The Perils of Fast-Tracking Ukraine’s NATO Membership
As the war in Ukraine rages on, the question of the country’s potential membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has once again taken center stage. While proponents argue that fast-tracking Ukraine’s accession is the key to ensuring its security and stability, a closer examination of the potential consequences suggests that such a move may do more harm than good. The 2024 NATO summit in Washington brought to light a paradox at the heart of the ongoing Ukraine conflict: the pursuit of Ukraine’s membership versus the potential benefits of remaining outside the alliance. While NATO membership promises security and deterrence against further aggression, it risks escalating tensions and prolonging the war. Conversely, opting out of NATO might facilitate a negotiated settlement, potentially ending hostilities but leaving Ukraine vulnerable. This dilemma encapsulates the strategic complexities NATO and Ukraine face, navigating the delicate balance between security aspirations and the urgent need for peace, as well as reflecting ongoing debates within the alliance.
Some commentators concluded that fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership at the Summit would be a big win for Biden given the alliance’s resurgence since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a signature achievement. Yet others contend that “America is in denial about NATO’s future.” They argue that an alliance that includes Ukraine will require a vastly larger military and economic commitment.
Recently dozens of foreign policy experts signed a letter arguing against fast-tracking Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The argument against such membership is that it will exacerbate the current war, with the authors noting “the closer NATO comes to promising that Ukraine will join the alliance once the war ends, the greater the incentive for Russia to keep fighting the war…The challenges Russia poses can be managed without bringing Ukraine into NATO.” They also reason that once Ukraine is admitted, any future attack by Russia would trigger NATO’s Article 5, which calls on members to rush to a member’s defense if attacked.
Uncertain Path to Victory and Risks of Article 5 Obligations
One of the primary arguments favoring Ukraine’s swift NATO membership is the belief that it will bolster the country’s ability to defeat the Russian invasion. However, the reality on the ground paints a more nuanced picture. Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made limited gains, and the prospect of a decisive military victory that restores the country’s pre-2014 borders appears elusive. As the war drags on, the manpower and resources required to achieve such an outcome seem unrealistic in the near term.
Proponents of Ukraine’s NATO membership often cite the alliance’s Article 5, which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all. However, this guarantee is not a simple tripwire that automatically commits all members to military action. Rather, it only obligates them to “take such action as it deems necessary.” Before bringing Ukraine into the fold, NATO members must carefully consider their willingness to risk their forces in the event of a renewed Russian assault, especially given the fragility of any potential ceasefire.
Peace Negotiations and Alternatives to NATO Membership
Granting Ukraine NATO membership while Russian forces still occupy parts of the country could have dire consequences for future peace efforts. Russia has long viewed NATO expansion as a direct threat to its security interests, and the prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance has been a key driver of the current conflict. By removing this bargaining chip from the table, the United States and its allies would eliminate a critical incentive for Russia to engage in meaningful negotiations and reach a lasting settlement.
While Ukraine’s desire for security guarantees is understandable, alternative paths may exist. Bilateral security agreements, for example, could provide Ukraine with the necessary protection without the geopolitical baggage associated with joining the alliance. Exploring these options could offer a more prudent and less aggressive approach to ensuring Ukraine’s long-term stability.
Modern war rarely ends in decisive military victories. Left behind are devastation, death, and destruction. An imperfect political settlement that gives peace a chance is better than fighting a righteous war and hoping to achieve a decisive military victory. The war in Ukraine has shown the limits of American power in corralling a global coalition to support its proxy wars – 165 of 195 nations, including South Africa, Mexico, India, and China have all refused to join in the sanctions against Russia. China’s ties with Russia grew stronger in the war’s wake.
The world, says the late elder statesman Henry Kissinger, is on the edge of a dangerous disequilibrium: “We are at the edge of war with Russia and China on issues which we partly created, without any concept of how this is going to end or what it’s supposed to lead to … You can’t just now say we’re going to split [China and Russia] off and turn them against each other. All you can do is not to accelerate the tensions and to create options, and for that you have to have some purpose.”
Given Russia’s battlefield gains and its occupation of nearly a quarter of Ukrainian territory, the stalemated conflict, absent a decisive military victory, suggests that negotiations leading to a cessation of hostilities and a political settlement offer the best option for both Ukraine and Russia. Certainly, negotiating would be challenging, especially regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. However, the real danger is not in agreeing to negotiate but in the continued loss of life and destruction in Ukraine, and the potential, albeit limited, for a wider war.
In a report for the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Eurasian experts George Beebe and Anatol Lieven challenge the conventional wisdom that a negotiated end to the Ukraine war is neither possible nor desirable. They argue that such a belief is dangerous and could lead to Ukraine’s eventual collapse, as Russia has adapted to an attrition strategy that exhausts Ukraine’s resources and Western resolve. The authors also refute the belief that Russia is interested in conquering all of Ukraine and beyond.
They propose that the United States has leverage to bring Russia to the negotiating table and should seize the opportunity before it diminishes. They recommend a combination of diplomatic outreach, including confidential back channels, and support for calls from key Global South actors for peace talks. The authors emphasize that any settlement must be seen as beneficial by Ukraine, Russia, and the West, ensuring Ukraine’s security, minimizing the risk of renewed attacks, and promoting stability in Europe.
In “Revisiting the Global Posture Review: A New U.S. Approach to European Defense and NATO in a Post-Ukraine War World,” Major Maxwell Stewart reassesses the U.S. military presence in Europe in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Stewart anticipates the conflict evolving into a “frozen conflict” in Ukraine, leading to a reduction of the U.S. military presence in Europe over the next decade, empowering European nations with greater leadership roles in NATO. This shift would enable the U.S. to rebalance its focus toward the Pacific, where China is seen as the primary strategic competitor. Unlike many proponents of maintaining a large U.S. presence in Europe, Stewart views the Pacific as core to U.S. national strategy, in line with the return of a multipolar order and the rise of China. By 2029, Stewart proposes creating a “new normal,” followed by a reimagining of NATO’s structure by 2035. This shift would involve moving from a permanent deterrence force to a more agile, responsive posture that relies on rapid reinforcement and strategic flexibility.
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., who served as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991, contends that it is unlikely Ukraine will recover all its 1991 territories, and continued efforts to do so could lead to Ukraine’s further devastation without significantly harming Russia. He argues that the United States, as a key player in Kyiv’s defense and leader of sanctions against Russia, has an obligation to help find a way out of the war in Ukraine. The United States should also push both Russia and Ukraine towards a ceasefire and genuine negotiations. He stresses the need for private diplomacy to achieve successful negotiations and criticizes the current lack of willingness among the involved parties to engage in peace talks.
Conclusion
The debate over Ukraine’s NATO membership highlights significant complexities. The potential risks of hastily fast-tracking Ukraine into NATO, including escalating tensions and prolonging the conflict, may outweigh the security benefits. Instead, the United States and its allies should consider alternative security arrangements that could facilitate a negotiated settlement and ensure stability. By leveraging diplomatic efforts and balancing security aspirations with the urgent need for peace, a more sustainable solution can be achieved. This path, though challenging, requires careful deliberation and a pragmatic assessment of the geopolitical landscape to serve the interests of Ukraine, Europe, and global stability.
