Resistance Lessons from Myanmar

Introduction

Ignoring localized security black spots can have global repercussions if left unchecked. Until 2024, for instance, the United States and its Western partners paid little attention to the Iranian-sponsored Houthis in Yemen…until this belligerent power disturbed global shipping patterns and completely shut down the Red Sea. Elsewhere, in North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and the Sahel, a vast trend in rampant irregular warfare has emerged with global implications – largely unaddressed today by the West until they become a pressing and immediate crisis.

Like with the aforementioned regions, little international attention is being paid to Myanmar (Burma), which has been embroiled in a pervasive conflict since 2021. This is an important contest for regional states, including China, which have vested interests. While preparation for large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary remains critical for countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, irregular warfare and proxy warfare along the periphery in fragile states remain the likely future battleground of competition.

Take one look at Figure 1 from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, which compares state-on-state conflict (dark blue) with intrastate conflict (teal) and intrastate conflict supported by external states in yellow. Instances of intrastate conflict (and states taking sides in intrastate conflict) is soaring, while occurrences of state-on-state conflict remains small. The picture that emerges shows that if the trend continues, then academic efforts within international security should prioritize the study and resolution of intra-state conflicts.

Figure 1: Armed Conflict by Type, 1946-2023 (Source: UCDP)

Recent intrastate struggles in Myanmar represent a needed area of study to advance the understanding of conflict. Support for popular resistance against Myanmar’s military force is evolving, and the distinctive lessons counter many of the prevailing lessons garnered from previous eras. For one, this case study demonstrates that contemporary resistance can coexist across a continuum, from nonviolent action through civil war simultaneously and symbiotic with one another. In Myanmar (as well as places like the Donbas in Ukraine) civil disobedience, partisan activities, and warfare have blended norms of nonviolent and violent resistance. This one fact stands in stark contrast to the academic consensus established by scholars, like Erica Chenoweth, who cautioned about the efficacy of nonviolent and violent resistance intermingling (Chenoweth, 147-148).

Western powers, and their special operations forces, should closely examine case studies like Myanmar to prepare for future conflict in the contemporary environment. Accordingly, this essay dives into four resistance lessons in Myanmar, which include: (a) understanding the politics in today’s fragile states, (b) finding the resistance center of gravity, (c) creating successful support strategies, and (d) leveraging shadow economies.

Background

Ongoing insurgencies have undermined the stability of Myanmar for nearly eight decades, but the recent conflict resembles more of a belligerency (as defined in international law)In late 2020, the National League for Democracy, the political party led by Aung San Suu Kyi (nickname Suu Kyi), won the democratic election. In 2021, the country’s military (Tatmadaw) under Min Aung Hlaing seized power instead. Hlaing then sentenced Suu Kyi to prison for 30 years, while her followers started a government-in-exile called the National Unity Government (NUG).

The NUG comprises both a government-in-exile and a shadow government, duplicating many of the functions of the military junta that ostensibly rules Myanmar from Yangon with the support of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To fund its operations, the NUG has raised over $100 million, with many of the funds raised through Singapore and with strong support from the Burmese diaspora. The NUG has also fielded an armed wing, with several organizations cooperating under the umbrella term of People’s Defense Forces.

Perhaps out of necessity, the CCP continues to have direct dialog and maintains investments with the military junta. Chinese investments in health, energy, and governmental services in 2021 alone equaled $291 million USD to the Tatmadaw. Over the past three years, this support has continued, with China preparing in 2025 to contribute financial and technical assistance to the military junta for an additional 20 projects, equating to $138 million. Meanwhile, the CCP appears to be hedging its bets through informal dialog with influential resistance groups, and it may not be wedded to the idea of a future Tatmadaw government.

Resistance Continuum

Myanmar’s diverse landscape of ethnicities, cultures, and languages create many seams and fractures in the human terrain, and a myriad of factions have formed and shifted between cooperation and competition during decades of political instability. Since 2021, most resistance movements have tenuously agreed to support the claims of the NUG government-in-exile or at least have united in opposition to the military junta. There are twelve major organizations, which Figure 2 categorizes by their general resistance nature, from nonviolent legal protest, nonviolent illegal action, rebellion, insurgency, and belligerency.

Figure 2: Resistance Continuum in Myanmar, 2024 (source: Author)

Lessons

Lesson 1 – Understand the Prevalent Political Environment in Today’s Fragile States (it might not be like back home)

In Myanmar, some organizations have ethnic aspirations of independence, but many others have an unflinchingly leftist, antifascist, and antiimperialist political ideology. This is by no means unique to Myanmar and suggests that supporting resistance in these regions compels an understanding of left-wing ideology. Unlike the Cold War, leftist movements no longer need to represent the adversary to external support from the West. China overtly supports a totalitarian regime in the Tatmadaw, for example, while several of Myanmar’s leftist resistance groups are asking for assistance from the United States, which includes funding for drones, armored vehicles and radar jamming gear. This situation potentially places Western nations in support of popular leftist groups while the Chinese Communist Party supports an unpopular right-wing autocracy. In short, the politics in today’s resistance environment may be shifting in the direction of leftist social agendas but not necessarily opposing Western interests. Understanding these environments allows external supporters to build sustainable partnerships, like those in Myanmar, but also with possible applicability in Africa and Latin America.

Lesson 2 – Find the Resistance Center of Gravity (it might not be where you expect)

Because resistance frequently exists on a continuum, the center of gravity today does not always exist with armed groups – even in armed conflict. One might point to the National Unity Government (NUG) as the center of gravity for resistance in Myanmar. For instance, NUG has achieved a consensus-based leadership role between multiple groups and has garnered encouragement from outside groups, like the European Union. However, one might take a closer look at an alternative nonviolent resistance center of gravity – the  All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) with flag shown in Figure 3. Student protest movements in Myanmar have a long history, and ABFSU has much experience in organizing nonviolent action.

Figure 3: Official Flag of All Burma Federation of Student Unions (Source: Creative Commons)

It might be best to describe ABFSU as an elite front organization. It consists of multiple student organizations and a Union whose leadership constantly changes. Like birds in flight, members act on consensus-based decision-making and simply replace leaders with enthusiastic volunteers when required.  ABFSU has frequent contact with Myanmar’s active insurgent groups and frequently coordinates with violent resistance while keeping its own activities nonviolent and officially non-aligned.  ABFSU alumni also occupy positions of power and authority in many of the other movements, some of which engage in violent resistance, while these students form a broad basis of recruits that feed rank-and-file membership of insurgents. ABFSU has been active for decades and continues to be the most effective nonviolent resistance in the country. As a result, idealistic, smart, and educated young people (and increasingly women) play a prominent role in Myanmar’s resistance, both nonviolent and violent forms.

Lesson 3 – Plan for the Desired End State from the Beginning (arming, training, and equipping may be secondary)

It is typical for resistance environments to contain multiple and competing organizations with opposing goals, causing great complexity in planning the desired end state following victory. The French Resistance is but one example; the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is another. While some of the major Myanmar resistance movements are currently united in opposition to the military junta, they also have varying and disparate objectives, with some animosities to each other going back generations.

If the military junta is eventually defeated, what happens next? That end state needs to drive the support provided to resistance activities. For example, if the desired end state in Myanmar is a transition to NUG authority, then the NUG is the logical centerpiece for external support. Is the NUG ready to transition to power in a way that increases the country’s stability and successfully addresses its endemic fragility (ethnic rivalries, corruption, and crime)? Scholars like Lumpy Lumbaca have argued that a continuation of civil war is likely the result of Tatmadaw defeat. If so, then the transition from resistance to effective and legitimate governance becomes perhaps the primary line of effort and overall objective from the very first stage of providing external support.

Lesson 4 – Utilize Existing Shadow Economies (get comfortable with irregular forms of sustainment)

Resistance movements and organized crime have a nexus around the globe, as seen in Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia. As part of the Golden Triangle, Myanmar possesses one of the largest shadow economies in the world and is home to one of the most powerful organized crime networks on earth. These types of transit routes and illicit activities are common in such resistance-rich conflict zones. The Akha people inhabiting northern Myanmar’s mountainous region embody but one example of a transnational actor utilizing underground routes. Meanwhile, perhaps the most powerful regional illicit organization is Red Wa, which has affiliations with United Wa State Army (UWSA) as shown in Figure 4. While embodying a resistance, UWSA has currently aligned itself with the Tatmadaw.

Figure 4: United Wa State Army, 2019 (source: Voice of America)

In today’s competitive environment, recognizing and leveraging nonstate entities, including those active in shadow economies, may prove pivotal. For instance, the UWSA and its Red Wa extension maintain strong ties with the Chinese Communist Party, indicating that China is strategically hedging its bets alongside the Tatmadaw by courting a nonstate actor with a powerful illicit network. One of the most effective ways to provide low-visibility material support to resistance is harnessing these existing markets. External states with interests in interstate conflict can leverage these networks by (1) ensuring governmental authorities exist to fund support to nonstate entities, (2) preparing the environment through persistent engagement which builds awareness of how these transnational networks operate, and (3) developing the necessary human relationships within shadow economies to facilitate use of them. These deliberate and concerted efforts can ensure timely support to partners in denied areas when such methods are deemed appropriate.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s civil war, though unique, shares similarities with other present-day intrastate conflicts. Recognizing the four key lessons discussed above can better enable future foreign policy objectives, particularly in regions of strategic competition like Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the African Sahel. Intrastate conflict in these areas is increasing at a shocking rate and, as in the case of Yemen, can have vital strategic consequences. Some important lessons to take note of include (a) appreciating prevalent leftist politics in many intrastate conflicts, (b) considering nonviolent organizations as resistance centers of gravity, (c) identifying long-term support strategies which can bring about better reconciliation, and (d) possibly leveraging shadow economies for material support to resistance. In this regard, Myanmar offers some distinct lessons about the evolution of resistance and support for resistance, which may inform future activities in other regions globally.