The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: A Missed Opportunity
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by the Russian Armed Forces was an undertaking not seen in Europe since WWII. It proceeded from three directions, several axes, and created a frontline more than 1,000km long. The invasion failed to achieve most of its strategic goals, the principal of which was the capture of Kyiv and overthrow of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. While much commentary has explicated the reasons for the failure of Russia’s northern incursion into Ukraine, there has been little discussion of the hypothetical alternatives that might have brought the Russians success.
The Battle of Kyiv, led by General Aleksandr Chaiko, attempted a coup de main fixed on the Ukrainian capital. The two main vectors proceeded from Gomel (Belarus) and Bryansk (Russia) toward the western and eastern outskirts of Kyiv, respectively. Russian forces from the Sumy axis joined the effort from the east.
Though succeeding with the element of surprise, Russian forces were soon hampered by unpreparedness, logistical breakdown, and poor motivation. After just 42 days, the Russians made a full retreat from northern Ukraine, ostensibly as a good-will gesture pursuant to the Istanbul Peace Initiative. President Putin would later say: “Russian troops were near Kyiv in March 2022 [however] …There was no political decision to storm the three-million-strong city; it was a coercive operation to establish peace.” Such a face-saving statement was a deflection from what was the intended goal of encircling Kyiv and placing it under siege.
In reviewing the failure of the northern incursion, various hypotheticals can only begin to speculate on what may have become of the campaign had it not been so wide-ranging and ambitious as to become overstretched. Though initially achieving a 12:1 force ratio advantage, the Russians did not anticipate strong resistance from locals and such rapid mobilization of Ukrainian conscripts. In fact, they had envisioned an invasion period of ten days, followed by an occupation lasting six months, and finally annexation in August of 2022.
Besides biting off more than could be chewed, a critical error of the northern campaign was the failure to consolidate around much easier targets in more compact tracts of land that were still of great strategic value. Specifically, had Russian forces avoided the megapolises of Kyiv and Kharkiv to instead concentrate on capturing smaller cities in the eastern Kyiv hinterland, such as Chernihiv, this could have given them a sturdy foothold and launching pad to reach the Dnieper or at least setup an intense chokepoint.
Failing to utilize Ukraine’s geography against its defensive interests is a central theme in the post-mortem of Russia’s northern incursion. In particular, the Dnieper River is an immense natural barrier that divides the country in two roughly equal parts, making it a potential liability for the defense of the eastern half. Had the Russians seized the territory to the east of Kyiv and proceeded southward toward Pereyaslav, this would have set up a scenario in which the river bridges could be destroyed – effectively stranding eastern Ukraine and hindering its ability to receive critical weaponry and supplies. The same principle was in play against the Russians at Kherson, such that they were forced to evacuate from the large territory that they controlled west of the Dnieper. The reverse scenario writ large could have left all of eastern Ukraine at the mercy of a slow but steady advance of Russian forces from both directions.
In a war of existential threat Ukraine has managed to mobilize just 1,050,000 men – a sign that its sole advantage, morale, has just about run dry. Not even Ukraine’s home-field advantage managed to inspire defenses to be constructed around Pokrovsk on time. In an attempt to shift the momentum, Ukraine has embarked on speculative and unsustainable forays that have inevitably backfired or led to the strange engagement in Kursk – fighting North Koreans for Potemkin village value. Corruption is not new to the Ukrainian military, but while Western aid has afforded this dependency, Russia’s lean war machine has experienced a dose of brutalism at all ranks and purged a number of top brass on account of incompetency. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s most notable change was to oust the highly popular and capable commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhny.
As the war now approaches its fourth year, the pace of Russian advancement on the eastern front is steady but comes at a large cost. Given that the overarching goals and long-term vision of the special military operation have evolved in concert with the political backdrop, so too may the ambit of tactics and maneuvers that the Russians are willing to employ in order to capitalize on developing weaknesses. The Ukrainians already demonstrated in Kursk that rapid and large territorial gains can be achieved in short order thanks to the element of surprise. With momentum firmly on the Russian side and Western support for Ukraine potentially waning, it’s feasible that Russian leadership may decide to go beyond the four oblasts.
Russia’s initial policy of only attacking command and control infrastructure was predicated on the notion that civilian infrastructure like railways and the power grid would be needed once Russia occupied Ukraine. It’s not clear why the course of the war and departure from this policy has exempted a few river bridges from being neutralized. Questions will also be asked about the improvident expenditure of troops to capture Bakhmut and Avdiivka by force, rather than bypassing them with an elongated frontline in which Russians enjoy a numerical advantage and eventual encirclement is possible. If a comprehensive Russian victory is the result that is reached by the end of the conflict, it will be because their command rediscovered the doctrine that Russian military history is renowned for more than any other: soldiers win battles, but logistics wins wars.
