From Hybrid to Conventional Warfare: Three Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Amid heightened geopolitical uncertainty, many defense analysts are questioning if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is now closer than ever. There is little doubt that Beijing has long sought control of Taiwan. This desire has only become more tangible since the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016. Since then, China has waged a prolonged and comprehensive hybrid warfare campaign against Taiwan. To put it briefly, this campaign has included isolating Taiwan diplomatically, spreading disinformation to undermine public trust, launching cyber-attacks on government systems, and exerting economic pressure to discourage public support for the Taiwanese government. Simultaneously, China has conducted frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and large-scale military drills, aiming to intimidate both the public and political leadership. Russia’s shift from a lengthy hybrid warfare campaign against Ukraine to a full-scale military invasion on February 24, 2022, highlights that hybrid warfare is not the sole approach available to revisionist states. This escalation suggests that Taiwan could face a similar escalation in the future. So, analyzing the factors behind Russia’s escalation in Ukraine is crucial to draw lessons that Taiwan and its allies might apply to prepare for potential threats. Three critical insights emerge from this analysis.

Lesson 1: Greater Threat Perception Leads to Escalation

With the overthrow of Ukraine’s Moscow-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, in February 2014, the Kremlin concluded that diplomacy alone was insufficient to curb pro-Western sentiments in Ukraine. Hence, it decided to intervene covertly in Crimea and the Donbas region, where a significant ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking population resided. Nevertheless, Moscow still held out hope for restoring relations, prompting it to refrain from direct and high-intensity military actions against Ukraine at the time. Despite Moscow’s hybrid warfare efforts, Ukrainian policymakers remained committed to pursuing NATO and EU membership. This deepened Russia’s threat perception regarding a Western-leaning Ukraine. Consequently, on February 24, 2022, Russian armed forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by land, air, and sea. Arguably, the Kremlin would not have opted for a large-scale military intervention in early 2022 if it had perceived the threat as still manageable. Beijing has long warned that any de jure declaration of independence by Taiwan would mean war. Whereas Taiwanese policymakers have regularly stated that Taiwan is already a sovereign and independent country, they have refrained from making a formal declaration in order not to provoke China. This cautious stance has kept Chinese threat perception from reaching a critical level. With this threat perceived as significant but not vital, Beijing has preferred a hybrid warfare model, which lies between diplomacy and conventional warfare. However, if Taiwan were to pursue de jure independence, China’s threat perception could escalate, potentially prompting Beijing to shift from hybrid warfare to a conventional military operation.

Lesson 2: Military Confidence Fuels Aggression

As pro-Western unrest erupted in Ukraine in late 2013, Russia was in the midst of a large-scale modernization of its military that began after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War owing to the profound shortcomings that the Russian armed forces experienced during that war. For this reason, it would not have been the ideal choice to wage an all-out conflict with Ukraine at that time. Because the hybrid form of warfare is fundamentally fought in the shadows, it provided Moscow with opportunities to minimize its drawbacks had it launched more overt campaign against its neighbors. After an extensive modernization process, Russia grew more confident by 2022, making it more inclined to engage in a full-scale war. China’s military is far superior to Taiwan’s military. Currently, China has the world’s largest military force by active-duty military personnel, with 2,035,000 active troops along with 500,000 gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. Taiwan, in comparison, has 169,000 active soldiers along with 11,800 gendarmerie and paramilitary forces. Moreover, Beijing’s defense expenditure is $224 billion, which is almost 12 times greater than Taiwan’s defense budget. Nevertheless, invading Taiwan may not be straightforward in military terms. Beijing faces two significant challenges in any potential offensive. First, China has not fought a conventional war since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam, meaning it has not had the opportunity to test its military doctrine or capabilities. Second, a direct Chinese invasion of Taiwan would necessitate large-scale amphibious warfare, which is fundamentally one of the most complex military operations. Therefore, it is not guaranteed that China would succeed in a military invasion of Taiwan. As with Russia’s shift from hybrid warfare to conventional conflict in Ukraine, the dynamics of military readiness and preparation will be pivotal in shaping the course of any future military engagements in the Taiwan Strait. Should Beijing become more confident in its military capabilities, it may be inclined to shift from hybrid warfare to a conventional military operation.

Lesson 3: Weak Deterrence Encourages Escalation

When NATO refrained from a military response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, covert occupation of Donbas, and military build-up near Ukraine, Putin likely concluded that avoiding superpower conflict was a higher priority for the US and its allies than countering Moscow’s influence in Ukraine. From 2014 to 2022, despite Russia’s continued aggression, Western leaders consistently signaled reluctance for direct confrontation, relying instead on sanctions and diplomacy. This stance ultimately weakened the West’s deterrence, paving the way for Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. The US views Taiwan as a crucial strategic partner and has consistently pledged to defend the island in the event of a direct Chinese invasion. Thus, a Chinese military attack on Taiwan could trigger a conventional or even nuclear conflict between China and the US. This catastrophic risk has so far led China to favor a hybrid warfare approach against Taiwan. However, if the US lose its deterrence over China for whatever reason, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would become more likely.

Conclusion

The fact that Moscow turned its protracted hybrid warfare campaign into a full-scale invasion in 2022 highlights that the hybrid model of warfare can act as a precursor to conventional warfare, especially as a nation’s perceived threats intensify, its military confidence grows, and external deterrence weakens. Taiwan, in a position similar to Ukraine’s pre-2022, could face escalated aggression if China’s threat perception changes, military confidence increases or if it feels emboldened by a perceived decline in US resolve. To mitigate this risk, Taiwan and its allies should prioritize strengthening deterrence, enhancing military readiness, and closely monitoring shifts in China’s strategic calculations. These lessons from Ukraine serve as essential guideposts for Taiwan in navigating an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment.