Command from the Commander’s Perspective: Essential Case Studies in Civ-Mil Relations

Lawrence Freedman’s Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, comprehensively explores civil-military relations. Freedman, a prolific writer on international relations and strategy, is regarded as the “dean of British strategic studies” for his immense contributions to the field. Command, however, significantly differs from his earlier work. Instead of examining the concept of strategy through a historical lens, as he did in Strategy: A History, Freedman provides a broader and more concrete analysis of post-World War II military operations. Similar to Eliot Cohen’s Supreme Command, Freedman employs case studies to investigate the complex nature of civil-military relations. In each of Freedman’s fifteen examples, he details the tensions between military and civilian leaders, illustrating the complexity and intricacy of their relationship during conflict. Rather than emphasizing heads of state, as Cohen does, Freedman focuses on military commanders, revealing the decision-making process from their perspective. More importantly, he dismantles the notion that military officers must operate independently and remain non-political, offers valuable insights into military culture, and demonstrates that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to command. 

While Freedom does not use the term​​ “military culture,” his case studies provide insights into the unique beliefs and attitudes that shape the behavior of military organizations. Freedman emphasizes how the distinction between military culture, shared among generals, and political culture, influencing the statesmen, often leads to conflict. In the case of President Nixon, Freedman points out the fight Nixon had with his generals to implement his desired bombing strategy in Vietnam. To encapsulate Nixon’s ​struggle​, Freedman claims “the dirty secret of American civil-military relations…the commander in chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.” Freedman echoes this sentiment with other cases, such as President Truman’s battle to restrain General MacArthur’s actions in Korea, which ended with MacArthur being fired. With this insight, Freedman shows how tensions—stemming from cultural differences—tend to arise between statesmen and generals and the difficulty in resolving these tensions. 

Another insight into strategic culture comes from Freedman’s exploration of NATO’s military operations in Kosovo and Yugoslavia​​. When describing the personality of General Wes Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander at the time, he compares him to the fictional character Courtney Massengale. Massengale comes from the popular novel Once an Eagle, where he is depicted as a cold-hearted, self-serving politician who cultivates the right relationships to gain promotion without any care for his subordinates. Freedman emphasizes this novel’s immense impact on U.S. Army officers and how, to this day, being labeled “another Courtney Massengale” would exclude you from promotion. General Clark’s experience and ability to work with political leaders meant he was unfairly considered a “Massengale.” Senior officers antagonized him “as a self-promotor” for his political prowess, which led to clashes among the military leadership. This insight into the culture of the U.S. Army clarifies the natural revulsion of officers to being labeled “political.” Still, as Freedman later points out, politics and command are inextricably linked. American officers seem to have forgotten their Clausewitz. 

Thus, Freedman dispels the myth that military officers must avoid being “political.” In the introduction, he notes how being called political is considered offensive in most militaries. To push back against that notion, Freedman cites Hew Strachan’s definition of political: being able to “negotiate as well as fight, to be sensitive to others’ culture as well as to the morale of their own units.” From there, he shows how political is not the derogatory word military leaders consider it to be; instead, it is a skill to be mastered. In each case study, from General MacArthur to East Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan, Freedman demonstrates how military officers must be astute politicians, dutifully aware of the personalities around them, and manage the competing interests in the room. When commanders could not navigate this environment, as occurred with the French in Algeria or General Khan in Pakistan, catastrophe ensued. 

Freedman also dismantles the notion that military and civilian leaders exist independently and should not interfere in each other’s work. Samuel Huntington outlines this idea in his book, The Soldier and the State, in which he describes ideal civil-military relations as one of separate spheres. In other words, political leaders should give the military leaders an objective and then leave them alone to achieve the goal. Through the case studies, Freedman shows how Huntington’s ideal is fundamentally flawed. Political leaders must constantly be involved in military operations to ensure strategic objectives are met. Conversely, military leaders frequently suggest alterations to the political objectives based on the evolving military situation. Freedman proves this iterative relationship better characterizes how civilian and military leaders work in tandem rather than in Huntington’s separate spheres. In this respect, his conclusions echo those of Cohen’s in Supreme Command. Freedman differs from Cohen not in his findings but rather​ by​ the actor chosen for analysis: the head of state versus the commander.

Freedman’s work also illustrates there is no “cookie-cutter” model of a good commander. Through the various case studies, he shows the audience different approaches to command, some successful and some not. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy took a hands-off approach to operational details, relying on the U.S. Navy to devise the Cuban quarantine, which he agreed with and approved. In contrast, President Nixon took a more hands-on approach in Vietnam, constantly overruling his generals and directing operational policy. Which style is correct? Both achieved their strategic goals: Kennedy avoided nuclear war, and Nixon forced the North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty. Freedman lays out just how dynamic and complex effective command is. There is no playbook for success.  

While historians and military enthusiasts will enjoy the well-written descriptions of military operations, this book is a must-read for those in or near high positions of command and authority. Whether you are about to take command of a military formation or are preparing for a senior role within the Department of Defense, Freedman’s case studies of command will guide your leadership. ​​There is no simple answer to command effectively; the best we can do is learn from those who have gone before us.