Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign.

Analytical material on the security situation in Ukraine as of January 2024, with a forecast of the development of events for the spring campaign.”

By Vlad Dut

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”

                                                                                                Sun Tzu’s “The Art of War”

The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the security situation in Ukraine across various domains: in the air (ACC), on land (LCC), at sea (MCC), in cyberspace (Cyber), and in space (Space). The aim is to fully understand the current situation and predict its medium-term development within the framework of applying NATO principles.

An additional task involves identifying the ‘Centre of Gravity (COG),’ a crucial aspect that often receives insufficient attention in contemporary operational planning and combat strategies.

The aim of this study is to conduct a critical evaluation of the current security situation in the most threatening areas of the front to achieve a realistic understanding and to propose measures for its improvement. Acquiring a thorough awareness of the situation during the period of russian aggression is crucial for identifying correct priorities in neutralizing the enemy’s offensive potential by the military-political leadership of Ukraine. This approach also allows for consideration of the genuine challenges faced by the civilian population.

Plan

1. The security situation in the regions of Ukraine in the air(ACC), on land(LCC), at sea(MCC), in cyber(Cyber) and outer space(Space).

2. Center of gravity (COG) according to Carl von Clausewitz. The current COG of the russian occupation forces.

3. Current critical gaps in the Defense Forces of Ukraine and their likely solutions.

4. Conclusion.

The security situation in Ukraine is marked by a high degree of complexity, leading to an inaccurate assessment of medium and long-term risks. This miscalculation reached a critical juncture by the end of December 2023.

Reflecting on Ukraine’s defensive and offensive actions throughout 2023, it is evident that the anticipated outcomes, established as objectives the previous year, were not fully realized. Unwarranted expectations resulted from a combination of consequences and miscalculations at both the political and military levels within Ukraine and, to a significant extent, among our allies, notably the USA[1].

The unsuccessful campaign on the Orihiv front served as a sobering moment for all participants in the so-called counter-offensive. This setback, occurring during the autumn-winter period, compelled a more realistic assessment of the Russian-Ukrainian war, particularly for Ukraine’s political leadership and civilian population.

Ukraine is fighting against the powerful russian military machine, which holds superiority in various aspects. Hence, there is no need to seek out betrayal, particularly at this moment, as the war is ongoing, and the final results will only be evident after the cessation of hostilities.

As noted earlier, the ongoing war represents the world’s largest armed confrontation since the Second World War. It involves a range of tactics, from mass infantry and armored vehicle attacks to highly precise cyber assaults capable of paralyzing a state for several days. Consequently, not everything can be meticulously planned and executed, given the absence of a template or standard for the correct conduct of the present war. The russian Federation poses a unique challenge, distinct from countries like Afghanistan or Iraq, where securing a specific border might be achieved solely with infantry—an approach that does not align with the complex realities faced by Ukraine.

1. The security situation in Ukraine as of December-January 2023/2024 is challenging, marked by the offensive of Russian troops in the northeast and east of Ukraine, with initial actions unfolding in the southeast. This offensive involves a potent strike group that was assembled during the covert mobilization of the Russian Federation in the spring-summer period of the current year. Notably, Russian units are adhering to previously defined strategic and operational goals established in 2022/2023, with only minimal adjustments depending on the situation.

The strategic goals of the Russian Federation in Ukraine have remained consistent since the onset of the invasion and are as follows:

1. ‘Denazification,’ which aims to eradicate Ukrainian identity in all its manifestations.
2. A shift in Ukraine’s political course involves halting the western trajectory of the country’s development and redirecting its political and economic orientation towards Moscow[2].

As the full-scale invasion unfolded, additional objectives came to light:

1. The reduction of Western support for Ukraine through non-kinetic actions aimed at altering the political situations of partner countries such as Slovakia, Poland, the Netherlands, and others. In our view, this newly crystallized goal takes precedence for the russian Federation, directing the maximum allowable resources to achieve the utmost result.
2. The goal of reducing the economic functioning of Ukraine involves both kinetic and non-kinetic influence by the special services of the russian Federation on key sectors. This includes missile strikes targeting the fuel and energy complex, attacks on sea/land trade infrastructure, and the use of proxy groups to block borders, all contributing to the destabilization of socio-political processes in Ukraine and beyond[3].

These strategic goals of russia remain permanent, experiencing only minimal changes as certain effects are achieved. Yet, it is precisely from these strategic goals that the operational goals emerge, determining the most relevant plan of action in Ukraine.

Operational goals of the russian Federation in Ukraine:

Military:

1. Full occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions to confirm their intentions to protect the so-called terrorist states and the zone of interest[4].

2. To counteract the offensive maneuvers of the Defense Forces of Ukraine in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, aiming to safeguard the integrity of communication lines (LOC – line of communication) in the South[5].

3. To reestablish full control (Sea Control) in the western part of the Black Sea, enabling the russian side to obstruct the actions of the Naval Forces of Ukraine (FOM/FON) and control trade routes.

Social and political:

4. Undermining the reputational and ideological trust of Ukrainian society in the top political and military leadership of Ukraine through informational and psychological operations, employing non-kinetic actions that involve discrediting and manipulation.

            International:   

5. Employ non-kinetic and kinetic methods to delay the construction and deployment of Ukraine’s Military-Industrial Complex, taking advantage of a 90% reduction in Western aid. For instance, impede the delivery of essential components and parts from China required for the production of FPV drones and other critical resources.

The execution of strategic and operational goals during the 2022-2023 campaign in Moscow showcased the high professionalism and expertise of the strategic and operational-strategic headquarters. In our assessment, they adeptly leverage their capabilities, conducting operations at a level that proves detrimental to the Ukrainian side. The higher headquarters of the russian military demonstrate a commendable proficiency in military management, effectively orchestrating a dynamic combination of forces and resources across various domains—land, air, sea, cybernetic, and space—to fulfill multi-level objectives. It is the adept coordination, management, and synchronization of these headquarters on both vertical and horizontal axes that, in our view, contribute significantly to their effectiveness.

For instance, the russian Federation’s offensive operation near the city of Avdiivka exemplifies a meticulously organized and coordinated effort by the headquarters element. This operation witnessed the engagement of approximately 40-50 thousand troops with effective battlefield management[6]. Over a span of two months, russia incurred losses of around 13,000 personnel and 200-250 units of heavy armored vehicles in the Avdiivka direction, yet without diminishing the momentum and scope of the offensive. An additional factor contributing to effectiveness is the judicious utilization of the russian Air Force (ACC). This includes guided missile strikes, kamikaze drones of various types, and missile strikes targeting critical elements of the Ukrainian side, specifically the 2-3 echelons of defense. This illustrates the operational/strategic headquarters and commands’ proficiency in creating a synergistic utilization of diverse weaponry across different domains to achieve desired outcomes. In essence, airspace complements land space (and vice versa), combining various methods for inflicting damage.

The present security situation in Ukraine, in contrast to the enemy’s summer campaign, has witnessed several changes. As a consequence, the offensive initiative shifted to the russian side in the autumn of 2023. Although the utilization format of the russian Federation’s forces and resources did not undergo significant alterations from previous attempts, it was notably adapted to the prevailing circumstances.

I will delve into a more detailed security analysis across five areas, each governed by the combat statutes of NATO alliance member countries, regulating their operations. It’s crucial to note that each application of a specific effect by the russian forces and resources is complementary and may partially overlap.

Land Component Command (LLC or land component). The situation on the conflict lines is challenging, primarily because of the engagement of pre-positioned russian reserves in the area of hostilities. Further exacerbating the scenario is the limitation of assistance from Western countries, encompassing a comprehensive range of ammunition. This restriction has led to a significant decline in the Ukrainian firing rate across various calibers, such as 155 mm, 152 mm, 122 mm, 120 mm, and others, by approximately 5-6 times.
In 2023, the primary objective for russian troops was to impede the advancement of Ukrainian offensive operations in the southeast. Simultaneously, by diverting the most combat-ready units of the Ukrainian army to the focal point of the attack, russia bolstered its armed forces through enticing financial incentives and effective propaganda[7]. Exactly, while specific units were occupied with restraining and neutralizing Ukrainian attacks, russia was concurrently engaged in the active establishment of new units. Furthermore, the most proficient and combat-ready units experienced an organizational advancement, exemplified by the deployment of a majority of russian Air Force regiments to the divisional level[8].

Hence, in September-October 2023, the new waves of attacks by russian units shifted their focus from a defensive posture to an offensive one, targeting the following directions:

1. Kupyansk Direction:

Russian units are attempting to compel the Defense Forces of Ukraine toward the city of Kupyansk, intending to cover a crucial transport hub with fire. This maneuver aims to neutralize potential Ukrainian offensive actions towards the western side of the Luhansk region. An additional objective for russia is to entirely restrict or limit maneuverability in the eastern part of the Oskil River. This direction is advantageous for the russian side, given the short logistics route from russian territory. The use of the Kupyansk freight-Valuyki railway branch facilitates maintaining the offensive pace. This is primarily achieved through the implementation of wave tactics in russian infantry attacks, following the algorithm:

1. Group No. 1 “Assault”:
   • Comprising 15-25 individuals, supported by 1-2 tanks or BMP and concentrated artillery fire, captures the Ukrainian position.
2. Group No. 2 “Diggers”:
   • Also consisting of a similar number of personnel, immediately moves to the freshly captured position. Here, the group focuses on swift engineering improvements. Group No. 1 retreats to restore combat capability, incurring losses of 50-60% of the initial number.
3. Group No. 3 “Defensive Infantry”:
   • Takes over the already improved position and initiates assigned duties.

Upon restoring combat capability (which may take 1-2 days, at times due to the russian HQ’s reluctance to allow for extended reformation), Group No. 1 resumes the offensive following the outlined algorithm.

These offensive operations predominantly occur in the vicinity of the settlements of Lyman First and Synkivka, aiming to penetrate the defense of Ukraine’s forward positions. This poses additional challenges for the Ukrainian side, particularly along the Oskil River, constraining actions and limiting the expansive use of the territory.

Simultaneously with the offensive operation, the forces and resources of russia significantly increased the use of the air component compared to the summer. They employed air defense systems to target the logistics routes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and potentially locate Ukrainian headquarters and UAV “Lancet” for artillery strikes and other purposes. As a result, in the future, the russian Federation’s forces will aim to sustain their offensive pace while experiencing a considerable loss of human resources. The Defense Forces of Ukraine, leveraging a substantial number of UAVs across various platforms and FPV drones, will adopt a static strategy to entangle and deplete the opponent.

2. Donetsk Direction:

Encompassing Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, and Mariinka, this direction signifies the second main vector of russian offensive actions. The objective is to secure the northern side of the city of Avdiyivka, compelling the withdrawal of the Defense Forces of Ukraine from the city and occupying strategically unfavorable defense lines to further advance their success.

The russian Federation concentrated approximately 40-50 thousand units in an attempt to capture Avdiyivka. However, they encountered a well-prepared Ukrainian defense line, prompting attempts to advance using heavily armored vehicles[9].