Doing the Wrong Thing Well: Flawed Security Policy for Ukraine

Among many national security challenges, the newly elected U.S. President will be confronted with making, communicating and implementing clear policy choices related to the Ukraine-Russian conflict. There is increasing international and increasingly heated domestic debate about U.S. support to Ukraine in over two years of war with Russia. The continuation of a policy that largely depends upon incremental war material support to aid Ukraine’s self-defense has proven ineffective in achieving military victory by Ukraine or political unity in Europe. According to the State Department, U.S. policy “is centered on realizing and strengthening a democratic, prosperous, and secure Ukraine more closely integrated into Europe and Euro-Atlantic structures.” This is a broadly ambiguous statement with much room for interpretation by allies and enemies alike. War in Europe continues as does the chance for escalation in scope and scale. The U.S. pursuit of ill-defined ends is akin to solving the wrong problem well. We no longer live in the bifurcated world where one is clearly on one side of an issue. Today the U.S., each of the NATO allies, Ukraine and Russia are entangled economically in ways that were not present in the Cold War. More than ever the U.S., European states, and the alliance itself experience tension due to competing self-interests and the interests of the alliance. The current Ukraine conflict represents a unique security challenge that requires reconsideration.
Even if only looking at the United States, there are different perspectives that fuel competing perceptions of the Ukraine-Russian war and what to do about it. On one hand there is President Biden’s promise to support for “as long as it takes.” This simplistic statement is not a reflection of a unified American people. Most recently a Bilateral Security Agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine states the U.S. policy is to “assist Ukraine in maintaining a credible defense and deterrence capability” which lacks specificity and is two years late. Internally, there are many questions associated with the financial and opportunity costs relative to other national interests such as deterring a patient, but aggressive, China or securing our own borders. Moreover, there is not agreement within either political party on the correct course and way ahead. The spectrum of debate in the information space is further shaped by international and sub sovereign stakeholders on both sides of the conflict. The issues surrounding Ukraine are a highly politicized topic inside the United States as are all US wars or interventions. It is within these circumstances that the United States policy makers have pursued a series of actions to help Ukraine win, despite the lack of consistently coherent and clear policy aim. I am confident our military is performing its assigned tasks well, yet the enacted policy is the wrong thing. We’ve supplied Ukraine war materials to include advanced air and land weapons systems along with training which might in fact contribute to Russian miscalculation and misinterpretation of US intentions. One example may be the employment of US supplied long range weapons to attack deep into Russia. As warned by the Russian Foreign Minister it may likely be perceived as an intentional escalation of the conflict by the US within unpredictable consequences. By many measures material support alone has not proven effective in shifting the tempo, intensity or duration of the war.
The late General Colin Powell, a greatly admired statesman and soldier, was famous for saying that “leadership is solving problems.” This war arguably began in February 2014 and has bedeviled three US Presidents, one of whom has been unable to unify the nation behind US and allies’ action in Ukraine. It is unclear what problem the last three Presidents and their administrations is trying to solve in Ukraine. Framing the problem at any level is often the most difficult challenge, especially when dealing with complex multi-variable issues with significant international interests. In as much as many wish differently, the U.S. is not overtly at war with Russia, nor is the NATO alliance or the European Union. Some might argue the war has evolved into a hybrid proxy as a hedge against an old opponent. This is not to say that the US and many other nations do not have interests or that they are not tipping the scale to their benefit. Framing the right problem and in what context is no easy task given the dynamic and murky character of a post-Soviet era in southeastern Europe. Famous systems thinker Russell Ackoff argued that positive and negative objectives are in tension meaning that getting rid of one undesired condition is not equivalent to obtaining what we do want. (See pages 20-24).
The lack of a clear U.S. political aim relating to the Ukraine conflict further exacerbates alliance cohesion and political division while giving Russia opportunities to exploit divisions of opinion and policy in Eastern Europe. Those that live within the “arc of instability” of Eastern Europe everyday feel the threat from Russian aggression, whereas others who are further removed from any perceived physical excursion by Russia are inundated with competing priorities. It is good to see more NATO members reaffirming a commitment to increased defense spending that had atrophied during decades of prosperity and elimination of an existential threat following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Europe once again confronts a threat to its stability and possibly sovereignty thus rekindling the need for military credibility of the Atlantic Alliance. This is a good thing if they their actions and funding follow the political rhetoric. Time will tell.
Given the current complexities surrounding the war in Ukraine, there is value in revisiting the criteria for use of military force abroad first proposed over 30 years ago by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, Gen Colin Powell. In what became known as the Powell Doctrine, General Powell offered a series of questions that should be asked before the United States initiates the use of military force. In the contemporary geopolitical climate I suggest that Powell doctrine is relevant and can apply in competition below the level of armed conflict. As such, the core questions proposed might prove useful in making decisions about interventions abroad such as Ukraine. First, we must identify if there is a vital interest at stake. The second factor is whether there are clear and attainable objective(s), and this case agreed upon by the alliance members. The third question is how well the US has identified and fully assessed the risks, to include opportunity costs, as it relates to other security challenges. Perhaps most importantly, the Powell Doctrine asks leaders to articulate a plausible exit strategy so when the goals have been achieved and avoid endless entanglement. This requires articulating what winning looks like which can avoid capture due to the hybrid and dynamic character of contemporary war. The usual refrain is that the exit strategy is conditions based. The often-unanswered question is what specific conditions.
General Powell would agree with a condition-based end but require that those conditions be articulated before sending troops, resources, and funds to another nation’s war. It is necessary to reassess the entirety of the effort if initial conditions which led to the decision change. All of this is further complicated by the political dynamics of aging alliances composed of members with increasingly competing and often divergent interests. Most importantly, Powell asked political leaders to consider whether the conflict is supported by the American people. Although Presidential power has expanded over the past decades, it does not eliminate the fact that we are a republic whose citizens get a voice – or should – in any major US intervention or war.
According to a recent Center for Public Affairs Research poll, more than half of Americans want the United States to take a less active role in addressing global conflict. Moreover, a Quincy Institute Poll suggests 70 percent of Americans preference a policy to reach a negotiated end of the conflict in Ukraine. Looking to our allies in Europe, there is not homogeneous agreement on policy either. A survey in January 2024 across 12 European nations shows a “weak confidence in Ukraine’s chances for victory” over Russia and that it favors a negotiated settlement, but they are also not in favor of appeasement. These are not mutually exclusive ends meaning one can hold a perception that Ukraine can’t win while also desiring a termination of the conflict favorable to Ukraine. Those states with dependencies to Russian energy or wheat likely lean toward Russia, while those under non-kinetic attack will be more hawkish. Evidence increasingly shows less not more American and European support to continue the war. In democratic states, especially the U.S .the people get a vote whether we agree with their opinions. This is equally true for most European states.
The dispassionate fact is that two sovereign states are in conflict with one another driven by a variety of historical and contemporary causal factors. Far too much of the analysis on this topic oversimplify this war. No one debates the fact that Putin’s Russia is the aggressor when it invaded Ukraine in 2014 and again in 2022. Despite consistent attempts to frame this conflict as good versus evil or some other binary choice, the reality is that it is not simple. It is not black and white and competes for priority among our citizens. There likely is general agreement that Russia is the aggressor while at the same time much greater divergence on what can or should be done about it.
This war is much more than Putin wanting to rekindle the Russian Empire or to dominate the West. This author argues that this war is another contemporary episode of centuries old collision of Western and other ontologies. How Russia and Ukraine see themselves, their interpretation of history, and themselves in the contemporary world are in competition. The projected realities are further shaped by ubiquitous media that serve up competing narratives about causes and solutions. Russia is viewed in the West as a revisionist power and an old adversary while Ukraine is presented as an aspirational NATO member. There is wide ranging debate about the complex causal factors for this war which merit more detailed analysis. Causal ambiguity makes it difficult for the United States, NATO and other interested parties to judge how to support or terminate hostilities as expressed by the Powel Doctrine. There is broad consensus that this war exemplifies the nature of war as a violent clash of moral and physical forces making this modern war both unique while at the same time similar to the past. As renowned strategist Colin Gray so clearly states, war has “one nature, with many characters.” For example there is the often-used false comparisons of Russian aggression to Hitler’s Germany. We live in a very different world than Europe in the 1930s.
It is important for broader context to highlight that many of the NATO alliance members have had and many still have long standing and entangled economic and social relationships with Russia and to a lesser degree Ukraine. This has become much more dynamic over the course of the past two years. Neither Russia nor Ukraine are members of NATO, although the alliance seems driven by a false assumption that any perceived appeasement on Ukraine might lead to Russian attacks on member Baltic states. Perhaps this is more evidence that we fail to objectivity assess Putin’s strategic logic. As such, NATO sees itself as the protective partner of Ukraine, a bulwark to further Russian aggression and to a lesser degree supports the sustained evolution of Ukrainian democratic governance. Beyond the continuation of gray zone active measures an overt attack on the alliance is illogical even for Putin who can achieve his goals other ways.
Likely to provoke some and despite contemporary aspirational roles for NATO, the original and core purpose of NATO is to be a defensive alliance. The conditions that birthed NATO to defend Western Europe against the threats posed by the Soviet Union and its formidable Red Army are not the same as those posed by the Russian Federation today. Yes, Putin’s Russia continues its egregious violence, meddles in the internal affairs of other states, and threatens the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. The Russian military’s proven inability to win decisively in Ukraine as compared to the capacity of NATO members states to defend their territory remains a credible deterrent against attack on the alliance.
Fortunately for the NATO alliance, Putin’s actions have on one hand awakened some sleeping nations that Europe is in fact not free from war and acutely sharpened the debate about Russian aggression. One result has been an overall increase in NATO defense spending that reaches half of total global spending. It is estimated that 19 of 32 members states will reach or exceed defense spending goals with overall spending increased by 11%. However, there remains a disparity among states in terms of GDP percentage and rate of investment. Those closest to the Russian threat meet or exceed spending as a percentage of GDP, while many further removed have been slow to adapt.
There are clear moral arguments for political, economic, and military support to Ukraine, just as there are for other inter-state conflicts. As this author and many readers know too well, war is the worst of humanity. Interestingly, we the United States and others in the western world tend not to apply this moral rule equally or evenly. The truth is that we do not have equal interests everywhere in the world and thus often overlook similar moral injustices in other places. How many raised the alarm in the West over the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict? What about other state incursions of sovereignty by outside states? Although not the focus of this essay and certainly a position that will invite criticism, one can reasonably argue that the continued US intervention into Syria is illegitimate and comparatively similar to the Russian invasion of Ukraine – at least from Assad’s perspective who was the legitimate leader recognized by the United Nations. We could debate each aspect of this statement for weeks.
The point is that we the United States must be consistent, with our words matching our deeds. We do not consistently follow the “rules” we so aggressively argue must be sustained. What the United States often argues for is our interpretation of rules and norms, often in conflict with consensual international law. There are many international treaties that we have not ratified and ones we’ve signed but simply do not follow. In the eyes of signatory states, any US failure to ratify major international treaties diminishes our credibility as the proponent for a rules-based order. For example, in heightened competition with China we frequently assert freedom of navigation using the rules and precedence of UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) a treaty we have not adopted. Paradoxically, we often refuse to apply equally the same rules to our own territorial waters creating a divergence between words and deeds. For the United States some rules appear to be more important than others.
In a dynamic international system comprised of diverse states seeking their own interests, the context and perspective of others matter when making strategic judgments and policy choices to achieve more favorable political outcomes. Unfortunately, the judgments, priorities of interests and policies are state driven and do tend to diverge with supra national organizations like NATO. One can easily assume that Romanians are very attuned to the threats posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Comparatively, I doubt the average Spanish or French citizen gives as much thought to the military threat from Russia as they consider the consequences of illegal immigration and the illicit drug trade in the western Mediterranean Sea.
When evaluating Ukraine policy, one should respect the expertise and experiences of those practitioners who offer alternative ways to win in Ukraine. Neither the United States nor NATO have articulated a well-defined military objective nor a clear political aim for this conflict. The perpetual flow of military supplies and equipment to support a conventional war is not and will not achieve military victory. Neither industrial might nor the many visible and bold tactical successes by Ukraine special operations forces can overcome poorly formulated and dynamic US or NATO policy for the Ukraine-Russian war. Despite the adoption of more sophisticated ways and means Foch and Ludendorff would recognize the current state of conflict. The ways have devolved to trench warfare, with FPV drones instead of Spads, Maxims, and Fokkers. This war is analogous to putting old wine in new skins. The political challenge is to reflectively recognize and courageously overcome the sunk cost bias and path dependency that have become a cycle of reinforcing strategic failure. Any Ukrainian military victories, which of late are more common, do not address the underlying political factors that led Russia to armed violence will only achieve temporal advantage. War will inevitably reemerge until such factors are addressed and resolved
The last point for discussion is our need to cautiously evaluate US political aims separately from those as alliance member, the alliance itself, and its many diverse members. U.S. policy must contribute to achieving an attainable and desirable political outcome beyond the conflict itself.
If we are honest, we must recognize there are divergent views and priorities. The notion that alliances are permanent is fallacy as evidenced by global wars in the 20th century. Counterintuitively, the pressure by many eastern NATO members related to Ukraine may in fact lead to emergent circumstances that reveal the brittleness of the alliance and bring about its demise. Is it possible that Putin is playing a bigger political game centered on pitting national and alliance interests? It is beneficial to consider Colin Powell’s quip that if you wrestle with a pig, he has fun, and you get dirty. The current ambiguity about U.S. policy objectives and increasingly divergence of views within the alliance actually helps rather than hinder Russia.
It would greatly benefit the Ukrainian people, although unlikely in the near term, to achieve an end to the suffering and violence, achieve a durable political resolution of the causal factors, and have everyone agree on the path forward. History and human nature suggest there are winners and losers from the political outcome of armed conflict. The end of one war is the often steppingstone to the next. How the conflict terminates to sustain a peace is the most pressing question. United States policy makers must make clear eyed judgments about the goals, ways to achieve them, as well as the near- and longer-term risks to our interests.