Learning for the Next War
11.23.2013 at 07:16pm
Learning for the Next War by Nathan Finney, Barefoot Strategist.
Following the publication of the recent article “COIN Doctrine Under Fire,” I was lucky enough to ‘listen in’ on an enlightening conversation on one of the dozen listservs I frequent. While debating the merits of counterinsurgency, the list began discussing the value of capturing the pertinent lessons from a war…during and immediately following the conflict. On the discussion were of the authors of both the Army’s pre-eminent volume on Desert Storm and the first solid look at Iraqi Freedom. Here’s the portion that really caught my attention, written by Terry L. Johnson…
This is an interesting comment as it goes to the core of the COIN discussion—have we as a Force really willing to discuss the failures of COIN in the midst of praising COIN and “winning” the surge.
If we cannot look critically at our conflicts, how they were prosecuted, what worked and didn’t work, and what this could imply for the future, all of the concept development (think AirSea Battle and Strategic Landpower) and budget battles we are currently debating will be largely premature, if not largely uninformed.
Are these the lessons that we should take home from OIF and OEF:
Lesson Number 1: Whether the United States military acted on its own, as part of a whole-of-government effort or even as part of a coalition of nations and their combined WOG forces, we/they COULD NOT, via COIN, and within the 10 year +/- timeframe given, achieve our objective, which was:
a. To successfully use the opportunity presented to us by 9/11.
b. To change — in what we would consider a positive, lasting and meaningful way — the political, economic and social orders (and the values, attitudes and beliefs upon which these such orders are based) of Iraq and Afghanistan.
This suggesting that, in the future, neither provocation — nor COIN — should be used for such purposes (to wit: state and societal transformations).
Lesson Number 2: In attempting to use the opportunity presented to us by 9/11, to change the political, economic and social structures and orders of Iraq and Afghanistan (specifically along modern western lines), we did, however, play directly into AQ’s hand. This, by revealing — for all the world to see — that our grand objective was and still is:
a. To undermine and eliminate alternative ways of life and alternative ways of governance and
b. To replace these with modern western ways of life and governance.
This “unmasking” tending, as AQ had hoped, to both broaden and deepen the struggle, to highly motivate the resistance and to successfully tar the West as modern-day crusaders.
Thus, “the performance of the people’s forces” (in this case that of AQ and via its provocations) “depends on the task of forcing the dictatorship” (in this case that of the U.S., in the manner that it is seen to rule the world) “to a decision – to retreat or unleash the struggle – thus beginning the state of long-range armed action.” (E. Guevara, 1961, p. 149)