New POTUS, New Policies: A Forecast of Five Futures for the Russia-Ukraine War
Introduction
The American people recently re-elected former President Donald J. Trump. President-elect Trump’s return to the Oval Office will likely change the future of the Russia-Ukraine War. In June 2024, President-elect Trump said, “I would tell Zelensky no more — you got to make a deal,” Mr. Trump said of President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. “I would tell Putin, if you don’t make a deal, we’re going to give him a lot.” Using President-elect Trump’s quote alongside an “Ends-Ways-Means” formulation for strategy, we forecasted five future scenarios we believe could come to fruition during the next few years. We applied Art Lykke’s strategy model, which seeks to employ a risk-informed balance of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources) that further a nation’s interests. In crafting our forecasts, we take the perspective of Ukraine for the End-Ways-Means strategy formulation.
Also inherent in the President-elect’s quote is the notion that Kyiv and Moscow have agency in the outcome but not the decision by the United States. President Zelensky’s response to the future POTUS plan was, “I believe that President Trump really wants a quick decision” to end the conflict, Zelensky remarked, but he added, “It doesn’t mean that it will happen this way.” He stressed that a peace process must be just and not risk leaving Ukraine vulnerable. Knowing that other actors have agency, we argue that the United States can influence the outcome but not impose a solution. Based on President Zelensky’s “Victory Plan,” we will assume Ukraine’s current ends remain the liberation of all occupied Ukrainian territory and the ability to ensure Ukraine’s future security.
The five scenarios we imagined are:
- Never Bet Against the (White) House
- Ukraine Stays the Course
- Chechnya 3.0 – Ukrainian Style
- Ukraine on Steroids
- Nuclear Wildcard
In ‘Never Bet Against the (White House), Ukraine’s ends change. In the ‘Ukraine Stays the Course,’ Ukraine’s means and the ends remain the same. In the remaining forecasts, Ukraine’s means either increase, decrease, or radically increase (by acquiring a nuclear weapon), forcing a change in how the war is fought conceptually (the ways).
As a disclaimer, which scenario occurs depends on several factors. First, and most importantly are the choices of the two principal combatants – Russia and Ukraine. A second factor would be choices made by the rest of “The Axis of Upheaval” (China, Iran, and the DPRK) if Russia escalates the conflict or refuses to compromise. A third major factor would be the status of the U.S. commitment to NATO and other NATO nations’ perception of that commitment. A strong commitment to NATO might make those nations most supportive of Ukraine to date more willing to continue supporting Ukraine. However, it might cause them to feel secure in their future and prioritize ending the war. Conversely, a perceived lack of commitment could also drive nations to act, perhaps through a change in military posture or increased support to Ukraine to tie up Russian forces and prevent Russia from turning on other former Soviet states. NATO nations that are closest to the Russian-Ukraine war feel its effect the most. Therefore, Nordic, Baltic, and Eastern European states are giving the highest percentage of their GDP to aid Ukraine. However, the U.S. gives the largest amount of aid to Ukraine. So, with a new Presidential administration, it is worth examining these five potential future scenarios.
Five Futures
1. Never Bet Against the (White) House
In this scenario, we see a change of Ukraine’s ends prioritizing a negotiated settlement, making warfighting ways and means irrelevant. In this scenario, the POTUS-elect crafts a masterful negotiation. Both Ukraine and Russia agree to settle, with each conceding from their original goals. This is the only scenario we imagine the desired end state changes for Ukraine. Dr. William Spaniel notes that Russia will be sprinting as far west as possible before January to maximize leverage based on the POTUS-elect’s plan despite the harsh winter months.
The presence or lack of a Western security guarantee will influence Kyiv’s decision to change its desired end state to accept a negotiated settlement short of Russian withdrawal. Without a security guarantee, Kyiv must accept the significant risk of Russia renewing war when the timing works for Moscow. Putin is unlikely to accept security guarantees that involve a NATO presence or arming of Ukraine, or that lack a clause requiring all parties– including Russia- to agree on any future military intervention.
Worldwide support for Ukraine remains. A November 2024 global poll of 30,000 participants in 29 countries by The Economist shows that 54% of respondents want Ukraine to win, with only 20% supporting Russia. Most participants supported Ukraine over Russia in 25 of the 29 countries. However, the opinion of those in Ukraine gives the best indicator of their will to fight. While the people of Ukraine undoubtedly demonstrate resolve, recent polls show that an increasing number of Ukrainians (38%) are willing to surrender some territory, a significant increase from the start of the war. However, while most Ukrainians may be tired of the war, the majority (58%) remain reluctant to give up any territory. Despite the will of the Ukrainian people, all wars must end, and this admittedly imperfect scenario may be the least bad alternative for Ukraine.
In all subsequent forecasts, we surmise that the ends do not change for Ukraine. The Ukrainian people have shown a remarkable “Will to Fight” for their national survival and territorial integrity. In On War, Prussian military strategist and philosopher Carl von Clausewitz reminds us that one’s resistance is a “product of two inseparable factors the means at his disposal and the strength of his will.”
The implications for NATO and the United States are an opportunity to reduce human suffering, including that brought about by Russia’s violation of international humanitarian law, preventing further loss of life as the conventional war would end. However, any negotiated settlement likely requires at least some compromise that would appear to reward Russian aggression with the message it might send China. More importantly, an end to the conventional war would free Russia to accelerate the rapid rebuilding of its military, augmenting its capabilities to threaten NATO. Finally, it is nearly certain, given Putin’s rejection of Ukrainian identity, that any negotiated settlement that did not result in a Moscow-friendly government would lead Moscow to continue a campaign of irregular warfare to emplace one.
2. Ukraine Stays the Course
This option see no change in ends, ways, or means. In this scenario, funding for Ukraine remains constant as U.S. aid does not decline or other nations make up any decline in U.S. support. A direct comparison of Russian and Ukrainian military capacity paints a grim picture for Ukraine, given Russia’s larger population, economy, defense budget, and sheer military force. However, the advantage arguably shifts to Ukraine if NATO nations have the political will to mobilize and use their transforming military capacity, even without the United States.
In this scenario, Ukraine’s theory of victory remains unchanged. Through attrition of the Russian military and deep strikes, Ukraine seeks to exhaust Russia. While experts debate how long both sides can sustain the war, neither side appears ready to compromise. Therefore, in this scenario, we expect a prolonged stalemate with fighting continuing at or near the current intensity as both sides seek to alter the military balance.
In a prolonged stalemate, Ukraine’s primary risk is exhaustion, given its smaller population and dependency on Western support. For the West, implications would center on escalation of the conflict, vertically or horizontally, as each side would be forced to seek ways to break the stalemate and end the war before their resources run out. Additionally, this scenario would require substantial mobilization of Western will and defense industrial capacity to sustain the Ukrainian effort – something that is far from certain given the pace at which Europe has mobilized its defense industry to date.
3. Chechnya 3.0—Ukrainian Style
In this scenario, Ukraine’s warfighting means are significantly reduced, forcing them to change their ways. In this scenario, a loss of U.S. funding and an inability or unwillingness by NATO nations to provide sufficient resources prevent Ukraine from maintaining the conflict at its current intensity level. Russia’s conventional military advantage compels Ukraine to revert to irregular warfare or an insurgency to exhaust Russia.
In Chechnya 3.0, the Ukrainian theory of victory shifts to that of most insurgencies – making the cost of occupation exceed the benefit. A sustainable insurgency would likely be based in a Ukrainian rump state or by a government in exile hosted in a NATO country such as Poland. NATO nations, especially those along NATO’s eastern flank, arguably have an interest in maintaining an active insurgency to tie up Russian forces and prevent their use against former Soviet states. This scenario would be susceptible to the status of U.S.-NATO relations and how that relationship influences nations’ risk calculus. Noteworthy, given the President-elect’s statements tying U.S. support to meeting the 2% threshold, is the fact that as of 2023, seven of the top ten nations in terms of defense spending as a percent of GDP come from the Nordic, Baltic, or Eastern European countries. In fact, through most of 2024, only Slovenia appears to be spending less than 2% of its GDP on defense.
For Ukraine, the principal risks in this scenario include the suffering of its population under what would likely be a brutal Russian occupation. Further, Ukraine could lose its national identity if too many Ukrainians determine it is better to collaborate than suffer. For the West, implications of this scenario include the potential for escalation if Russia perceives Western complicity in a Ukrainian insurgency, the shift in the Russia-NATO frontline if Ukraine ceases to exist, and the ability of Russia to rebuild its conventional forces depending on the intensity of the insurgency. Finally, there is a possibility that in this scenario, a sub-set of nations is prepared to support Ukraine, potentially undermining NATO unity, thus eroding the deterrent power that is core to the alliance.
4. Ukraine on Steroids
In this option, Ukraine’s military means increase and improve, allowing for a change in ways. Furthermore, in this scenario, Moscow is unwilling to negotiate out of a sense they can win militarily or are outright unwilling to compromise. As a result, the United States and NATO partners bolster their support and loosen constraints on Ukraine, allowing them to fight differently.
In this scenario, Ukraine’s theory of victory would remain one of attriting Russian forces while exhausting Russian means and will, but Ukraine’s ability to implement this strategy would increase. Depending on how the means are increased, this could include Ukraine regaining the operational initiative and an expanded ability to strike targets at depth in Russia with greater precision and intensity. Additionally, this scenario could include greater diplomatic isolation of Russia if the war’s continuation is considered Russia’s fault.
The principal risk for Ukraine in this scenario is vertical escalation. Suppose Moscow truly believes the annexed territories are part of Russia or that their retention is critical to regime survival. In that case, the probability of vertical escalation rises if Ukraine generates real military success and would even meet conditions for nuclear escalation. For the West, the implications include the risk of escalation as many experts argue Russia sees this conflict as part of a broader struggle against a U.S.-dominated global order. A separate, if less likely, risk is one of the Russian state’s collapse in the event of Russian military defeat or internal Russian power struggle if Putin is perceived to have failed. That said, it is important to note that Russian nuclear saber-rattling has proven largely rhetorical to date, but that could change in the future.
5. Nuclear Wildcard
Means are dramatically changed, making predictions highly speculative. In an implausible, but not impossible, scenario Ukraine acquires a nuclear weapon(s). Alternatively, this could involve threats of or actual formalization of extended deterrence by another nation seeking to influence the outcome of the conflict. Though no one has suggested this to date, this could occur if Russia appears to be on the verge of a military victory, which could be seen as leading to a larger conflict in Europe. This scenario could also increase in likelihood if Russia refuses to negotiate and third-parties want to ramp up the pressure on Russia to compromise.
In this scenario, Ukraine’s theory of victory would greatly depend on the extent of Ukrainian control over and scale of any nuclear capability. If Ukraine were to acquire a limited nuclear capability or be dependent on third-party extended deterrence, they could threaten nuclear use to compel Russia to negotiate an end to a conflict that Russia appeared to be winning. In a highly unlikely scenario where Ukraine acquires multiple nuclear weapons, it might employ one to create a battlefield opportunity or political shock sufficient to change Russian calculations about the logic of the war.
Escalation is the principal risk for Ukraine and a major implication for the West in this scenario. Of course, Ukraine and any nation that aided them in acquiring a nuclear capability would be violating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and at risk of severe diplomatic or other sanctions. Further, any use of a nuclear weapon would erode existing norms related to their employment and undermine non-proliferation efforts going back decades. Though a highly improbable scenario, as both sides see this conflict as existential, it is worth considering as a thought experiment.
Tell me how this ends
How the Russia-Ukraine war ends has profound implications for global security, the European balance of power, and norms of international conduct. We explored five scenarios – from negotiated settlement to nuclear wildcards – to illustrate the complex interplay of ends, ways and means and some of the tradeoffs that decision-makers must consider. While the United States, as Ukraine’s largest arms supplier, can play a significant role in determining how this ends, many others closer to the conflict have a vote – especially Moscow and Kyiv.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.
