Great Power Competition and Irregular Warfare

Those of a certain age will remember the issues that the Defense Department and the U.S. Government overall have had with labeling operations short of full-scale conventional war. The plethora of terms used in the past for seemingly similar missions was virtually guaranteed to preclude an intellectual underpinning for analysis and strategic planning. With the adoption of the term irregular warfare (IW) and the ongoing efforts to develop a more sophisticated doctrine, the level of consistency on how to approach these most difficult of operations may show both coherence and further doctrinal progress.

A key issue to be resolved, however, is the ‘boundaries’ of IW. The right boundary is clear: operations short of full-scale war. It is the left boundary that remains problematic. Exactly what constitutes IW as opposed to ‘normal’ diplomatic, information, and military operations? At least in theory, if not in practice, the old chestnut of the acronym MIDLIFE – Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, Economic – should drive national policy on a routine basis. In practice, of course, actually melding these disparate functions into a coherent whole has very much proven to be the exception rather than the rule. This is why having a conceptualization of multiple strands of effort is so important. Irregular warfare can provide the framework for this.

The definition of IW has evolved over time. The Defense Department’s Joint Operating Concept of 2007 emphasized “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy.” By the date of the public release of the 2020 National Defense Strategy, the term “violent” had been dropped, but the stress on legitimacy remained. Likewise, legitimacy has been a keystone for definitional purposes by Ucko and Marks. There has developed broad agreement that operations included under the rubric of IW involve unconventional warfare, stabilization, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. Some have argued that re-labeling at least some of these would result in greater clarity, but the missions seem to be conceptually clear at the operational level.

One overarching issue for current IW doctrine development is that it is now largely viewed through the prism of great power competition. Then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced that the era of irregular warfare was over and that the era of “great power competition” was underway. The Biden Administration adopted policies that emphasized this conceptualization, although exactly how ‘great power competition’ is defined remains somewhat hazy in US strategic thinking. One recent example – which seems to exemplify the murkiness of the policy – is from an Administration spokesperson: “We seek a strategic competition with China, we do not seek conflict.”  Most recently, a similar statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen H. Hicks stressed competition rather than conflict, although emphasizing the defensive nature of the competition. There is of course the possibility of change with the incoming Administration, but the initial indicators are that the policy will be similar.

Clearly, IW has an important role to play in global competition with troublesome adversaries, whether ‘great power’ or emergent. If the aperture of focus becomes too restrictive, however, many opportunities may be missed.

This conceptualization of competition rather than conflict can lead to some strategic fuzziness. The key ‘boundary line’ separating the two likely will be rather amorphous and can be somewhat broad. This boundary will be where IW is of the most use – and, in fact, be critical – but requires that the government make a strategically coherent decision that the competition has reached the stage in which the various IW tools are required. Half-hearted or poorly coordinated efforts likely either will fail or actually make the strategic environment worse.

There is a second issue in dealing with the strategy surrounding IW. Much of the current rhetoric surrounding IW involves competition or conflict with major powers or emerging powers. Typically, these have been identified as Russia, China, Iran, and sometimes North Korea. In part, this is a reflection of the writings and thought pieces by various Russian and Chinese military leaders. Also, of course, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bellicose rhetoric (and some actions) coming from Beijing emphasize their competitive threats. Certainly, the current and possible activities of these two countries (along with Iran) must be taken into account in developing IW doctrine and strategy along with broader strategic guidance.

The danger with a focus on competition with only a few countries is that this does not encompass other significant operations that require US involvement. In practice, the two largest and most sustained campaigns in recent years that might be subsumed under the rubric of IW were in Afghanistan and Iraq. Neither would fit under the strategic umbrella of great power competition. Even if one were to argue that operations in Iraq involved a competition and occasional conflict with Iran, this largely was a result of the invasion, not the principal cause. There certainly have been several other long-lasting operations – such as in Syria and the Sahel – that would emphasize this point.

There are numerous regions and countries whose stability is important to the US. In many cases (if not the majority), these do not represent a direct struggle for influence with either Russia or China. Putting these types of operations in a separate box can lead to some doctrinal and strategic orphans. In many ways, these non-‘great power’ IW missions may, in fact, be more critical in establishing and maintaining ‘arcs of stability’ in which both regional and US interests are maintained. A narrow focus on great power competition can miss both the challenges and the opportunities in these environments.

Clearly, IW has an important role to play in global competition with troublesome adversaries, whether ‘great power’ or emergent. If the aperture of focus becomes too restrictive, however, many opportunities may be missed. There are multiple threats in the international environment, and well-crafted IW strategies can minimize the expansion of these threats. IW certainly must play a significant role in broader international competition and conflict with major adversaries but focusing it solely on that environment can lead to some ugly surprises.