Taliban and Hells Angels: Same Difference
Taliban and Hells Angels: Same Difference – Jason Thomas, The Interpreter.
In many respects, the war against the Taliban is no different to a war on gangs such as the Hells Angels. Both rely on a breakdown in the socio-economic conditions that force sections of the community to make unfortunate decisions. Where the community is ravaged by violence, drugs and intergenerational deprivation, how do you stop people supporting the Taliban or their local gang? This is how I began to look at the struggle against the Taliban during my time in Afghanistan.
Counterinsurgency is the military’s version of what criminal and social justice systems have been doing for years. Whether it’s Afghanistan or the Bronx, the population is the prize and it is no longer acceptable just to shoot the bad guys.
Counterinsurgency has become a blindingly complex approach to winning the war in Afghanistan. Fighting the Taliban has become a multi-layered offensive that combines the maintenance of security, the restoration of law and order, community and tribal mapping (‘human terrain analysis’), rebuilding social, health and educational facilities, establishing systems of governance and straight-out capturing and killing the enemy. Counterinsurgency is only effective by winning on all these fronts…
More at The Interpreter.
You might like to see this response to Jason’s piece, featured on The Interpreter: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/07/16/Reader-riposte-What-hubris.aspx
Of course, there are similarities between countering gang culture and countering an insurgency. I suspect Jason has mischaracterised the process in both cases. The suitability of means always depend on the end that one wishes to achieve, and counterinsurgency warfare need not create nirvana out of a living hell. In fact, I can’t think of an occasion in the history of counterinsurgency warfare where anything like ‘radical social re-engineering’ as ever been successfully achieved yet I can think of many insurgencies that have suffered defeat.
Will,
Depends on how you look at it. One could argue that, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the Supreme Court decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education in 1971 brought a much needed sweeping “radical social re-engineering” to my part of the world quelling a burgeoning non-violent insurgency.
Best,
Mike
This kind of reminds me of a sign I saw that said:
“Don’t bother us. We are like virgins writing sex manuals.”
which of course can be used to interpret this piece, FM 3-24, and some of our attempts at “armed nation building” in many different ways because the author is right – this is all “blindingly complex.” (by the way what was it we were told would make us go blind??? :-))
Or to take a longer view, Mike, if you put the end point of the civil rights movement in the 1960s as the point where the United States finally (although certainly not completely) put to bed, so to speak, the major and fundamental social and political problem since its inception, then what does that tell us about our prospects in Afghanistan? I mean shoot, start with Jamestown in 1607 up to the Civil War 1861-1865 then onwards to the 1960s you are talking about 350 years plus. Why do we think that clever and innovative social science methods such as Human Terrain Teams or even a Global CORDs (Kilcullen’s recommendation in his new book) for Afghanistan can solve its problems and transform (or build) its institutions in a matter of months or even years?
Furthermore, if the Taliban are like the Hells Angels well that is not a happy prospect for American strategy in Afghanistan because the Hells Angels have been around since 1948: And they are still here and active! So does that mean in order to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan we have to be there for a generation?
This whole fascination and fetish with Counterinsurgency becomes more and more surreal every day (like clocks dripping down the wall in a Salvador Dali painting). Now as this article shows we have our experts telling us that the way to think about the problem in Afghanistan is to think of our own problems at home. But hence the rub: Afghanistan is not our home, and it is not in our interests pursuant to the President’s policy objectives to carry about societal rewiring in that place.
Yesterday a NY Times piece suggesting that Mortensons book can in fact become weaponized by the American military in Afghanistan and now an expert telling us to think of the Taliban just like they were the Hells Angels.
When will our senior generals and flag officers start to pull the curtain back and expose the falsity of the man (the theory and practice of population centric counterinsurgency) behind the curtain? Perhaps my friend and colleague LTC Paul Yingling should consider writing “A Failure of Generalship, Version 2” in this regard.
gian
Gian,
Unfortunately, I think the answer is in your comment:
“Furthermore, if the Taliban are like the Hells Angels well that is not a happy prospect for American strategy in Afghanistan because the Hells Angels have been around since 1948: And they are still here and active! So does that mean in order to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan we have to be there for a generation?”
As bad as it sounds and that it goes against all sense of “winning”, we may be stuck with having to live with and try manage the problems (or allow the Afghan government to manage its problems) especially given the complexity of the nexus of the challenges in Afghanistan; e.g., Pakistan ISI-Taliban connection, the India-Pakistani conflict being indirectly played out in Afghanistan at least as a periphery of that conflict, the Iranian situation, Chinese economic expansion on the Global chess board – influencing Indian actions while China aligns with Pakistan and attempts to get to the southern and western waterways through Burma in the east and Afghanistan/Pakistan to the west of India. Sometimes I think the Taliban problem is the least of the world’s worries.
COL Gentile,
First, I’m still trying to get the coffee out of my nose that I coughed up after COL Maxwell’s comment. Additionally, I’m struggling not to make a porn joke about FM 3-24.
Second, IMO, your entire post is correct. I remain pessimistic that we (US/Int’l Community) can affect large-scale change in a short time period. Now, small scale interventions (FID, social entrepreneurs, etc) affecting change over decades or centuries is another matter.
Finally, I actually liked the article from a “virgin” perspective. Hell’s Angels and other gangs can be a useful analogy; HOWEVER, the distinctions are important and key critical.
– Hell’s Angels started as a social club for WWII veterans trying to find an outlet for adrenaline. They “radicalized” as drugs and money began to flow in. *
– Similarly, La Nuestra Familia, one of the major gangs in NorCal, started as a violent gang back in the 1960’s with efforts to force equal rights for Hispanic-Americans in a similar fashion as the Black Panther. They were further militarized in the 1980s as disenfranchised Vietnam Vets sweltered into their ranks and the drug trade flowed.**
-Contrastingly, the Taliban is a quasi political-religious-ethnic insurgency that seeks to overthrow the Karzai government.
Mike
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hells_Angels
** http://cryptome.org/gangs/nuestra.pdf
We all seek to understand that which we do not in the context of that which we do. We look for similarities that may well be very real, and draw conclusions from the same that are dangerously flawed.
Conventional warfighting militaries faced with insurgency do this, and cast the problem in the context of warfare, and threat-focused defeating of the insurgent.
Law enforcement types will be more likely to see the legal similarities, and cast the problem in the context of gangs (as in this example)
Development community sees it in the context of shortfalls in that area. Same for the governance crowd, that tends to focus on ineffectiveness rather than on populace perceptions of the same.
All of this is natural, and all of this leads to the jumble of COIN theory and engagement we are all bombarded with (and likely frustrated by).
I know I was, am, and will continue to be. This is a journey. Where I am now in my journey is to focus myself, and ask others to shift their focuse as well, to the study of insurgency itself.
Bike Gangs are not “insurgents” They are outlaws for social and economic reasons. Insurgency is political and a result of governance forced upon a popualce that does not in turn feel that that governance is really out for their best interests. Those who have read my latest know how I think it is primarily the perceptions of Legimacy, Hope, Justice and Respect that must be understood and addressed. Probably not a bullseye, but it is definitely ‘on the paper’ (and I think pretty close to the bull).
This idea here? Off the paper. I understand why you took the shot, there are similarities, but not ones that help to resolve such problems in a meaningful way. My take.
As an LE type I can tell you that nobody makes or forces somebody to join the “Hells Angels” they do it because they want to….they like it. It is more a lifestyle then anything else. And no amount of social engineering support will change that,so it is not a very good analogy IMO. My experience with theses types is that if you take out the drugs,sex and violence they are pretty much Republicans. They have real jobs in the community,they vote and raise families. They will and have fought for their country,they are very pro America. They just want to be left alone.
However there is a lesson to learn here. The UW model(the one minute guerrilla warfare course) on how we should fight such small wars is a much better method to follow than COIN. If you want to change a country and could recruit these guys (Hells Angels)the war would be over in about 30 days. Also Maslow could have learned something from them on how you establish and maintain a hierarchy of needs.
slapout9, you’re ignorant of recent moves made by the HAs. During the previous decade, there were a number of outlaw mc gangs forcibly incorporated into the HAs.
how do can you possibly reconcile murder, racism, drug production/trafficing, sex trade and neighborhood intimidation schemes, with law abiding citizens that vote Republican?
You must know HAs are staunchly anti-black, there are no black members. Most, if not all clubhouses, prohibit blacks from parties.
Anyway, the fact that someone like yourself somehow condones this type of criminal organization and criminal activity, on sociological grounds, pretty much affirms the point Jason Thomas is making.
Brother Slapout9,
Reference…”if you take out the drugs, sex and violence they are pretty much Republicans”…
So, you are telling me that all Republicans are potential Hell’s Angels? I am trying to imagine my Dad (platoon leader and Co Commander in S-VN, Parrots Peak -Michelin Rubber Plantation ’68-’69 and successful businessman)riding a Hog, sporting his colors while his girlfriend is free-breasting and enjoying the open road.
What are Democrats? Easy Riders?
Enjoyed the post 🙂
r/
MAC
anonymous and Mac. have to go do a mission for higher headquarters (wife) but I will resond later.
Slap:
Best not screw that op up!
happy sunday
gian
(ps, sorry Dave D for the mindless driveby!)
Gian, I have my eye on you and Carl right now. – Dave D.
You have your eye on us?
Mike is sitting in church and is trying to stifle an erotic joke about FM 3-24.
His very soul is in play. Concentrate on that!
The difference between the Taliban and the Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation is you will probably get served with legal papers in the mail, for defamation. No seriously one is an insurgent group the other a legal corporation.
http://diffusionblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/battle-of-brands-contest-for-best-brand.html
http://www.newswek.org/2010/07/17/how-legal-pot-could-harm-the-cartels.html?from=rss
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/08/california-dems-endorse-p_n_639933.html
The US is broke, with another war to fight on the border, whether Holder and his FBI, DEA foot soldiers lets it slide or not, is up to him, if he does not want to cut off the logistics and reduce the projected US military KIA rate, that is up to him. A penny for your thoughts and a cup of tea for your Kingdom.
The way we figure it is legal to sell it and legal to defend yourself with a firearm and use lethal force. Work the rest out. It is called the greenlight.
KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents
p.298 The Plot to Destroy Mexico.
To plunge Mexico into civil war and destroy its government by armed force. In the words of a Mexican servant of the KGB, it would make of Mexico “another Vietnam”.
anonymous,
If you really believe I am ignorant and if you really believe I condone criminal behavior then there is nothing I can say to you….so I want.
“MAC” McCallister,
Short answer is yes, but let me explain. Your father because of his business skills and guerrilla warfare, weapons skills would be a prime target for recruitment “IF” he believed in the Biker lifestyle. Despite popular myth you don’t really join a Biker Gang you are recruited and you usually have to have a sponsor who will vouch for you. And if you mess up you and your sponsor will pay for it.
To be effective in fighting a gang you have to understand their appeal from THEIR point of view, not some abstract rational college degree theory, it just ain’t gonna work in the real world. These guys are more like Vikings, they value Warriorship of any kind,even if they then decide to kill you.
As for Republicans, I still stand by my above statement. Republicans are perceived by the 3 R’s(I just invented this) Rich… and don’t care about anyone else,Racist…. (how many Black US Senators do we have)and don’t care about anyone else, few Rules (anti-regulation)and don’t care about any other group. Hell’s Angels pretty much think like that.
What would Democrat Hell’s Angels be, probably be Easy riders as you suggested. For those folks who don’t know what an Easy rider is. An Easy rider is a Biker who’s Ole Lady (wife so to speak) is a prostitute, hence the easy ride on her efforts.
I can speak more to this subject but I think I hit the high points, if not let me know.
gian,
I survived,her commander’s intent was very clear. Slap
I think Mr. Thomas got a little confused when said “Hells Angels”. His comments more closely describe inner city drug gangs and the dystopia that results the “don’t rat” syndrome etc.
He also misses some very important things. American criminal gangs are American. They are not sponsored, trained and directed from abroad. The Taliban is.
Society in some parts of American inner cities has completely broken down, even the basic family structure is wrecked. The basic family structure from what I’ve read is still pretty strong in Afghanistan. The village and regional social structure and been under terrible pressure since the Russians showed up but they still exist even though the Taliban tries to break it when it suits them.
American gangs don’t seek to replace the existing political and cultural structure. All they want is to make money and have their fun fights. The Taliban seeks to overthrow everything and control everything.
Some things that apply to fighting gangs in the US apply to Afghanistan, knowing the people, having people in the hood or ville close by and through the night, things like that. But for the most part I don’t think the article stands up.
Ironically, I think the task in Afghanistan may be more practicable than restoring normal society in the American inner cities. In our cities society has to be completely rebuilt. I don’t think that is true in Afghanistan. Perhaps what mostly needs to be done is get the Taliban off the backs of the people, get the warlords off the backs of the people and get the Kabul kingpins off the backs of the people.
All those contested villages didn’t have much in the 60’s before the communists came. But there was no big insurgency. They handled their own affairs tolerably well with their various arrangements, and the government was fairly well respected. The more I think about this, the more I think we are trying to do to much. If we mainly fought the Taliban using the methods that have worked in the small wars of the past (I was tempted to say counterinsurgencies but I didn’t want to excite Gian), kept the Paks out of it (a very tall order), provided the warlords with chartered jets to Dubai and twisted some arms in Kabul, the Afhgans may be able to handle things over the years to come.
Jason Thomas,
First, Ive given up on trying to reel in the Active Duty Colonels and prior enlisted reporters and law enforcement officials. They are incorrigible so I submit. I am but one man :).
Second, Ive been following your short anecdotes on SWJ and other sites. Your voice has merit. What I would encourage is for you to consolidate your thoughts and experience into a thorough essay for SWJ. If you need advice or assistance, then you can click on my name and send me an email. We need more non-mil types with boots on the ground experience to voice their truth.
Carl,
My brother focused on the Apostle Pauls optimism while under house arrest to encourage the populace of Philippi to stay the course and not drink the Kool-Aid of false idols.
I listened well.
Best,
Mike
Mike:
I am normally too stubborn to admit defeat but your comment lost me.
Dave, Could I please steal your comment:”Don’t bother us. We are like virgins writing sex manuals.” It sounds like the Army War College paper I am writing. I’ll bludge anything anytime if it helps. Even my nickname I purloined off David Finkelstein.
You may use it but I cannot take credit for it. Saw it on a sign somewhere but cannot recall where so I cannot give you a citation for it. But it does come in handy to provide some levity as well as provide an (in)appropriate analogy sometimes!
Speaking of quotes anybody know what the Hell’s Angels motto is?
“When we do right,nobody remembers. When we do wrong,nobody forgets”
Gentlemen
I thoroughly admire the depth of thought put into responding to this article. Will pursue the critical thinking further with your combined comments.
There are nuances that I may have missed however Im a great believer in the psychology of incentives that drive people to make decisions and believe they dont change too much no matter where you live.
Within two weeks of a project finishing in an RC E Province in AFG two former labourers blew themselves up laying an IED. They were young guys faced with incentives from opposing sides – there had been zero incidents in this area during the period of the project. (there are of course many other issues here such as the often short term approach to many projects in clear to hold areas or the poor retention of labourers to be re-employed in another project to keep them out of the grip of the instigators)
In other words it is hard to break that bond with the only way you know in life – cloaked in the mist of religious fanaticism and it is even more dangerous and difficult to break.
I take street kids up the Kokoda track in PNG. It is as much of a mental and emotional challange as physical. A few come back with a completely different view of the world. Yet others slip back into what they know given the incentives of their surrounding environment – violence, crime, drugs, associations gangs etc
Im not ignoring obvious differences between AFG and our societies – but I found the many similarities and tried to keep the analysis to simple constructs in this respect and therefore any practicable implementation of actions.
It also played out in both environments that information was gathered on leadership structures and tensions and where the real bad-guys lived so that “other people” could do their job – call it neighbourhood watch. So it wasnt all just about being nice. There needs to be equal amounts of carrot and stick.
Thanks
Jason
PS: Virgins writing sex manuals; that is superb!
Great thread!! And the contemporary environment stuff is pretty good as well!
I think that COL Gentile’s first post pretty well hit the nail on the head, in that how can we…”solve its problems and transform (or build) its institutions in a matter of months or even years?”
I’m not sure where it came from but for the last 18 months or so, we’ve been using as a model that it takes at least a full generation, more likely two, for change to really take effect in a society. At the very minimum, a year of stability to overcome every year of chaos/irregularity, which for Afghanistan would give us 31 years if we got back to 1979…and that period of stability has not yet started in Afghanistan…in some ink spots, yes, in other areas, not even close…Conversely, the descent into chaos can take effect in a disproportionately short period of time e.g. the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Iraq, etc
Noting a general lack of success in quelling organised crime since the end of WW2, the analogy between the Taliban and organisations like Hells Angels might be more apt that it first appears…?
Im a bit confused by the assumption that the Taleban, or more accurately, the mujahedin isnt a lifestyle choice too. Why work home on the farm breaking your back all day when you can be part of gods army, ride a cool motorbike and fight Shaitan?
The majority of the Taliban are resistance fighters. They fight us because they are pashtun, because they feel no loyalty to the current government (must be shown to them first, and it is not), because they can earn an honest wage for a days work doing it, and because the Coalition is there.
The resistance will be there as long as the revolutionary leadership for the taliban (the target of Karzai’s reconciliation program) want to keep it going and as long as the Coalition is present.
This is why Reconciliation is far more important of a COIN program than the Reintegration program that the Coalition is so fixated on. The Reistance will reintigrate all by itself once the Revolution is effectively reconciled.
The problem is that we are waging our own little resistance to the Reconciliation program, because WE don’t like the likely results. So long as we make it all about us we will not make much headway.
Fnord:
Im a bit confused by the assumption that the Taleban, or more accurately, the mujahedin isnt a lifestyle choice too. Why work home on the farm breaking your back all day when you can be part of gods army, ride a cool motorbike and fight Shaitan?
That is the greatest attractiveness of crime/ gangs. But it is not just that,it is the sense of Brotherhood along with it. The US has a policy of no child left behind. Angels have the policy of no Angel(read citizen)left behind. They share prosperity and protection,if one Angel is attacked there will be a counter-attack by all the Angels. That is an extremely powerful motive. Which is why I keep saying the Strategic model of Ends,Ways,and Means want work. The LE model of Motive,Methods and Opportunity is a lot more appropriate, because until you understand the Motive (why are they doing what they are doing) your chances of developing a counter Strategy are not very good IMO. The best you can do is suppress it.
Seems to me that “conflict ecosystem” research even applies to gangs as gangs think, act, and organize much in the same way insurgent groups do in order to survive against the “counter-insurgent” or in the case of gangs survive other gangs or the police.
“Conflict ecosystems” do not exclude the possibility of multiple gangs and or insurgent groups competing in the same environment–something to think about.
Link to the Republican Hell’s Angels, to include an order of merit from Congress,diner invitations from President George W.Bush and the fact that many Republicans support or admirer the Angels.
http://www.newsherald.com/news/hells-4650-riding-angels.html
Bob’s World point gets to the crux of the matter (and the likely difference between the two).
If the Afghan National Army was roving amongst our neighbourhoods, would:
a) The Hells Angels fight them;
b) Would we turn over Hell’s Angels members living in the neighbourhood when the ANA came through?
PS: Virgins writing sex manuals; that is superb! From Jason’s post.
I disagree we are more like “Sex Therapist With Amnesia”. As R.C.Jones has pointed out our country was born from an Insurgency we know exactly how to fight them when we use the American System of UW. We did it not once but twice in Afghanistan and we have forgotten what made us successful, so now we are blaming the Hell’s Angeles method of Gang organization/intimidation as the problem.
Robert:
I have a couple of questions about this quote.
“This is why Reconciliation is far more important of a COIN program than the Reintegration program that the Coalition is so fixated on. The Reistance will reintigrate all by itself once the Revolution is effectively reconciled.”
What will it take to get the Taliban to reconcile? I don’t understand why they would since they are an absolutist movement who believe they are winning anyway.
Related to the above question: what would it take to get the Pakistani Army/ISI to allow the Taliban to reconcile?
If a reconciliation involved giving power to the Taliban, would the other non-Pathan groups put up with it?
“What will it take to get the Taliban to reconcile?”
Their perception/realization that they are in a losing situation and negotiating from a point of disadvantage. Unfortunately, that will require a lot of violence by some actor (ISAF, A’stan Army, Pak Army). We will not persuade them with words or money.
Mike Few I believe you are right. And the only answer may be a Hell’s Angel Strategy. The Angels symbol is from a Air Force B-17 Bomber group!! not some commando,or dirty dozen type outfit as is often believed,usually by people who have never been toe to toe or nose to nose with OMG’s(Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs). It’s time for an Air Campaign from Hell.
Slap,
I forgot to add that right now, the Taliban believe that they are winning. That understanding is important.
Mike
Why the Taliban would be willing to reconcile even though they are already currently winning:
This is just my assessment, so take it for what it’s worth (true of everything posted on here by anyone, but important to note all the same):
1. The Taliban are being employed by the government of Pakistan as their agent to destabilize Afghanistan at a minimum, but ideally to take control and ensure that Afghanistan is available as rearward maneuver room that is critical for ensuring the survival of Pakistan in any major confrontation with India. I know many say “no, there is no direct intel on this, and it is just the ISI doing this.” Ok, so if it is just the CIA doing something it is not the USA doing it? This is a silly nuance to play. We don’t see what we don’t want to see.
2. If the Taliban senior leadership make a break from their Pakistani masters and take the Karzai deal they have a true chance at the one thing they have no chance at under the current situation – they have a chance at a major leadership role at some point down the road in Afghanistan free and clear from Pakistani control. THAT is huge!
3. Some evidence of this is the recent roll up of about half the Qetta Shura by Pakistan. I think that was a non too subtle message to TB leadership that, much like being a hitman for the Mafia, there is no quitting.
So, why is reconciliation so important? Because it take the TB leadership out of the fight and into the governance of Afghanistan. There they operate in the light of day and we can work with the entire new, more comprehensive GIROA as a whole. This addresses the top of the insurgency, the revolutionary movement that MUST be resolved prior to being able to have success with the rank and file resistance insurgency.
Reintegration only deals with the bottom of the insurgency. This will largely cure itself once the top is addressed. We need to get over our revulsion to dealing with the top. Reintegration programs will be fairly simple and low cost. The current program to dump buckets of cash into a reintegration program that is not tied to following a successful reconciliation program is a mindless attempt to buy the support of the popualce, and will merely contribute to the conditions feeding the insurgency and further line the pockets of governmnet officials and their cronies. It has no basis in sound insurgency or COIN theory to go with this plan.
My opinion. Reasonable minds can and do differ, but look hard at the insurgency understanding of those who shun reconciliation and promote reintegration instead. Make them make their case.
Mike, I hear you. That is why we need an Operation: Jawbreaker II.
What would then Karzi get out of a reconciliation or reintegration as they will challenge him on both the political and corruption cash flows.
Why would I if I perceive myself to be winning even want to share—that was what triggered the internal civil war after the Soviets left and then the TB sold themselves as the “peacemakers” and he know how that went.
Robert:
Given Pakistan’s malevolent intent, is reconciliation at the top practicable at all? Haqqani, Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar have, to my limited knowledge, always been in line with the Pakistanis. So with that group as it is, and anybody else who might be inclined to reconcile getting picked up, who is left to make a deal? If by some stratagem they were able to do a deal would it not be liable to split the country along ethnic lines as the other groups do not remember the Taliban with fondness?
I know only what I read, mostly at this site, but I don’t see how a deal can be made unless two things happen. First, as Mike says, the Taliban have get beat up more severely than they are now.
Second, and this goes to strategy (Gian is reading this I hope), Pakistan’s behavior must be changed. Nothing is going to work well or at all in Afghanistan unless this happens and it won’t happen unless we see “what we don’t want to see.” Then if we see it, we have to figure what to do about it. That might require something fairly radical.
I think Pakistan’s actions are motivated by something beyond their silly notion of strategic depth. I think there is also a pretty strong ideological component to their actions, the notion of Pakistan, leader of the pious Muslim world etc. What do you, or anybody else, think the strength of the ideological component is?
Carl,
A few thoughts, first, anyone who doesn’t think we are beating up the Taliban out on the ground is misinformed. Sure, we walk away from many engagements where civcas and civdamage is likely, but when we get them away from their civilian shields it goes very bad for them very fast.
As to Pakistan (and several other nearby states that are using the US involvement in Afghanistan as an opportunity to make life hard for us – but nearly so much as we did when the Soviets were in the same boat) I would suggest that first we need to as a matter of policy fully recognize that US interests and US values are NOT UNIVERSAL INTERESTS AND VALUES.
We have to evolve from “you are with us or against us” mindset that every nation, friend or foe, would share and prioritize their interests the same way the US does, because they don’t. We abuse allies by strong-arming them with NATO to participate in our little adventures; and we add unnecessary friction with “foes” as well simply because they disagree with us. Same with values. It is a galactic level of arrogance to assume that US values circa 2010 are somehow now “universal values” for all people in all times.
Point being that countries such as Pakistan, Iran, the other Stans and China (which all have borders with Afghanistan) have very unique and distinct national interests in regards to their relationships with Afghanistan that we in large part ignore in our demand that that everyone help us with ours. This puts friends and foe alike in difficult positions. Oh, and significant segments of the Afghan populace have unique and distinct relationships back with these neighboring countries as well.
Poor Pakistan is supporting the TB with one hand, and now attacking them at our demand with the other. Don’t think that that has not contributed significantly to the instability in that country. They play a balancing game, and we have them in a precarious position. Any US position in Afghanistan must include a serious sit-down with Pakistan to insure that their interests are recognized as well. As to the insurgents who take advantage of the sanctuary the border provides, they have their own interests as well. All must be taken into account, and to skew them to line up with US interests as the measure of “right” or “wrong” is not helpful. Dangerous in fact.
To tell our senior leaders that we can “Develop” our way out of this is as wrong and dangerous as it is to tell them we can “Secure” our way out of this. Similarly, to take a condition that we must preserve the Karzai government and help them to “Govern” their way out of this is even more flawed unless they can fix their legitimacy issues. Reconciliation is the last, best chance Karzai has at fixing his Legitimacy. We can’t fix it for him, and we need to stop being an obstacle to his efforts to fix it himself merely because we can’t square that with how we see our national interests.
COL Jones,
Sir, we do not fundamentally disagree along the lines of what GEN Petraeus would call, “killing the irreconcilables and turning the reconcilable.” In application, I would start with my direct tone while indirectly attempting your approach.
The tone affects your posture and resolve while the enemy and populace are trying to read your intent. In other words, it projects power.
Additionally, the urgency of the DC clock hampers “patience, presence, and persistance.” I tried to include time into one of my factors and the political demand for results.
Mike
One of the biggest problems the US (our people, our policy, etc) has is this incredible lack of Empathy. Sympathy? We have that in spades. But Empathy? The ability to truly see and apreciate things from the perspectives of others? No. We mirror image ourselves, our values, our perspectives on others and are shocked or angry when others reject or fail to conform to that perspective. They are deemed “failed states” or “immoral” or “evil empires” etc.
Currently Ms Flournoy and others call for “pragmatism.” Ok, but lets start with some empathy first, and THEN get pragmatic about how to best address our interests in a manner that does not inadvertantly create greater problems by trodding all over the interests of others in the process. Maybe we need to seen the Humnan Terrain Teams to DC instead of Afghanistatn.
We have a President with great instincts for this, but he is not getting great advice from his “experts.” Hard is indeed not impossible, but we need to focus on the right hard tasks if we want to produce the best effects.
We can’t start with “dirct tone” or “secure first” as one never gets past “Clear-clear-clear.” We need to start with a fresh understanding of the problem and the cures; then a comprehensive messaging campaign to beat that in a steady drumbeat; then a family of actions across that spectrum that are clearly consistent with and linked to that drumbeat message.
COL Jones,
Concur (particularly on empathy), but that would require a new policy and strategy. That’s way above my level. We just execute. That’s my own difficulty in transitioning back and forth between theory and practice.
Mike
When senior leadership is misinformed and ill advised by those who do not understand the nature of a particular problem set, its causes or its cures; it is essential for those who do to speak up.
The US is like the Semi-truck wedged firmly beneath the overpass; as a dozen experts on road construction, emergency operations, public security, civil engineering, etc all stood about and discussed the problems and relative expense associated with raising the bridge, lowering the road, etc as a small boy sat watching the scene with curiosity from his bike nearby. Finally he said “why don’t you let some air out of the tires?”
We can go around the world lowering proverbial road beds and raising proverbial overpasses; but such programs are terribly disruptive and expensive. It is time to look for ways to simply let some air out of the tires; and that can not be done by changing the tactics, tools, and design of DOD; it can only be done by changing the policies contributing to the rise of the products of friction we face, and that shape our approaches to dealing with the same.
I’m just sitting here on my bike.
Maybe we should let Special Forces do what Special Forces were created to do. Fight and win UW. The President should call Billy Jack.
Actually, the organization “fighting and winning UW” across the Middle East today most effectively is Al Qaeda.
UW is to foment and incite insurgency among the populaces of States where one hopes to modify the existing form of governance to one that is more supportive of the UW organizations goals, objectives and interests. UW only really works well where there already exists conditions of what I call “Poor Governance” between the existing governance and the segment of the populace one is targeting for their UW campaign.
I would argue that the US does not need to conduct UW with these states, as the fact is we already have relationships with these governments in large part that are willing to support our goals, objectives and interests. The problem is that those same governments have in many places come to act with impunity toward their own populaces based on the security this relationship with the US provides; thereby creating ripe ground for UW as being executed by AQ.
So, I would argue that we do not need to execute UW, but rather that we must understand UW and how it works, and then adjust our approaches with these countries so as to make those governments less vulnerable to UW and insurgency within their borders; and also to make the US less vulnerable to acts of “terrorism” by these nationalist insurgents globally as well.
I don’t think the President needs to be Billy Jack, but he should damn sure know his phone number so that he can leverage his capabilities and perspectives when he needs to.
“Actually, the organization “fighting and winning UW” across the Middle East today most effectively is Al Qaeda.”
Sir, to further bolster your argument, I’d recommend reading Ali Chrishti’s examination of radicalization in the public school systems of Pakistan.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010 526story_26-5-2010_pg3_6
If this is true, then it’s classic revolutionary tactics and quite worrisome.
Mike
R.C. you have me confused now. What you say (USA)is doing would be called FID as opposed to UW, wouldn’t it? Which I agree is a problem.
My thinking is to simply follow the SF motto, “Liberate The Oppressed” often done through a resistance movement and all it’s elements.
Slap – “Bingo” (as I touch the tip of my nose with my index finger).
You have just had a breakthough momoment: If what we are doing if FID to sustain oppressive governments friendly to us in power, then it is AQ that is conducting UW among their populaces in order to “liberate the oppressed.”
Or, as I like to say, “The US has grown up and become its father.” (Picture Uncle Sam looking in the mirror shaving, and seeing good old King George looking back at him, and thinking to himself “when the hell did this happen?”)
I would suggest that it began to happen around 1985, but really began in earnest in 1989, and became obvious to everyone else by 9/11/2001. For us, the realization is still yet to fully sink in.
Robert C. Jones:
Not really…
I think you’re well over a hundred years late…LINK
Even as late as 110 years before your year of choice, perhaps, per Senator Stevens but most commonly attributed to FDR re: Somoza…LINK.
Speaking of Roosevelts and manifest destinies of sorts, to discover that you’re about 80 years late at a minimum, you should read this:LINK
“Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place”, to James Reston of The New York Times immediately after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna.” LINK.
We’ve been there before…LINK.
Selective misuse of history to make an ideological point on this Board seems to be endemic among some of you old Colonels…. 😀