Cooperation or Bust: A Case for Adding “Cooperation” to the Principles of War

It may be time to figure out what the MOOSEMUSS acronym would turn into with the addition of a “C” for cooperation.  The big lesson the International Community should draw from the last ten years in Afghanistan is that cooperation must be a key principle of war if they hope to achieve peace.  The author argues that in addition to the traditional principles of war and the American Joint principles of war one more principle should be added.  The lack of cooperation among the nations and organizations involved in Afghanistan has multiplied the difficulties found there; but in areas where cooperation has existed progress has been visible.  Legitimacy and Unity of Effort are two of the most complicated aspects of modern war and to better achieve them all the actors on the battlefield must cooperate.

The Nine Traditional Principles of War

The nine traditional principles of war are sound.  They were learned by trial and error over centuries and mastered by only a handful of great commanders.  Knowledge of their meanings does not mean a leader will be successful in battle and choosing not to follow them likewise does not ensure defeat.  Readers of this journal are surely familiar with them but for the sake of others here they are.  

The observation that many Soldiers operating on the modern battlefield make is that there is something missing from this list.  In order to be effective today, leaders at the strategic, operational and tactical level, must figure out how to get all the different actors on the battlefield to work together.  That is where cooperation comes in.  Before moving to cooperation two more lists of principles are examined.  Once the military started to think in terms of Joint Operations the United States learned that the nine principles needed to be augmented

The Principles of Joint Operations

The US Military based on years of experience in irregular warfare added three additional principles that when combined with the traditional nine creates the Principles Joint Operations.[i]  The three additions are:

To irregular war historians it is clear that without these three additions it is difficult to keep a force in the field.  Many historians of general war would likely argue that legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance are the cornerstone of all military interventions if the goal is to see peace take hold among the population after the major battles have ended.  Legitimacy is arguably the most critical principle on this list but is often the most neglected concept.  It is certainly one of the most vulnerable areas for any force involved in modern war.  Next we look at the final traditional principle of the U.S. Military.

Unity of Effort

All of the principles of Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) are included in the Principles of Joint Operations except for Unity of Effort.  This term points us towards the importance of cooperation in war zones where unity of command is not possible because of the diverse character of the actors present.  The concept goes hand-in-hand with Unity of Command, which is focused on clearly conferring one commander the authority to get things done.  The purpose of unity of command is to extract every bit of combat power out of a force so that it can be applied at the right place at the right time.  In other words in order to achieve unity of effort, coordination, and synchronization one single commander needs to be in charge.[ii]

According to Joint Publication 3-07 (MOOTW), “Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.”[iii]  So, while military units achieve unity of effort through unity of command, to get the myriad of non-military actors involved in modern war to work together something else is needed.  This article calls for the achievement of unity of effort by applying the principle of cooperation.

Cooperation

The author is not alone in calling for something beyond Unity of Command.  The new U.S. Army doctrine emphasizes the need for integration, coordination, and synchronization of elements inside and outside the military chain of command in order to achieve its desired effects.[iv]  This emphasis recognizes that the U.S. Army not only needs the other U.S. military services to win wars but also the cooperation of other governmental and non-governmental organizations.  This concept of getting all the rowers to pull on the oar at once is called unified action.[v]   

Why is cooperation the right concept to achieve unity of effort and unified action?  Whereas coordination, integration and synchronization imply that a leader has the authority to organize and harmonize the organizations in his area of operations cooperation denotes that no such authority exists.  Cooperation is synonymous with working together, coming to an agreement, and/or give and take.[vi]  These latter three terms more aptly describe what is needed to accomplish missions on today’s battlefield.  Cooperation augments unity of command and creates the legitimacy needed to underwrite a mission.  The final section of this article describes a case where a mission was accomplished by applying the principle of cooperation in Afghanistan. 

Cooperation success in Kabul

In order to assist the Afghan government in achieving its desire to begin the Reintegration of low-level anti-Afghan Government fighters and Reconciliation with Insurgent Leaders the ISAF forces under General McChrystal developed an organization to enhance cooperation of the numerous stakeholders involved with the concept.  Under the leadership of Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb a diverse team of people from a variety of military and civilian organizations cooperated to transform the concept of reintegration and reconciliation from a vague idea into international policy in less than one year.  This organization was known as the Force-Reintegration Cell or F-RIC.

The keys to success were creating a shared understanding among the stakeholders involved in the process, providing them with a clear purpose, and developing the appropriate incentives to get them to cooperate.  Some of the stakeholders in this enterprise included military personnel, Afghan leaders, lawmakers, presidents and prime ministers, diplomats, intelligence officers, non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, the media, universities, regional and international organizations, government aid organizations, neighboring and regionally concerned nations, and the myriad of anti-Afghan Government fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The first step towards cooperation was to correctly identify who all the stakeholders were inside and outside the military and government.  To achieve the necessary cooperation among this diverse group required that the people assigned or volunteering at the F-RIC be drawn from among of these stakeholders.  Additionally the F-RIC spent a large amount of its time studying the problem and gaining an understanding of the motives of the stakeholders.  Finally the F-RIC learned to give and take with each of the stakeholders until they reached a workable agreement.  This is a very simplified version of events but serves to highlight the complexity of the tasks given to the military and the need for the concept of cooperation on today’s battlefield.

Conclusion

It is likely that the current principles of war will continue to influence leaders in combat.  If the world learns the lessons of modern war it may add the principle of cooperation to this short list of valuable ideas.  On the other hand militaries may fall back to the advice a seasoned Sergeant Major once gave to a future British Chief of the Imperial General Staff when he was just a cadet.  According to the NCO who watched Cadet Slim furiously studying the principles of war:

“Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad, there’s only one principle of war and that’s this.  Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts the most, when he ain’t lookin!”[vii]

But then again if you have ever tried this Sergeant-Major’s theory out with a village elder, a United Nations employee, a diplomat, or a human rights worker you probably found that it was not very successful.  In summary cooperation can help leaders achieve unity of effort when unity of command is not an available option.  Cooperation enhances legitimacy and helps to build a shared understanding of the problem and the achievable solutions.  Finally cooperation is a principle that can be applied at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.