Long-Range Maritime Air Assault Operation in the Indo-Pacific Theater
Indo-Pacific Theater Operations
Operational reach refers to the distance and duration a military force can effectively project its capabilities. During a long-range maritime air assault, this concept is directly tied to the limitations of basing and lines of operation. The tyranny of distance across the Indo-Pacific region presents a significant challenge, one that can only be mitigated by higher headquarters providing a well-thought-out support and sustainment plan. Brigade and battalion-level units assume significant risk when conducting long-range maritime air assaults, especially when the operation occurs hundreds of miles away from support.
It is unrealistic to expect a brigade or battalion to support and sustain itself from such a distance without external assistance. This risk extends to medical support, where a battalion’s medical platoon and physician’s assistant are insufficient for managing casualties over long distances. Dedicated air medevac support must be planned and on standby for immediate response. Additionally, joint capabilities, such as U.S. Navy vessels with onboard surgical departments, are critical to mitigating the distance in the event of medical emergencies.
Similarly, naval gunfire support is invaluable for prepping objectives and providing fires that enable ground forces to maneuver freely. The phrase “We will never fight alone again” should be taken seriously, particularly in the context of long-range maritime air assault operations. Units must plan, resource, and train for these type of air assaults.
Air Assault Operations
During a Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center training rotation, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment “Wolfhounds” practiced one of the most challenging joint operations in our modern strategic catalog; a long-range maritime air assault. During this exercise, the Wolfhounds conducted operations over the north Pacific Ocean, flying from Dillingham Army Airfield on the northern shore of Oahu to Pohakuloa Training Area on the island of Hawaii—more than 200 miles from their higher headquarters. A basic air assault operation is a military mission in which ground forces utilize rotary-winged aircraft and their mobility to combine all available firepower and maneuver assets under a single ground force commander, known as the air assault task force commander. The goal is to enable the commander to envelop the enemy and gain a battlefield advantage by seizing and securing key terrain.
For light infantry units, specifically one assigned to the Indo-Pacific Theater, mastering the planning and execution of air assault operations is essential. The ability to rapidly move assault forces across a dynamic battlefield can be the decisive factor in determining victory or defeat. Now, consider the added complexity of conducting an air assault over the Pacific; a vast, unforgiving body of water.
Military Maritime Forces and Long-Range Maritime Air Assault
Military maritime forces are defined as those that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, achieve sea control, or deny the sea, and/or project power from the sea. The Wolfhounds mission was to execute a 400 to 500 Soldier strong long-range maritime air assault, a complex operation. The likelihood of conducting such an assault is real in the Indo-Pacific region, which consists of numerous island chain countries. Such terrain demands combined and joint coordination’s to achieve success, across all domains: Land, Maritime, Air, Space, and Cyberspace.
The challenges from the get-go were significant, particularly in determining the minimal force required to achieve fire superiority and secure the objective. The task of organizing maneuver, fires, medical support, and sustainment were planning factors that had to be balanced, with difficult decisions being made on the risk to mission and force.
The goal is to enable the commander to envelop the enemy and gain a battlefield advantage by seizing and securing key terrain.
Ultimately, the number of rotary-wing aircraft available dictated the task organization, influencing how combat power would be delivered due to the limited seating capacity of the aircraft to the helicopter landing zones. The decision was made to deploy two infantry companies, the dismounted command and control node, and a small attachment of medical personnel to provide coverage. A long-range maritime air assault inherently adds friction to an already complex mission set due to the distance covered and the isolation of the unit conducting the air assault. When adding to the challenges of outlining what headquarters owns specific planning tasks, all planning and coordination must be briefed and rehearsed at echelon to minimize friction.
Friction During the Air Assault Planning Process and Rehearsals
Planning for air assaults requires collaborative and parallel planning, allotting additional time for executing units to continue to rehearse and refine the ground combat plan. Culminating in the development of a detailed plan ensuring a successful operation. Initially, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment began deliberate planning, had a liaison officer attached and were coordinating directly with their aviation counterparts. This flattened the communication and planning process, with the assumption that the battalion commander would act as the air assault task force commander. A plan was formed, guidance issued, and the mission execution timeline was initiated.
A decision to consolidate responsibilities back to the brigade staff after initial planning had begun, led to confusion with planning and rehearsals. This friction experienced was frustrating; specifically, because it added an unnecessary duplication of effort: repeating coordination meetings and rehearsals between the ground unit and the air assets. In an already compressed planning environment, this wasted precious time and energy.
Ultimately, it was resolved by correcting our communication gaps; critical leaders ensured that all stakeholders were on the same page and committed to not repeating the error. In the end, the brigade led the overall planning, air mission coordination, and execution, while the battalion focused on its ground tactical plan. The brigade then tasked the Wolfhounds with running pick-up zone rehearsals, due to the rapid shift in duties, this further delayed critical rehearsals needed for the ground tactical plan.
Yet, we were soon to experience that even the most well-developed plans are vulnerable to the unknown. As the saying goes, murphy’s law can and will strike at the most inconvenient moments.
The Unknown to the Unknown
Conducting a long-range maritime air assault brings many unknowns. Staffs make assumptions made based on intelligence reports and past experiences yet may not have vital data to make the most sound decisions. Assumptions provide commanders with a general understanding of the situation, but they are not foolproof.
The Army cannot plan for every eventuality, but we must be prepared to respond to unexpected events with agility and expertise. One key area of preparation focus that enhances our flexibility during a long-range maritime air assault mission is ensuring that Soldier and alternate aircraft load plans are thought out and rehearsed. This ensures that combat power reaches the objective at the right moment.
Joint capabilities, such as U.S. Navy vessels with onboard surgical departments, are critical to mitigating the distance in the event of medical emergencies.
Once 1st battalion was finally in the air, murphy reared his ugly head. One incident during the operation starkly illustrated the unpredictability of such missions: a helicopter carrying the battalion commander was diverted 30 minutes into a two-hour flight due to a potential catastrophic failure in its partner helicopter’s rear drive shaft. Both aircraft had to divert from their planned air assault corridor and land at the nearest airfield to avoid a ditching incident in the deep waters of the North Pacific Ocean.
This emergency decision, made by the pilot, saved lives and preserved equipment; it was the right choice without a doubt. However, it also resulted in separating the command-and-control node that oversees and manages the entire operation from the intended air assault objective, delaying the ground commander by hours. The battalion did not think through the ‘what-ifs’ or contingencies for aircraft malfunctions while enroute to the objective, a foreseeable and moderately probable circumstance.
But as reliable Soldiers always do, they adapted and overcame getting the job done! Subordinate company commanders, already in position, adjusted the plan and word was passed between aircraft that a subordinate commander would assume command in the interim. Eventually, the battalion commander was moved to an alternate landing zone, where he resumed command of the already initiated attack.
Despite the setback, the operation was a success due to the flexibility and initiative of subordinate leaders, ones that fully understood the commander’s intent and executed the mission violently and effectively.
Conclusion
While air assault operations are inherently challenging, conducting a long-range maritime air assault significantly amplifies the need for meticulous planning at all levels. The friction and confusion a long-range maritime air assault brought became frustrating at multiple echelons, quickly identifying which unit at echelon owns what specific responsibility will significantly reduce friction and confusion. The battalion should have been allowed to continue to refine and complete the plan independently, this would have streamlined and simplified the planning process.
By failing to think through every problem set, we didn’t allow subordinate commanders to take appropriate action when the unexpected happened. War game, war game, war game, war game every phase of the operation. Echelons above brigade must recognize the importance of such operations and provide the necessary support and sustainment that only they can offer. Having the fly-away air assault unit directly reporting to it’s higher headquarters, would have made coordinating and receiving the appropriate echelons of support so much more effective. Requiring a unit report through multiple levels of command slowed battlefield effects and forced the battalion to rely solely on its internal mortars and attached 105mm artillery.
The division being the echelon on action, requires fast and flat communications directly to the headquarters that owns the assets which impacts the battlefield and turns the fight in favor of friendly forces.
Conducting a long-range maritime air assault is a mission uniquely suited to the Indo-Pacific region, where vast distances and island chains create unique challenges and opportunities. There were many lessoned learned at echelon during the training exercise, especially training for long range maritime air assaults. Units assigned to the Indo-Pacific region must train for this type of strategically impactful mission consistently and build proficiency.
