.”
Last week’s military confrontation between India and Pakistan seems to confirm that any escalation can reach the nuclear threshold within days. After receiving “alarming intelligence” about the situation, the U.S. had to intervene at the highest policy level to mediate the conflict. It would not be a surprise if the alarming intelligence had to do with the possibility of nuclear weapons deployment. We already have some indications of that. The media reported that following a sharp escalation, Pakistan convened an emergency meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the apex body that deals with nuclear weapons. Although Islamabad later clarified that an NCA meeting was not called, earlier media reports suggesting otherwise could have been a deliberate and consequential nuclear signaling move on the part of Pakistan.
Limits of Conventional Deterrence
The risks of an escalatory spiral that leads to a nuclear catastrophe are not the only reason why India and Pakistan should not go to war. An equally compelling reason is that both countries have little to achieve through war. The famous Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz deemed war “the continuation of policy by other means.” What if war, as a policy instrument, cannot help one achieve the desired objectives? In such a case, it is irrational to attempt to achieve political goals through war.
No credible deterrence through conventional military means is thus at play between India and Pakistan.
As I mentioned earlier, the two countries have hardly achieved any meaningful objectives through war. This is especially true for limited warfare and confrontations that fall below the nuclear threshold. Specifically, India and Pakistan believe that they can deter each other from perceived provocations through the use of force in a limited war scenario. India believes that it can employ hard power to establish credible deterrence against what it considers Pakistan’s abetment of cross-border terrorism. In other words, India believes conventional military action against Pakistan is a deterrent against terrorism on Indian soil. Meanwhile, Pakistan believes that if it gives a befitting response to any Indian aggression, credible deterrence against any future Indian military action can be established. Both propositions are overrated, if not unrealistic, as developments around both the 2019 military confrontation and the latest round of violence between India and Pakistan prove.
In 2019, India carried out non-lethal airstrikes against Pakistan in retaliation for a major terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel. As the terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the attack operated out of Pakistan, India launched retaliatory airstrikes inside Pakistan. Pakistan responded effectively to Indian aggression by shooting down an Indian jet and capturing its pilot. The Indian airstrikes and Pakistan’s counter-offensive only led to a strategic stalemate. Pakistan did not escalate the conflict because the closer it gets to a full-scale war with India, the more its military vulnerabilities are exposed. Meanwhile, India did not escalate the conflict either, even though it could have the upper hand in a full-scale conventional war with Pakistan. As John Mearsheimer has explained, for India to establish escalation domination, or to prevail over Pakistan in a conventional conflict, it must get far up the escalation ladder. Moving up the escalation ladder poses grave risks of nuclear deployment by Pakistan, hence India’s strategic compulsion to not follow that path.
An argument that permeates Indian policy circles is that the Indian airstrikes in 2019, and to a greater extent the 2025 airstrikes, were aimed at establishing deterrence rather than seeking vengeance or triggering a full-scale war with Pakistan. Perhaps Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi follows the same logic. In a recent speech, he asserted that New Delhi will militarily strike Pakistan in response to any future terrorist attack that is blamed on Islamabad. However, while such strikes can be deemed punitive at best, it is difficult for them to have a deterrent effect. The 2019 military confrontation lends credence to this. Neither side could punish the other militarily insofar as it could be deterred from actions that were perceived to have provoked the initial military action.
For India, the principal purpose for initiating a military action against Pakistan in 2019 was to deter Islamabad from what New Delhi saw as its support for cross-border terrorism. The objective was not achieved, even from an Indian standpoint. Despite India claiming to have punished Pakistan through the airstrikes, another major terrorist attack blamed on Pakistan occurred in Indian-administered Kashmir in April 2025. This proves that while India can claim to punish Pakistan for what it sees as cross-border terrorism, such punishment cannot avert terrorist attacks in the future. The fact that India has been unable to present undeniable evidence to establish Pakistani culpability in terrorism makes the dilemma even more problematic.
Like India, Pakistan was unable to achieve much through its retaliatory action. Pakistan’s objective of deterring future Indian aggression by punishing India for strikes inside Pakistan’s territory could not be achieved. In response to Indian airstrikes inside Pakistan, Islamabad claimed to have offered a quid pro quo by shooting down an Indian fighter jet and capturing its pilot. But did that deter India from carrying out the current missile strikes? No. India’s recent missile strikes, despite Pakistan’s quid pro quo in 2019, demonstrate that deterrence through punishment in the conventional domain has significant limitations.
War can be a strategic nightmare. In such a case, peace is not only preferable over conflict, but it is a strategic necessity for India and Pakistan.
The latest military confrontation between India and Pakistan has produced the same set of perils that the 2019 crisis did, although on a more serious scale. To start with, neither state has achieved much notwithstanding significant investment in the military stand-off. By acting militarily against Pakistan, India has neither solved the terrorism problem nor weakened Pakistan. On the contrary, Pakistan appears to have emerged emboldened following the conflict. Meanwhile, Pakistan has inflicted limited damage on India through its retaliatory strikes. This means that neither side feels deterred from using force in the name of punishment or retaliation in the future. No credible deterrence through conventional military means is thus at play between India and Pakistan.
Conclusion
The latest military confrontation between India and Pakistan demonstrates the dangerous risks of escalation that any military face-off can create. Because of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery technologies possessed by both states, any escalation can have catastrophic consequences. Neither side can afford such consequences, hence the futility of contemplating and fighting a war that can quickly spiral out of control.
War, whether full-scale or limited, does not provide either country with solutions to the grave irritants in the Indo-Pakistan bilateral relationship. Conventional (and sub-conventional) deterrence has shown its limitations, as aggression and retaliatory action often do little to deter perceived future provocations and thus prevent the next crisis. Targeted operations deemed necessary for national security do not prevent the threat of terrorism in the future. Instead, they contribute towards increased risks of escalation, miscalculation, and unintended consequences. Likewise, any retaliation to such strikes does not deter future operations. Instead, the tit-for-tat retaliation cycle establishes a baseline for the future, leading to the next round of escalation being graver.
What does either side truly gain from the conundrum? Nothing—only heightened tensions, bigger risks, greater uncertainty, and more lives caught in the crossfire. Perhaps the only dividend either side can realize is appeasement of nationalistic sentiments at home. However, such an appeasement is not only a minor gain in the grand scheme of things, but it is also fraught with significant risks. So, war can be a strategic nightmare. In such a case, peace is not only preferable over conflict, but it is a strategic necessity for India and Pakistan.
