Army FM 3-0 (March 2025)

Below, you will find expert commentary from our Editor-at-Large, Retired Special Forces Col. David Maxwell.

The new FM 3-0 Operations was released last month. The 296 page document is publicly available and can be downloaded here.

I remember reading my first version of FM 100-5 Operations. It was the 1976 education and then the 1982 edition and then the 1986 version. As I skimmed over this, I reminisced about AirLand Battle and how that really was one of the very best organizing principles for our Army.

As an aside: The term “Air-Land Battle” first appeared in the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, specifically in Chapter 8, which discussed joint procedures between the Army and Air Force. However, the AirLand Battle doctrine was formally introduced and fully developed in the 1982 edition of FM 100-5.

Since 2022 multidomain operations has been the organizing principle for our Army. Is it doing the job as well as AirLand battle did? I thought that AirLand battle was quite advanced (and I think it was at the time). But I think multidomain operations is even more sophisticated and intellectually challenging. But why don’t we write it like AirLand Battle and capitalize it as in Mutidomain Operations to raise it to the visual stature of AirLAnd Battle? (slight attempt at humor)

“Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 30). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.”

But who are the thought leaders of multidomain operations who are the equivalent of the Airland Battle thought leaders? It seems to me that the single person who is working behind the scenes pulling all of this together is Rich Creed. Do we have senior leaders who are advocating for multi-domain operations and inform the political leadership and public and educate and train the force the way our AirLand Battle thought leaders did. I am sure there are many who are doing a lot of important work but they just do not seem to be as visible as the leaders were in the 1970s and 1980s. Even as a Lieutenant and Captain in the 1980s I had heard the names of these senior leaders (and I have my first exposure to SAMS planners in 1985 as a Brigade Plans Officer in the 3ID in Germany. When we worked with the division planners (who were among the earliest SAMS graduates I knew I wanted to think like them and so I set my sights on SAMS (and attended 10 years later). I also worked for battalion and group commanders in 2ID and then 1st Special Forces Group for almost the entire 10 years until I attended SAMS.

1. General Donn A. Starry

• Role: Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (1977–1981)
• Contribution:
  • The primary architect of AirLand Battle.
  • Oversaw the development of the 1982 edition of FM 100-5.
  • Advocated for maneuver, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.
  • Emphasized integration of Air Force capabilities to counter the Soviet echeloned threat.
• Legacy: His writings and reforms institutionalized operational-level warfighting and joint force integration.

2. General William E. DePuy

• Role: First Commander of TRADOC (1973–1977)
• Contribution:
  • Authored the 1976 FM 100-5 featuring “Active Defense.”
  • Though not an AirLand Battle advocate per se, he laid the groundwork by calling for a doctrine to counter the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe.
  • Influenced later doctrinal shifts with his focus on training, doctrine development, and centralized operational design.

3. Colonel Huba Wass de Czege

• Role: Founder of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
• Contribution:
  • Key conceptual architect of operational art within AirLand Battle.
  • Developed ideas of “operational maneuver” and campaign design.
  • Promoted the linkage between tactics and strategy at the operational level.
  • Authored influential internal papers shaping doctrinal thinking.
• Legacy: SAMS graduates became core contributors to future doctrinal development.

4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hart Sinnreich

• Role: Strategic planner and doctrinal writer
• Contribution:
  • Collaborated closely with Starry and Wass de Czege on drafting the 1982 FM 100-5.
  • A thought leader in bridging tactical realities with strategic aims.
  • Wrote and spoke extensively on doctrine, professionalism, and joint operations.

5. Major General Paul Gorman

• Role: Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
• Contribution:
  • Played a key role in the internal critique of Active Defense.
  • Promoted the view that doctrine needed to emphasize maneuver and depth, not just linear defense.
  • Helped sponsor war-gaming and studies that supported AirLand Battle concepts.

6. General Glenn K. Otis

• Role: Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command (after Starry)
• Contribution:
  • Continued development and refinement of AirLand Battle.
  • Oversaw implementation of related training and modernization efforts.

As I reflect on the many discussions I have online with various people and groups it strikes me that we might all go back to “first principles” and begin our discussions (and arguments) from the foundation of this document. So many of us (me included) argue based on our past experience as well as our biases.

So let me address my biases. That is the terminology we use. We have too many terms describing warfighting across the spectrum of conflict (see Threats and the Word We Use” HERE). However, I think FM 3-0 does the best job of really distinguishing the two broad methods of warfare: conventional and irregular, as well as describes their interrelationship and the balance between the different forces.

For example:

• Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused – in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare
• Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare

I think this distinction is useful and important in that both forces operate among both methods of warfare with each in a primary or supporting role depending on the method of warfare being conducted. And most important is that conventional and irregular warfare can be conducted simultaneously. This should lead to the conclusion that planners and commanders should strive to use the right forces for the right missions despite this last sentence:

Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

And lastly I would say to note my real bias, special operations is more thoroughly discussed in this manual than in any previous one.

METHODS OF WARFARE

1-38. Although the nature and principles of war reflect the continuity of war, the conduct of warfare, like dynamic operational environments, reflects wide variations. Therefore, depending on the situation, strategic actors pursue their objectives in war through different methods of warfare. There are many different methods, but they generally fall into two broad categories: conventional and irregular. Each method of warfare serves the same strategic purpose—to defeat an enemy—but they take fundamentally different approaches to achieving their purpose. Both methods share one characteristic, which is that they involve the use of lethal force to achieve a political end. Warfare rarely fits neatly into any of these subjective categories, and it almost always entails a blend of both methods over the course of a conflict.

Note: These broad categories describe the overall approaches to warfare. Other categories attempt to describe the dominant means used in a particular application, for example “information warfare,” “cyber warfare,” or “anti-submarine warfare,” In these cases, the terms “warfare,” “operations,” and “activities” are often used interchangeably.

Conventional Warfare

1-39. Conventional warfare is a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions of nation- states (ADP 3-0). Conventional warfare is generally carried out by two or more military forces through armed conflict. It is commonly known as conventional warfare because it means to fight enemy forces directly, with comparable military systems and organizations. A nation-state’s strategic purpose for conducting conventional warfare is to impose its will on an enemy government and avoid imposition of the enemy government’s will on it and its citizens. Joint doctrine refers to conventional warfare as “traditional” because it has been understood that way in the West since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. However, irregular warfare has a longer history, and it has been just as common as the “traditional” method of warfare in some societies.

1-40. Conventional warfare normally focuses on defeating enemy armed forces, enemy warfighting capabilities, and controlling key terrain and populations to decisively influence an enemy government’s behavior in favorable ways. During conventional warfare, enemies engage in combat openly against each other and generally employ similar capabilities. Conventional war may escalate to include nation-state use of weapons of mass destruction. Like the other branches of the armed forces, the Army is organized, trained, and equipped primarily to conduct or deter conventional warfare, especially its most lethal manifestation— large-scale combat operations.

1-41. Conventional deterrence creates the paradox that although combat-ready forces reduce the probability of large-scale combat, they increase the frequency of adversaries pursuing irregular warfare and malign activity short of armed conflict to achieve objectives. The tradeoff is acceptable because conducting irregular warfare with forces prepared for large-scale ground combat incurs less risk than conducting large-scale ground combat with forces unprepared to do so.

Irregular Warfare

1-42. Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and nonmilitary capabilities by state and non-state actors to achieve policy objectives other than military domination of an enemy, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare (ADP 3-0). Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example, the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare:

• The intent is to erode a political authority’s legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle.
• The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.

1-43. JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces [ARSOF]), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.