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For the Incoming Administration: Remember Before Relegating or Dismissing NATO

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01.17.2025 at 03:25pm
For the Incoming Administration: Remember Before Relegating or Dismissing NATO Image

When it comes to the next U.S. administration’s approach to security matters in Europe, the tea leaves don’t appear to bode well for those who consider transatlantic relations a bedrock of world peace and prosperity. Within days of a meeting between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Mark Rutte and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, Rutte implored “citizens living in NATO countries, especially in Europe and Canada, it’s you I’m talking to. It’s your support I need,” and added that “the security situation is ‘undoubtedly the worst’ in his lifetime.” The absence of the U.S. in his mention is what grabbed my attention, seeming to confirm the “America First” movement’s vanguard voices of Vivek Ramaswamy, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump Jr. as harbingers of what is to come. 

With that said, perhaps this is all just part of Trump’s approach to broker favorable near-term deals. As former (and respected) Ambassador James Jeffrey recently cautioned, “no one can predict how any president is going to act in the future.” He then conveyed the need to confront “these various threats [namely, those led by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping that] are ever more integrated and coalescing to form a basic global threat to the international order based on peace, prosperity and the promotion of democratic and international values we have been leading since the 1940s” – seeming to imply hope for continued commitment by the next administration. But regardless, the chatter is hard to ignore, especially as one of those strategic adversaries continues to wreak havoc in Ukraine, violating every conceivable international rule upon which the credibility of the order relies. There exists much uncertainty about U.S. intentions during this chaotic period, the likes of which, in the past, were successfully navigated thanks in large part to stalwart leadership of the U.S. on the world stage. 

Therefore, in an attempt to bridge the gap between the crazy talk of U.S. disengagement from Europe and the importance of American leadership among NATO allies in the face of aggressors hell-bent on the free world’s demise, I think some historical context might serve us well. At its core, NATO is about much more than money, or even about deterrence. While those are important considerations, I’d like to remind Americans of two other historical points that are often lost in today’s conversations. 

9-11 

The first involves U.S. security directly, and the demonstrated commitment of our allies to it. NATO solidarity remains the essence of our alliance. Our message to the people of the United States is that we are with you. Our message to those who perpetrated these unspeakable crimes is equally clear: you will not get away with it.” These were the words spoken by Lord Robertson, NATO’s Secretary General on 9-11. The next day, the North Atlantic Council invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the history of the Alliance, treating the terrorist attacks against the U.S. as an attack upon all of the [then] 19 member nations, and committing themselves towards its defense. Within weeks, NATO deployed naval assets to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, acted to prevent terrorist activity in the Balkans, and directly assisted the U.S. in patrolling its own airspace with seven Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems aircraft. Then, over the next 20 years, NATO allies slugged it out alongside American servicemen in Afghanistan to ensure no terrorist safe haven there, and led the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2003 to 2014.  

I personally can attest to the credible solidarity provided by U.S. alliance structures in the wake of the terrorist attacks. Deploying forward as a young Navy lieutenant to work fleet operations with Commander, Fifth Fleet in Bahrain following the 9-11 attacks, I witnessed firsthand the resolve of NATO and other allies in combatting a shared adversary. Tasked with maintaining situational awareness of coalition surface operations of naval vessels from the UK, Canada, Italy, Germany, and France, among others, I also recall Japan eagerly sending fleet oilers to aid in the response. I worked with each country’s liaisons as the fleet built up into to a massive armada spanning across the Red Sea, North Arabian Sea, and Persian Gulf. The commitment of each nation’s ships and crews to the forward fight was matched in every respect by the culturally diverse set of officers I worked with to coordinate their movements. 

It will be right for the cooler heads in the next administration’s cabinet to remember the immediate support the U.S. received from its allies in the wake of 9-11. Or as Senator Mitch McConnell reminded us all in a recent Foreign Affairs article warning about the perils of isolationism, we may want to remember that “the enemy gets a vote, too, and may decide to confront the United States simultaneously on multiple fronts, at which point allies become more valuable than ever.”  

NATO’s finer and forgotten points 

The second involves the reasons for NATO’s existence, which remain relevant today. 

NATO’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, stated that “the paramount, the permanent, the all absorbing business at NATO is to avoid war.” Ismay is also known for stating, rather bluntly, that NATO’s methods for ensuring this peace were “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” At the time, this rough caricature may have been appropriate. But to translate its relevance to today requires a glimpse into the context of the period, followed by a review of its finer points that still apply to America’s responsibility in NATO and Europe. 

First and for historical context, before NATO’s establishment the U.S. as a nation was beginning to comprehend the necessity of its leadership role in the post-war world. In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall addressed the economic fallout in Europe following WWII, eliciting American support for aid to the continent as being in America’s direct interest. He stated that “it is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.” Clear about the stakes, he famously continued, “the whole world hangs in the balance.” With his speech on world economics and its role in forging peace, Marshall ushered in a new global perspective for America. It would carry forth two years later in the U.S.’s proactive approach to security in Europe which resulted in the formation of NATO. 

Next come the finer, often forgotten points about NATO’s reasons for existence. 

Most recognized of the original purposes for forming NATO, of course, was deterring the threat of Soviet expansion. The alliance’s founding in 1949 coincided with the evolution of their nuclear threat as well as a deterioration in diplomatic trust between the Western powers and the Soviet Union as Stalin violated every one of 48 signed agreements made at the 1945 Potsdam Agreements. This combination of threats and broken agreements was enough to spur the creation of an alliance against a menacing neighbor. 

Decades later, the cycle of broken agreements and threats were repeated as Russia inserted “little green men” into Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and again when they launched their full-scale invasion in 2022, violating the 1994 Budapest Agreement which had ensured the security of a sovereign Ukraine. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the invasion of Georgia in 2008, followed by endless threats and warnings against NATO nations (both conventional and nuclear), they also broke Article 2, Section 4 of the United Nations Charter, which states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” In short, “keeping the Russians out” remains as relevant to NATO’s purpose in preserving peace and prosperity today as it did 75 years ago. 

But deterrence is only part of NATO’s reason for existence. Often forgotten are the other two inducements for North American presence on the European continent. Namely, these included: [second] “to reconcile Germany’s legitimate aspirations to regain its sovereignty with Europe’s legitimate desires to regain its security; [and third] to forge a transatlantic link binding the U.S. to Europe in a durable partnership.” The matter of balancing Germany’s sovereignty with Europe’s desire for security (i.e., Ismay’s “keeping Germany down”) was immediately relevant to American assurance in the aftermath of two world wars; but decades later as the Cold War drew to a close with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, many European and American officials remembered the concern not just about nationalist movements in Germany, but in Europe as a whole. According to Dr. Timothy Andrews Sayle, 

When American officials considered their response to changes in Europe, they looked to Europe’s past. And the past was not promising. [President H.W. Bush’s National Security Advisor Brent] Scowcroft saw no reason to believe that Europeans could avoid war on their continent without an American presence. NSC staffers agreed with columnist Steve Rosenfeld’s December 1989 piece in the Washington Post contrasting 1930s Europe with that of the 1990s: the only difference, but all the difference, was that ‘the United States was in, not out.’  

Applied more broadly today (and less crassly than Ismay conjured them), NATO’s reasons for existence remain relevant in the broader desire to guard against the threat of nationalist and extremist movements writ large. The matter of Germany, I think, may be NATO’s greatest achievement, namely in serving its reunification and inclusion into a broader European Union as a democratic nation – and American presence created the space for it. According to Peter Rodman, “Ismay was not wrong to associate the three central elements of NATO’s geopolitical purpose: to ensure the American military presence in Europe as a counterweight to Russian power and as the guarantor of the framework for Germany’s reintegration into the European system.”  

The informed counterargument 

Still, some might point to the immediate, tangible benefits of isolationism. In breaking from the day-to-day grind of 24/7 military and diplomatic engagement to maintain forward presence and keep sea lines of communication open – while ensuring peace and stability the world over – it logically follows that near-term cost savings would be realized in dropping some or all of it. It also follows that with the reduction in self-imposed demands for U.S. engagement abroad, the cash saved in operational and deployment costs might notionally be returned to the pockets of the American taxpayer. But what are the mid- to long-term costs in ceding the strategic space to aggressors who have demonstrated they are ready to fill the voids left by U.S. absence? What about the economic impacts of turning inward, when trade is no longer free – whether as the result of regional hegemons exacting tribute from merchants passing through, or the rise in piracy in unpatrolled waters? In our transatlantic alliance, what will be the costs of failing to deter an expansionist Russia, or tempering the nationalist movements NATO was intended to pre-empt by way of its “binding, durable partnership” between North American and European democracies? Such questions must be asked when considering the allure of isolationism, for history teaches the answers are both in blood and treasure. 

The next administration might also consider something less drastic, staying committed to NATO but dealing heavy-handedly with allies not pulling their “fair share” to meet minimum GDP thresholds – whether the current two percent GDP threshold or the five percent suggested by the president-elect. Spain, for example, might be a prime target given its place at the bottom of NATO contributions in terms of percentage of GDP. Playing tough, the new administration could press the alliance to ouster Spain as a member. But for the cost savings of a few million, the U.S. and NATO in turn would conceivably lose access (which we currently enjoy at Spain’s invitation) to the naval base in Rota – a strategically valuable port guarding the entrance to the Mediterranean. Dissolving the military alliance might reasonably deteriorate diplomatic and trade relations, as well – with an ally that has been stalwart in its bi-lateral support to Ukraine, and an active, leading participant in exercises from the Baltics to the Mediterranean. Haggling over percentage points as the sole metric of contribution is dangerous business, and it ignores the strategic value NATO members like Spain deliver in their own ways. Why would we create such a void – trading stability and friendship on account of percentages – as aggressive adversaries lie in wait to fill it? 

As a final counterargument, some might point out that by leaving Europe to Europe, the U.S. would finally heed the words of America’s beloved first president, George Washington, who, having navigated the young, fragile nation under his charge as chaos and power struggles erupted from France’s revolution abroad, warned of becoming entangled in European affairs and permanent alliances. But as transportation and technological advances have created the conditions for a more connected world, the two oceans that once buffered the U.S. from it aren’t the barriers they once were.  Nor should they be. Hugo Grotius’s 17th Century idea of freedom of the sea became a foundation for responsible interaction between the democratic nations which emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries as the most successful and most powerful – with the U.S. a primary beneficiary. Returning to its isolationist-leaning origins for periods during the latter did not further advance America’s rise as a world power; instead, neo-isolationist foreign policies contributed to the world’s unravelling with two world wars originated in Europe. 

In conclusion 

To prevent the uprisings that lead to war, there is a calming effect when North Americans are engaged in Europe – perhaps simply because of signaled commitment by the leader of the free world. As NATO was created, “the allies believed that by signing the North Atlantic Treaty and maintaining NATO … they were insulating themselves, and their citizens, from appeasement and ultimately a war that no one, on either side of the Iron Curtain, wanted.” In other words, NATO is as important in protecting the citizens of its nations from Russia’s threats of war as much as it is from war itself. 

Given the above, Ismay’s bluntness in 1949 might translate today to “keep the Russians out, the Americans and Canadians in, and European nationalism down.” American leadership in NATO and presence in Europe is essential to these ends. 

The two historical points on NATO’s response to 9-11 and their reasons for existence – as well as the specter of counterarguments to continued U.S. commitment – laid out above highlight how NATO, to Americans as well as Europeans, is more than a matter of monetary cost, geographic priority, or even security against a resurgent Russian threat. It is those things and much more, based on principles and relations which are more enduring and significant when compared to the historical folly of near-term cost savings and short-sighted national interests. U.S. presence, engagement, and commitment to Europe remain as important today as it did in 1949. Security responsibilities should not be relegated and divided to the extent that Europe is left on its own – only for the U.S. to have to expend the blood of its sons and daughters for a third great war. American commitment to Europe and leadership within NATO must be maintained to spare us that expense. 

The views expressed by the author are his alone, and do not represent those of the U.S. government or any organization. 

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