NCTC’s war on terrorism is way beyond Afghanistan
On December 1st, Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), delivered remarks and answered questions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (click here to view the entire event). NCTC is the U.S. government’s central all-source collection point for terrorist data and intelligence. NCTC is also a principal counter-terrorism (CT) analyst and maintains the TIDE terror suspect database, produces daily CT intelligence products, and publishes a variety of CT watch-lists. The NCTC director is also one of the government’s primary CT strategists.
Leiter’s speech discussed the evolving terror threat and what U.S. citizens should expect from their government’s CT efforts. Leiter’s remarks had two themes. First, al Qaeda has transformed from a tightly controlled hierarchical organization into a highly diffuse and “headless” movement. Second, although he and his colleagues are striving mightily, Leiter warned that it will be “impossible” to prevent Islamist terrorist attacks inside the United States, especially small-scale attacks such as those experienced over the past year. Leiter recommended that the country adopt an attitude of “quiet, confident resilience” against this prospect. In his view, extravagant responses to non-existential attacks only reward the terrorists and are self-defeating. Leiter’s remarks implied that the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan is at best peripheral to his mission and at worst making his job more difficult.
According to Leiter, from 1998 to 2006, al Qaeda was a centralized organization run by its high command in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Between 2006 and 2009, a variety of al Qaeda affiliates emerged, which are now independent of the high command and pursue their own objectives with their own techniques. Since 2009, al Qaeda has evolved into its current stage which Leiter calls a “movement,” or a diffuse global culture. In this movement phase, the United States must now increasingly contend with self-radicalizing homegrown terrorists.
Leiter explained that al Qaeda’s transformation since 1998 has made his job enormously more difficult. He asserted that the operational tempo of his dispersed adversaries is increasing, with the past 15 months being the busiest since 2001.
Although Leiter discussed CT operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, not once in the nearly hour-long session did he mention the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan and its relationship to counter-terrorism. NCTC’s war against terrorism has long since moved on to many different fronts, including many inside the United States itself. Policymakers will have to ponder whether the Afghan war is now about terrorism or more about protecting America’s prestige. And whether the answer to that question should have a bearing on Afghan war policy.