Considerations on Libya
Considerations on Libya
by Steven T. Brothers
We must prevent Qaddafi from more efficiently slaughtering his own people. This can be accomplished with intervention. Yet, we must carefully weigh the risks lest a hazy contingency plan creep into a muddling campaign.
As a military officer I know that no fly zones (NFZ) and air strikes are not easy to implement, nor are they necessarily effective. Libyan air defenses would need to be suppressed. We could lose aircraft. Combat search and rescue (C.S.A.R.) personnel deployed to save downed pilots could be killed or captured. Also, our laser-guided bombs would require soldiers — on the ground –to direct them to their targets.
Those who say an NFZ would be “easy” point to Operation Northern Watch over Iraq as proof. Yet, much of Iraq’s air defenses were destroyed in the Gulf war. Further, Iraqi air defenses were easier to find and destroy. Libya does not have such a capacity; what it has is more dangerous: scores of shoulder-fired missiles that are tougher to locate.
Complicating this is a dangerous absence of information about the opposition. Although Secretary of State Clinton said the U.S. is “reaching out” to the rebels we should be skeptical of any intelligence information provided to us. We do not need a Libyan version of the Iraqi informant “Curveball” feeding us false tips in order to further a narrow agenda.
Also, much of the opposition are former government employees which have not been paid in days. Should this drag on for weeks — and this is certainly possible — there is a risk of the opposition fracturing. Rival leaders might then capitalize on U.S. ignorance and seek support for personal power grabs.
Also, what happens after Qaddafi is toppled? Libya does not have the civil capacity and structures that Tunisia and Egypt have. Libya is — dangerously so- more like Yemen. It lacks the mechanisms to provide basic services, which themselves can check the kind of hopelessness and desperation that feeds violence.
We also must determine how far we are —to go. When does a no fly zone turn into a no drive zone? Qaddafi’s aircraft should be grounded but he also possesses equally efficient means: tanks, artillery, and gun trucks. Also, according to Human Rights Watch, the Red Crescent, and other relief organizations, there is a humanitarian crisis developing. Qaddafi’s forces are sealing off supply routes. Qaddafi is using food as a weapon. If we plan on assisting here, this will require “boots on the ground.”
Reminiscent of Somalia, our soldiers would face the difficult task of discerning allies from enemies. A sizeable portion of the opposition is former military, many of whom still wear the same uniforms and use the same equipment as Qaddafi’s forces. This makes a corner stone of any military intervention – the rules of engagement – extremely problematic.
We have not adequately evaluated the political risks. Most Libyans would resent the presence of foreign troops. If we overreach, we risk alienating the next generation of Libya’s leaders and the young people that will chart its political future.
If the opposition’s supposed leadership asks for an intervention then they may lose legitimacy. Libyans see this as their revolution and want to emulate the Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with little outside help. The opposition has already appropriated dozens of tanks, attack helicopters, and the critically important anti-aircraft weapons. It may take a while but they might be able to accomplish this on their own.
Others have suggested inserting Special Forces teams to assist the rebels. An apparent rag-tag unprofessional gang, the rebels are led by a few professional soldiers. We could assist by sending teams to help train and lead them. Yet, this is also risky: A U.K. SAS team was captured by a faction of the opposition that considered them invaders. Also, the Libyan opposition is not the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. There is no Ahmad Shah Masoud — nor the legacy of a martyred one — to rally around. We do not have a twenty-plus year history of assisting the Libyan rebels. There may be a leader in the making but they have yet to assert themselves.
There are more workable options. While the U.N. has taken measures to prevent more weapons from getting to Qaddafi what about personnel? The U.N., the Arab league and the African Union must pressure those countries that have supplied the mercenaries in order to prevent more from arriving. Also, the E.U. –although it has frozen Qaddafi’s assets — must also freeze those of the Libyan state. Until the opposition is in control of the treasury, this is an option worth considering.
Qaddafi’s ruthlessness rivals that of Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, and Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his leadership, rebel soldiers are bound, gagged, shot, and set on fire while merciless guns for hire execute civilians. He must be stopped. Yet, before we rush to rattling our sabers, our policy makers must build a multinational consensus, weigh the risks, and always respect the wishes of the Libyan people.
Major Steven T. Brothers is an Army Middle East Foreign Area Officer and Graduate Student at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University. His comments do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army, the US Government, or Harvard University.
Editor’s Note: While we will present all options for intervention, SWJ does not maintain an official position. Rather, we want to facilitate the discussion.
