An Open Letter to Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, General Keith Kellogg: The Strategic Realities of the War in Ukraine

An Open Letter to Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia General Keith Kellogg: The Strategic Realities of the War in Ukraine

By Keith D. Dickson and Yurij Holowinsky

After 1,000 days of war, there seems to be no end in sight.  Ukrainian forces have pushed into the Kursk Oblast, occupying the Sudzhansky Rayon and have a tentative grip on the territory, creating a bulge that must be defended, while serving as an occupying force.  Russian forces batter relentlessly against entrenched Ukrainian defenders from Kupyarsk to Pokrovsk in the eastern Donbas.  Although both sides put their hopes in fielding a new weapons system or missile will change the course of the war, it is a false hope: this is a war of attrition.  Despite Russia’s often admired sophisticated concepts of war at the operational level, the Russian armed forces are incapable of applying them.  Their leadership has neither the imagination, nor do their combat units have the training, to conduct sophisticated joint operations or combined arms maneuver.  Russian forces have naturally, almost unconsciously, reverted to the model of war their grandfathers and great-great grandfathers understood: simple, straightforward, uncomplicated, unsophisticated infantry assaults backed by mass artillery strikes with the belief that enough men and steel thrown against the enemy will eventually break them.  It has been the approach from the Masurian Lakes to Grozny.  The Russians accept casualties at a rate that has astounded their enemies for over 100 years; the Russian soldier is capable of enduring atrocious conditions that would destroy the morale of any other army.  New wrinkles have been introduced, with mostly indiscriminate rocket and missile attacks and the arrival of thousands of mercenaries from around the globe along with North Korean combat troops.  Yet, the model of simple attrition is unchanged.  The enemy inevitably wears down before the Russian steamroller wears down.

The Ukrainian armed forces have shown remarkable resilience and morale, adapting quickly, and fighting tenaciously, while continuously introducing and integrating new capabilities that are changing the tactical battlefield forever.  And yet, like all those who have faced the Russian army for over a century, it is difficult to sustain units in combat as they suffer casualties and fewer and fewer replacements are available as the manpower pool shrinks.  This affects front line unit morale and cohesiveness and wears on the national will.

Because neither side can achieve its goals, there must be a new approach to ending this war.  Several important strategic realities stand out.

• Ukraine has become the strategic bulwark of the West. Ukraine’s ultimate survival and regeneration is now a priority for the long-term security of Europe.
• Any cease-fire or peace arrangement will only be temporary. There will be another war in three to five years.  Putin will use this time to rearm and correct mistakes.  The West must understand that this period represents strategic breathing space to prepare Ukraine to fight and win against another Russian assault employing economic, informational, military (land, air, and missile forces), and cyber capabilities.  This means significant investment in airpower, ballistic missile defense, a fully equipped, NATO standard heavy division, several light infantry brigades, and a robust special operations capability.
• There is no formal NATO membership in Ukraine’s future. Instead, Ukraine becomes for all intents and purposes, a shadow member without Article V guarantees, but with all the benefits of NATO training and interoperability.
• Zelensky will have to accept territory lost to Russia is permanent, but it allows for a definable zone of separation and allows Putin to declare his pyrrhic victory.
• The West must look carefully at the leaders who will emerge after Zelensky. Ukraine’s shaky political history over the past 20 years is an essential factor to consider in this assessment.  The post-war truce will require strong and visionary leadership to prepare the country for the next war, while building close ties with the EU and NATO as a shadow member.  How the Western leaders guide this transition will determine the future of peace in Europe.
• Putin must be made to realize that Russia is trapped in a war that requires a demonstratable victory. Yet, this victory ultimately has no benefit.  Putin’s goal of defeating the Ukrainian armed forces in open combat and occupying any more Ukrainian territory is a strategic impossibility and will result in disaster.
• The 1994 Trilateral Statement is dead. The nuclear weapons that Ukraine turned over to Russia most likely now threaten its existence.  The security assurances agreed upon by Russia, the U.S., and Great Britain became null and void when Russia seized Crimea and the Donbas.  Ukraine could assert that because it once was a nuclear power, it can become one again.  This possibility should not be ruled out.
• Sanctions must remain in place as a guarantee of good faith in any negotiated outcome. If Russia shows an actual interest in long-term peace, the sanctions can be selectively lifted.

Here are the considerations associated with these realities that can be addressed to Russia, Ukraine, and Western allies in initial talks.

For Russia: Vladimir Putin clearly has miscalculated.  He needs time to salvage what he can from this disastrous war.  Allowing him to keep the occupied territory can give him the opportunity to claim victory, even at an enormous and debilitating cost.  The territory Russia controls now is largely an economic and social wasteland, populated by toadies who serve Putin and a population almost completely ethnic Russian.  These people have largely chosen the path of unification with Russia and it has brought nothing but misery.  It is true that the region is rich in natural resources, but the ability to extract these resources profitably is nearly impossible and far beyond Russia’s capability.  Crimea is a useless piece of territory that is nearly impossible to defend effectively.  Putin must deploy significant military forces to occupy and defend these new regions; the Russian people will have to bear the economic recovery in these regions at a staggering cost.  Russia’s victory will mire the nation in a vast morass of prohibitively costly economic and strategic requirements that will bring it little or no benefit and may actually help to extend the truce period.

Undoubtedly, as soon as peace is declared, Putin will turn to the General Staff planners with orders to prepare to replay the attack on Ukraine, with the same objective: Russian forces move about 200 miles forward to a line defined by Zaporizhia, Dnipro, Cherkasy, and Kyiv.  It is doubtful that Russian military planners are any more capable than their counterparts who devised the amateurish and unrealistic operational plan in 2022.  Nonetheless, Russian planners would be required to find a way for Russian forces to defeat any opposing force, capture several major cities, and be able in the aftermath to occupy and control roughly 47,500 square miles of central Ukraine, approximately the size of North Korea.  Certainly, any attempt to build a force even remotely capable of accomplishing such an historic feat will take many years.  The effort will be a drain on the economy and sources of manpower will be limited.  Nevertheless, Russia will pour resources into supporting this plan.

For Ukraine: If Ukraine is to survive, Volodymyr Zelensky must choose the path that his inspiring leadership has attempted to avoid.  He must realize that he must safeguard his existing resources for the future, which will include an inevitable second war with Russia.  Ukraine can accept the battlefield status quo as the beginning of negotiations and use the truce for economic and military redevelopment.  Zelensky must take a strategic long view understanding that the lost territories in reality represent a gangrenous limb that must be cut off to save the healthy body.  By letting Russia absorb the costs of territory that will never be productive again, Ukraine gains valuable time for using its resources toward rearming and building a capability that will overwhelm and repel a future Russian attack.  He must look ahead and prepare the way for creating a strong strategic bridge to the West.

For the U.S., NATO, and the EU: What the Western democracies must do is accept the fact that any peace between Ukraine and Russia is only temporary.  Another war is inevitable as long as Putin remains the autocrat.  But there is no guarantee that the next leader will not be more dangerous than Putin.  Because NATO has been so reluctant to give Ukraine all the support it has needed out of fear of Russia, it has obtained the worst of all outcomes: Russia is encouraged to continue its war of attrition to its inevitable, disastrous conclusion, while Ukraine is being sacrificed in the vain hope it alone with dribs and drabs of military support, can hold Russia.  If the NATO nations lack the will to challenge Russia outright, then the West must use Ukraine to gain strategic breathing space.  Just as Russia will attempt to rebuild and retool its armed forces for the next war, Ukraine must also be made capable of fighting on its own and defeating a Russian offensive in the next war.  Western economic investment, and military modernization is essential, especially in developing an air force that is second to none in Europe with advanced F-35 aircraft and bombers.  Ballistic missiles and a nuclear capability modeled on the French Force de Frappe should not be ruled out.  Ukrainian land, air, missile, air defense, and special operations forces must be NATO compatible and trained to NATO standards.  Ukrainian forces and command and staff should be integrated into NATO exercises, essentially as a shadow member.

The roadmap ahead: The United States must take the lead, cooperating with Turkish President Erdoğan and other Western leaders in negotiations starting with the initial peace terms Erdoğan offered in November.  The goals are strategic breathing space: a ceasefire with a mutual withdrawal along a line of demarcation and a zone of separation with applicable provisions from the 2015 Minsk-2 agreement (including a proposed strong OSCE monitoring force); Ukraine does not join NATO; Russia retains annexed territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.  Russia is ceded the information domain temporarily to declare victory.  In return, Ukraine sets no limits on its future military capabilities.  By accepting these terms, Ukraine becomes a shadow NATO member, rearmed and reconstructed to meet the next war.  While Ukraine is rebuilt, Russia is ensnared in holding empty ground that only rises in costs that weakens its economy and drains its military forces.  It is a bitter tradeoff, born of Western irresolution.  War will come again, tragically, but at a far less disadvantage for Ukraine than 2022.  The West must accept this reality, gain strategic breathing space, and build Ukraine as a bulwark worthy of its gallant people who have paid so much for their freedom over the past 100 years.