Don’t Listen to the Kagans

Along these same lines, here’s a draft op ed I’m getting ready to shop around:

In the 1920s, Germany struggled to understand how it had lost World War I. Rather than accepting the idea that the policy which led to war was so deeply flawed that even the most astute military strategy could not salvage it, many Germans concluded that their nation had been “stabbed in the back.” Enemies within had sabotaged the war effort thus turning certain victory into defeat. While psychologically comforting, this failed the reality test.

Today U.S. supporters of the 2003 invasion of Iraq are promoting their own version of the “stab in the back” narrative. According to this, the strategic shift of 2006–popularly known as “the surge”–staved off defeat and paved the way for ultimate success. Victory was at hand. But then President Obama withdrew U.S. forces before it was consolidated, allowing Iraq to teeter toward sectarian war, Iranian meddling, and possible disintegration. The failure of U.S. policy toward Iraq will be because it was subverted by domestic political concerns rather than shortcomings in the policy itself.

Those making this argument are forced to undertake some logical gymnastics. The primary reason for withdrawing U.S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 as stipulated in the Bush administration’s 2008 status of forces agreement was that the Iraqis themselves demanded it. Hence proponents of the “stab in the back” narrative assert that the Obama administration did not try hard enough to negotiate an extension. Since this is a counterfactual it cannot be refuted.

But the shortcomings of the “stab in the back” narrative run even deeper. It is an attempt to discount the flawed assumptions of the Bush policy in Iraq: that the Iraqi leadership and people wanted the same thing as the United States–a unified, stable nation based on an equitable distribution of power among the sects and ethnic groups. Since both the Iraqis and the United States wanted the same thing, the thinking went, the U.S. role was to provide assistance and tutelage until democracy and an equitable power sharing arrangement took root, and to prevent Iranian subversion. As Iraq approached disintegration and chaos in 2006, the Bush administration and its supporters concluded that the problem was inadequate U.S. support for Iraqi President Maliki and his security forces. The “surge” was intended to address this and give the fragile Iraqi government time to consolidate.

Today advocates of the “stab in the back” narrative cling to the notion that the Maliki regime shares American objectives but simply needs more more time to attain them. However much this reflects the way Americans view politics, it does not reflect reality. By every indication, the sects and ethnic groups in Iraq are more concerned with limiting the power of other groups than with constructing a sustainable balance among them. Another year or another decade of U.S. military presence would not have changed this. President Maliki’s preeminent objective is retaining political power. Keeping U.S. troops would have politically weakened him to the benefit of of his political rival Muqtada al-Sadr who Maliki considers a greater threat than either Iran or Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. For Maliki, being seen as a U.S. puppet was a greater political risk for Maliki than having American troops leave.

The “stab in the back” group believes that Iran is the primary threat to Iraq. While this may or may not be true, every indication is that few Iraqi leaders share the idea. Iraqis certainly do not welcome Iranian meddling but most are more concerned with other sects and ethnic groups. A continued U.S. military presence would have constrained group conflict but withdrawal in 2014 or beyond would have left Iraq in the same condition it faces today. It simply would have postponed the inevitable.

Ultimately, there is no evidence to support the contention that if the Obama administration could have convinced the Maliki regime to change its threat perception and act counter to what it sees as its interests, or that if U.S. troops had stayed a few years more, the basic dynamic of Iraqi politics would have changed. The assertion that withdrawing U.S. military turned victory into sure defeat is simply false.

Nothing short of a massive U.S. occupation lasting decades would have led to the sort of Iraq the Bush administration sought when it invaded. That, not a politically motivated “stab in the back,” explains the current situation. Rather than concocting narratives to explain why the rosy predictions of 2003 proved wrong, Americans now should concentrate on thinking through the implications of sustained sectarian conflict in Iraq.

All: I returned in July from a PRT tour in Khost Province, Afghanistan. The Kagan’s were on the lecture circuit and stopped by the IN unit I was supporting (I’m a CA guy). Their main point (think it was just after Christmas last year) was attempting to understand the insurgent foot traffic patterns. When they asked around the room for opinion/input, I said I only have the opinion of my boss (PRT’s are commanded by Navy officers) I replied that I could not/would not speak for him. Kim then asked me, in front of the other attendees (BN CDR, CSM, several VIP’s, etc..) what I thought should be done to stabilize Afghanistan. I asked her if she wanted Major Kinton’s opinion or Tom Kinton’s opinion; she replied that she wanted Tom Kinton’s opinion. So I gave it to her; told her if I had the fairy dust I would spend it all on micro-loans and teacher training.

One day later I was called in to my bosses office and verbally counseled (he was screaming at me) and accussed of ‘grandstanding’. He told me another 06 had called him and ratted me out.

So what’s the point to my pity-party? Only this: until we fix the Army, people like the Kagan’s will never make a difference one way or another.

R/
tom