Trump and Kim, Act Two: Challenges of Engagement in a New Geopolitical Landscape
Abstract
The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 introduces new complexities to the already volatile geopolitical landscape. This is particularly true in the U.S.–Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) relations. Trump’s first term was marked by unprecedented direct engagement with DPRK’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, capturing global attention but failing to secure lasting agreements. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s alliance-building efforts were rebuffed by Pyongyang. Recent years have seen the DPRK strengthen alliances with Russia and China, leveraging these relationships to bolster its strategic and economic resilience. This evolving alignment complicates the United States’ capacity to recalibrate its approach under Trump’s renewed leadership.
Simultaneously, domestic political turbulence in the Republic of Korea and Japan further disrupts the regional security framework, challenging trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s potential approaches to alliances raise questions about the sustainability of U.S. influence and the ability of allies to adapt independently. As the DPRK deepens military and economic ties with Russia, its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict could reshape its strategic posture. This analysis explores how these shifting dynamics test the viability of U.S. strategies in the Indo-Pacific and highlights the urgent need for adaptable, multi-faceted policy approaches to address emerging challenges and sustain long-term stability.
(Author’s note: This analysis was completed on February 9, 2025. As world news is constantly evolving, developments may have occurred since this date that could counter the arguments and perspectives proposed herein.)
Introduction
The outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election surprised many, with Donald Trump returning to the White House and promising significant changes in U.S. foreign policies. Among these, U.S. policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains a critical question. Trump’s first term marked a bold departure from previous strategies, involving unprecedented direct engagement with DPRK’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and high-profile summits. While these efforts garnered global attention, they faced challenges in achieving lasting agreements. In contrast, the Biden administration prioritized alliance-building in the Indo-Pacific. While efforts were made to contact the DPRK, they were ultimately rebuffed. Since then, the DPRK has deepened alliances with Russia and China, recalibrating its strategy and complicating the United States’ traditional methods of engagement. As global dynamics shift, the viability of renewed U.S.-DPRK engagement remains uncertain.
North Korea’s Geopolitical Shift and Strategic Alliance
Since Trump’s departure in 2021, the DPRK has undergone significant geopolitical shifts, with its reignited relationship with Russia standing out as the most consequential. In a short amount of time, the bilateral relationship has intensified. Key developments have brought renewed attention to the DPRK’s strategic maneuvers. These include high-level state visits, the ratification of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty,” and the deployment of DPRK soldiers to Europe in support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the March 2024 Russian vote against renewing the United Nations’ expert panel tasked with monitoring sanctions targeting the DPRK highlights the growing partnership between the two nations.
While Russia provides military and strategic support, China remains the DPRK’s largest partner and is a crucial source of economic stability. Despite this, Beijing’s role in recent DPRK maneuvers has been comparatively subdued. While trade between the two nations reached its highest monthly volume of 2024 in November, experts have noted that it remains slightly below pre-pandemic figures. This dynamic reflects China’s measured approach, supporting DPRK economically while observing its evolving relationship with Russia. Despite this cautious stance, China continues to supply essential aid, enabling the DPRK to circumvent sanctions and focus on its military modernization.
Trump 2.0: New Challenges with the DPRK
Trump’s second term introduces new challenges for U.S.-DPRK relations. During his first term, Trump’s approach combined “maximum pressure” through sanctions with high-profile summits and direct engagement, representing a significant distinction from previous U.S. strategies. While it drew global attention, the complexities of denuclearization remained unresolved. Recent developments, however, suggest a shift in focus. The selection of Richard Grenell as Special Missions Envoy, tasked with “addressing multiple global hotspots,” signals that DPRK may not “be as high a priority as it was during Trump’s first term.” In addition, Marco Rubio endorsed a “rethinking of U.S. policy toward the DPRK” during his January 2025 confirmation hearing for his nominated position of Secretary of State. He emphasized “actively engaging the DPRK over-relying on sanctions,” signaling a shift from the Biden administration’s approach. Moreover, Trump’s reference to the DPRK as a “nuclear power” shortly after his inauguration, paraphrased by Secretary Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, signals a potential shift in tone. While not a formal policy change, South Korean officials characterized the comment as consistent with Trump’s previous approach and reaffirmed the administration’s goal of complete denuclearization. Despite this recognition, Trump has repeatedly expressed a willingness to re-engage in dialogue with Kim Jong Un, signaling his preference for direct diplomacy. This dual narrative of acknowledging Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities while pursuing disarmament reflects both the transactional nature of his approach and the complexities of negotiating with a nuclear-armed DPRK.
However, the perspective has changed north of the 38th Parallel. Kim’s remarks at the opening ceremony of the Military Hardware Exhibition Defense Development in November 2024 cast uncertainty on the viability of diplomatic efforts for the United States. In his speech, Kim expressed skepticism about U.S. support for its allies and dismissed the possibility of productive dialogue, stating, “We already did everything possible in the bilateral negotiations with the United States, and what we were eventually convinced of was not the superpower’s will to co-exist with us but its domineering stand and unchangeably aggressive and hostile policy towards the DPRK.” Additionally in February 2025, DPRK state media reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Rubio for calling the country “a rogue state” in an interview. The ministry asserted in their press statement that “We will never tolerate any provocation of the U.S., which has been always hostile to the DPRK and will be hostile to it in the future, too, but will take tough counteraction corresponding to it as usual.” These sentiments, combined with Kim’s strengthened alliance with his closest ally, question whether Trump’s prior tactics can be effective.
Another challenge that involves the DPRK is its role in the Russia-Ukraine war. Officials from Europe, advisors to Trump, and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg have collectively noted recalibrations in Trump’s strategy for resolving the conflict. His initial plan to end the war in “24 hours” has been extended to “several months,” signaling “continued U.S. involvement in the conflict to ensure a stronger negotiating position.” Should negotiations to end the conflict occur, potentially involving Trump, the resulting settlement could affect the DPRK and reshape its relations with Russia. This potential shift, dependent on the terms of the agreement and Trump’s approach, remains a critical factor in the evolving geopolitical landscape.
Regional Security Dynamics
The second Trump administration will face intricate challenges with its Indo-Pacific allies, especially within the trilateral alliance. In the Republic of Korea (ROK), political uncertainty following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and subsequent leadership changes complicates its capacity to align with U.S. strategic priorities. Acting President Choi Sang-mok has vowed to maintain stability, but domestic turmoil poses challenges for advancing trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Prior to Yoon’s December 2024 marital law incident, concerns were already growing about alliance assurance under Trump’s transactional approach, prompting renewed discussions on nuclear armament as a means of self-reliance.
In Japan, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s administration faces its own political challenges following significant parliamentary losses by the ruling coalition in the late 2024 elections. The outcome has limited his party’s dominance, exposing challenges in maintaining political stability. Ishiba’s emphasis on enhancing Japan’s defense posture and maintaining dialogue with both the United States and China highlights a dual strategy of deterrence and engagement. Ishiba’s February 2025 meeting with Trump reaffirmed the commitment to strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, which the White House described as the “cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.” The summit underscored key priorities, including defense cooperation, economic security, and a renewed commitment to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK. Ishiba has also expressed interest in meeting with Xi Jinping. These diplomatic engagements underscore Japan’s efforts to stabilize relations with its largest trading partners while balancing regional security concerns, particularly regarding the DPRK.
These dynamics underscore broader regional recalibrations driven by DPRK’s strategic alignments with Russia and China. Experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies note that the DPRK’s reliance on Russia for sanctions relief and military support has significantly reduced its incentive to negotiate with the United States. This growing alignment has further weakened the effectiveness of U.S.-led sanctions and diplomatic efforts for engagement. Indo-Pacific scholars affirm that both the ROK and Japan remain pivotal to U.S. efforts in the Indo-Pacific. Still, their domestic and foreign policy challenges could complicate the endurance of the trilateral alliance.
Furthermore, Trump’s potential “America First” policies, which might emphasize transactional alliances, could reshape U.S. partnerships. Some foreign policy scholars argued that this approach risks alienating allies who view alliances as essential for mutual defense and regional stability. However, others suggest that such a stance could drive greater burden-sharing among U.S. allies, especially in the Indo-Pacific, fostering stronger coalitions independent of the United States. Multilateralism defined the Biden administration’s foreign policy approach to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the trilateral alliance. Pyongyang is likely to monitor each member’s domestic and foreign policy challenges, as well as the impact of U.S. policies on the alliance’s future.
Conclusion
Trump’s return to the presidency coincides with a volatile geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific. The DPRK’s deepened alliances with Russia and China, coupled with the domestic political challenges in the ROK and Japan, complicate traditional U.S. strategies. The administration must monitor pivotal developments in the region, including the reconvening of the Special Assembly, the fate of the Yoon administration, and Ishiba’s regional diplomacy. As these developments unfold, Rubio’s emphasis on avoiding nuclear proliferation in the region underscores the administration’s cautious yet pragmatic approach to managing these challenges. In their first days in office, Rubio and Hegseth individually engaged with their respective Japanese and South Korean counterparts, reinforcing U.S. commitment to regional stability through trilateral cooperation.
Additionally, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war could significantly influence Russia-DPRK relations. Experts suggest that a favorable settlement for Russia might reduce its reliance on the DPRK, weakening their relationship. Conversely, an unfavorable outcome could deepen their partnership, making Pyongyang less willing to engage with Washington. However, if Russia’s position is weakened, it could create opportunities for renewed U.S. dialogue with the DPRK.
Navigating these complexities will require the second Trump administration to carefully balance global priorities and regional commitments. Success depends on crafting strategies that address immediate threats while adapting to long-term shifts shaping the Indo-Pacific.
