Building partner capacity: a security strategy for the Indo-Pacific region

A recent conference at the American Enterprise Institute reached an interesting conclusion concerning United States security strategy in the Indian Ocean-East Asian-Pacific Ocean (“Indo-Pacific”) region. U.S. security would benefit from a much stronger effort to build partner security capacity in the region. The current “protectorate” approach employed by the United States, centered on large military bases in the region, is rapidly becoming obsolete. These bases are politically toxic and are increasingly vulnerable to missile attack. A mobile sea-base strategy is not likely to be a feasible alternative; such sea-bases and naval task forces will become increasingly vulnerable to anti-access/area denial capabilities fielded in the future by China and other rising powers.

And yet it will remain a vital national security task for the United States to maintain a forward presence in the region in order to protect freedom of navigation in the region’s sea, air, space, and cyber commons and to maintain the credibility of its partner security relationships. A major component of the solution to this problem will be a stronger U.S. program to build partner capacity in the region. Such a program would include, but also extend well beyond, security force assistance directed against insurgency and irregular warfare threats.

A “full spectrum” regional security force assistance strategy would buy broader access to the region for U.S. military forces, an improvement on the current vulnerable basing plan. It would create additional capacity with which to share the burden of policing the region’s commons. This strategy would help develop positive norms of behavior for all countries in the region which benefit from the commons. Finally, a “full spectrum” regional security force assistance strategy would provide an organizing principle for the U.S. government’s overall strategy for the region and would include significant roles for all of the military services, the Department of State, U.S. country teams across the region, and many other agencies of the U.S. government.

Background

Last week, Michael Auslin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, presented his research report “Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons.” A panel discussion, moderated by AEI’s Thomas Donnelly, critiqued his report (click here for a video of the conference).

Here are bullet points from Auslin’s report and from the panel discussion:

“Security in the Indo-Pacific Commons”

1. Due to its economic strength, military power, and political dynamism, the Indo-Pacific will be the world’s most important region in coming decades.

2. Ensuring security in the Indo-Pacific region will be the primary foreign policy challenge for the United States and liberal nations over the next generation.

3. The interests of the United States and its allies and partners lie in protecting the Indo-Pacific commons.

4. As a result of China’s military buildup, the United States and its allies can no longer be assured of maintaining regional superiority of forces either numerically or, eventually, qualitatively.

5. The U.S. military must maintain a forward presence and superior power projection capabilities in the region. In order to achieve this, the U.S. should increase its attack submarine, ballistic missile defense surface combatant, Air Force, and cyber-ISR force structure in the region.

6. The U.S. government needs a new regional political strategy for the region. One part of this strategy would be to end the traditional U.S.-centered “hub-and-spoke” security system and encourage more multilateral security cooperation. Auslin proposes a “concentric triangles” political approach with the outer triangle representing Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India and the inner triangle centered on countries bordering the lower South China Sea.

7. The U.S. should also promote a more liberal political environment and culture in the region. A liberal political culture would foster political stability, positive norms of behavior in the commons, and cooperation in resolving conflicts. Auslin is careful not to equate this effort to explicit democracy promotion or a “freedom agenda.”

Panel discussion

Admiral Timothy Keating, USN (ret), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

1. Keating’s conclusion from a long career spent in the region: all players he talked to, whether friends or non-friends of the U.S., said the U.S. was “the indispensible power” in the region and must never leave.

2. Keating expressed concern that China will view U.S. multilateral alliance-building as an effort to isolate and contain China.

3. U.S. anti-piracy assistance provided to Indonesia and Singapore largely vanquished the piracy problem in the Strait of Malacca and is a notable recent BPC success. [I will add JSOTF-Philippines to this example.]

J.D. Crouch II, deputy national security advisor, George W. Bush administration

1. The East Asian security environment has changed “radically’ over the past 14 months. The Chinese leadership has misinterpreted the global financial crisis, mistakenly viewing it as a significant weakening in the U.S. strategic position. China is now testing whether it can exploit this misperceived opportunity.

2. The Bush and Obama administrations have attempted to persuade China to become “a responsible stakeholder” in the international system. China has rejected this proposal and the U.S. will have to adjust its strategies accordingly.

3. Other Asian countries like having the U.S. as a security partner because the U.S. homeland is not in Asia.

4. The State Department needs a modernized organization and better internal communications in order to improve its effectiveness in the region.

Jim Thomas, vice president for studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Also a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.

1. Anti access/area denial threats to U.S. sea and air power in the region will get much worse. The United States will no longer be able to take air and sea dominance for granted.

2. Forward basing and power projection will become increasingly challenging. The Pentagon should only acquire platform and capabilities that can survive in non-permissive environments.