The Strategic Use of Plausible Deniability in Proxy Wars Azerbaijan’s Proxy War (1988–1994)

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (1988–1994) was deeply intertwined with the dissolution of the USSR, as the collapse created a power vacuum and widespread instability across the Caucasus region. Following the USSR’s dissolution in 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) declared its independence, becoming a contested state. This declaration came during a volatile period. Many former Soviet Republics, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, were grappling to define their national security and assert their sovereignty for the first time since they joined the USSR in 1922 as part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The political and security turmoil of this transitional era heightened the tensions between the NKR and Azerbaijan. This was due in large part because during the Soviet period, the NKR was part of Azerbaijan. The tension between the two actors eventually led to a conflict that symbolized the broader struggles of the post-Soviet states to assert their sovereignty and control.

In this volatile environment, the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh takes on a central role in the new regional power dynamics, soon drawing the attention and involvement of external states. The proxy war that followed is an early post–Cold War example of how states leverage plausible deniability to advance their interests. Armenia, as the primary supporter of the NKR and its insurgency against Azerbaijan, used plausible deniability as a means to an end Armenia used NKR to gain regional influence without the negative consequences of a strong international condemnation. On the other hand, Türkiye took a contrasting approach by openly communicating its support and involvement in the proxy war. This dichotomy between Armenia’s denial and Türkiye’s transparency highlights how states strategically employ plausible deniability to advance their interests, while in other cases, states may opt for open acknowledgment of their involvement in proxy wars.

In a recent article, I argued that claims of plausible deniability are becoming increasingly challenging for states to sustain. During a recent podcast with Amos Fox, we explored how this trend traces back to Cold War-era proxy wars. In this essay, I delve deeper into how, even in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, states like Türkiye and Armenia adopted distinct approaches to plausible deniability. Türkiye’s overt support for Azerbaijan against the NKR posed a direct challenge to the post-Soviet regional order, where the USSR had long been the dominant power. This case exemplifies how regional powers navigate the complex and shifting dynamics of the post-Cold War proxy wars.

The Proxy War Actors

Consistent with the literature, I argue that Armenia, Russia, and Türkiye supported proxies in the civil war (Table 1). It is important to note that while external actors engaged in mediation efforts and provided humanitarian aid, these actions are distinct from the support coded for this proxy war and therefore their humanitarian aid efforts should be viewed separately from their proxy war strategies.

Another critical aspect is that certain actors, particularly Russia and Türkiye, shifted their regional policies over time. Before and after 1994, these states supported different sides in the conflict, which aligns with the broader argument that their involvement was driven by a desire to secure influence in the region rather than loyalty to a specific proxy.

State Sponsors in Azerbaijan's Proxy War

A notable limitation of this study is the lack of U.S. support for Azerbaijan compared to the humanitarian aid provided to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Under the New Independent States (NIS) program, the US extended significant support to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Consequently, the US aid and policy for on Armenia and Azerbaijan fall outside the purview of this research.

Plausible Deniability and Armenia’s strategy in the proxy war

Armenia’s role as the primary supporter of the NKR aimed to coerce Azerbaijan into recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. Armenia sought to leverage its ethnic ties and shared interests with the NKR to gain regional influence. However, Azerbaijan, in a series of letters to the United Nations, argued that Armenian armed forces had crossed their borders and occupied Azerbaijani territory. In response, Armenia consistently denied any military involvement, asserting that its armed forces were not responsible for the attacks. Instead, Armenia maintained that any Armenians fighting in the conflict did so voluntarily, without state direction or authorization.

UN resolutions adopted a more cautious narrative, referring to “influence” over the NKR rather than referring to Armenia’s military support as a direct military intervention. Indeed, Armenia never formally admitted to intervening militarily in Azerbaijan, emphasizing instead its sovereign right to secure its borders and denying any territorial claims against Azerbaijan. This ambiguity aligns with the broader argument that states often seek to obscure their support in conflicts to maintain plausible deniability to prevent condemnation from the international community. Still, evidence from the UCDP database suggested that Armenia was more active in the civil war because they deployed secondary troops to support the NKR.

This case closely mirrors the concept of sovereign defection in foreign policy. As Vladimir Rauta argued in the context of Russian actions in Ukraine, Armenia’s approach shares similar characteristics—denying military involvement despite contrary evidence while pursuing regional objectives through indirect means. Armenia’s support for the NKR, coupled with its denials of direct involvement and reliance on diplomatic efforts to influence the outcome of the conflict, reinforces the classification of this as a proxy war where the state involved relies on plausible deniability rather than outright military intervention. Indeed, Armenia’s support for the NKR was multifaceted, encompassing technical and economic assistance as well as limited ground and air support.

We should keep in mind that Armenia and Azerbaijan were newly independent states with suboptimal military equipment, largely inherited from the collapsing USSR. It is telling that when Azerbaijan declared its independence it requested from the USSR’s troops to remain in key areas until it could establish a national guard. Meanwhile, the region was engulfed in insecurity. By 1991, the Georgian civil war was in full swing, further destabilizing a region where Armenia and Azerbaijan shared borders with an increasingly fragile neighbor. The two nations were locked in a constant security competition without the constraints of Cold War-era bipolar security dilemmas and with the foreign policies of previous decades rendered obsolete, both nations faced unprecedented challenges.

Turkish Strategy in the Proxy War: Opting in Acknowledging Supporting a Proxy

Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal adopted a clear and assertive stance regarding Azerbaijan during this period. Türkiye viewed the region as a strategic opportunity to challenge Russia’s longstanding dominance, and Özal made public statements condemning Armenia’s actions while pledging Türkiye’s allegiance as a trusted ally of Azerbaijan. In fact, the Azeri government rejected Iran’s offer of support, favoring instead the more welcome backing from Türkiye. On 9 November 1991, Türkiye became the first state to recognize the Republic of Azerbaijan, which declared its independence on 30 August 1991.

Türkiye’s open support for Azerbaijan was deeply tied to its strategic ambitions in the Caucasus, a region bordering Central Asia with significant geopolitical importance. By abandoning plausible deniability and openly backing the Azeri government, Türkiye sent a clear message about its intent to expand its sphere of influence—particularly in opposition to regional powers such as Iran and Russia. This stance was further reinforced through key diplomatic actions, including Türkiye’s decision to close its border with Armenia following the Armenian capture of Kalbajar in 1993, a city located outside the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Turkish policymakers also consistently advocated for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, underscoring Türkiye’s commitment to aligning itself with Azerbaijan’s strategic goals and asserting its influence in the region.

However, despite the initial enthusiasm, Turkish proxy war strategy ultimately fell short of Azerbaijan’s expectations. By 1992, cracks began to appear in the relationship, as Azerbaijan grew increasingly critical of Türkiye’s limited involvement. Elchibey, the then Head of State of Azerbaijan, expressed frustration, stating that Türkiye had not provided substantive aid apart from diplomatic support. While this may have come as a disappointment to the Azerbaijani government, Türkiye’s cautious approach was consistent with its broader strategic priorities. Entering a new geopolitical era, Türkiye was unwilling to take significant risks in a region that did not rank high among its political priorities.

Türkiye’s engagement in the proxy war was ultimately limited, focusing more on advancing its economic interests in the region rather than on security or military objectives. By the end of 1994, Türkiye’s contributions to Azerbaijan were confined to limited technical and economic assistance, falling far short of the full-scale support Azerbaijan had hoped for.

The Role of the Former Superpower in the Region

With the collapse of the USSR, Russia’s military leadership decided to provide military and financial support to the newly independent states emerging from the Union. In the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, both nations reportedly received similar amounts of military equipment. Meanwhile, Russia deployed a limited force to Armenia in 1992 under a bilateral agreement, ostensibly to provide security amid the ongoing civil war in Georgia and effectively providing security against Armenia’s role in the proxy war in Azerbaijan. This deployment offered Armenia a significant advantage by securing an active ally within its territory while simultaneously sending a clear message to Azerbaijan and Türkiye: Armenia remained within Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.

By 1992, regional dynamics shifted as Russia openly competed with Iran and Türkiye for influence in the South Caucasus. This competition was mirrored in Armenia’s reliance on Russia as a credible ally, which emboldened Armenia to push for more aggressive actions in its proxy war with Azerbaijan. By 1993, Armenia supported the NKR in intensifying military operations against Azerbaijani forces. With Armenia’s full backing, the NKR made significant territorial gains beyond its enclave, especially capturing the city of Kalbajar.

Tensions in the region were on the rise, with the absence of an active US role creating opportunities for regional powers to vie for dominance. However, Russia, facing its own internal challenges after the dissolution of the USSR, was not in a position to escalate the proxy war further.

The Epilogue of the Proxy War

Russia’s waning influence in the region and military fatigue marked a critical turning point in the proxy war. By 1993, Türkiye limited its role to diplomatic support, withdrawing from direct engagement in Azerbaijan’s proxy war. Similarly, Russia—now grappling with reduced military effectiveness and growing concerns over rogue elements within its armed forces—shifted its focus toward economic interests and avoided further escalation. By early 1994, Iran and Türkiye were supporting Azerbaijan solely through diplomatic efforts. Eventually Russia through the Bishkek Protocol brokered a ceasefire contributing to the eventual de-escalation of the conflict.

The contrasting approaches of Armenia and Türkiye during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict illustrate that plausible deniability is not a fixed feature of proxy wars. Rather, plausible deniability is a strategic tool that provides policymakers with a range of options which are shaped by a state’s broader objectives and chosen proxy war strategy. Armenia leveraged plausible deniability as a means to avoid direct accountability while advancing its support for the NKR, framing its involvement as non-military despite significant evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, Türkiye adopted an open and public stance, using its overt support for Azerbaijan to signal its ambitions to expand regional influence and challenge rival powers like Iran and Russia. These examples demonstrate that plausible deniability is not synonymous with proxy wars but operates as one of several strategies that states employ to manage risks, shape perceptions, and send signals to other actors in the conflict and the broader region. The choice of whether to conceal or reveal involvement ultimately depends on the strategic goals of the state, underscoring the need to view proxy wars as dynamic phenomena where covert and overt actions coexist, driven by the military and political objectives of the states sponsors.