Civil Affairs Reset
Civil Affairs Reset
by Greg Grimes
The scramble is on. With the Army Chief of Staff having recently announced a “clean sheet” review of what the Army will look like after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is joining a government-wide movement to restructure itself for post-war years. Service branches, systems proponents, defense agencies, most of the major government agencies; all are hustling to re-invent themselves for a future of budget cuts and close scrutiny.
There is little doubt of an approaching ‘constrained fiscal environment,’ the euphemism for turning off the spigots of government money that flowed during these past war years. As troops begin to return home the clamor will increase for reductions in ‘defense budgets’, commonly considered to be any agency with that has engaged in the war zones. Agencies, like the Department of State, that beefed up their expeditionary capabilities to support expanded engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan will find themselves retrenching to their “core” missions. This atmosphere of consolidation and reorganization will be the Civil Affairs branch’s best opportunity to re-configure itself for the future battle, reclaim its mission and re-establish its value in an increasingly complex battle space.
The question is: What should Civil Affairs (CA) be in the future? The stark reality is that much of the traditional CA mission has been eroded over the past ten years as other governmental agencies developed degrees of ability to project themselves into the battle space. While much of this has happened under the aegis of adopting the ‘whole of government’ approach, it has ultimately eroded the Civil Affairs mission and diminished CA relevance in the fight. CA units were too often marginalized as each civilian agency appeared downrange, even when restrictive rules of engagement and force protection requirements led to excessively large logistical and security footprints that frequently left the civilians FOB-bound. As a result, Civil Affairs forces on the whole have seen adverse impacts on their ability to:
A. Provide primary guidance on the design, implementation and oversight of population-centric engagement in support of military operations.
B. Maximize their capability for local population engagement.
C. Advise, conduct and exploit civil authority engagement.
Civil Affairs units are uniquely suited to both the nature of fight we’ve been in for ten years and the types of engagements anticipated in the future. The near- and intermediate-operational environment of the future will likely be a continuation of the current ‘graywar’: persistent and complex conflict of variable intensity. As other agencies adjust to new budgetary realities (read: smaller budgets) and retract from a battlefield presence, Civil Affairs should emphasize its strengths when crafting its evolution. Civil Affairs units are:
Self protecting. CA units are armed and equipped to venture into nearly any environment, especially non-permissive or remote areas. No other US government organization has this capability to this extent. Civil Affairs units can engage local populations and support the mission to counter violent extremism even in challenging security environments. Civilian agency members usually are not trained to operate under fire.
Robust. There are more total Civil Affairs personnel available and skilled to sustain persistent operations than in any other agency working foreign engagement. This becomes doubly significant when considering the use of CA forces in sustained operations. Continuing the relationships, networks, and program oversight the US government has spent over 10 years and billions of dollars creating in many corners of the world is in our national interest. Areas of the world that have produced the threats in the past are likely to be sources of threat in the future. The civilian elements of the USG, despite recent upsurges in funding to support increased foreign engagement capacity, will never be properly resourced or staffed for sustained foreign missions. The military will remain the only entity with anywhere near enough capacity for persistent engagement in contested, weak and failing areas, able to serve as the agent for US government interests where no one else can.
Expeditionary. CA units typically operate with a small logistical footprint; organic capabilities are adequate to support operations for extended durations. CA units arrive at the loading ramps already equipped with transportation, communication and security assets, and knowledgeable in local procurement for items they don’t have. Force protection is always of significance, but CA units can self-protect up to levels that prevent most civilian agencies from engagement.
These strengths need to be reinforced. As CA units have seen their mission nibbled away in the theatres of operations, a secondary effect has been the withering of proficiency and focused recruitment. The trend toward designating CA personnel as generalists was compounded by a need to fill the breach in-theatre; CA personnel too often weren’t used in their actual specialties as the need was simply for troops to conduct a generalized mission. This has led to atrophy of CA’s specialized skill sets, especially in the Rule of Law and Governance lines of operations. Both of these became prime functions of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (which, in point of fact, did see partial staffing with CA personnel). A byproduct of qualifying CA forces as generalists is that it steers the force to employment in collaborative environments (Ex: as PRT staff). While not inherently deleterious to the CA mission, it undermines the use of CA as a stand-alone capability. With an eye to the future, the Civil Affairs branch should revitalize its strengths in:
Persistent engagement in Phase 0 (Shaping) operations and hostile environments. This will require accepting a persistent mission for CA forces. That is, a role of regular employment as a long-term/long-reach asset that maintains much of its proficiency through regular use. CA units could implement a program of regular, short, rotational deployments in the manner of SF forces. This is currently done on a small scale with Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE’s) and other CA support to embassy teams, but should be expanded across all CA forces.
An enhanced advisory role to supported commands. A more robust capacity is essential if Civil Affairs soldiers are to serve as effective advisors, and if CA is to be a primary asset in Shaping operations. This will require improved staffing of CA personnel on command staffs.
Improved liaison relationships with other governmental agencies. The goal is to foster information sharing, cross-fertilization of skills and awareness other operational cultures. This is particularly applicable to those U.S. governmental agencies with whom CA has (or should have) vigorous relationships: Department of State, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice and USAID. A strong relationship with Dept. of State is particularly important in that CA forces will also be answerable to the Chief of Mission (US Ambassador) in any country they are employed. This will require increased, dedicated staffing assignments to these agencies. An added benefit will be an improved ability to support interagency, whole-of-government engagement.
Enhanced reach-back relationships with specialized CONUS subject matter experts. These would be sources to be tapped for functional guidance when local circumstances require. This would include, for example, university departments and other government organizations that specialize in unique or esoteric fields: archeology, mineral development and exploitation, education, etc. In the event of humanitarian assistance or disaster response activities this could include FEMA, certain NGO’s or air-transport specialists.
Enhanced relationships with foreign CIMIC forces. US Civil Affairs coexist in the battle space with CIMIC forces of Coalition or Allied nations well enough, but we fail to make efficient use of partner nation CA/CIMIC capabilities. This is an asset U.S. CA is overlooking to its detriment. Improved integration of CA and foreign CIMIC operational capabilities is a tool simply waiting to be leveraged. A more robust partnership and training exchange program would address this.
Nation-building/Reconstruction. Though considered a task outside the scope of military responsibility, practical experience says the military will find itself, de facto, conducting the reconstruction mission to some extent. Management of construction as a CMO supporting activity is a core CA mission. The recent problem has been the relegation of CA forces to little more than contract managers as other responsibilities have been usurped by other agencies. To correct this, Civil Affairs should reinvigorate its reconstruction management capabilities as a subset skill in support of engagement activities, not as an end unto itself (note that this point is primarily applicable at the tactical level). Using CA forces to develop infrastructure and essential services under the umbrella of foreign engagement fosters regional and cultural awareness, maintenance of linguistic skills and networked relationships with locals. Such relationships become valuable in the event of future operations in the area. Also, this ideally positions CA forces to manage humanitarian assistance or disaster relief responses.
Cultural Expertise. This has been a perpetual thorn in the side of US forces, despite admirable efforts at educating the forces with some sense of cultural sensitivity. Military forces are regularly accused of cultural indifference or, worse, intentional disregard. It is probably not realistic to expect CA forces to become true cultural experts themselves, but they could effectively ensure the supported command receives dependable guidance from knowledgeable sources.
Language Expertise. Civil Affairs as a force needs to revisit the practicality of expecting CA practitioners to develop and maintain true linguistic skill. If the future reflects the past, we can expect involvement in Middle Eastern and African environments. The languages of these areas are numerous, provincial and difficult to extremely-difficult. Practical experience has shown that local interpreters are the solution of choice. Therefore the expectation of CA forces should probably be changed from linguistic proficiency to linguistic familiarity. If, as described above, CA units are employed on a persistent basis, that regular exposure will help cultivate improved language skills. But it unlikely that any CA personnel will ever develop enough linguistic skill to conduct meaningful negotiations or other CA activities without interpreters.
Civil Affairs has the opportunity to compose itself for an improved role in future operations. For the foreseeable future the engagement environment will be more of this graywar, more of this heightened-risk environmental-shaping mission. Though Phase 0 operations inherently anticipate a very low security risk, CA unit self protection capability remains a significant discriminator; civilian agencies often cannot operate in even the lowest risk environment. The political-economic currents moving at senior policy and budgetary levels foreshadow the changes to come. CA support is regularly recognized as critical to ensuring commanders and the US government meet their obligations and achieve their mission. This is, therefore, an important window of opportunity for Civil Affairs. CA needs to ensure its evolution incorporates changes that maximize its value across the spectrum of engagement. Used this way, CA forces are a low-cost/high-impact way to engage in consequential areas.
The measures suggested here place an increased burden on CA forces for greater peacetime activity, a challenge for a fatigued force. But the idea is to take advantage of peacetime to keep sharp the perishable skills and relationships that make us effective in wartime. Employed in this manner CA forces also serve as a regionally-knowledgeable, highly flexible option for response to complex contingencies. If 50% of world’s population lives in cities by 2025 (that’s the projection), capability for engaging in the civil world becomes ever more important. Civil Affairs units restructured to meet the future challenges will be an excellent programmable option, an option that matches a U.S. national security approach evolving to emphasize partnerships and pre-emptive engagement over pre-emptive war.
COL Greg Grimes is currently assigned to the Joint Irregular Warfare Center of USJFCOM.
