Pop-COIN and ‘The Death of American Strategy’ (Updated)
Pop-COIN and ‘The Death of American Strategy’
by A.E. Stahl
Defenceiq
Gentile states that “American armed nation building at the barrel of a gun simply does not work and strategy should discern this basic truth.” Again, Gentile is correct. The idea that one can simultaneously engage in warfare and nation building is comparable to mixing oil and water. They do not and cannot blend. As the article clearly states, Gentile, Peters, Long, Biden, and others are not against assisting a nation in reconstruction efforts if that is what the U.S. government decides is best for its national interests. However, as should be clear given our historical treasure chest of over 3,000 years of the history of warfare, the wars first need to be won — again, hardly an original notion. That is, if a country has chosen to engage in warfare, the focus of one’s efforts and the means at one’s disposal must be on the physical attrition of the enemy to the point that the enemy’s will to continue violently resisting has been broken. Once will is broken and once one’s political condition has been imposed, post-war reconstruction projects can then commence at will, but only if that is what the policy calls for.
The COIN war: B.H. Liddell Hart and T.E. Lawrence Edition
by Gulliver
Ink Spots
In 1928, T. E. Lawrence wrote to his friend Basil Liddell Hart on the subject of the latter man's advocacy for what he called the Indirect Approach, a concept that emphasized dislocation of the enemy through rapid, unexpected strategic and operational maneuver and held out the hope of bloodless, battle-free victory.
A surfeit of the "hit" school brings on an attack of the "run" method; and then the pendulum swings back. You, at present, are trying (with very little help from those whose business it is to think upon their profession) to put the balance straight after the orgy of the late war. When you succeed (about 1945) your sheep will pass your bounds of discretion, and have to be chivied back by some later strategist. Back and forward we go.
Lawrence was highlighting the cyclical tendencies of the never-ending debate about strategy. First come the proponents of maneuever and wars of position – Frederick, Vauban, Bulow, and even Jomini, to a certain extent – then the purported advocates of mass, destruction of the main force, decisive battle – Napoleon, Clausewitz, Moltke, Mahan, Foch – before returning to indirect approaches in reaction – Douhet, Liddell Hart, De Gaulle, Guderian, etc.
Let’s just get down to business here. If in fact the population is NOT the center of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare, then – what is ? Body counts ? Control of the ground ? Multiple “lines of operations” ? I’m being deliberately and rhetorically aggressive here, because if one is to have a discussion about COIN strategy, it does not good at all to just say, “Stay clear of these situations”, or some other obfuscatory mechanism that avoids the theoretical issues altogether. (We’ve had)Enough of that. I concede that post-conflict reconstruction implies that the conflict is actually over. But if in fact, it is not the rebuilding effort that is the focus of the enemy’s actions, but in fact one’s own combat forces, then it is reasonable to ask what role those forces play in securing anything, much less the population. Likewise, if what is taking place amounts to a civil war, and one takes sides (or even does not take sides, from time to time), then under what circumstances does the control and security of the population make conceptual sense at all ? Are there in fact circumstances where the people become the enemy, and how does one act if such is the case ? And once you have subdued these people (as I assume the COINTRA position demands), how do your past actions affect how you deal with the self-same people afterwards ?
Strategy should determine a center of gravity. Clausewitz says that a center of gravity is something to be discovered; the rules of population centric coin that the “people are the prize” have done the discovering for us.
When I was a student at the Coin Academy in December 2005 at Taji one of the instructors said just that: that the “people are the center of gravity.” When i raised my hand and asked why the people are the center of gravity I got an answer that mumbled something about Galula combined with a stare that i didnt know what the heck i was talking about by asking such a question.
Now if good strategy determines that the most cost effective operational method to achieve policy aims is pop centric coin, then sure the people can be the center of gravity. But because the operational method of pop coin has eclipsed strategic thinking, we know can only imagine that in any coin operation it must be so.
Perhaps a slight change of POV might help the article and the comments thusfar make some headway. Nation Building and Warfare are spoken of as distinct activities. Now, if you replace the peculiar phrase “nation building” with “governance” then a hierarchy becomes possible…….governance on favorable terms is what you are always seeking, and warfare is what you engage in to further governance. Here I speak only in terms of occupation. T.E. Lawrence was aiding the rebels, so his POV is fundamentally opposed as he sought to disrupt governance and engaged in warfare to make it happen.
This requires estbalishing a framework for your campaign. A framework MUST be established before even starting the discussion (what am I about to do? ‘go to war’ is the wrong answer). Governance is not always relevant. For example, if Iran blocks Hormuz and we send the 5th Fleet to secure that terrain. But in Occupation, which is after all what we are talking about 90% of the time on this site, governance IS the terrain. If the 5th Fleet receives marching orders then they will read “secure the strait IOT ensure free passage”. Limited and achievable objective. When the POTUS set out on OEF/OIF the orders should have read “secure local governance IOT permit US-friendly regime”. Limited and achievable objective, if a hell of a lot more resource intensive. The analogous failures to articulate frameworks in both OEF and OIF were the core strategic failures.
COIN in this regard, especially pop-COIN, misses the point of war completely. Getting the population on your side is a technique to the end, not the goal. If our goal was to cripple AQ in Afghanistan in 2001 then the local population was relevant only to the extent of its value to our intelligence gathering and operations (essentially the CT view). When we decided that we were going to install an enduring US-friendly regime from scratch we took on governance…and SURPRISE, all the problems of governance…security, economy, education, international relations, etc. At this point, COIN is in the right direction…yes, we need more than CT…but it is painfully inadequate and will continue to be until we define our framework and realize that what we committed to is governance first and foremost.
PS as an aside, is anyone else utterly confused by the term Nation Building? I can’t define it no matter how hard I try without reducing it to a term of art and just making it mean whatever the hell sounds convenient.
There was a similar discussion over at the SWC awhile back where I pointed out that Galula Never!!! called the people a COG,but many experts still keep saying he said that,he didn’t do that. What he clearly writes in his book is that the people are the Objective!!!! they are the target! They are being attacked and or affected by another force and that other force is or should be IMO opinion the COG. In LE it’s like saying the victim is the COG, the victim is the target and the criminal is the COG (source of all power) don’t understand why that is so hard to understand,also that used to Green Beret stuff 101.
double post, sorry.
No, Vitesse et Puissance, I don’t think you understand Colonel Gentile’s position. He is not, has not, and will not suggest what exactly he thinks the enemy’s COG in A-Stan is. He is merely pointing out that it might not (or probably not depending on his mood) be the civilian population.
Your question (if not the civilian population then who or what) is at least facially a logical and sensible one.
But we are dealing with Colonel Gentile. He does not answer or analyze such questions. He only derides the analysis of others.
He tells us that “strategy should discern the true COG.”
But has Colonel Gentile used his obvious talents to apply “strategy” to discern for us what the true COG is in A-Stan? If so, i’ve somehow missed it.
No, Colonel Gentile’s analysis rarely gets beyond tbe ‘we shouldn’t be there’ stage, which strongly implies that we shouldn’t have gone in the first place. This is, of course, a perfectly valid position–for someone like Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich, and in Colonel Gentile’s private political life that is a perfectly valid position as well.
So while Colonel Gentile is his usual brilliant self when pointing out flaws in “pop centric coin” this brilliance somehow is never put to use in figuring out what, exactly, is the best course to take in A-Stan. Afterall, there still is a mission to accomplish, one that President Obama has yet to relinquish, despite Colonel Gentile’s wise protestations to do so.
No, Vitesse et Puissance, you are barking up the wrong tree my friend.
double post
Nation-states come in many forms. We need not be so obsessed with the inherent goodness of badness of any particular form as judged by how closely it mirrors our own.
As to “the populace” perhaps is it easy to start with Clausewitz’s very simple construct of “the people” as one of three elements (the others being “the army” and “the government”). But “the people” are indeed no monolith, but is made up of many interrelated and interconnected “populaces.”
So what is the best way to think of “populaces”? I am currently doing this through the lens of “identity.” Consider, each person identifies with hundreds or thousands of things, big and small, and if tasked good generally prioritize the identities. You may be of some nation, and some tribe, and some religion, and some region, and be a father, a son, and like blue shirts, and Honda motorcycles, and sugar in your coffee, etc. With each of these “identities” one is a de facto member of a global populace of people with that shared identity. If tasked, you could prioritize these identities in a rough order, but to simplify, simply list those and prioritize those you would be willing to kill for. Now, draw line through those to divide those you would be willing to die for. These are the “critical populaces” for purposes of stability. When one believes that their identity with some state facilitates their ability to preserve their other critical identities, there is stability. When one believes that their state, or some external state that affects governance within their state, is a danger to other critical identities, there is instability.
The “simple” task of government is to expand the perception that identifying with the state is the best option for preserving all or most of one’s critical identities. What brings stability to “the people” and in extension to “the nation-state” are when one forms and nurtures trust and faith in a national identity/populace across “the people.”
In Afghanistan there has never been an effort to create such a populace; but then, in the traditional, decentralized, largely self-governing approach there was no need for such an identity. Today we attempt to force a centralized control without the development first of a national identity/populace. One cannot order or mandate beliefs; but must nurture them over time and create structures people who have no trust in each other can trust in if there is any hope of developing such a national identity. But when instead the government is dedicated to the idea that one segment of the populace will have dominion over others, no amount of military and police effort, or development or any other band-aid approaches will develop such an identity.
In the United States it took generations to build such a national identity. The Constitution, dedicated to this task, was a big help, but consider Robert E. Lee’s famous decision as to if he prioritized his identity as an American and US soldier, causes he had devoted his life to, over his identity as a Virginian. One cannot mandate these things, but must set proper conditions and then work ceaselessly to nurture them. Governments being made up of politicians, being made up of humans, often forget or never fully appreciate this. They simply expect “the people” to support the rule of law. As the American Declaration of Independence proclaims so eloquently, governments can only expect that presumption to take them so far. The people hold the ultimate power, and if pushed, the people will push back.
Cheers!
Bob