Proxy is Not a Pejorative

Let’s begin by stating in the affirmative that the word proxy is not a pejorative. This includes the ideas of proxy war, proxies (i.e., the actors), proxy strategy, and principal-proxy relationships. Now having cleared the collective air, let’s explore why this is the case.

The highly contested and emotionally charged nature of proxy wars, which is also known as “conflict delegation,” is an emotionally charged concept in war, has led to two dominant perspectives in how it is studied and discussed by scholars, institutions, and other researchers.

Some scholars approach the subject from an impassive position of causal identification and realistic assessments of the proxy dynamics. Scholar Tony Pfaff offers another way of thinking about this approach. He states that researchers can approach the subject from a morally neutral position, and just focus on structural causality. Others, however, take an emotional position. These scholars, institutions, and other researchers focus on idealizing the proxy and ignoring how the structural of principal-proxy dyads impacts the character of the relationship between the dyad’s two actors, and advocate for fanciful language that lightens the ostensible negativity associated with the term proxy.

Causal realists work to align practice and empirical evidence to enhance existing theories of proxy and create new theories where extant concepts don’t exist or are no longer useful. Scholars approaching the subject from an idealized mindset do not operate in empirical causality, but instead use whimsical idealizations about personal and group connections to discuss the subject.

Whimsical idealization is not inherently bad, especially when it attempts to improve the concept, but many of today’s idealists, like Professor Barbara Elias take an iconoclastic position. Elias and others attempt to destroy the concept of proxy war outright and replace it with superfluous terminology that does not accurately reflect the long-documented way principal-proxy relationships work. Whimsical idealization resonates in the iconoclast’s suggestions that the existing literature on proxy war: (1) minimizes local agency, (2) over-emphasizes US influence, (3) provides misleading hierarchical implications, (4) inaccurately describes local interests, (5) over-simplifies complex relationships, and (6) misrepresents compliance and control. Moreover, the iconoclasts push for replacing proxy war language with more “accurate” language, such as “strategic local partners” and “foreign military intervention,” both of which are oxymorons and more gibberish than refined language, will help soften the coarseness of proxy war scholarship.

The problem with these idealizations is twofold. First, these assertions do not align with most scholarship on the subject.

Second, whimsical and idealistic thought provides no benefit for practitioners – whether government strategists and policymakers, senior military leaders, or military commanders on the ground in any of the vast number of ongoing proxy wars. As scholar Stephen Walt reminds us, “Bad international relations theories can lead policymakers astray.” Considering Walt’s advice, proxy war scholars must focus on the practitioner – the policymakers, strategists, leaders, and forces on the ground – and not on obstructive ontologies or arcane research programs tangentially pertinent with the subject. Furthermore, modern proxy war scholarship is extensive. Following Andrew Mumford’s publication of Proxy Warfare: War and Conflict in the Modern World in 2013 and Geraint Hughes’ My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics in 2014, the study of modern proxy wars – i.e., post-Cold War proxy wars – exploded. Today, and arguably for the past decade, the field of proxy war studies is thoroughly rigorous, diverse, and addresses the subject from nearly every conceivable angle. Thus, many of the arguments against proxy war are either ignorant to the rich tapestry of proxy war scholarship found in academic journals, professional articles, and think tank reports, or they are cherry-picking from the literature to craft seductive strawmen to attack the concept for self-interested purposes.

Moreover, proxy war presents an interesting – and likely related – paradox. Western militaries shun owning the irrefutable fact that they operate as principals in proxy wars all across the globe. To be sure, the US relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria is a classic principal-proxy relationship, just as is the US-Iraq relationship during the 2014-2018 fight against the Islamic State, or the US-Ukraine relationship in the on-going Russo-Ukrainian War. Yet, when you examine US joint and Army doctrine, and the National Defense Strategy, however, you only find proxy wars mentioned when attempting to discredit strategic competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran. According to the US government and the US Army, proxy wars, despite the irrefutable empirical evidence, are something someone else does – despite irrefutable empirical evidence to the contrary – whereas the US (and its allies) partner with local security forces in a symbiotic and mutually beneficial way. As comical as this statement appears, this irony of this position is not lost on everyone. A recent report by the Congressional Research Service makes mention of this inconsistency in a 2024 report on irregular warfare.

Nevertheless, proxy war scholarships exist to support policymakers and military practitioners. Policymakers and practitioners need clear, crisp, and correct language and causally correct information in the literature that supports their practical experience implementing, guiding, supporting, and fighting in proxy wars. Academic gibberish, built on speaking in niceties, multisyllable words, and idiomatic expressions, while eschewing causal reality helps none of the individuals and organizations who require an understanding proxy war, principal-proxy dyad relationship dynamics, the range of options a specific dyad might execute as part of a general war strategy. Thus, we must embrace the term proxy, because it is not a pejorative. Rather, the term proxy is the mot juste; it is a clear, crip, and precisely correct term for explaining how actors operate through other actors when not joined into a formal alliance or task-oriented coalition.

The Conceptual Utility of the Term “Proxy”

Conceptually, proxy war is a very helpful concept. Like any concept, it helps allow policymakers and practitioners to develop strategies and plans for how to successfully compete against adversaries, while leveraging other actors, in the competitive arena of international affairs. Of secondary importance, the concept, like any other military concept, provides scholars and analysts with a framework to examine armed conflict.

The problem, however, is the phrase “proxy war” is a misnomer. When we say, “proxy war,” we are almost always referring to a conflict in which states, and lesser political units, use proxy strategies to support their general military strategy. Put differently, there are no proxy wars, only wars with proxy strategies as a supporting, or subordinate, strategy to a general strategy.

Interwoven, or subordinate, strategies are not a new idea. To be sure, Colin Gray writes “Strategy, singular, refers to a specific universal challenge and behavior, whereas strategies mean the actual, specific operational plans at every level of analysis. The latter is context dependent; the former is not.” Furthermore, Gray asserts “Military strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework, if only in order to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to bear.” Considering Gray’s argument, most so-called proxy wars are actually overgeneralizations of conflicts in which one or more combatants is using a proxy strategy as a subordinate element of a general strategy.

What’s more, a conflict wears many hats. A war might simultaneously be a war of attrition, a proxy war, and a civil war. At the same time, a war might be a war of movement, a proxy war, and a war of independence, such as we see with the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989). Yet, the adjectives used to describe a war are not universal, but as Gray notes, they must be considered in context. In the Soviet-Afghan War for instance, you can easily identify three lenses through which to ascribe adjectives – Soviet, Afghan, and American. Each one of those lenses can, and do, have different adjectives to describe the war. For the Soviets, the war was a counterinsurgency against groups using irregular warfare. For the Afghans, the war was a civil war, and they used irregular warfare, and perhaps even Fabian tactics, to evade the Soviets, outlast their commitment, and to survive to take political control of the state. For the US, the war was wholly proxy, with the US using the Afghans as the primary lever to defeat the Soviets on the battlefield. Thus, the characterization and classification of a conflict is a matter of perspective and not always universal.

In rare instances, such as the US’s intervention in the Soviet-Afghan War, or the US’s intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War, does a war stand alone as a “proxy war.” And even in these situations, only the US was fighting a proxy war – the Soviets and Afghans and the Russians and Ukrainians fought with blended versions of conventional and irregular warfare.

A Theory of Proxy Strategy

Outlining a simple theory of proxy strategy is helpful in this situation. Again, when we say proxy war, what we’re referring to are wars in which one or more actors use a proxy strategy. That is, one actor (Actor A) relies on another actor to (1) do a significant portion of combat operations or (2) augment the land forces of another actor (Actor B) in combat against an adversarial combatant (Actor C). If P equals proxy strategy, we can visualize this idea as: P = AB → C.

That is, one actor (A, the principle) relies on another actor (B, the agent) to achieve tactical objectives through the conduct of military action against an adversarial combatant (Actor C).

Actor A can find a host of players in the international arena to fulfill their need for Actor B. The player fulfilling Actor B’s role plays an important part in determining potential hierarchical implications, explaining the complexity of the dyad’s relationship, and how Actor A leads, manages, or controls the former on the battlefield. Contrary to the quips of scholars like Barbara Elias, a significant amount of published research finds that the structure of a principal and an agent (i.e., our AB dyad) paring is significantly shaped by the attitudes, interests, agency costs, time, and power dynamics that each actor possesses and how those independent variables impact how the AB dyad operates as a unified whole.

Considering that power differential might exist in the AB dyad, the relationship may be hierarchical. The AB dyads represent power differentials in a handful of ways. What most often comes to mind is coercive or exploited behavior, which is what many critics of the principal-agent point at to suggest that proxy language is hurtful and harmful to because it contributes to the delegitimization and control of an agent. However, this is an incomplete view, and does not resonate with longstanding proxy war scholarship, which finds a spectrum of agents within a state’s bullpen of potential proxies, and that proxies often place their own self-interest alongside those of their principal. This can be best appreciated as the agency costs that A incurs when integrated into an AB dyad. Likewise, this can be seen as the emergence of divergent interests between the A and B. Continuing with the AB dyad model, in a practical situation, the Ukrainian military’s attack into Kursk (August 2024) and the Iraqi security force’s attack on Iraqi Kurdistan in October 2017 are both examples of B placing their self-interest ahead of A. Proxy war scholarship’s transactional relationship provides a good starting point for better understanding the dynamics of this type of AB dyad, and its potential behavior. The transactional dyad finds that B, that is, the proxy, will diverge from supporting A in their mutual interests if or when B’s primary security interests are met, or when an opportunity to accomplish a tertiary interest presents itself as a viable opportunity. See figure 1.

Figure 1: Transactional Dyad Relationship

In this situation, B’s actions can often result in A chasing the former to maintain the dyad and continue pursuing their own self-interest. In other cases, A and B’s relationship diverges altogether once their mutual interests have been met, and each actor pursues their self-interest. See figure 2.

Figure 2: Transactional Dyad Relationship

On the other hand, coercive and exploitative behavior generally does not exist between a principal and agents who are private military companies (PMCs), like Wagner Group. PMCs tend to operate independently – that is, under their own commanders – while the principal fosters a supporting relationship and manages their employment far more than controls their forces. It must be noted, however, that if (and when) PMCs go rogue, like Wagner Group did in July 2023, then the principal tightens its hold on the PMC, changing from supporting the group to establishing a hierarchical relationship and transitioning from managing their operations to control their forces.

Coercive and exploitative behavior, nor controlling attitudes, also don’t tend to follow AB dyads in which the agent is another state or a culturally symmetric intercessor. In those relationships, strategic-level agency costs are often low – though this might not be the case at the tactical level – and therefore, the principal supports the proxy with intelligence, equipment, weapons, financial, and combat advising, while managing – not controlling – them on the battlefield. The idea of state-to-state AB dyads and that those relationships differ significantly from coerced or exploitative AB dyads is a longstanding idea in proxy war scholarship (summarized in Table 1).

To suggest that proxy agency is minimalized, that hierarchical implications are misleading, local interests are underrepresented, that control of a proxy is misrepresented, or that the scholarship oversimplifies complex principal-proxy relationships is either a disingenuous bending of existing proxy scholarship, illustrates a serious gap of awareness regarding existing proxy war scholarship, or is a cognitive trap door intended to advance an idealistic position regarding proxy strategy.

Two examples of US proxy strategy are helpful to parse how proxy strategies and AB dyads fit within a general military strategy. Moreover, these examples help illustrate how perspective – or which actor or analytical lenses the research uses – impacts and shapes one’s findings.

Soviet-Afghan War

Considering the importance of perspective, it is correct to state that within the Soviet-Afghan War, the US was fighting a proxy war against the Soviet Union. Or if we accept that there are no proxy wars, the US was using a proxy strategy in its war against the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the Soviets and Afghans were fighting a war against one another for political primacy in Afghanistan. Both the Soviets and Afghans’ methods of warfare included conventional and irregular warfighting. The Soviets were generally engaged in this conflict alone, whereas the Afghans received external support (courtesy of the US’s proxy strategy) from the US and many other donors.

Considering hierarchical relationships, local agency, and control, one must remember that the US did not create the Afghan fighting forces but tapped into multiple existing local networks. The US deployed advisors to the battlefield to offset the cost of working through local fighters, and to advise and training the Afghans on tactics and weapon system employment.

Using Table 1 as a guide, the Afghans were an exploited proxy. This meant that the US engaged in an advising relationship with the Afghans. The US-Afghan AB dyad came with moderate agency costs. One of example of this was the concern that the US had for its Stinger missiles – a new technology and one that turned the war in favor of the Afghans – going “missing” during the conflict. Nonetheless, the US sought to manage the Afghans, but certainly not control them during the conflict.

Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russo-Ukrainian War is another example where the phrase “proxy war” creates problems. Like the example provided above, in Ukraine, Russia is fighting against Kyiv’s military forces for political agency over Ukraine and for control of significant portions of Ukrainian territory. Thankfully, Ukrainian success at the outset of the conflict, coupled with many strategic and tactical missteps on the part of Russia, prevented Russia from annexing Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other significant sources of Ukrainian sovereignty.

Nonetheless, the war continues to rage in the eastern and southern portions of Ukraine. The war between the Russia and Ukraine remains a blend of conventional and irregular warfare. Due to the voracity of the conflict, both sides have received external support to keep the flames of war appropriately stoked. Russia has received helped from China, North Korea, Iran, and some smaller states. Ukraine has received significant support from the US, Poland, the UK, Germany, and other states from across the globe.

Quickly seizing on the opportunity to defeat Russia’s attempt to annex Ukraine and stymy Moscow’s efforts at undercutting Western political, economic, and ideological beliefs throughout southern and eastern Europe, the US rapidly crafted a proxy strategy that brought the US and Ukraine into a transactional AB dyad. Desperate for help and needing significant military assistance, Ukraine stepped into the role of B. In this capacity, a supporting relationship took hold of the US-Ukraine AB dyad. Furthermore, because of Ukraine’s status as a fully functioning state, with all the institutions and bureaucracy required for self-control, the dyad had low agency costs, and the US only sought to manage aspects of the military operation. Thus, the US provides little in the way of advising and controlling the Ukrainian military, but rather supplies Kyiv with the materiel and financing it needs to defeat Russia on the battlefield. The establishment of Task Force Dragon, and later, the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) reinforces this point. SAG-U serves as the coordination point, “To enable donor countries from around the world to provide military equipment, training, and aid to Ukraine.” SAG-U is a more formal response to the immediacy of Task Force Dragon, which served the same basic function. Nevertheless, both Task Force Dragon and SAG-U are the primary conduits for the US fulfilling its proxy strategy in Ukraine. Reference Figure 1 for a visual depiction of this interaction.

A Word on the Use of Language

Proxy is not a pejorative. Let’s not forget that authors express clear thinking about a subject through clear, precise writing. Academic or professional jargon, buzzwords, and flourishes diminish the value of knowledge transmissions. The fewer words an author uses to explain an idea or concept the better understanding the writer has for the content, but also, the more they help the novice understand the content in question. Thus, the goal of writing is to use as few, and most accurate, words as possible to explain a concept. This goal holds truth whether one is writing for an academic audience, in a professional situation, or in any other environment in which the transition of knowledge between the holder of the knowledge and the seeker of knowledge is critical.

Bringing this back to the discussion on the use of the term proxy, the confluence of adjectives to describe a proxy violates the most basic tenets of useful writing. Proxy is clear – an actor doing something for another actor. Proxy does not imply hierarchy, but instead it implies a situationally dependent relationship between two strategic actors (i.e., the AB dyad). Furthermore, proxy strategy is clear – it is a war in which an actor is fighting in a war for another actor, and conversely, a war in which one actor relies on the combat actions of another actor to help fulfill the former’s strategic interests. The confusion with both terms arises from the work of academics who have over-engineered the ideas to fit a host of non-causal oriented proclivities.

Moreover, there are no implications of hierarchy, nor sweeping aside of the proxy’s self-interest in the use of proxy terminology. Individuals and institutions who over-generalize proxy war and do not account for the importance of the structural dynamics of AB dyads are where the devaluing of proxies and their self-interest enter the equation. Or, perhaps more importantly, scholarship, reporting, and field reports that attempt to cull lessons from one conflict and then superimpose observations across the field of proxy war studies encourages the growth of over-generalization and missing the salience of structural dynamics of AB dyads contributes to this problem more than we appreciate.

Thus, instead of lamenting the language of proxy war, scholars, practitioners, analysts, and others interested in proxy war must examine the scholarship more broadly, perhaps getting off of the beaten path of well-worn literature. Scholars, practitioners, analysts, and others must look at the rich field of research that empirically refutes and offers alternative insight into the challenges of proxy war. The information is out there, it is just up to the reader to find it.

Lastly, in doing this analysis, one must not take government press releases at face value. This is because many of these releases are just as much about government narratives as they are about stating true policy and strategy goals. Moreover, government, senior civilian military leaders, and commanders are equally sensitive to the argument that the use of the word proxy comes with negative and potentially demeaning connotations. They therefore don’t often use the term proxy publicly, or in official policy and strategy. It is therefore incumbent on the scholar and researcher to accurately report on causality and empirical evidence, and not get swept away in the pleasantries of advancing political narratives.

Conclusion

The concept of proxy, proxies, and proxy strategy is not a pejorative. Nor is it time to retire the term proxy and the phrase proxy war. If anything, it is time to retire emotive interpretations of international affairs. Flourished interpretations of international affairs and armed conflict offer little in the way of beneficial contribution to the study of proxy strategy and must be cast aside because strategic competition doesn’t operate on kindly deference to other actors’ strategic interests. Strategic competition, instead, is the product of states and other actors, vigorously striving to maintain their own survival, extend their influence, and advance their respective foreign policy goals in a competitive global order. Though this occurs within the limits of their resources, and those they can obtain through proxy strategies (among many other strategies), the pursuit and maintenance of a state’s strategic interest comes at the cost of others.

Lastly, scholars and others dedicated to the study and ontological improvement of proxy war studies must use simple theories and definitions to explain proxy strategy and its place within foreign policy and armed conflict. Proxy strategic theory can be reduced to a basic theory: P=AB→C. Yet within that general theory of proxy strategy, several supporting theories of proxy strategy provide ballast to our theory. The deniability strategy – the basic post-Cold war methodology – and today’s minimalist strategy are the two primary strategic approaches in post-Cold War proxy application. Strategic relationships – outlined earlier in this article – provide the structure to explain how AB dyads operate in minimalist strategies on contemporary battlefields. Moreover, those strategic relationships illustrate that many of the cries of whimsical idealists about proxies losing agency as a result of the language interwoven throughout proxy war literature prove to be little more than strawmen. As a result, we must collectively embrace the sentiment that proxy is not a pejorative, but rather the mot juste.