Book Review – The Devil We Know
A review of:
The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower
by Robert Baer. Published
by Crown, 2008.
Reviewed by:
Thomas (Tom) P. Odom
LTC US Army (ret)
Author,
Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda
A good friend of mine lent me this book to read with the caution, “This will
piss you off.” I was not sure exactly what he meant by that remark but I took
the book. I liked Bob Baer’s first book and have recommended it to others.
After reading this one, Baer’s latest, I would recommend it but with some very
strong cautions. I will address those later. For now, let me highlight its
strengths.
The Good
On Iran as a Nation
Despite the title and its inherent hyperbole, Baer offers some clear insights
into the entity we know as Iran. He correctly takes the reader beyond the
recent and ongoing to demonize Iran as a country of religious fanatics led by
outspoken, out there, President Ahmandinejad. Baer instead lays out his
argument that the Iran we know today is not the Iran we knew in 1979. Rather he
argues that Iran in 2008 has long abandoned the mob fanaticism of 1979. Instead
Iran has returned to the deeper, longer nationalistic tendencies toward empire
that drove the Persians centuries ago and more recently the Pahlavi Dynasty
under the Shah. Baer’s thesis–and I will admit to agreeing with him on this—is
that most of what Iran does these days driven by long standing grievances toward
West colored very brightly by the psychosis of Shia Islam’s cult like
persecution complex. So that while Iran sees those wrongs as a case of long
standing injustices that must be set right, the mechanisms and the ultimate
motives for correcting said wrongs are very much the stuff of realpolitik. Baer
makes the point that Iran despite Ahmandinejad’s rhetoric is not on a holy war
tear to destroy Israel. Rather Iran seeks to use the injustices it sees in the
West’s support for Israel as a club to force concessions furthering Iran’s own
desires for regional supremacy. I would offer a parallel in the recent actions
of Putin’s Russia. Many have used the phrase “return to a Cold War” as if Putin
is trying to resurrect the Soviet Union. I believe Putin’s actions and desires
are more like the Czars than the Commissars. Baer is in my view suggesting that
Khamenei and Rafsanjani have more in common with Xerxes or Reza Shah than they
do with Khomeini.
On the Sunni versus Shia Split
Baer makes a very valuable contribution with his analysis of Shia Islam’s
political structures as compared to the wide paths of interpretation open to
Sunni Islam. Shia Islam is inherently more political because Shia Islam does
have a rigidly controlled clergy whose traditions drive it to challenge secular
power. Sunni Islam does not have that hierarchy and its traditions have been
generally more secular. But in the context of today’s radical Islam, the Shia
longstanding political traditions also serve as a limiting factor. Not everyone
in Shia Islam can claim clerical status. Calls for religious-based actions are
therefore limited in their scope and ultimately more reasonable in their
application.
In contrast, the Al Qaeda “thinkers” are at once unhindered by such traditions
and limited by their vision of reinstating a caliphate that never really was and
certainly could not survive the modern world. Baer’s point in offering these
thoughts are two fold: first that the Shia are by the nature of their religion
self-limiting when it comes to religious fervor and two that the Iranians use
that fervor to further nationalistic aims. His key example in that is the
metamorphosis of Lebanon’s Hezbollah from a terror-driven organization to a
political, social, and governmental force capable of challenging Israel in a
fight to hold ground. In contrast, radical Sunni Muslim organizations have
consistently failed on efforts to shift from the terror front to the political
front—at least until Hamas benefited from Hezbollah and Iranian tutelage.
A Pan-Islamic Nationalism
Baer rightly points out that the longstanding dominance of Sunni Islam is
clearly in decline if not openly under attack. Secular pan-Arabism as a social
and political force drew its strengths from Sunni Islam’s rejection of a clergy
and religion-based political system. Arab socialism and near communism took
those anti-religious tendencies even further while maintaining a faí§ade of
pan-Arab ideology. Neither secular pan-Arabism nor socialist/communist
pan-Arabism has advanced Arab causes in the past 50 years. Baer again rightly
points to Israel as a symbol of that impotency and frustration. The upsurge in
radical Sunni Islam has done nothing to bolster that image of consistent
failure.
In contrast, Iran and its contacts and supporters have made progress. Baer
offers the critical insight that Iran is not about to collapse in social
upheaval as many in the West would like to see. Rather Iran is quite capable of
managing its internal pressures through its own complex system of cultural
safety valves even as it seeks to expand its influence across the region. As
you should expect, Baer uses Lebanon as a key case study in examining that
effort. He then uses the Lebanese success story to explain Iranian motives
elsewhere in the Middle East. At its central core, Baer’s thesis postulates
that the inherent political disciple of Shia Islam is perfectly capable of
creating a pan-Islamic nationalism, at once accepting of Iranian hegemony and
accommodating both Shia and Sunni partners. He offers Hamas as an example of
that cross-secular and cross-national cooperation. Baer’s point that neither
Nasrallah nor Khamenei is akin to wide-eyed, radical mullahs we typically
associate with the Iranian Revolution is essential to understanding this
movement is more about building power than it is about destroying all things
Western.
The Not So Good
The Sky is Not Falling
I liked Baer’s book because of its subtle but substantive points. I did not
like his penchant for doom and despair. I almost felt like I was watching
300, and I kept waiting for someone to throw a spear at Xerxes. No
one did. The Spartans in this version surrendered. To make his points, Baer
seems driven to the overstatement. For example is Iran’s desire for regional
influence the same as a desire for empire? Maybe it is then again maybe it’s
not. I see it more as a desire for regional influence than a need for
conquest. I suspect that Baer sees it the same way but if you read this book
without a strong grounding in the area, you probably will get a bit angry. My
friend reacted to Baer’s statement that we have lost Iraq and handed Iran a
strategic victory. I would say that Baer is probably correct in offering that
as an Iranian view. Personally I believe any such Iranian “victory” to be
doomed to ultimate defeat.
Shared Interests Do Not a Proxy Make
I offer similar concerns over Baer’s portrayal of Hezbollah. Certainly
Hezbollah is an Iranian client and its actions serve Tehran’s interest in
portraying itself as a champion against the West in general and Israel in
particular. I offer the same cautions when it comes to seeing Hamas as an
Iranian proxy. Time is the greatest test to any such relationship and long
standing alliances in the Middle East are non-existent. Hezbollah likes Iranian
support because it is easier to send Iranian advisors home than it was to kick
the Syrians out. Iraqi acceptance of Iranian interests and support with US and
Coalition Forces on the ground is a wedding of convenience not love. Put
another way, common borders do not good friends make when forming such alliances
in the Middle East. Long distance relationships are much safer and easier to
manage.
The Really Useful
Baer’s real contribution in this book comes in the epilogue. You have to
read the book to get to the epilogue if you are going to understand the author’s
intent. It is all content and context based. A warning however is in order; neocons will not like the book and they will most likely hate Baer’s
conclusions. I found them thought provoking and in that regard quite useful for
fresh discussions regarding Iran and Iranian intentions toward the region and
the West. The book did not piss me off but it did make me think.
Thomas (Tom) Odom
LTC (ret) U.S. Army
