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Counterinsurgency 3.0 and More at Parameters

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06.02.2010 at 08:23am

Counterinsurgency 3.0 – Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis, Parameters.

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wounded, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was “deteriorating” badly, according to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an August 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban’s reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban’s austerity over the Karzai government’s corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fanaticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international development assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international development aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

The conflict in Iraq taught the US military many valuable lessons about how to gain the trust and cooperation of the local populace in the fight against radical Islamic insurgents, demonstrated in the new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy implemented during the 2007 “surge.” First, the Anbar Awakening established a successful precedent of the US military partnering with local tribes against insurgents, a tactical approach that could be consid¬ered “COIN 1.0.” Next, COIN theorists led by General David Petraeus described the Clear-Hold-Build strategy to transition and expand tribal security alliances into long-term governance arrangements, a strategic advance that can be termed “COIN 2.0.” General McChrystal and ISAF forces are applying many of these lessons in their current COIN operations in Afghanistan. There remains, however, a substantial doctrinal need to move from tactical methods that cultivate and develop tribal alliances to the strategic use of international aid to defeat insurgencies broadly and decisively. The authors term this new strategic approach to providing development aid in conflict areas “COIN 3.0.” …

Much more at Parameters.

Also in the latest issue of Parameters:

Integrating Civilian and Military Activities – Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

Combating a Combat Legacy – Chad Serena

The Issue of Attrition – J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.

The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda – Thomas R. Mccabe

Growing Strategic Leaders for Future Conflict – Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny Mcpherson, and Aidan Kirby Winn

Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars – Bart Schuurman

Our Visual Persuasion Gap – Martin Gurri, Craig Denny, and Aaron Harms

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