Command Posts, the Iron Triangle, and 1st Armored Division in WFX 23-4
Introduction
In small wars and large-scale combat operations (LSCO), command posts require not only trained personnel, but mutually supportive physical infrastructure to properly execute the six functions of a command post per ATP 3-90.5, 2-5. During 1st Armored Division’s (1AD) most recent Warfighter Exercise (WFX), which focused on LSCO against a peer competitor in the European region, the Division further refined its own command post operations. The intention of this field report is to share key findings from that exercise, WFX 23-4, with the reader. The key findings from the exercise include: (1) a mutually supportive command post system, (2) acknowledgement of limitations of even the most ideal system, and (3) the need for iterative training with the appropriate focus and rigor to identify shortcomings.
During WFX 23-4, 1AD created a resilient and robust command post system through a deliberate training progression. The train-up, starting in the deserts of Fort Irwin’s National Training Center (NTC), and culminating with Warfighter (WFX) 23-4, 1AD Staff proved its capability through constant tests, mission-generated friction, and relentless contention with the opposing forces (OPFOR). Throughout these challenges 1AD’s headquarters maintained their full range of capabilities and it experienced no loss of tempo from inefficient systems and processes. 1AD used a framework known as the Iron Triangle to build a mutually supportive network of command posts, covering the inherent weaknesses of any single or desynchronized command post.
Throughout these challenges 1AD’s headquarters maintained their full range of capabilities and it experienced no loss of tempo from inefficient systems and processes.
The Idea of Cheap, Fast, and Good
The concept of good, fast, and cheap has been referred to by many names, but it is most commonly called the Iron Triangle. The Iron Triangle is often used for product development, and in this model, the product can only realistically achieve two of the three components of the Iron Triangle, as the third component is mutually exclusive of the other two. The overlap between the two parts represents the characteristics of the final product. Figure 1 illustrates the concept and serves as the baseline for Army application.
Figure 1. Visualization of the Iron Triangle’s concept of Good, Fast, and Cheap
Application to the Army
In the cult classic film The Pentagon Wars, which documented the development of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the movie’s tagline was: “They aimed to build the ultimate fighting machine, they missed.” The Bradley’s development process is an example of the application of cheap, fast, and good—among numerous other things— being forcefully applied to a single product, instead of a system that can handle the burden of accounting for each of the three factors. However, the application to the Army is not limited to vehicles or weapons. The Iron Triangle can also be overlayed on top of a command posts. In the aggregate, and when working as a system, command posts can achieve all three elements of the Iron Triangle. In this approach, the cheap, fast, and good are replaced by capacity, survivability, and continuous operations.
Figure 2. The three components of the command post’s Iron Triangle
For the command post Iron Triangle framework, capacity is characterized by the command post’s ability to control operations in the immediate deep, close, and rear fight while also managing planning horizons at 48, 72, 96 hours, and beyond. ATP 6-0.5, 1-40 defines capacity as:
“CPs should be manned and organized to manage the information needed to operate effectively. The capacity to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operations concerns both staffing and information systems. So too, does the ability to manage relevant information. The CP personnel must be trained and have the requisite tactical and technical proficiency.”
The command post needs personnel to execute these functions and expertise in the various warfighting functions. In addition to the personnel necessary to control and plan the fight, the command post will also need technical support to gain and maintain communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher echelons. For all these functions to work, the physical environment must be conducive to their requirements.
Survivability is the command post’s resiliency to threats during large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Per ATP 6-0.5, 1-41:
“… survivability is vital to mission success. Survivability is often obtained at the price of capacity or continuous operations. Depending on the threat, CPs must remain small and highly mobile — especially at lower echelons. CPs are easily acquired and targeted when concentrated. Considerations for CP survivability include dispersion, size, redundancy, mobility, camouflage, and concealment. Additional measures include cover or shielding by terrain features or urban structures.”
Survivability can also be achieved through signature and spectrum management, geographical location, physical size, and active defenses, to list a few methods.
Continuous operations per ATP 6-0.5, 3-1 and 3-2 is defined as:
“Army operations are continuous and continue at the same level of intensity for extended periods. Man, equip, and organize CPs to execute operations and sustain mission command without interruption. During continuous operations, CP personnel execute several routine and recurring tasks to establish, operate, and move the CP.”
Continuous operations must also incorporate the command post’s ability to maintain operations and planning horizons for long periods. Divisions, like 1AD, must manage operations and synchronize brigade activities, and shape the deep area to create the situation that supports success in the close area. Additionally, the command posts at the division level must maintain planning horizon discipline and have the capacity to plan and refine plans out to 96 hours and beyond. To do so, the command post’s staff must possess sufficient depth to handle requirements throughout a continuous 24-hour cycle.
Figure 3. Example planning horizons from ATP 6-0.5.
Achieving all three components of the command post’s Iron Triangle becomes the quintessential gold standard, but as stated by ATP 6-0.5, the components often come at the cost of the other. If the command post has excellent control and the personnel to achieve continuous operations, for instance, its size is likely not optimized for survivability. However, achieving all three components of the command post’s Iron Triangle is required to counter the friction that complex operations induce and that an enemy force adds.
Figure 4. Visual of the Division’s Command Post Threshold of Excellence versus example complex activities with enemy influence during a Warfighter scenario
A System That Brought It All Together
During WFX 23-4, 1AD’s command post proved survivable, could control the entirety of the division’s operations, while coordinating with adjacent units and higher, and maintained the capacity to operate continuous operations. All of this occurred at the division’s desired operational tempo and duration, especially at the most critical points in the operation.
Separately, each of the 1AD’s command posts had its own deficiencies. The Division Main Command Post (DMAIN) could control and maintain continuous operations but was only survivable with multiple and regular relocations (or jumps). Each of those jumps took upwards of at least four to six hours just to gain initial operating capacity. The Division Tactical Command Post (DTAC) was highly survivable and managed the division’s operations. However, the DTAC lacked the endurance of personnel to continuously manage the division’s operations for extended periods of time.
Like the DMAIN, the Rear Area Command Post (RCP) could maintain continuous operations, but it had limited capacity to cover all aspects of the division’s operations. Unlike the DMAIN, the RCP gained survivability through its geographic positioning away from enemy long-range fires, thus reducing its chance of being targeted.
Through mutual employment, 1AD achieved all three components of the command post’s Iron Triangle— capacity, survivability, and continuous operations. The 1AD CP was, by design, at its strongest when it prepositioned itself for the unknown or uncertain. In such instances, 1AD deployed all its command assets, operating at its highest potential. The DTAC deployed to manage mission-specific fights, such as a wet gap crossing and deliberate defense operations, allowing the DMAIN to continue focusing on the deep area and future planning. 1AD’s division of labor amongst its command posts allowed the headquarters to effectively coordinate operations in the close fight without becoming fixated on it and neglecting to prepare for future operations.
During the WFX, for instance, 1AD’s DMAIN was destroyed by a theater ballistic missile attack. Nonetheless, 1AD’s DTAC, in cooperation with the RCP, maintained operations and conducted planning despite the loss of the DMAIN. The two smaller command posts focused on refining the plan for this period, allowing the division to continue setting conditions in anticipation of actions 48 to 96 hours out. Furthermore, the DTAC and RCP simultaneously coordinated logistics from the rear to provide the force options to exploit opportunities following the enemy’s attack.
Despite these strengths and command post resiliency in the aggregate, micro-level flaws remained. Due to the constraints emplaced by the DMAIN’s survivability jumps, shared understanding often came at a cost for the organization. During the initial train-up at NTC, the DMAIN retained the functional nodes to practice survivability. However, the physical structure of the DMAIN’s functional nodes created unforeseen inefficiencies with information sharing. These inefficiencies remained unidentified during the III Armored Corps’ CPX II in February 2023 because extreme weather reduced the exercise by three days, thus limiting 1AD to a single jump. However, information sharing improved drastically once the DMAIN was established in the nonstandard location during WFX 23-4. Once all nodes were consolidated into a single open area, unknown inefficiencies in the staff’s knowledge management and information-sharing processes were illuminated. The staff drastically improved the knowledge management processes and information sharing that occurred in the battle rhythm, which increased the speed of command decisions throughout the operations process.
Figure 5. Example Command Post layout. The distance between nodes/clusters is not to scale
Conclusion
The iterative train-up of the staff and employment of a deliberate command post system enabled the division to maintain the depth and flexibility required to continuously maintain options and exploit opportunities despite the complex LSCO environment. Though the train-up was not revolutionary, a disciplined progression informed by doctrine and subject matter experts created a formative experience that produced the flexible and knowledgeable staff required to operate the Iron Triangle command post system. It was that convergence of a well-trained staff and the Iron Triangle command posts that gained strength and resiliency during the most complex environments. The division can withstand the frictions of war and uncertainty by having the separate command posts work as a system and complement each other. The command posts of the future will need to continue to evolve with future demands, but the basics of how they operate and how they are filled are exemplified by the 1AD during WFX 23-4.
