New Era, New Ethics? A German Perspective on Just War and Just Peace
Author’s note: This article is based on a paper presented at the International Society for Military Ethics’ (ISME) 2024 Conference in Colorado Springs.
Introduction: The War in Ukraine – A Turning Point in the Ethics of War and Peace?
When Russia started its invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, the German government was quick to condemn the attack and express its unqualified support for Ukraine. But it took a while – and several policy revisions – before Germany provided the comprehensive and robust support that has now made it the second-largest arms supplier to Ukraine after the USA. The delays were largely due to political and ethical concerns, among them constitutional worries regarding arms deliveries to a war zone, a potential escalation of the war (nuclear threats, economic risks, etc.), and objections from influential pacifists. But, invoking the principle of defense of others and the need to protect the global peace order by stopping the Russian aggressor, the German government decided not only to support Ukraine, but also to revise its security policy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz famously termed this policy shift a “Zeitenwende” (i.e., a turning point and beginning of a new era): Putin’s “opprobrious breach of international law” necessitates “new, strong capabilities” for the Bundeswehr (Germany’s Armed Forces).[1] Germany’s new defense policy guidelines, published on November 9th, 2023, elaborate on this: “Warfighting capability” is the goal, and Germany aspires to be the “backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe.”[2]
This raises the question of whether the strategic policy shift also requires a change in our approach to the ethics of war and peace. In the case of Germany, this means specifically, a return from the doctrine of just peace to the classical doctrine of just war. While, on the one hand, the current focus on warfighting has caused widespread discomfort in Germany’s civil society (although most Germans aren’t antimilitaristic, the potential militarization of society is a significant concern), there are, on the other hand, even some theologians who have revived just war theory (= JWT) to justify (a) the support of Ukraine and (b) increased efforts to strengthen the Bundeswehr. While understandable, this is unnecessary. My brief account of the German concept of just peace theory (= JPT) aims to show why Putin’s aggression doesn’t necessitate the search for a ‘new’ ethic and return to JWT; the international reaction so far rather confirms the efficacy of JPT. Even if it were true that, for the German armed forces, the era of small wars was over (it is not), the ‘new era’ marked by a return of great power confrontation doesn’t compel us to abandon JPT and replace it with JWT again because JPT incorporates key criteria of JWT as “principles of law-preserving violence.” The German concept of JPT is immune to the criticism the vision of “just peace” often faces across the globe, from scholars and practitioners alike, especially where it is identified, justly or unjustly, with a radical pacifism that many deem unrealistic.
The Catholic Church’s Shift from Just War to Just Peace
JWT rests on seven principles that are traditionally divided into (a) jus ad bellum (“right to war,” these are conditions that make the use of warfare morally permissible: just cause, last resort, legitimate authority, right intent, reasonable chance of success) and (b) jus in bello (“right conduct in war,” i.e., proportionality and non-combatant immunity). Although JWT has some roots in ancient philosophy and is today used in non-religious contexts as well, it was mainly developed by Christian thinkers like Augustine (354-430) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and has often been considered an essential part of Catholic social teaching. Catholic ethicists in the USA, therefore, observed a “momentous change” when the Vatican’s 2016 “Nonviolence and Just Peace Conference” advocated for replacing JWT with a concept of just peace. Most agreed with the conference’s emphasis on peacemaking, but critics objected to the following assertions: “We believe there is no just war (…) Suggesting that a just war is possible also undermines the moral imperative to develop tools and capacities for nonviolent transformation of conflict. (…) We call upon the Church we love to no longer use or teach just war theory.”[3] Critics argued that the document failed to acknowledge current, more restrictive forms of JWT, i.e., contemporary JWT (= cJWT[4]), which “can be seen as practically pacifist with its strong presumption in favor of peace and strict application of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria.” While critics were convinced that “just peace and just war are not mutually exclusive,”[5] they supported the conference’s call for a papal encyclical on the topic, hoping for clarification and some middle ground.
Although Pope Francis has repeatedly expressed his antiwar stance, e.g., in his 2020 encyclical Fratelli tutti (No. 25-28, 255-262, 281-285), he has not authored an encyclical specifically addressing this topic.[6] But there have long been Catholic teachings on just peace that constitute compromise positions in the controversy, for instance, the German concept of JPT, which has a somewhat ‘magisterial’ character[7] since its foundational document – “the Magna Carta of Catholic peace ethics in Germany” – was authored by the German Conference of Catholic Bishops in 2000 (= GB).[8] The bishops took inspiration from the fact that, with the end of the Cold War, Germany’s armed forces had shifted their attention from preparation for defense operations in a potential large war – assuming, however, that nuclear deterrence would in fact avert a third world war – to the actual participation in UN or NATO-mandated peacekeeping and stabilization missions (“humanitarian interventions”) in small wars all across the globe. It is noteworthy that, in Germany, just peace teaching has long replaced just war teaching even within the Bundeswehr, where ethics training is largely provided by military chaplains and theologians. But far from being radically pacifist, the German bishops’ understanding of just peace demonstrates the realism American critics of the 2016 Vatican document demand, as it incorporates key elements of JWT.
The German Concept of JPT
The German concept of JPT was developed after the end of the Cold War. The principles outlined in GB rest on the assumption of stable peace in Europe – where Germany is “surrounded by friends,” as former defense secretary Volker Rühe put it – and focus on international crisis management (GB 1-6). It would, however, be misleading to regard JPT as a peace ethics for the post-Cold War era and JWT as an ethics for the Cold War, which must now be revived due to the confrontation with Putin’s Russia.
Instead, JPT, as the German Bishops understand it, has its roots in Christian teachings on peace inspired by Jesus’s commandment to love one another, in the biblical “link between justice and peace” (GB 63), and in the pursuit of a rule-based security order that was influenced by Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) vision of “Perpetual Peace” (laid out in his eponymous 1795 book) and found expression in the UN Charter’s ban on war. At the height of the Cold War, the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) demanded: “Never again war!” – this motto has guided recent popes from Paul VI to John Paul II to Francis –, but at the same time the Council also acknowledged the role of a strong military in securing peace, calling soldiers “agents of peace” and morally justifying their service.[9] The German Bishops build on this view in GB 133, and it is noteworthy that it aligns nicely with the very idea behind German rearmament: the military – General Wolf Graf von Baudissin (1907-93), one of the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr, wrote in 1957 – affirms “peace as the normal state, which is the only goal for which a war can be justified. Peace gives warfare its mandate and its limits.”[10]
Unlike others, I see JPT less as a momentous “paradigm shift” and more as a mere shift in perspective, focusing on the only acceptable goal of justified military force, namely peace. JPT prioritizes (a) peace through justice: the goal is violence prevention by addressing “the root causes of war” and creating economically, socially, ecologically, and politically just conditions worldwide that make war unnecessary and undesirable (GB 60). Nonviolent, civilian, constructive, and cooperative conflict resolution and reconciliation take precedence over military force. At the same time, however, JPT also (b) insists that only a just peace is acceptable, not merely the absence of hostilities (GB 7).
After 1945, many believed that understanding war as a justifiable means of politics was no longer viable. The World Wars had once more highlighted the longstanding misuse of JWT, which had turned the efforts of its early advocates like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to limit violence[11] into a perceived “right to war,” often giving national interests the appearance of legitimacy by reducing the jus ad bellum to the “legitimate authority” criterion that was considered fulfilled if a sovereign state issued a formal declaration of war. Weapons of mass destruction further challenged the jus in bello standards, particularly the principle of noncombatant immunity. Yet, the Cold War kept JWT alive, and some misuse continued where politicians invoked JWT rhetoric to provide pseudo-moral justification for proxy wars.
When the work of American scholars like R. Potter and M. Walzer led to a philosophical renaissance of JWT, German ethicists reacted with skepticism and started to develop JPT as an alternative. Much like the 2016 Vatican conference, however, they often ignored that contemporary JWT theorists were critical of, for instance, the Vietnam War and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and never intended to reintroduce war as a morally acceptable political instrument.
This is even more obvious today. cJWT interprets the principle of right intent very restrictively: one must aim not only at restoring peace, but “the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.”[12] In fact, the goal of a truly “just and lasting peace” is now sometimes considered a new category of JWT called “jus post bellum.”[13] And recently, a fourth category, “jus ante bellum”, has been suggested. Although this term has various meanings, some US scholars use it in alignment with a key idea behind the German concept of JPT, i.e., as an expression of the obligation to secure peace and prevent conflict through justice and diplomacy. Mark Allman and Tobias Winright explicitly suggest that “just peacemaking” principles could serve as the jus ante bellum part of JWT. Jus ante bellum, for them, is the “standard to measure right intent and last resort.”[14]
In short, cJWT does not seek to rehabilitate the institution of war and must be distinguished from so-called political realism, which uses JWT language as “moral camouflage” (Allman). JPT and cJWT agree that war is merely a last resort.
If only self-defense – and, by extension, the defense of another nation – is a just cause, the Ukraine War is not just, since it was started by Russia; yet those forced to participate in this war are justified in defending Ukraine. Despite seeing no need to revive JWT, I do think there is indeed a big advantage when some want to speak of a “just war” again: the term “war” accurately describes the reality the aggressor has forced upon the defender. And war is the reality that German soldiers would experience should they need to defend peace in Europe following a potential future attack on NATO or EU countries.
The term “warfighting capability,” which is so controversial in Germany right now, doesn’t mean preparing for a war of aggression and doesn’t entail a “militarization of society.”[15] Warfighting capability is the goal of any armed forces and, apparently unbeknown to its critics, has been part of the Bundeswehr’s raison d’être since its inception.[16] But for democratic Germany, it never meant more than the readiness to defend the nation, our allies, and shared values against potential attacks.[17] Ideally, warfighting capability functions as a deterrent and prevents wars. The current war in Europe necessitates strengthening the military’s warfighting capability, but it also offers a chance to remind our society and our soldiers of the importance of a military committed to moral values.
German JPT and cJWT as Compromise Positions in the Ethics of Peace and War
Problems with JWT do not undermine its underlying idea. The German Bishops recognize that “in extreme cases,” when the peace commandment of Christian ethics and international law is violated, “counter-violence” is acceptable (GB 66). The German concept of JPT explicitly adopts the traditional principles of JWT but understands them as an “ethic of law-preserving violence” (EKD 102). German church leaders recognize that military force can protect minimum standards for a peace that is acceptable as just when a “life in dignity” (GB 59), freedom, and human rights are guaranteed. Military force is an instrument of “just peace through law” (GB 51, EKD 85).
To be clear: I have no issues with cJWT, which limits violence more than it legitimizes it. However, since the German concept of JPT has a lot in common with current forms of JWT, there is no need to return to the latter. The great advantage of JPT is its terminological clarity in focusing on peace and refusing to recognize war as a moral category. Besides, a realistic JPT that prioritizes conflict prevention without disregarding the occasional need for military force seems more coherent than attempts to integrate conflict prevention into JWT by calling it “jus ante bellum.” In short, calls by some German theologians to revive JWT in light of the Russian attack are unnecessary precisely because the concept of JPT developed in the cited church documents and cJWT share a similar understanding of justified military force.
But this similarity has sparked criticism from absolute pacifists who reject the German concept of JPT as insufficient, believing peace ethics must always be nonviolent. They are suspicious that both JWT and JPT language have been used as ‘moral camouflage’ to justify international interventions driven by Western interests (e.g., in former Yugoslavia or Afghanistan). It is important to point out, though, that this radically pacifist critique of the German concept of JPT does not apply in the case of the Ukraine War and Germany’s arms support for Ukraine: while Western interests are definitely at stake in this conflict, the global peace order is also at risk.
It is understandable that Putin’s aggression has sparked renewed interest in JWT, but, more importantly, the international reaction has underscored the principles of JPT. Despite some Russia sympathizers, the overwhelming consensus persists, which led to Russia’s condemnation by the UN General Assembly on March 2nd, 2022. Political leaders worldwide, from the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, have used the term “just peace” in the exact same way in which the German churches understand it, i.e., to demand a peace that is more than a “peace dictated by Russia” (Guterres on January 16th, 2024). The Ukraine War demonstrates that the German concept of JPT is not, as is sometimes said, a “special path” but consistent with international peace ethics, precisely because, while (a) prioritizing peacebuilding through justice, it also (b) establishes conditions for a truly just peace.
Adhering to the principles of JPT, most German church leaders, except some radical pacifists, therefore support military aid for Ukraine. The 2023 German Protestant Church Assembly even invited, for the first time in its history, the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Carsten Breuer, and he took the opportunity to put the government’s Ukraine policy in a nutshell: “If the West had not supported with weapons, the war would be over, but Ukraine would be under Russia’s yoke. The war would be over, but the suffering would continue” (October 3rd, 2023). Germany’s Catholic Military Bishop, Franz-Josef Overbeck, has made a similar argument. Both express the fundamental principle of JPT: negative peace does not suffice; we need to fight for just conditions to guarantee a peaceful existence.
Multilateralism for a Multipolar World Order
The blatant violation of the international security order by a permanent member of the UN Security Council does not compromise key elements of JPT such as peacebuilding through dialogue and international law. It simply is a stark reminder that a reform is needed to make the UN more effective. The overwhelming condemnation of Russia by the UN’s General Assembly may point the way. The key documents of the German concept of JPT already noted, decades ago, “a weakening of multilateralism” (EKD, 32), but it remains true now what their authors demanded then, i.e., that the emerging multipolar world order should not deter us from strengthening a “cooperatively constituted order” (EKD, 125) – whether value-based or merely rule-based – that is foundational to the Kantian and Christian vision of just peace.
Even Putin’s cynical refusal to speak of a “war” in Ukraine – he calls the Russian invasion a “special military operation” instead – only confirms JPT’s internationality principle: not only does the deceptive terminology enable the Russian regime to downplay the dimensions of the conflict on the domestic front and to fake adherence to international law (the UN Charter’s ban on war), Putin also refuses to acknowledge an international conflict altogether: he attempts to legitimize the war with the help of the pseudo-historical, revisionist doctrine of “Russki Mir (One Russian World)”[18], thus denying Ukrainian sovereignty and viewing the war as a merely “internal affair” (October 5th, 2023).
But most Western leaders haven’t fallen for Putin’s attempts to hide his imperialist interests. The Ukraine War does indeed constitute the turning point Chancellor Scholz described. The Cold War scenario of conventional defense operations on German territory is unrealistic – collective defense of NATO territory is not. Accordingly, the brigade Germany prepares to station permanently in Lithuania next year (2025) has been called the “lighthouse project of the Zeitenwende.” Through their “forward presence” on the eastern flank of NATO, German soldiers could experience war again, and our country itself could become a “hub” for NATO forces in the case of an attack. Strengthening our “warfighting capability” – i.e., preparing our military and society for the worst case – is therefore the right response to the Zeitenwende.[19]
And this is compatible with JPT. The right to self-defense requires the power to enforce it – even as a measure to prevent war: the comprehensive war readiness Germany’s new security policy envisions, along with demonstrated solidarity among EU and NATO partners, primarily aims at deterring potential attackers.
It would, however, be fatal and incompatible with JPT to ignore international crisis management operations and small wars over the current emphasis on national and collective defense. Germany’s new defense policy guidelines acknowledge this explicitly (p. 10). The Zeitenwende marked by Russia’s attack on Ukraine above all reminds every German citizen of the ever-present threat of war, and it has thus provided the opportunity for a political promise: to publicly recognize the immense complexity of the tasks faced by the Bundeswehr as a true “army of peace,” and to provide the resources needed to fulfill these tasks.
Conclusion and Outlook
JPT and JWT agree on the jus in bello, which is embedded in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), but it is more than a set of legal norms soldiers must adhere to. It poses challenges for military ethics training, since soldiers are expected to transcend, in Lawrence Kohlberg’s terms, “conventional moral judgment” and base ethical decisions on universal human rights principles. Indeed, we must remember that the traditional values military ethics training often focuses on (duty, loyalty, courage and the like) are merely secondary or instrumental virtues that need an external foundation to gain proper moral worth.
Recognizing this from its inception, the Bundeswehr, reacting to the Nazi regime’s instrumentalization of the Wehrmacht, created a leadership philosophy called Innere Führung (“leadership development and civic education”) that establishes within the military values based on the “liberal democratic basic order” of Germany’s 1949 constitution and the human rights ethos of the UN Charter. But the suitability of this philosophy for combat operations has been questioned occasionally. During Germany’s participation in the international military mission in Afghanistan (ISAF), some generals called for a ‘new’ warrior mindset, prioritizing, as they put it, “archaic fighters” over moral concerns. The Ukraine War shows how shortsighted this was. It demonstrates the importance of a military that acts morally and embraces, in particular, the jus in bello principles that are part of both JWT and JPT: The international community has not only condemned Russia’s breach of the international peace order but also the ongoing violations of IHL (war crimes against civilians, prisoners of war, civilian infrastructure, etc.). The fact that Russia has given up any moral high ground has only strengthened Western support for Ukraine. For this and other reasons, the Ukraine War can also be seen as a case study in the strategic relevance of military ethics or, better, the lack thereof.[20]
References
[1] The text of Scholz’s speech from February 27th, 2022 can be found here (my translation): https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-am-27-februar-2022-2008356.
[2] The official English translation of the guidelines is available here: https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5702190/edabed114d7856c8aa71ad666cbce8b3/download-defence-policy-guidelines-2023-data.pdf.
[3] Catholic Nonviolence Initiative, An Appeal to the Catholic Church to Re-Commit to the Centrality of Gospel Non-Violence, cited in Theological Roundtable: “Must Just Peace and Just War Be Mutually Exclusive?”, Horizons 45 (2018), p. 105-127: 108.
[4] This distinction should not be confused with the debate between classical or “traditionalist” and “revisionist” just war theorists, although there may be some overlap.
[5] Quotes are from Tobias Winright’s and Mark Allman’s contributions to the “Theological Roundtable” in Horizons 45 (2018), p. 114 and 124.
[6] For that reason, there is still room for interpretation: while clearly a pacifist at heart, it is not clear how radical Francis’s pacifism is. For a brief overview, cf. M. Thurau, “Just Peace Despite War,” Ethics and Armed Forces 02/2023, https://www.ethikundmilitaer.de/en/magazine-datenbank/detail/02-2023/article/just-peace-despite-war-in-defense-of-a-criticized-concept.
[7] The term ‘magisterial’ here refers to the teaching authority of the Catholic Church, which rests with the pope and the bishops, and responds to the critics’ desire for an authoritative answer to the question of just peace or just war.
[8] The German Bishops, Gerechter Friede [Just Peace]. Bonn 2000, https://www.dbk-shop.de/media/files_public/aa854b8461836b577d6a6d8d6d7278f6/DBK_1166.pdf. The quote is from the bishops’ conference’s website. In the following, I shall quote this document in the text as “GB” (= German Bishops) followed by the relevant section number. The bishops have confirmed their teaching on just peace, although with some updates and adjustments, in a recently published document that makes explicit references to the war in Ukraine and to other recent developments (Friede diesem Haus [Peace to this house]. Bonn, 2024). The Protestant Church in Germany published a document similar to GB in 2007: Rat der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland: Aus Gottes Frieden leben – für gerechten Frieden sorgen [Living in God’s Peace – Taking Care of Just Peace]. Gütersloh 2007 https://www.ekd.de/ekd_de/ds_doc/ekd_friedensdenkschrift.pdf (quoted in the following as “EKD”). Although I shall focus on GB, both documents are representative of the German concept of JPT.
[9] Cf. the Council document Gaudium et spes (1965), No. 79.
[10] Handbuch Innere Führung. Bonn 1957, p. 59.
[11] Augustine says war must be waged “only for the sake of peace” (The City of God XIX 12).
[12] https://www.missioalliance.org/just-war-theory-a-primer/
[13] Louis V. Iasiello, “Jus Post Bellum,” Naval War College Review 57:3 (2004), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=2151&context=nwc-review
[14] Mark J. Allman, Tobias L. Winright, “Growing Edges of Just War Theory: Jus ante bellum, jus post bellum, and Imperfect Justice,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 32:2 (2012), 173-191: 175f. Allman and Winright refer to the just peacemaking principles suggested by Glen Stassen and others; cf. G. Stassen (ed.), Just Peacemaking: Ten Practices for Abolishing War. Cleveland 1998.
[15] This word has been used by politicians on the far right and far left of the political spectrum in Germany.
[16] For instance, in the above-mentioned manual on military leadership in the Bundeswehr (Handbuch Innere Führung. Bonn 1957, p. 36).
[17] Germany’s new defense policy guidelines call this to mind (p. 27f.).
[18] Apart from numerous references in recent speeches, Putin elaborated on this doctrine in his pseudo-academic, highly manipulative 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/On_the_Historical_Unity_of_Russians_and_Ukrainians.
[19] Quotes in this paragraph are from Germany’s November 2023 Defense Policy Guidelines (p. 13f, 27).
[20] This is a topic for a separate paper. I made the point in my essay “Krieg in der Ukraine und Innere Führung. Zur strategischen Relevanz militärischer Ethik [War in Ukraine and Innere Führung: On the Strategic Relevance of Military Ethics]” https://zms.bundeswehr.de/de/mediathek/ukraine-innere-fuehrung-ethik-zmsbw-5573712 (published on January 26th, 2023; an English translation is forthcoming), and it still rings true despite the changing fortunes of war that we have seen on the battlefields of Ukraine over the last two and a half years.
