USNI Debate on Afghanistan End Game: Stavridis Weighs In
ADM James Stavridis weighs in at the USNI blog in response to CDR (Ret) John Kuehn's call in Proceedings to "Punch Them in the Nose and Leave" – calling for NATO/ISAF to conduct a fighting withdrawal in the vein of the Soviets' exit from Afghanistan. ADM Stavridis points out ISAF successes and states that a responsible and managed transition is already underway. Most of the commenters seem unconvinced. Make sure to scroll down to see their counters and you'll find some useful links as well.
You'll note several references to prestige or saving face. On this topic, I highly recommend reading Gordon M. Goldstein's Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam (New York: Holt, 2008).
Two surprises in this short piece, first that ADM Stavridis would resort to largely irrelevant statistics to support his counter position to the “punch them in the nose and leave” article, and second the overwhelming the negativity to his response. In general people are no longer buying attempts to spin the war with meaningless statistics, and of all people the ADM should know that.
Despite the ADM’s less than successful efforts to put a positive spin on the war, his support for putting the Afghans in the lead and continuing support (hopefully much reduced) seems the right course to me. He wrote,
“We must and will continue engagement post-2014 with Afghans fully in the lead for security and with NATO / ISAF mentorship, support, and assistance.”
My fear is after 10 years of spin people are so tired of this conflict they may support the irrational approach of quitting cold turkey. I think that approach will do more than just cause a loss of face, but reduce America’s credibility and ability to lead in the future, which could have serious repercussions to our national security in time (this is speculative, but seems reasonable). Starting now, and definitely after we support to a true supporting role we need a much more honest portrayal of what is happening, one that sets realistic expectations, and one that clearly points out this is now an Afghan problem that will require an Afghan solution, but we’ll assist where we can.
Ultimately I hope we’re serious about putting the Afghans in the lead, not just for security, but for governance and all that goes with it. We have to stop imposing solutions that don’t work for them and accept their solutions. The million dollar is will we, are will we continue to meddle excessively and get shown the door?
At some point, Karzai suffers the same fate as his predecessor. He will be seen hanging from a lamp post as an object lesson. As with Najibullah, few will notice. History does rhyme; this time with the Soviet chime. We have not defeated the enemy, the Taliban; but we have corrupted our “allies.” SEA veterans should be having hot flashes of deja vu right about now.
In all of this, the DOD is no different than any other federal bureaucracy. Once started, military campaigns or programs develop contract and congressional constituents with self-serving motives unrelated to success or national security. Indeed, the word “victory” has been struck from the American flag officer lexicon.
Reformist national security and foreign policy agendas are unlikely planks for either party this election year. When it comes to small wars in the Muslim world, apathy may be loudest voice in the room. Indeed, both major parties have confused revolution and insurgency with reform. Revolts change regimes; only reform corrects abuses.
Reform is not part of anyone’s agenda; not apathetic Washington nor corrupt Kabul. The only course that might be worse than precipitous withdrawal is a prolonged, albeit lower profile, presence in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. There is little danger that they might become more like us, but every signal that we aspire to appear more like them. No small wonder then that “victory” is still part of the Islamist vocabulary. They see a bonfire at the end of the tunnel.
Something of a bottom line question here:
By our continuing efforts as described by ADM Stavridis, are we more likely to prevail over enemies who would limit American access and influence throughout the world?
(“Punch them in the nose and then leave” not seeming to have much of a chance of accomplishing this objective.)