Counterinsurgency: The Graduate Level of War or Pure Hokum?
Counterinsurgency: The Graduate Level of War or Pure Hokum? By COL Gian Gentile, e-International Relations.
… This notion of counterinsurgency warfare requiring a special martial skill set because of its so-called difficulty that conventional armies by nature do not have is nothing new in modern history. Starting in the 19th century, the French and British armies began to treat small wars (an earlier moniker for counterinsurgency) as a special form of war requiring officers with unconventional skills who can transform the hidebound conventional armies that were resistant to change…
Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is not the graduate level of war, it is simply war. Moreover, the notion that counterinsurgency wars require the soldiers who fight them to possess special skills is not supported by historical evidence. And contrary to what writers like Krepinevich and Cassidy say, counterinsurgency wars have not been won or lost by the tactical methods of the armies that have fought them. Instead, as historian Douglas Porch argues, they were won or lost “because the strategic context in which the wars were fought defied a tactical remedy.” …
Christopher Preble reviewed the Gentile book at Reason. I’m still working my way through the book because I want to read it carefully so that I can compare its arguments to counterarguments.
Although a relatively short read and written in deceptively simple language, the book makes a series of complicated and layered arguments.
One thought from my reading: even if you disagree with the argument that there was more continuity than discontinuity in Iraq during the Surge, I don’t think it invalidates his other points.
This is the curious thing about the book. The arguments are layered so that even if you disagree with one point, the others still point in the same direction.
I sometimes think the other points (the multifactorial and contigent nature of what happened in Iraq) is given short shrift in public discussion because of the criticism of “the better war” theory. I understand the criticism of the thesis, tend to agree with it, understand its importance, and, yet, good arguments are somehow missed because of this framing. Or maybe it’s only me given my lack of a military background.
Like I said, it’s a more complicated book than it seems on initial read.
http://reason.com/blog/2013/07/30/christopher-preble-on-the-myth-of-the-be
PS: The other thing is that I’m ready to read some of the more “staid” histories being written because I’ve sort of reached the limits with the broad brush pundit conversation (this is not directed at the Gentile article, I agree naturally) I’m just talking about the think tank phenomenon. I really feel burned by the shallow, reactionary nature of so much policy discussion. I used to think I was so well-informed because I watched CSPAN and listened to panels of think tank experts. Didn’t help me from being blindsided by silly theories in the past decade or so….I feel remarkably stupid that I believed some of the stuff that I did.
I think this is why I post so many things about US history in South Asia with regard to our “AfPak” strategy around here. I think the original framing–so influenced by our Cold War history and the post Cold War developmental history in that part of the world–really messed us up from the beginning.
If you want to keep allies, and they are deemed problematic, then you don’t go about trying to change their entire societies. You start by figuring out what the best most cost effective and reasonable form of engagement happens to be.
It’s remarkable, some of the terrible pundit histories written on the subject. The 90’s policy from first Bush to Clinton is remarkable varied and remarkable engaged in its own way. Yet almost none of this makes its way into the narratives in the Anglo-American conversation, or, until fairly recently.
Weirdly, Canadian and Australian papers seem a bit better on this. We really blinded ourselves to the basic strategic nature of the place.
I’m glad that DC is developing a new cadre of South Asia experts, more varied, different generation, greater in number. We need better quality expertise in the policy arena in many areas because the military then absorbs these ideas. The military may not make policy but it is hostage to current intellectual fashions as much as any institution. I’m sorry, but someone had to say it.
I purchased Gentile’s book last week and read it in the same day. His findings can be debated, but his warning requires consideration.
Gentile cautions the reader and Americans in general from falling into the trap of thinking that COIN and a great General are the solution for every conflict. We would be wise to heed this warning. Despite the partisan politics that have driven criticism at President Obama, he has sacrificed short term political capital for the greater long term interests of the United States when the subject of Syria is reviewed. The COINdinistas may suggest that a General “like” Petreaus or Abrams with a strategy like Templer and the Brits brought to Malaya could bring an acceptable solution to Syria. That is the message that Gentile wants to dissect and it is critical that we do so. This myth must be muted.
Full disclosure, I jumped over and read the e-International Relations review but have not yet read the book.
I appreciate COL Gentile’s efforts, as I do the efforts of many thinkers, planners and actors dealing with the sphere of conflict. However, reading this piece triggered a thought I’ve had repeatedly while reading the past 10 years worth of COIN writings. Are we blind, forgetful, or do we speak without listening to what we’re saying?
For many years I worked a mission area where capability was defined as forces that were “…organized, trained, equipped, and specifically directed…”. Isn’t that mantra the basis for any successful military plan? I see graduate level versus whatever, or conventional versus whatever, as arguments or explorations that miss the mark; the key to success is properly organizing, training, and equipping a force that is tasked with a specific mission. Quite simply, different missions (objectives) require different forces.
This simple, but far-reaching, line of reasoning explains why we have infantry and armor units, why we have marines and airborne forces, and why within certain contexts we may specialize even further – why we have SF and Rangers as distinct players within the SOF community. It also explains why, in the absence of current, fully informed strategic or operational level guidance, standing military forces are able to accomplish missions and ad-hoc military or “irregular” forces can also achieve success. “Specific direction”, quite properly translated into “focus”, is arguably what differentiates effective, from ineffective, forces.
Isn’t the critical aspect of military planning, the key consideration, at all levels, the matching of forces with objectives?
The bombast in the two opening paragraphs of Counterinsurgency: The Graduate level of War or Pure Hokum? conveniently ignores the inconvenient truth of RAND studies, the Defense Science Board and other documents and reports. 1
On the other hand, I do agree with the hokum of a genius savior general, that is why staffs were created. I also agree that ‘…what mattered most were the strategic, political, and social contexts in which these wars were fought.” However, the pure hokum is what is deliberately cast aside.
Here is what is left unsaid:
“The tactical manner in which conflict is waged and the operational and strategic choices made all have a political meaning. This is the currency conversion dilemma – converting one currency, military behavior into another, political effect.”
“There is a relationship, albeit not always straight forward, between the course of military events and the political consequences; there is no automatic advantage and the advantage is always transient.” (As in the perception of success or failure in an “engagement?)
“In conflict / intervention, one is fighting and intervening for peace. Not just any peace, but the kind of peace that makes it (intervention) worthwhile.This maxim has two transactions.
1. The threat of force / military power to achieve an outcome
2. This power must translate to an advantage of power on the ground and into political leverage. The Difficulties of this are legion. “
“This requires a two step thought process.
Understand what is probable & possible consequences of the action/behavior
And the consequences of those consequences.” 2
The military has undeniably taught the art of kinetic and technological technical competence in the art of war, but it has failed in integrating essential and critical skills that build the excellence required in the interdependent complexities. “Effective COIN practices runs in packs.”3
DoD still does not effectively understand that COIN is about capability and putting the right capability in the right place. The misuse of, and non-integration of Af/Pak Hands is a clear example of monumental fraud, waste and abuse,and in squandering opportunity. Not really understanding what the HTT could deliver in terms of consequence understanding or avoidance is another.
The ability to engage in multiple and mutually supporting lines of operation simultaneously, that required complex decision making, that considered the consequences of its “engagements” over time, and what political and legitimacy perceptions could be accumulated with those engagements were absent. Not at all times and places, but sufficient to tip the dynamic away from US Forces.
The pure application of Modernization Theory, throwing money at development (see footnote 4 for the SIGARS website and pull down the report or reports you choose, there are multiple instances that go back years), coupled with implementation of a Cost-Benefit approach in the metrics it developed, it never overcame the inability to gain traction in the legitimacy of its forces or the government. 4 In defense of DoD, this was not just a tactical or operational issue, it was strategic as well.
Even by 2010, while I was an COIN instructor and adviser, large amounts of personnel, more than 50% of those I was training and assisting in Theater, had never read the COIN manual or the COIN in tactics Manual.
In defense of those that did read it, FM 3-24 has a very few short paragraphs on the key principal of “Social Capital” in COIN. It might have been better had the authors left it out because not understanding the concepts of social capital in relation to doctrinal guidance in the context of a “traditional” society was a a fatal flaw. This is an absolute required complexity that must be understood in the context of the operating environment that the essay Counterinsurgency: The Graduate level of War or Pure Hokum? also ignores.
The realm of strategy is a relational one, ultimately, the enemy has to be beaten by somebody, somewhere. 5 It is an error to believe that tactics are more important than strategy, that tactics do not shape and create some form of “currency,” or “currency conversion,” or that tactical competence in soft skills is not what makes strategic effect.
The political object-the original motive for war-will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires….Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Howard-Paret, 1976, Book 1 Chapter 1, Page 81.
The remaining portion of that paragraph is also very relevant. “The political object cannot, however, in itself provide the standard of measurement….The political object can elicit differing sections from different peoples. We can therefore take the political object as a standard only if we think of the influence it can exert upon the forces it is meant to move ( in connection with DIME/PMESII).
This was never completely understood in two Administrations or at all levels of the Force. That the “engagement” was where the “currency” of success was created. Additionally, the emphasis on technology and over-modernization is closely related and relational to tactical and operational mentality.
The real truth is that there were tactical, strategic, political, and diplomatic failure at all levels from top to bottom. 6 There was never any real consideration for the ‘consequences of consequences.” The failure was not embracing a doctrine, the failure was not understanding how to integrate and implement the multiple layers and levels of complexity required of that doctrine.
Footnotes
1. Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Sources of Success in COIN, RAND; Victory has a Thousand Fathers,Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies, RAND; War by Other Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency, RAND; Understanding Human Dynamics, DSB, 2009; A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility, Jeffrey Bordin, Ph.D; Decade of War, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations, Vol One Report, JCOA, 2012
2. These four bullet points are from Modern Strategy, Colin S Gray pp 1-80
3.Victory has a Thousand Fathers, Sources of Success in COIN, RAND
4. Pick the report or reports of your choice from the SIGARS web site. http://www.sigar.mil/
5. 5 Ibid Colin S Gray, footnote 2
6. A couple of examples include: Wanat, Combat Action in Afghanistan, 2008, CSI Press; and the Decade of War Enduring Lessons Learned, Volume One Report.
I find it fascinating that Gentile used the Battle of the Somme as his example of a more complex war. One of the latter wars of WWI it pitted outdated tactics on both sides against each other in a largely indecisive blood bath. This is better? This demonstrating deep thinking?
Despite Gentiles apparent hatred for GEN David Petraeus he does not make any reasonable argument against counterinsurgency being less complicated than simply throwing wave after wave of Soldier against fortified machinegun positions. By its nature counterinsurgency adds a layer of political complexity over the standard tactics. It inserts civilians into the battlefield. It IS more complicated. Whether it is graduate level war I cannot say. That it requires considerations beyond simple tactics should go without saying.
Gian repeatedly undermines several of his valid arguments when he directs his criticism at the Savior General. This is unfortunate, because many people who should seriously debate his thoughts dismiss them because of this perceived personal attack on Petreaus.
As to the comments below, counterinsurgency is hardly a “wicked” problem in all cases, and perhaps not even in most; however, I agree that it is in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Still it is much less complex than a major war where a number of truly strategic variables interact in ways that will “significantly” alter the course of history. The conflicts we’re involved in today pale in comparison when it comes to complexity to WWII (not the individual battles) and the Cold War. Both WWII and the Cold War had the same social-cultural-political factors we’re dealing with in Afghanistan in multiple parts of the world. They were subsets of problems in a larger strategic context that poised existential threats to our national security, so they were put in context and managed in a practical manner. Neither the situation in Iraq or Afghanistan pose that type of threat to the U.S. or the West, so we have considerable freedom of choice (less complexity) to respond to these challenges. In fact, having that freedom (not being deterred) is what led to our hubris. Both of these conflicts evolved into wicked problems (combination terrorism, insurgency, civil war, etc.) due to our unrealistic policy objectives. In short our policies more than our tactics resulted in challenges that were and are not conducive to a military solution.
We continually debate doctrine and tactics, and while there is always room for improvement, these really are not the issues nor the key lessons we should take from these two theaters of war. Even if every U.S. service member executed our COIN doctrine at the tactical and operational level, that military excellence would have not resulted in a different outcome in either Iraq or Afghanistan. This I fear is what we fail to, or perhaps refuse to understand. In my opinion focusing on the tactics instead of the strategy for our lessons learnt for the future will simply lead to more self-imposed failures (regardless of how good we are tactically).
The sad and very disappointing truth is that we can afford to fail to Afghanistan and Iraq. Of course none of us desire that outcome, but consider what would have happened if we couldn’t afford to fail, if somehow we perceived an existential threat to our nation if we did fail? I think we would all agree one of two course of action would have been pursued. If we decided to engage militarily we would be less concerned with the hubris related nation building and appeasement of actors like Pakistan. We would have focused on eliminating the existential threat to our nation even if that meant entering Pakistan and Iran to deny safehaven for our foes. While the population would be important (they always are), they wouldn’t have been “our” center of gravity. However, the fact is that COIN in other countries doesn’t present an existential threat so we half step because the strategic context allows us to.
On the other hand, we may have deemed that a military intervention presented too strategic risk, so we wouldn’t have opted for a military solution (at least an overt one), we would have been deterred by the risk to our greater interests like we were many times during the Cold War. That meant we would have accepted the fact that the risk versus gain was not worth a military action. We let Hungary fall to the Soviets because of this calculus for example.
As we look to the future and how we should design Joint Force 2020 we need to stay focused on what is truly important. Al-Qaeda and other non-state actors and state actors will likely continue to wage unconventional warfare against the U.S. much like the USSR did (though in a different manner and in a different context), and we still risk future state on state wars, major cyber attacks, and host of other very real threats to our interests that require a holistic approach. Irregular warfare (including COIN) will be part of that context, but if we view this as a long war (more to come), then we would be wise to pursue a strategy that doesn’t rely on unsustainable surges. In most cases we fortunately can work in a FID versus COIN context as part of our counter-UW campaign against AQ. In some cases like Bosnia and Haiti we’ll be drawn in a larger manner to provide some degree of stability and the lessons learnt at the tactical level over the past decade (and the many decades prior to that) will be relevant. Don’t toss out the baby with the bathwater, but we need to get a better understanding of the bathtub we’re in.
Gian… how the hell are you? Still poking the bear I see. Here is my take away after participating in the planning and the high-diddle-diddle-up the left middle push to Baghdad… plus six plus years in country doing COIN for this or that organization.
It’s not strictly a matter of liking or disliking COIN… COIN is contextual.. Iraq is different than Afghanistan… or the Philippines between 1899-1913… While concepts remain steady… execution is malleable. Cultures, fighting styles, local and regional politics differ.
Reference surge. The surge did nothing more than create an operational reserve. It provided the theater commander with greater flexibility to weigh his main effort… or develop situation. The district commanders remained free to engage and recruit locals to fight AQI and or other bad men… something they had been doing anyway since 2003.
Major learning points for me… all COIN is local. The host-nation does COIN… the liberator or occupier (take your pick) does FID or security assistance after regime change/removal. Example. The local police in Springfield, Massachusetts are doing COIN as we speak… It appears that local gangs had been running rough-shad over the local population… State-troopers with Iraq and Astan experience are working hearts and minds… turning locals into eyes and ears… neighborhood building… block-by-block. COIN doctrine appears to work… when you do it in your own nation-state and not as a cultural/ethnic/civilizational outsider.
Reference “Savior-General”… a more appropriate and less irritating term might be “Celebrity-General”… Celebrity sells… and there is nothing wrong with selling a war when you are trying to win it. Doesn’t mean that you should believe your own press.
Gian… good to read your stuff..
v/r
MAC
Just a few observations from the last few years that might be relevant/ offer some insight:
– In 2008, then-GEN Petraeus came to CGSC and gave a presentation about Iraq. It was a power-point display that used metrics to sell us that the surge and the “ways” (presumably 3-24, though not stated explicitly as I remember) had won the war. It was a slick presentation and very hard not to be impressed- but I remember coming away thinking that it had been not only a very good IO message- but also seemed to be delivered to a wider audience than CGSC (it was filmed and broadcast over some public channel as I recall and definitely wasn’t delivered in a way that was best for U.S. Army Majors- very dry and PC). I concluded that winning in war meant selling the concept that one was winning or that one won. I also later marveled that although GEN Petraeus didn’t seem to be able to do the same selling after he commanded in Afghanistan- many folks seemed to give him credit for “turning things around there” too.
– In 2012, during the COIN (3-24) manual rewrite, I witnessed time and again U.S. Army officers unable to imagine COIN in any way except for what they had experienced and/or what they “knew” about U.S. political and U.S. military institutional norms. This led me to believe that what our Army suffers from (among other things) is the inability of our leaders and their staffs to frame things in different ways. So, what I see (Madhu) from inside the institution is one set of officers (the majority) who have internalized the doctrine and therefore see the world through a 3-24 lens- and only through that lens, and another set of officers (a minority) who see the world through a different lens (but only that one lens). Very, very few have I encountered who are able to see the world through a 3-24 lens, a non-3-24 lens, and other lenses. This concerns me due to my belief that in order to conduct meaningful operations in areas in which our policy objectives are a little unclear, our strategy is a little (or a lot) broad and abstract, and our operational lines of effort are pulled directly out of doctrinal pubs with no thought to them other than using them to connect policy objectives to tactics via power point shapes- it is critical that one be able to view the world through multiple lenses.
– At that same manual rewrite conference, then-CIA Director Petraeus came and addressed the conference. He stated very clearly his belief that we needed to take our time in rewriting the manual- that the manual had really been written mainly for Iraq with lessons learned pulled from Iraq- and that with Afghanistan and post-OIF Iraq, there were many more things we have learned that would make a fundamental rewrite necessary. He ended by saying there should be no rush to complete the manual. I was often reminded of those words over the next year as I felt the pressure to not only finish the manual quickly- but also avoid changing anything fundamentally. I was left thinking that there were definite institutional and political pressures at work that kept us from taking the advice of the at-that-time-still-revered father of the manual and that maybe things that were attributed to Petraeus weren’t necessarily things he believed (specifically about 3-24, Iraq, and COIN in general). In short- he was perhaps made into a celebrity general from others who gained from using his name in vain as well as his own actions for political (as opposed to ideological or personal) reasons.
– Lastly, I have seen over the last 5 years general officers attempt to initiate efforts- only to see them get bogged down in the bureaucracy of their organization. Although I think GEN Petraeus contributed to some of the perception that the surge, 3-24, and his own leadership were more or less responsible for the uptick in positive data points in 2008, I think that just as much of it came from those who had (and have) something to gain- or think they have something to gain from fostering that impression. Some of it IMO is tied to the inability of many to imagine the world through anything other than what they’ve read in doctrine. Others gain due to the doctrine being tied to funding and mission strategies. Regardless of the reasons, my takeaway recently has been that general officers often don’t have as much influence over strategic direction as we’d like to think they do, things they get involved in often take on a life of their own- getting intertwined with partisan efforts and used by those with agendas, and changing course- even for someone as “celebrity” as Petraeus is- is often impossible taking into consideration the strength of the bureaucracy and the intractability of things once they become part of “the system” (doctrine, for instance).
Madhu- hope that helps some in describing things “on the inside”.
I, for one, am not as interested in whether COIN doctrine is right or not (I’m also biased- I studied under Porch and agree with much of what Gentile writes about), but am more interested in WHY we believe in what we believe. I am fascinated with how our institution “learns” (if you want to call it that- I call it that simply because we say we learn- but I think learning in general is a very subjective term anyway, but even more so when we (the military) use the term…)- specifically how we have “learned” from Afghanistan and Iraq. I submit that beyond some learning by some at the tactical level (and most of those guys are out now or getting out)- our higher level learning has been blocked by systemic forces tied to the fight for funding and institutional paradigms. These forces tend to force behavior that makes sense at the individual level- but is killing us IMO at the organizational/institutional level. There doesn’t seem to me to be any room for productive red-teaming of concepts, alternative viewpoints of strategic direction, or folks telling “the emperor” he has no clothes. The solution can’t be the CJCS telling everyone they need to be as courageous in the conference room as they are on the battlefield- we have to be honest about why we aren’t and work on changing that.
– GMM
In the second paragraph of his article, COL Gentile says this:
When you have a history hammer, every solution resembles a historical wooden peg. COL Gentile already has commanded mechanized units and witnessed airpower that would have circumvented what he sees as the “graduate” level of WWI. Trench warfare artillery and human wave casualties certainly weren’t a positive example of how to fight for future Soldiers and leaders as Curmudgeon points out. Ask the Iranians in the Iraq-Iran War.
In addition is it appropriate for a talented historian to attempt to postulate or theorize revised history through the mechanism of counterfactuals? If enemy-centric armored force warfare was the solution in some place like Iraq or Afghanistan for post war stability operations why was it working so poorly from 2004-2006 or when the Soviets had all their armor in Afghanistan?
COL Gentile has been seen speculating about counterfactuals in past forums with James Dobbins and John Nagl and he continues that trend in a recent Op-Ed in the LA Times, “America’s Nation-Building at Gunpoint” that included this:
Note how his second sentence implies the Surge of 2009 seemingly is related to more violence now. Instead, a more logical conclusion might be that more US forces replaced by fewer, less effective ANSF are unable to fully limit such violence. That leads to what would have been achieved had we just left after 2002? If the Afghan security forces now are imperfect, how would they have fared in 2002 had we just departed unceremoniously before they existed? What kind of government would exist? More warlords, or a return to Taliban rule? If less security exists now than during the Afghan Surge, doesn’t that say something about that Surge’s effectiveness? Recall Sangin as an economy of force under-resourced British effort before the Surge, its improvement during the USMC Surge, and its current status under ANSF control. Now imagine how chaotic it would be without the forces trained by our Marines.
An equally unprovable but common sense conclusion would be that Afghanistan would be Chaosistan providing sanctuary for many of Pakistan’s more radical Taliban who threaten Pakistan’s stability. Look at Iraq now and speculate what it would resemble had we not stayed as long as we did. This Bloomberg article talks about going from 5-10 suicide attacks monthly in 2011 and 2012 to upwards of 30 in Iraq in the last 90 days due to Syrian Sunni insurgent resurgence. Consider whether Iraq would be seeking US help had we not demonstrated some prior commitment to their stability:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-16/iraqi-foreign-minister-open-to-u-s-drone-strikes-on-terrorists.html
If we accomplished al Qaeda’s destruction back then, what are all these groups in Yemen, Syria, back in Iraq, and North Africa…and yes still in AfPak? Could it be that our persistence drove al Qaeda out of isolated areas well inland in AfPak to areas where we better can can target them now? Counterfactuals are handy tools when overestimating positive outcomes in the absence of actual action.
We believed Saddam Hussein would be overthrown after we left prematurely after Desert Storm. We thought the no-fly zone would solve the problem. How did that hope and change thing work out then? Why did we use cruise missiles to try to take out al Qaeda training camps back in Clinton’s days? Could it be that pesky overflight-rights problem that we also experienced back in the early 80s when we first bombed Qaddafi and France objected? Why assume our aircraft always could return via Pakistan and other “stans” airspace as al Qaeda and the Taliban returned to Afghanistan…over and over. By staying long enough to train the ANSF and build some relationship with the Afghan and Pakistan government, we demonstrate to all parties our commitment to not letting things return to the way they were.
Finally, I noted that COL Gentile joined retired flag officers Admiral Fitzgerald and Lt Gen Deptula in a piece in “The National Interest,” “A Cheaper, Stronger Army.” The below quote demonstrates the same lack of foresight that we saw in OIF 1 where we failed to plan for post major conflict stability operations:
One very dangerous aspect of any such conflict would be the occupation after most organized bullets and bombs/missiles/artillery were exchanged. The Army recently decided that MRAPs do not fit Korea, because more lethal systems are required. However, a secondary reason could be the complete absence of applicability off road and on narrow muddy roads north of the DMZ according to Ken White. Those are the same conditions that drive the need for light infantry, the JLTV, and Strykers in addition to the mechanized and aviation forces our Army already has and would need during and post war. Even if our primary role was stability operations south of the DMZ while the ROK stabilized in the north (which I’m not saying it would be) there clearly would be stability operations with some measure of peacekeeping and nation-building at the point of a gun. Otherwise NGOs, USAID, and the State Department and South Korean and UN equivalents would be attacked repeatedly leading to either mercenary security or none at all and no progress in stability operations.
Speculation will continue as to what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan, and historians will attempt to shape views of history based on their biases. That alone calls into question history’s value as references to the Battle of Somme have little relevance to Iraq or Afghanistan, unless related to the utter stupidity of trench warfare and human wave attacks of the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, these arguments should not be used to question the necessity of long-term stability operations or the next war will resemble OIF in 2004-2006.
My historically-based and common sense bet is that even though we may no longer be interested in stability operations, they will be imposed upon us if we wish to achieve positive outcomes for the sacrifices of our service members during major conflict. Like it or not, COIN and Stability Operations are very similar. Identical conditions of insurgents disguised as civilians could occur in any number of future conflicts to include Korea or Taiwan. That complicates the notion of the anti-COIN/enemy-centric crowd that we could just “go find and kill those insurgents” or employ counter-terror and SOF operations only.
… they never defeated us on the battlefield… they never defeated our supported allies on the battlefield… and then we left.
What are we actually debating? Are we still debating whether the population-centric approach is the more dominant form of irregular war than the strictly enemy-centric approach? Are we to believe that COL Gentile is proposing that we strictly focus on heavy-armored enemy centric warfare? Anyone who has been engaged in this conversation for awhile understands that Gian is not arguing for strictly one over the other… Battalion Commander Gentile did hearts and minds to defend against an irregular threat in and around Baghdad himself. All warfare is population-centric… Defeat mechanisms are influenced by both civilian and fighter attitudes.
They never defeated us on the battlefield, nor our allies whom we trained and funded… until the trainers left and the funding ran out.
I just finished reading Predictive Analytics by Eric Siegel… uses and abuses of mega-data and all that… I am learning that all data is predictive… therefore… history is data and all data is history… therefore history is predictive. COIN and Stability Operations may be quite similar but in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan where if we had actually studied the “historical data” beforehand… we might have predicted different outcomes … Gian’s appears to be the wining argument.
The argument I hear is if we would only have had more time… and COL Gentile argues it was wasted.
r/
MAC
Madhu,
… I like the term “expeditionary COIN”… In my gut I believe that expeditionary COIN, stability operations, et al are nothing more than force protection TTPs on a grand scale… Ethnic, cultural and or civilizational outsiders don’t do COIN… they do FID and or security assistance operations. I have no doubt that should our armed forces be called upon to execute COIN operations in these United States.. we would win.
The cynic in me thinks you are absolutely correct… a kinder and gentler form of war is packaged in a hearts and minds ribbon. As you know… I am a shame and honor proponent, especially in Muslim/frontier/mountain cultures where the hearts of those we are fighting belongs to Allah.
Finally… reference doing it better. Our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan is also an indictment of our university (intellectual) – military complex… The social sciences departments are in need of some deep naval gazing and contemplation as to how they see the world and the stuff they are teaching… not to mention the crap we are buying.
v/r
MAC
I suspect that the primary reason COIN has come be perceived as “graduate level” warfare is because most COIN is not warfare at all, yet we send our very best war fighters off to address insurgencies in a war-like manner.
Kind of if you sent the currently redhot LA Dodgers to Alabama to play the dynastic University of Alabama in a game of football, but with the Dodgers thinking it was just a game of “graduate level” baseball they were getting into.
War is political violence; but we all appreciate that not all violence is war, and equally all politics is not war either. But for whatever reason, insurgency causes our brains to vapor lock and simply dump it into the war category, and off we go.
But war is external. Two distinct systems battling each other over issues that no lesser form of debate can apparently resolve. Insurgency, however, at least revolutionary insurgency, is internal. It is two sides taking internal politics to an illegal and often violent level when legal internal politics are either denied or inadequate to the issue at hand.
It is not that one is harder than the other, it is that they are two very different things. The sooner we cross that intellectual bridge, the sooner we can think more effectively about what it is we find on the other side.
Bob
Until recently, insurgency and counterinsurgency theory had been used to consider conflict within states.
In our current case, however, insurgency and counterinsurgency are often viewed within the context of a challenge to the current world order.
Thus, Al Qaeda, a non-state actor, challenges the hegemon and its allies, whose political, economic, military, and cultural power maintains that world order.
In this circumstance, and at this level, should counterinsurgency be considered the graduate level of war?
We have a bad habit of describing tasks as difficult when we do a poor job of accomplishing them. It’s not hard, but it’s easy to make excuses for failings.
… coming up with a good excuse for failing is actually very hard… the excuse has to pass the common sense test… the excuse has to be able to successfully deflect blame… or as the old staff mantra advises it should successfully blame someone else.
IMHO an important reason why the “graduate level of war” is so hard to execute and ultimately fails is that it is based on the misguided notion that a central planning commission can develop a comprehensive reform package (modernization theory) to build a civil society from scratch.
… on the other hand… maybe an inability to accomplish a given task is because the task is too difficult to accomplish… and no amount of “I will try harder” is going to make a difference…
How is that for an excuse 🙂
v/r
MAC
Yup, and when it’s too difficult in the first place, we’ve got to be honest and stop giving it the college try as we rush in headlong.
What did “build local institutions, establish rule of law, repair and construct infrastructure, rebuild energy sector, support Iraqi efforts to resolve differences through politics rather than through violence” morph into? I take it that you never had an opportunity to work with the civilian reconstruction-modernization effort? I had an opportunity to experience both the initial military efforts at “nation-restoring”… and the civilian sectors crack at the same effort. I sat in enough “wouldn’t it be great if the Iraqis had this or that” meetings. I will have to write a book someday on all the silly-little and grand public works projects we imposed on the country in the name of “nation-restoration”… from building the most modern waste disposal system in the world requiring the most educated waste disposal engineers anywhere to teaching local farmers to genetically engineer their own seeds to better grow them in the desert. We would have to send the poor, illiterate farmer to the United States to earn a degree in genetic engineering first mind you. Hundreds of millions of dollars spent and wasted.
By the way what does nation-restoring actually mean and what does it entail? Here is my take on some definitions … A country is a place, a land. A nation is a group of people who think they have enough in common to live together in a single political unit. A state is the political-administrative structure that governs the nation in the country… So what are you restoring? I am not saying that getting the major groups of people in Iraq or Afghanistan to live together in a single political unit is impossible… Saddam Hussein was successful for many years…. but what I am saying is that an outsiders efforts at why can’t we all just get along initiatives will fail if pushed by ethnic/religious/civilizational outsiders in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
… please… enough of the “should we stand aside and allow havoc to occur” lamentations and “if we can only save one life it will have been worth it” arguments.. Ever hear of martial law and its uses? How did we do it in liberated France… how about occupied Germany? Ever read the “Public Safety Manual for Liberated Territory” dated 1944… or “Public Safety Manual for Occupied Germany” dated 1944? I studied the documents before we departed on our big adventure… Do you know the difference between liberated and occupied territories and the international legal responsibilities for both? No one even considered declaring martial law after we removed the regime…
The time for excuses is actually over. The proof is in the end-result… Look at Iraq today… and in about five years look at Afghanistan… I believe everyone did their best and I am not about to question motives. In the end everyone did a grand job… I lost a dear friend in the effort and am proud of everyone who served… my boy is serving in Afghanistan as we speak. In the end, I am not too concerned any longer as to the who, what, when, and why of it all…
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MAC