Cultural Heritage in Ukraine: a Gap in Russian IO Monitoring

Cultural Heritage in Ukraine: a Gap in Russian IO Monitoring

By Damian Koropeckyj

“Today, we are confronting Ukraine not only in an open armed conflict but also in the fight for the hearts and minds of millions of Russian people… An information and psychological war has been waged against our history and the memory of our heroes. They want to deprive us of our self-identity with barefaced lie[s]. The Russian Donbass will firmly rebuff the attempts to compromise the unity of Russians.”

-Denis Pushilin, leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, announcing the opening of a new Russian cultural center in Donetsk on November 30, 2021[1]

Introduction

            The conflict in Eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea have been described as “the debut of online Russian propaganda on the world stage.”[2] Research to understand and combat this threat has led to a focus on the obvious avenues of Russian Information Operations (IO) through the internet and Russian-language television media.[3]^,[4],[5] Two key narratives arising from pro-Russian social media campaigns can be highlighted for the purpose of the following analysis[6]:

• “the portrayal of Ukrainians as neo-Nazis and the framing of the war in the Donbas as a continuation of World War II…”

• “the depiction of south and east Ukraine as historically Russian as well as the positioning of Crimea as an ancient Russian land and the cradle of Russian orthodoxy…”

            In these traditional IO avenues, the above narratives are packaged into simple messaging to reach as broad of an audience as possible and narratives, such as depicting the new Ukrainian government as a return to fascism, utilize the audience’s familiarity with historical themes and facilitate easier messaging efforts.[7]

However, aside from a brief discussion of pro-Russian billboards in Crimea during the annexation in 2014, little attention has been paid to any attempts by Russian and separatist forces to utilize physical modes of communication specifically in IO in these contested landscapes, especially the use of tangible cultural heritage.[8]

Considering current organizations and military units tasked with monitoring cultural heritage in such conflicts, USAR’s 38G/6V Monuments Officers are rightfully and legally focused on Cultural Property Protection. This practically amounts to the prevention and documentation of the destruction of existing cultural heritage in conflict through activities such as the contribution of cultural heritage inventories to No Strike Lists during the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) process.[9]^,[10]

In turn, institutional partners such as the Virginia Museum of Natural History’s Cultural Heritage Monitoring Lab (CHML) provide Subject Matter Expertise (SME) focused on threats and impacts to cultural heritage through conflict and natural disaster, including the destruction of monuments that have occurred in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine during the present conflict.[11] A recent UNESCO report outlines the extensive destructive actions Russia has taken concerning cultural property, including: damaging rehabilitation and appropriation of existing monuments; illegal archaeological excavation of at least one million artifacts, with many exported to Russia; and the destruction of Muslim burial grounds during the construction of infrastructure related to the Crimean Bridge.[12]^,[13] The archaeological evidence collected through these destructive practices is utilized in the justification of the narratives described above concerning Russian territorial claims to Crimea.[14] However, gray zone competition and complex modes of IO necessitate new approaches, including to the strategic use of cultural heritage.[15]^,[16] This includes new techniques of monitoring cultural heritage as it pertains to the civilian environment in conflict[17]. Looking at Ukraine as a case study reveals a potential gap in both the traditional approaches to Russian IO and current approaches to cultural heritage in conflict: the construction of new monuments as an IO tactic by malign actors.

Research has been ongoing at CHML since May 2021, tracking and analyzing the construction of new monuments in Crimea and the separatist-held territories of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) as potential evidence of Russian IO.

The methodology consists of open-source research to find sources describing monument construction in Russian-occupied Crimea and separatist-held territories in Eastern Ukraine, from the beginning of the conflict in 2014 up to the present. Both newly-constructed monuments and old monuments repaired after the start of hostilities were grouped into the definition of “monument construction.” This essay will discuss some of the methodological considerations and some general, quantitative analysis of the data collected. Then, a more nuanced, qualitative discussion of three monument case studies will better illuminate how the monuments are being utilized as vehicles for the narratives listed above. This analysis reveals patterns in monument placement and composition that prove useful for the projection of Russian narratives at target populations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, akin to the IO seen in traditional media.

New Monument Construction in Ukraine

This research considers all monuments constructed- regardless of the ability to directly attribute it to Russian sponsorship, though attribution to the Russian government, Russian-backed proxies like the Night Wolves and the Wagner Group, and local separatist political parties such as the Peace to Lugansk movement is clear in certain cases. This is based firstly on the idea that non-attribution is a key tenet of modern Russian IO.[18] However, I also argue that each of these monuments enjoys, at a minimum, implicit approval by the occupying forces for their messaging, outside of any direct sponsorship of their construction. This is based on examples of monuments that do not meet messaging requirements being removed in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.[19]^,[20]

Further implicit approval may be assumed based on instances of the monuments’ reporting in Russian or separtatist state-owned media operations, or the public attendance of government officials at monument ceremonies.

Tying these threads together is an example of a monument depicting Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference which was originally offered as a donation to Crimea for display in 2005 by Zurab Tsereteli, the head of the Russian Academy of Arts. The monument was not accepted at the time due to local opposition by Crimean Tartars, who as an ethnic group were deported from Crimea in 1944, to a portrayal of Stalin.[21] Wider Ukrainian sentiment is illustrated by a survey showing only 16% of respondents agreeing with the statement that Stalin was a great leader.[22] After Russia’s annexation, the monument was then installed in 2015 at the historical site of the Conference, Livadia Palace, with then-Chairman of the Russian Duma (and now Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service and Chairman of the Russian Historical Society) Sergey Naryshkin and the leader of the Night Wolves attending the opening ceremony.[23] Livadia Palace’s historical importance not only as the site of the Yalta Conference, but as the imperial tsar’s residence, was later recognized as President Putin personally unveiled a new monument to Alexander III there in 2017.[24]

As a methodological approach, collecting data on every monument constructed also provides a fuller picture of the information and narratives disseminated among civil society, and provides a potential model for collection as an element of digital civil reconnaissance by CA officers.[25]^,[26],[27]

Monuments were grouped by theme. Monuments concerning Pre-Revolutionary history and figures, from Kievan Rus’ up to the Russian Empire ending in 1917, are grouped under the theme of Russian Empire. 

            The construction of new, and repair of old, WWII monuments across these territories can be explained not only on for their use as a narrative vehicle as will be described in a specific case below, but also for the ability to literally build upon the historic Soviet campaign of WWII monument construction across the Soviet Union as a means of shaping political legitimacy.[28] A notable divergence in comparing monuments constructed in Crimea versus those in Eastern Ukraine is the higher percentage of monuments dedicated to the Russian Empire in Crimea. This can be attributed to the ostensibly stronger historical claims to Crimea based on Russia’s imperial history on the peninsula, finding traction in Western appraisals of Russian claims of ownership.[29]^,[30]

            More patterns emerge when considering the physical placement of the monuments:

            Parks obviously present useful messaging opportunities as high-traffic public spaces. Parks also offer an opportunity to reach target populations who are less likely to access other IO channels like the internet, such as children and older people. A survey conducted in Ukraine in 2014 indicated 50.9% of households had an internet connection, and only 12.1% of individuals over 55 accessed news sources online.[31] Soviet emphasis on green space in public planning led to the installation of a high number of parks in urban areas based on population.[32] These spaces were then utilized as venues for the aforementioned Soviet campaigns of monument construction, extending to the placement of monuments in other prominent positions including outside of institutional buildings.[33]^,[34]

Aside from institutional and park locations which call back to Soviet monument construction strategy, the most obvious and direct connection is the use of existing historic locations such as: repaired Soviet WWII monuments and new monuments placed alongside Soviet-built monuments, including those dedicated to WWII.

At least 20% of the monuments were placed in a primary location described above, but also within a secondary location of note. An example of this is the “Oni otsoyali Rodinu/”They defended the homeland” monument in Luhansk. The monument is placed both primarily in a prominent position at a park in central Luhansk, and also secondarily across from an institutional building: the LNR’s Ministry for State Security.  

Looking at broader geographic trends, mapping the monument locations against population density estimates by WorldPop reveal monuments have been constructed in nearly every heavily populated area. In Eastern Ukraine, this extends to less populated areas in the south.