Armed Confrontations and Forced Evacuation from Villages in Chiapas, Mexico: The Uncontrolled Southern Border with Guatemala

This research outlines the current state of violence and armed confrontations in the Mexican southern state of Chiapas during the calendar year 2024. The purpose of the work is to serve as an abstract civilian version of a military indications and warnings (I&W) report. In this case, the warnings are that governance in Chiapas is frail and that its people are being victimized and displaced. Several notable events are catalogued in vignettes that describe the sieges of towns and the forced displacement of their inhabitants. These warnings are based on indications that organized crime elements are increasingly dominating territory in southern Mexico and displacing thousands of innocent civilians during criminal operations and conflicts.

We begin by providing background and context related to similar conflicts in the area, followed by a listing of the actors or criminal armed groups (in lay terms combatants)  that are currently engaged in localized warfare, and further amplified with a chronology of the specific town or villages and municipalities that have been laid to siege. The paper continues with a collated summary of tactics and methods used to victimize innocent inhabitants and includes a limited review of the response of public safety entities to the violence. Policy ramifications and other consequences to governance are discussed in the closing section of this paper.

Introduction

Chiapas is fertile ground for victimization of people, properties and places, given that it has a higher proportion of indigenous peoples and that the south is less developed economically than the rest of Mexico. This research covers victimization of all Mexicans in Chiapas, without providing specific attention to indigenous Mexicans.

Chiapas experienced continuing periods of violence and internal warfare since the Zapatista Uprising of 1994, the Zapatista Crisis of 1995, and the continued tension between the Mexican government, the indigenous peoples and farmers in the area since that time.[1] The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) emerged from the southern state of Chiapas in Mexico in the late 1980s championing indigenous rights and localized self-governance. Chiapas has a diverse cultural landscape, home to numerous native groups, including the Tzeltal, Tzotzil, and Tojolabal indigenous peoples who have been marginalized and subjected to continuous injustices such as loss of land holdings and the negative effects on the local economy that these forms of exploitation bring.[2]

Armed conflicts in Chiapas have continued since the 1990s and are currently attributed to violent clashes between competing criminal cartels for the purpose of temporarily occupying a municipality or area to ensure the unimpeded arrival or transit of drugs, migrants, weapons, and other illicit shipments. Currently, cartel warfare over control of disputed territories inside southern Mexico near the Guatemalan border is conducted to establish dominance over access to territory, or land access and use, known as “cobro de piso,” extortions, kidnappings, drug trafficking, and human or migrant smuggling. Most confrontations occur in two of the three distinct geographical areas of Chiapas, namely the mountainous and border zones between Mexico and Guatemala. The third, or coastal zone, comprised of highways or roadways that run roughly along the Pacific coastline, sees less intercartel confrontations.

Two major cartels, the Cártel de Sinaloa (CDS or Sinaloa Cartel) and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and their surrogates are the principal fighters, resulting in warfare that has led to killings and the temporary displacement of thousands of innocent civilians who are caught in the crossfire. The location of Chiapas at Mexico’s border with Guatemala makes this southern state an important pathway to the interior of the country. While these cartels often alternate in winning control of swaths of territory, or individual towns or cities from rivals, the consistent presence of armed criminals in these plazas (trafficking corridors) is destabilizing and could lead to further loss of Mexican sovereignty and governance.

Numerous tactics are used to either forcibly remove people from a cartel’s area of operations, or to subjugate residents in a town of interest, including making conditions intolerable enough to cause the involuntary evacuation of entire municipalities.  In some cases, villagers or townspeople are forced to serve as guards at checkpoints, where they work as involuntary lookouts that are part of a cartel’s early warning system, or work at access control points that are formed at the outer perimeter of their operational area or territory being contested. These same civilians are also forcibly kept at these checkpoints to act as human shields that are used to deter attacks from rivals.

In the case of Chiapas, once an airstrip, road, river, path or village is identified as necessary to cartel operations, traffickers set blockades to stop or deny entry to any vehicular traffic or set up checkpoints to identify and filter traffic so that no enemy arms-bearers or government forces approach or enter the area.

The resulting forced evacuations of civilians create increased needs for transportation, shelter, water, food, sanitation, and other life sustaining necessities for the dozens, hundreds or thousands of people who are displaced from their homes. In 2024, upwards of 5,000 residents of Chiapas were forcibly evacuated from their villages for temporary periods by the cartels. The federal and state governments have been slow to respond to the victimization and are typically dismissive of these events, sometimes claiming these confrontations are not drug cartel related, but rather caused by disputes among local farmers.

Cartels & Criminal Armed Groups (CAGs)

The CDS (Cártel De Sinaloa,) or Sinaloa Cartel is the patriarch organization of drug trafficking in Mexico and has generally reigned supreme for decades until it began to splinter and enter into warfare with break-away groups and other competitors for market share. The CDS is being challenged throughout Mexico, primarily by the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). The Sinaloa Cartel leader, Joaquin Guzman Loera, or “El Chapo Guzman,” is in a US federal prison and two of the remaining leaders of the organization, Ismael Zambada Garcia, “El Mayo Zambada,” and Joaquin Guzman Lopez, the son Chapo Guzman, were arrested on July 25, 2024, at an airport outside of El Paso, Texas. The arrests leave the organization vulnerable to challenges by competitors which are attempting to increase market share in a multi-billion-dollar criminal enterprise.[3]

The Sinaloa Cartel is frequently engaged in firefights with competitors throughout Mexico as they seek to continue to dominate the importation of essential and precursor chemicals, production of illicit drugs, acquisition of weaponry, repatriation of drug proceeds, movement of migrants, as well as many other crimes that are operated by the cartel, or its surrogates, or organizations that operate under the Sinaloa brand as franchisees. In the warring front of Chiapas, the Sinaloa Cartel is aided by surrogate gangs such as a previous alliance with “El Karma,” an armed group operating and engaged in warfare in Tila, and surrounding areas of Chiapas.

Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) 

The Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) was founded in 2011 and has evolved into one of the most powerful and violent criminal organizations in Mexico. The CJNG has been identified as being extensively involved in drug trafficking, particularly methamphetamine. The cartel is known for its violent methods and sophisticated operations including the use of drones and rocket-propelled grenades. In 2018, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimated that the CJNG exerts influence in 23 of 31 (three fourths) of Mexican states, including key drug production and transportation corridors.  CJNG is disciplined and has a structured command and control hierarchy, conducts sophisticated money laundering techniques, operates efficient drug transportation routes and engages in extreme acts of violence.[4]

The CJNG are aided in Chiapas by surrogate gangs such as:

“Los Huistas” is a Guatemala Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) that is based in the northwestern Department of Huehuetenango and that operates on both sides of the Guatemala-Mexico border.  Los Huistas are known to smuggle cocaine, methamphetamine and heroin from Guatemala through Mexico for distribution in multiple U.S. cities. Los Huistas also control poppy cultivation fields in the mountainous departments of Huehuetenango and San Marcos and have imported precursor chemicals from China to manufacture methamphetamine. Los Huistas also engages in money laundering.[5]

“Los Autonomos” is a heavily armed group dressed in military style tactical uniforms with balaclavas covering their faces, that operates in Tila and surrounding areas of Chiapas. They have engaged in warfare with “El Karma” for territory in Chiapas and have been ruthless in their attacks including executions of adults, children and entire families, causing injuries, burning of vehicles, homes and businesses, and torture.

“El Karma” is an armed group operating in Tila and surrounding areas of Chiapas. They have engaged in warfare with “Los Autonomos” for territory in Chiapas.

“Cártel Chiapas-Guatemala” is an armed group reportedly comprised of deserters from the CJNG and also engaged in warfare against the CDS in Chiapas.

“Los Maiz” is an armed wing of the CJNG that took control of several municipalities in Chiapas in January 2024.

“El/Los Machete/s” is an armed civilian self-defense (autodefensas) group operating in Pantelhó and Chenalhó, Chiapas. Their affiliation with any criminal organization is unknown, however they have formed an alliance with another autodefensas group comprised of former members of the EZLN.

“Unnamed Autodefensas” (formerly EZLN Fighters) is an armed force of more than one thousand former members of the del Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN)* established themselves as a self-defense (autodefensas) group and has allied themselves with the Los Machetes to defend the inhabitants from the warring cartels in the area.

*EZLN or the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) is a guerrilla group in Mexico, founded in the late 20th century and named for the early 20th-century peasant revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. On 1 January 1994, the Zapatistas staged a rebellion from their base in Chiapas, the southernmost Mexican state, to protest economic policies that they believed would negatively affect Mexico’s indigenous population. The insurgency later developed into a forceful political movement that advocated for Mexico’s disenfranchised indigenous.[6]

“Los Herrera” is a criminal organization operated by a family of the same name in the area of Pantelhó and Chenalhó, Chiapas, also known as the “Ejército Civil Indígena” (The Indigenous Civilian Army) that is allied with the CJNG.

Armed Confrontations and Forced Evacuations 

Though not all inclusive, the following events have taken place since May 2023 in the mountainous region of the state of Chiapas. Most if not all of the events resulted in either a siege or forced evacuation of a town or village, followed by an exodus of residents by foot, car or whatever transportation method is available for escape (Figure 1). Frontera Comalpa Siege and Exodus

Figure 1. Frontera Comalpa Siege and Exodus (May 2023). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

On or about 15 May 2023, over 3,000 residents living in the area of Frontera Comalapa (Figure 1), a municipality on the Mexican side of the Guatemalan border, were forced to flee their homes after almost 60 people were killed amid a wave of executions, forced recruitments, or forced labor at roadblocks constructed by members of either the CDS or the CJNG, or their surrogates.[7]

The CJNG is reportedly working with Guatemalan drug trafficking organizations, as well as corrupting military officials, to smuggle shipments of drugs over land and by sea into Mexico. Arms and human trafficking also occur along the Frontera Comalapa through which smugglers transport their cargos along mountain pathways to La Angostura (a reservoir and dam), and further north by boat or vehicle. The CJNG joined Los Huistas, one of Guatemala’s known drug trafficking organizations, that previously had an alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel.

InSight Crime reported that Frontera Comalapa has been split into two domains, “with the CJNG controlling areas next to the border and the Sinaloa Cartel operating in its mountainous northern areas,” while the area remains an armed conflict zone. On 29 May 2024, approximately two weeks later, a large contingent of over 1,500 soldiers and police personnel arrived to restore order.

Socoltenango Siege and Exodus

Figure 2. Socoltenango Siege and Exodus (January 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

The Socoltenango siege and exodus (Figure 2) was the first reported displacement event of 2024.[8] In early January, members of the CDS arrived in the villages listed below and began taking a census of people that were operating local farms for the purpose of recruiting more warriors. Local farmers refused to be recruited and demanded that the traffickers leave their villages. Instead, the Sinaloa fighters threatened them and imposed taxes on families farming corn in the area. These same communities had been threatened by opposing the CJNG and their surrogate group called Maiz, which had previously established control of the area of Frontera Comalpa.

On 16 January 2024, elements of the Mexican Army and the National Guard responded and began an attempt to restore normalcy to these communities. On Wednesday, 17 January 2024 thousands of villagers comprised of men, women, and children from four municipalities including Chicomuselo, Frontera Comalapa, La Concordia and residents of Puerto Rico and Nuevo Chejel, from Socoltenango, abandoned their homes, animals and crops and began a mass exodus on foot that led them to La Angostura Dam, about 300 kilometers (180 miles) where they were trapped due to a lack of transport across the lake.  Residents of Chicomusluelo were quickly joined by inhabitants of Rizo de Oro, Guadalupe, San José Maravilla, San Isidro, Resplandor, and Colonia El Retiro, villages of which comprise the area of Los Lagos, La Concordia.  Nearly one month later, on 5 February 2024, some of the townspeople began to return to the villages of Nuevo Chejel and Puerto Rico, located near Socoltenango.

Pantelhó Siege & Exodus (18 April 2024)

Figure 3. Pantelhó Siege & Exodus (18 April 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

The Pantelhó siege and exodus (Figure 3) was the second civilian displacement event of 2024 as a result of cartel clashes in Chiapas between two groups that are fighting for over rights to operate and dominate various business lines such as territorial control, taxes or fees of which are known as “cobro de piso” (translated literally is “land use fees”), extortions, kidnappings, drug trafficking and human or migrant smuggling and other crimes.[9]

On 15 April 2024, members of the self-defense (autodefensas) group called “El Machete” blockaded roadways in the area of Pantelhó, Chiapas in anticipation of a confrontation with a member of a criminal organization known as “Los Herrera.” In the days following, the Herreras killed several residents and kidnapped two truck drivers.  Subsequently, the two groups engaged in firefights that trapped many residents of Pantelhó in their home or businesses for more than twenty-four hours beginning on Wednesday, 17 April 2024. On Thursday, 18 April 2024, several dozen residents fled their homes in at least 45 vehicles, for fear of being caught in the crossfire. A civil rights group called Las Abejas (The Bees) requested that state or federal authorities intervene to restore order, however, it is not known if any agencies responded to the call for assistance.

Tila Siege & Exodus (June 2024)

Figure 4. Tila Siege & Exodus (June 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

The Tila siege and exodus was the third civilian displacement event of 2024 as a result of cartel clashes in Chiapas (Figure 4).[10] During the weekend of 8 June 2024, over 4,000 Mexican residents fled their burned-out and shot-up homes in the town of Tila, Chiapas as a result of being similarly displaced by warring cartel surrogates and factions vying for dominance of illegal trade routes in the area.

Reporting indicates that two drug trafficking groups called “Los Autonomos,” and group another called “El Karma,” were responsible for armed confrontations between each other for control of the area. Some residents were extorted, forced to work at trafficker checkpoints, and state prosecutors stated that seventeen buildings were also burned during the siege.

The Mexican Army, National Guard, and State Police responded to the chaos and encouraged the inhabitants to leave the town, however most decided to remain and guard their belongings while others were already trapped in their homes due to the violence. The federal government considered the event to be a dispute among local farmers and dismissed the significance of the mass displacement event. Despite federal indifference, state prosecutors also said that this siege led to an exodus that was probably the biggest mass displacement in Chiapas since 1997.

On 29 June 2024, Mexican authorities identified a new armed group, the Cártel Chiapas y Guatemala (CCYG), that is engaged in armed conflict with the Cártel de Sinaloa, as being reportedly responsible for the murder of nineteen presumed fighters, six of which were identified as Guatemalans, in the municipality of La Concordia, Chiapas.[11]

Amatenango Siege & Exodus (July 2024)

Figure 5. Amatenango Siege & Exodus (July 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

This most current event is the fourth trafficker related siege of a town in 2024 causing civilian displacement as cartel clashes have become more frequent in Chiapas (See Figure 5).[12]

On 24 July 2024, Guatemala President Arévalo told reporters that approximately 600 Mexicans had abandoned their village of Amatenango del Valle, Chiapas Mexico and crossed the border into Guatemala at Ampliación Nueva Reforma, Chiapas, just north of Huixtla, Chiapas (the same day migrant Caravan 37 reached Huixtla) and are being provided refuge just inside of Guatemala at Cuilco, after having been displaced by firefights between the CDS and CJNG.  Reports indicate that some of the affected families said that they were forced to flee their village because cartel fighters forced them to work checkpoints (undisclosed type of checkpoints used for the purposes of detecting and reporting the arrival of enemy fighters at outer perimeter entryways into the area) and to serve as human shields while the criminals battled their rivals.

Civilians being used as human shields are a form of irregular warfare that is intended to prevent or deter an attack on a potential target by using civilians as cover.

Archbishop Jaime Calderón Calderón of the Catholic Diocese of Tapachula in Chiapas penned the following open letter (Figure 6) on 24 July 2024 to regional parishioners acknowledging their suffering by stating that “the permanent presence of drug cartels, disputing territory in the mountainous region of Chiapas” is being done with the “apparent complicity of the National Guard and the Mexican military, as well as that of the federal and state governments, with locals and migrants being intimidated, threatened and forced to participate as human shields at roadblocks checkpoints, referred to as “filtros” in confrontations between the drug cartels.”

Figure 6. Archbishop of Tapachula Letter to Parishioners. Source: Archbishop of Tapachula.

Eight days later, on 2 August 2024, the Mexican Ministry of Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional – SEDENA) reported that 540 members of a combined force of the National Guard and Army troops responded to the area where they removed 15 road blockades located in the vicinity of Chicomuselo, Frontera Comalapa, El Jocote, Bellavista, La Grandeza, El Porvenir and Motozintla. Military troops were able to reduce the number of the eighteen blockades they encountered to five, and the number of checkpoints to three, that had been established on the highway that runs from Frontera Comalapa to Amatenango de la Frontera.[13]

Tzanembolom Seige & Exodus (6 August 2024)

The fifth forced displacement of over 2,000 villagers and the torture and dismemberment of a young man was reported in the community of Tzanembolom, Chiapas on 6 August 2024.[14]  In the absence of a response from state and federal authorities, an unnamed autodefensas group comprised of men and women, over a thousand of which are former members of the EZLN, joined forces with another autodefensas group called “Los Machetes” to defend villagers from attacks attributed to unnamed organized crime groups.

Figure 7. Tzanembolom Seige & Exodus (6 August 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

Chenalhó Siege & Exodus (September 2024)

The sixth displacement event of 2024 occurred from the period of July through September 2024, when several hundred inhabitants of the village of La Esperanza, Municipality of Chenalhó, Chiapas, were forced from their homes by cartel violence in the area (See Figure 8 below).[15]  Villagers lamented that the presence of an Army unit stationed within 500 meters of the village did nothing to control the violence, stating “the soldiers take no action against the assassins and that do not engender confidence.” The inhabitants of the village have had to flee their homes on at least two occasions since 2021, the year in which the group named “Los Machetes” began fighting the “Los Herrera,” also known as the Indigenous Civilian Army (“Ejército Civil Indígena”) which is tied to the CJNG.

In the wake of this violence, more than one thousand former members of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) established themselves as a self-defense (“autodefensas”) group and has allied themselves with the Los Machetes to defend the inhabitants from the warring cartels in the area.

Figure 8. Chenalhó Siege & Exodus (September 2024). Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

Maps and Summary of Critical Factors 

The above narrative is further supported by a map for each event, seen at the front of each event, as well as an additional map of the combined events, here (Figure 9):

Figure 9. Combined Events Map. Source: Voir Dire International, LLC.

Also included below is a collated summary of key points of information contained in this report.

Victims: Civilians. Elderly, women, men, children, indigenous

Victimization: 

• Executions/Murder (including four indigenous Tzeltal’s)

• Kidnappings

• Forced recruitments into the cartel ranks

• Forced labor (work at roadblocks and access control checkpoints)

• Forced defensive combat (work as human shields)

• Forced collaboration (work as required and being required to accept payment.)

• Arson (burning and/or destruction of homes, businesses)

• Theft (animals, livestock, vehicles, possessions)

• Extortion (obligatory payment of “taxes,” and fees known as “cuota” payments from profit made by victims from cultivating and marketing corn and other crops.)

• Extortion (“derecho de piso” or payments made for right to work and right to occupy land or property.)

• Threats (death threats and fines for failure to comply.)

• Occupation (of public and private lands by force and intimidation)

• Restricted or denial of the freedom of movement – Blockades and access control checkpoints inhibit free movement and free trade among locals. “Narcobloqueos” or blockades are also formed on roadways that traverse the outer perimeter of a cartel’s area of operations to allow time for the conduct of kidnappings, jail breaks, revenge attacks, or other actions necessary to establish and maintain control of a town, city or area, within their perimeter.  Most blockades include the burning of vehicles, buses, tires and buildings, belonging to innocent civilians, that are used to form barriers behind which cartel defensive fighterss take cover and engage their enemies, military units, or police forces while their team offensive attack units conduct the mission at hand. Blockades are also formed to respond to actions taken by the government, such as the arrest of a key criminal figure.

Civilian and Migrant Support Organizations

• The Caritas de San Cristobal de Las Casas A.C. organization requested assistance and support for displaced civilians in the municipalities of Chicomuselo, Socoltenango and La Concordia, Chiapas.

• “Las Abejas” – a local advocacy organization requested that the federal government intervene to regain control or stop the violence in Pantelhó, Chiapas.

Public Safety Responders

• SEDENA – Mexican Army

• Guardia Nacional – Mexican National Guard

• Chiapas State Police (Protección Civil Estatal)

• Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) Bienestar

The Mexican Army, officially referred to as the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA) functions more like a hybrid paramilitary police force than it does a military entity. In a 2016 report written by Tony Payan and Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, the Mexican Army and other armed forces are described as having been engaged in tasks that are more closely aligned with public safety than national security. Over the past 40 years, “Mexico’s armed forces have been assigned many civil defense or assistance tasks such as dealing with the aftermath of natural disasters, running health campaigns, managing anti-hunger facilities, safeguarding national strategic facilities, patrolling Mexico’s exclusive economic zones, and helping in public safety and security operations, particularly against organized crime.”[16]

To further assist in that mission, the Guardia Nacional (GN) or National Guard, was formed in 2019 during the Lopez-Obrador Administration to replace the Secretariat of Public Safety and Civil Protection (SSP) or federal police forces. While the GN mission was first intended to independently perform law enforcement duties as a civilian entity outside of military control, it has since been fully incorporated into SEDENA which maintains day-to-day operational control of the entity. The SEDENA command cadre currently provides leadership, doctrine and training for GN troops. In the past 5 years the GN has evolved into a large military police corps of the Mexican Army, providing the latter with the police or law enforcement authority, processes and procedures that have long complicated the role of soldiers operating in the public safety space. The inclusion of the GN into SEDENA helps justify the involvement of the military in what would otherwise be considered civilian law enforcement duties and actions.

Thus, SEDENA and the GN, along with the occasional cooperation and assistance of under equipped state and municipal police, are all responsible for enforcing the law and maintaining order throughout the nation.[17]

Despite the level of effort and combined forces of SEDENA and the GN, the military continues to struggle with responding to deadly and violent events on a timely basis and has been dreadfully slow, taking weeks to respond, appearing indifferent to the plight of these victims. Some reports allege that the military forces are allegedly colluding with the cartels, causing locals to question the motives of their would-be saviors.

The estimated response times to these attacks or siege events, as reported by open sources, is listed here and reveals that the military and its subordinate units took an average of approximately ten to fourteen days, or two weeks to respond to most events:

• Frontera Comalpa – about fourteen days.  The military response to the Frontera Comalpa siege took about fourteen days before any order could be restored.

• Socoltenango – about fourteen days.  Locals displaced by the Socoltenango siege requested that the military withdraw its troops in order to reduce hostilities, but instead, soldiers threw stones and tear gas at villagers and assaulted others.

• Pantelho – Unknown. In the case of the Pantelhó siege, a local shelter requested that the government take immediate action to avoid bloodshed brought by cartel infighting, however, there are no reports that indicate that the military or national guard intervened.

• Tila – Unknown. In the Tila siege and evacuation, the Army, National Guard and State Police arrived and confronted the cartels and the fighting resulted in the decision of villagers to evacuate, however the situation was chaotic and not all were able to leave.  Given that many stayed behind, villagers requested that the Army remain in place until the cartel fighters left the area.

• Amatenango – about 8 days. In the Amatenango siege and evacuation, local religious leaders complained about the “the permanent presence of drug cartels,” and “coming and going (of cartel fighters) throughout the territory in the face of indifference and apparent complicity from the National Guard and the Mexican military (and) with the apparent complicity of the federal and state governments.”[18]

• Tzanembolom – No reported government response. In the absence of a response from state and federal authorities, an unnamed autodefensas group comprised of men and women, over a thousand of which are former members of the EZLN, joined forces with another autodefensas group called “Los Machetes” to defend villagers from attacks attributed to unnamed organized crime groups.
• Chenalhó – About one week. Inhabitants of La Esperanza were given shelter at the municipal headquarters at Chenalhó, with the assistance of public safety officials from Protección Civil and the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) Bienestar, the latter of which provides medical assistance.

While it can be argued that the military is spread thin and seemingly responding to simultaneous tasks or calls for assistance throughout Mexico, it is nonetheless concerning that such a long lag time is attributed to the delays in their response to these violent, loss-of-life events that may otherwise be averted by the response and presence of public safety forces such as SEDENA and the GN. These long response times reveal the inability or disinterest of the combined military forces to physically respond to an armed confrontation within a 24–48-hour period.[19]

A review of the combined events map shows the publicly listed locations of SEDENA command units in comparison to the location of the siege events, which place the military within close proximity to these critical events.

The average of about fourteen days from the day of an incident to the day of a military (including the GN) response suggests that other factors may be affecting response times, including perceived political motives for the warring between local civic organizations, as reason for the violence, and those possible biases may affect the lack of immediate military concern and response. Projecting blame on unidentified political players and an alleged dispute between the indigenous peoples of the region, have also been consistent themes of the Lopez Obrador administration whenever the President was challenged about most issues during his daily press conferences, or “manañeras.”

Putting response times aside, the Mexican Army and National Guard have demonstrated an ability to mobilize, transport and engage their troops in lethal warfare against equally or better armed cartel fighters, or perceived enemies such as some villagers and autodefensas, once a command decision was made to deploy in response to calls for help or assistance.

Corruption Driving Responses 

The reasons for not responding, or the timing of when to respond, both likely relate to the depth of clandestine relationships that corrupt government and military officials have with one or the other of the cartels. While there is no “smoking gun” about these alleged corrupt relationships in throughout Mexico, there are consistent indications that give rise to reasonable suspicion that the cartels are either operating as equals with the Mexican military or influence government policy and decision making. Two cases demonstrate the depth of the allegations of government corruption under the current administration.

During 2024, ProPublica, Deutsche Welle and Insight Crime all published reports saying that “people working for López Obrador’s 2006 presidential campaign received between US $2 million and $4 million from drug traffickers affiliated with the Beltrán-Leyva Organization and the Sinaloa Cartel.”[20]  The New York Times followed up with allegations that people close to López Obrador, including his sons, received drug money after he took office in late 2018.[21]

Further, in some cases the military may be deployed to act against an “enemy” cartel, but not against a “friendly” cartel with whom an agreement for derecho de piso, or rights to operate in a given geographic area, may have been reached through an illicit arrangement. If true, the decision for the military to act likely becomes clouded by the intricacies of organizational deconfliction within SEDENA, where all key officers in the chain of command for a particular military district must be party to the illicit agreements made with any particular cartel, for the agreements to be honored.

Further complicating the issue is that not all corrupt agreements reached in Mexico City “trickle-down” to all military districts in the country, sometimes resulting in actions against a “friendly” cartel in some parts of Mexico, while the desired inaction against the same cartel may result elsewhere.  An analysis of 2024 by Mexico Evalua entitled: “La Otra Militarización Fuerzas Armadas al frente de Instituciones Estatales de Seguridad Pública en México, 2011-2024” determined that since 2006 there has been an evolutionary shift towards militarization of civil police duties.

The current distribution of current or retired military officers finds them well dispersed as the heads of many state police agencies in Mexico, but not in all states. When factored into the security framework it had mixed results.

One is that having military doctrine as the backbone of public safety goes a long way towards establishing what was called during the Mérida Initiative as the Comando Unico or Unified Command structure that would have all police forces operating under the same doctrine, policies, procedures and practices. Placing military officers into the majority of public safety leadership positions is a move in that direction, even if by accident. The negative side of this stacking of the personnel deck with military officers, is that corruption becomes a well-organized and disciplined business that gives the military even more power than their civilian counterparts.

The implication that a military entity such as the Mexican army, and its subordinate GN troops, can be influenced or directed by a criminal organization, demonstrates that some high-ranking officers could be putting profits or personal gain above national interests, all the while ignoring the imminent and inherent threat to Mexico’s national security and sovereignty that the events in Chiapas imply and present.

Conclusion

The situation in Chiapas appears to be a zero-sum endgame, where the result of the overall geographical conflict would be an advantage for one side (the cartels) and an equal loss for the other (the government). There is no equal gain because the revenue gained by the cartels through extortion, taxes, and drug sales are black market equities that serve to recapitalize the criminal enterprise and therefore accumulate wealth unevenly in favor of the cartels, with only a small percentage of their gains being shared with corrupt officials.

The more the cartels succeed, the stronger they become militarily, politically, financially and in other ways that provide them with equal or greater power than their own government. Mexico is habituated to corruption and the violence that it brings, with some considering the chaos in Chiapas a regional conflict, as opposed to the lingering danger posed by a loss of governance over the southern state. It may be lost on Mexico City that the cartels have the power, militarily and politically, to create a break-away province, should they find it advantageous to do so, and could one day easily defend and hold any territory they have already conquered.

Former President Lopez Obrador’s policy of appeasement, abrazos, no balazos (hugs not bullets), has likely made many corrupt Mexican officials richer, but in achieving such wealth they have betrayed their oath to “to be always faithful to the principles of freedom and justice” and have only served to make the cartels their masters, thereby making them partners in crime.[22] Evidence of this exists in Chiapas, where ordinary Mexicans are being killed for weeks before the military makes an appearance.

Claudia Sheinbaum took office in 2024 and aside from short-term reaction to President-elect Trumps threats of tariffs, her administration continues to ignore the existential threat to Mexico that the cartels represent. Organized crime in Mexico has become so ingrained into Mexican society that corrupt officials eagerly acquiesce government power and functions in exchange for a piece of the black-market economy pie, yielding many richer, but corrupt politicians. The continued evolution, influence, strength and power of the cartels may someday surpass the governments’ ability to function as a democratic institution. If the cartels maneuvered themselves into an equal position or become dominant over the government, this development could signal the dawn of a narco-democracy in Mexico.

These activities demonstrate a degradation or total loss of security and public safety in Chiapas. Cartels operate in southern Mexico with little or no fear or consequence and are alleged to be operating with the full knowledge, if not participation of many public safety entities that include some local autodefensas or civil self-defense forces, as well as municipal, state, federal and military entities that are charged with protecting people from criminals instead of colluding with them.

The implications for Mexico are not favorable. At some point, one cartel or another will achieve dominance in the region and will reign as the virtual owners of southern Mexico and its border with Guatemala. The full and sustained control of Chiapas by a cartel means that Mexico will have lost its sovereignty to an unconventional domestic militarized cartel that will govern through armed force instead of being administered by a duly elected democratic government. The reigning cartel will continue to subvert local, state and federal entities, conduct an illegitimate system of taxation (cobro de piso and cuotas), restrict freedom of movement, or otherwise administer a break-away region that will belong to Mexico in name only.

Endnotes

[1] Kate Doyle, Ed., “Rebellion in Chiapas and the Mexican Military.” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 109. 20 January 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB109/.

[2] “The History and Legacy of the Zapatista Movement in Chiapas.” Mexico Histórico. No date, https://www.mexicohistorico.com/paginas/The-History-and-Legacy-of-the-Zapatista-Movement-in-Chiapas.html.

[3] Merrick B. Garland, “Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Statement on Arrests of Alleged Leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel Ismael Zambada Garcia (El Mayo) and Joaquin Guzman Lopez.” US Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-statement-arrests-alleged-leaders-sinaloa-cartel-ismael.

[4] “Justice, Treasury, and State Departments Announce Coordinated Enforcement Efforts Against Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion.” US Department of Justice. 16 October 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-treasury-and-state-departments-announce-coordinated-enforcement-efforts-against.

[5] “Treasury Sanctions Guatemala’s Los Huistas Drug Trafficking Organization with Ties to Mexican Cartels.” US Department of the Treasury. 18 March 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0666.

[6] “Zapatista National Liberation Army.” Britannica. 6 February 2025, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zapatista-National-Liberation-Army.

[7] “Chiapas Bleeds as CJNG, Sinaloa Cartel Fight Over Guatemala Trafficking Routes.” InSight Crime. 2 June 2023, https://insightcrime.org/news/chiapas-bleeds-cjng-sinaloa-cartel-guatemala-trafficking-routes/; “Behind the Criminal Conflict Raging in Chiapas, Mexico.” InSight Crime. 8 February 2024, https://insightcrime.org/news/behind-criminal-conflict-raging-chiapas-mexico/.

[8] “Exodus of Population Fleeing Cartels Increases in Chiapas – Urgent Help Needed.” Schools for Chiapas. 19 January 2024, https://schoolsforchiapas.org/exodus-of-population-fleeing-cartels-increases-in-chiapas-urgent-help-needed/.

[9] “Chiapas: Piden al Gobierno Detener la Violencia en Pantelhó; Decenas de Personas y Maestros Abandonaron el Municipio.” AZ Medios, 20 April 2024, https://azmedios.net/2024/04/20/chiapas-piden-al-gobierno-detener-la-violencia-en-pantelho-decenas-de-personas-y-maestros-abandonaron-el-municipio/.

[10] “Over 4,000 Residents Flee a Town in Southern Mexico After Armed Gangs Start Shooting, Burn Homes.” Associated Press. 10 June 2024, https://apnews.com/article/mexico-fleeing-violence-chiapas-f1e9707b5f2ad01f436a412357b05c45.

[11] “Así Fue la Primera Vez que la SSPC Reconoció la Existencia del Cártel de Chiapas y Guatemala.” Infobae, 3 July 2024, https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2024/07/03/asi-fue-la-primera-vez-que-la-sspc-reconocio-la-existencia-del-cartel-de-chiapas-y-guatemala/.

[12] “Mexicans Flee to Neighboring Guatemala to Avoid Being ‘Human Shields,’ Bishop Says.” National Catholic Reporter. 26 June 2024, https://www.ncronline.org/news/mexicans-flee-neighboring-guatemala-avoid-being-human-shields-bishop-says.

[13] “Guardia Nacional y Ejército Mexicano Realizan Actividades de Seguridad en Chiapas.” Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, https://www.gob.mx/sedena/prensa/guardia-nacional-y-ejercito-mexicano-realizan-actividades-de-seguridad-en-chiapas.

[14] “Forced Displacement of More than Two Thousand Persons.” Latinus. 8 August 2024, https://latinus.us/mexico/2024/8/8/exintegrantes-del-ezln-se-unen-autodefensas-en-chiapas-para-enfrentar-al-crimen-organizado-en-la-region-121034.html.

[15] “Al menos 210 desplazados de Chenalhó a causa de la violencia del crimen organizado regresan a sus casas.” Latinus. 10 August 2024, https://latinus.us/mexico/2024/8/10/al-menos-210-desplazados-de-chenalho-causa-de-la-violencia-del-crimen-organizado-regresan-sus-casas-121120.html.

[16] “Mexican Armed Forces and Security in Mexico.” Rice University’s Baker Institute. 31 May 2016, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/mexican-armed-forces-public-safety.

[17] “The World Fact Book, CIA 2021, Military & Security Forces.” Central Intelligence Agency. 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/about/archives/2021/countries/mexico/#military-and-security.

[18] Op cit., National Catholic Reporter at Note 12.

[19] These response times were discerned from media reporting and do not include a comparison to how quickly or slowly the government has other responded to similar events in other Mexican states.

[20] “AMLO Calls on US to Stop Funding Anti-Corruption NGO,” Mexico News Daily, 14 August 2024, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/politics/amlo-mcci-us-funding/.

[21] “AMLO vs. MCCI: Rancor over US Financing of NGO Resurges.” Mexico News Daily. 14 August 2024,https://mexiconewsdaily.com/politics/amlo-mcci-us-funding/.

[22] “Flag of Mexico: Meaning and History.” Humanidades. 2025, https://humanidades.com/en/flag-of-mexico/.