Afghan Good Enough?
Achieving Victory in Afghanistan Requires More Than Just “Afghan Good Enough”
by Colin P. Clarke
During my three months at ISAF headquarters, a commonly heard expression around the base was the term “Afghan Good Enough.” Ostensibly, this translates to doing the best one can—given the resources available—even if the end product is less than optimal.
But the troubling reality is that the term is more than just a pejorative colloquialism used by Westerners to describe what they view as half-hearted efforts or the jury-rigging that accompanies commonplace tasks. “Afghan Good Enough” represents a harbinger for the future of the Afghan state and diminishing support for what has become an unpopular war in many NATO capitals, from Ottawa to Berlin.
One of the two overarching hindrances plaguing ISAF counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is the Karzai government’s refusal to take concrete steps toward addressing the issue of corruption (the other is the ubiquitous insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.) On the contrary, instead of behaving as a reliable and responsible partner in the effort to reduce corruption, the Government of the Islamic Republic (GIROA) has facilitated the rise of criminal patronage networks and thus remains a significant part of the problem.
Despite carefully choreographed public statements suggesting that President Karzai understands the corrosive effects of corruption on the legitimacy of the Afghan state, officials in his administration continue to operate in a culture of impunity. Karzai and his cronies pay lip service to the international community’s demands for reform while simultaneously pocketing international aid, reconstruction assistance, and contracting funds, all without fear of prosecution.
Corruption in Afghanistan takes several forms and is pervasive. It occurs at the national, provincial, and district levels. Moreover, as the Kabul Bank scandal demonstrated, corruption has the ability to undermine confidence in some of Afghanistan’s few trusted institutions.
The lack of political will exhibited by GIROA is astounding, especially when one considers that the U.S. and its allies have stood by Afghanistan’s beleaguered President through myriad accusations of wrongdoing—including electoral fraud and empowering the Taliban through statements of solidarity.
Meanwhile, President Obama’s decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to bolster counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is beginning to show tangible results. In Kandahar province, the Taliban’s traditional stronghold, the insurgency’s momentum has been reversed. In neighboring Helmand province, where the bulk of the country’s opium poppy is grown (and by extension a majority of the global supply), ISAF forces continue to target the nexus between narcotics and the insurgency, destroying heroin processing labs and disrupting key smuggling networks.
Military officials and counterinsurgency experts all agree that recent gains made by ISAF forces throughout the country are tenuous. A successful population-centric counterinsurgency campaign will require sustained and long-lasting support from the Afghans themselves. In turn, this requires a holistic approach to winning “hearts and minds.”
Though the expression has become somewhat well-worn and hackneyed, the tenets buttressing this approach remain as true today as they did in 1950s Malaya, when British General Sir Gerald Templer is credited with coining the phrase. “Hearts” means persuading the population that its best interests are served by government success. “Minds” is shorthand for demonstrating to the population that the government has the ability to protect it from danger.
Since taking command of ISAF forces last August, General Petraeus has overseen a high- tempo kinetic campaign which has attenuated the Taliban through kill-and- capture operations. To be sure, these operations have forced insurgents back across the border into Pakistan, paving the way for the safety of Afghan citizens in previously conflict-ridden districts and villages. But while the counterinsurgents attempt to prove they can protect the population from the Taliban, many ordinary Afghans wonder who will protect them from the predatory actions of the government.
In what is now the longest war in American history, the United States has spent over $330 billion and lost nearly 1,500 soldiers’ lives. Yet Afghan government officials and politically connected powerbrokers continue to prey on their own citizens, turning would-be supporters into sympathizers and potential recruits for the insurgency.
With the recent killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, calls to withdraw U.S. troops before 2014 are likely to grow louder. Crucial NATO allies, including Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, and Canada are all planning to withdraw a substantial percentage of their troops within the next year. Even to the most ardent hawks, an open-ended military presence in Afghanistan is unpalatable.
To many, the phrase “Afghan Good Enough” evokes memories of the British military officer and celebrated counterinsurgency theorist T.E. Lawrence, who famously quipped, “Better to let them [the Arabs] do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country … and your time is short.”
As 2014 fast approaches, only part of Lawrence’s quote seems instructive. If the United States seeks to achieve lasting stability in Afghanistan, it may not be better to let the Afghans continue to do things imperfectly. However, Lawrence is correct about one thing: our time is short.
Colin P. Clarke is a project associate at the RAND Corporation and a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. He recently spent three months embedded with CJIATF-Shafafiyat at HQ ISAF in Kabul, Afghanistan. The opinions and views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not represent the RAND Corporation, the University of Pittsburgh, or CJIATF-Shafafiyat.
