Information Operations
Information Operations
By Andrew Exum
I have a few questions for the learned readership of Small Wars Journal. The first is, how many of you have ever looked up the official Department of Defense definition for ‘Information Operations?’
According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”
I am confident there exist more confusing definitions in the U.S. military lexicon, but surely there cannot be too many. In effect, the Department of Defense has taken the term ‘information operations’ as understood by cyberwarfare types and mashed it together with the term ‘information operations’ as understood by those of us waging wars of narratives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resulting confusion has left us with a definition that tries to be everything to everyone while at the same time leaving us with a shoddy definition to communicate what we’re talking about as counter-insurgency theorist-practitioners when we use the term.
As Frank Hoffman has noted, one of the deficiencies in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency is the lack of any real, in-depth discussion of IO. On the once hand, our operational designs imply that all lines of operations — combat operations, the training of host nation security forces, governance, etc. — rest upon effective IO. It follows, as Hoffman writes, that “something that is ‘critical’ should merit more than three pages of succinct comments.”
I found it really interesting to note, though, the different ways in which IO are discussed in the old FM 3-0, Operations (from 2001) and the latest edition of FM 3-0 (published earlier this year). In the old manual, IO are discussed within the context of cyberwarfare and net-centric warfare, noting the way in which IO enhance our situational awareness and knowledge of what’s taking place on the battlefield. In the new edition of FM 3-0, by contrast, an entire chapter is devoted to something called “information superiority.” And though the chapter more or less follows the JP 3-13 definition and discusses everything from psychological operations to surveillance and reconnaissance (honestly, what does one have to do with the other?), the passage offered at the beginning of the chapter alludes to something much different than IO as they’re discussed in the old FM 3-0:
Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what [public affairs officers] say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media. Commanders should communicate key messages down to the individual level, but, in general, leaders and Soldiers should be able to tell their stories unconstrained by overly prescriptive themes. When communicating, speed is critical—minutes and hours matter—and we should remember to communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first—U.S./global audience can follow. Tell the truth, stay in
your lane, and get the message out fast. Be forthright and never allow enemy lies to stand unchallenged. Demand accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization from the media. (From Multinational Corps–Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2007)
This passage, of course, is drawn from the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq, and what it alludes to is our ability to control the narrative of the campaign and to counter the efforts of others — the enemy; misinformed or biased media — to do the same. But surely IO go beyond just that.
My challenge for this website’s readers, then, is the following: what do we, as counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners, mean when we use the term “information operations?” Do we use IO as shorthand for psychological operations and message management? Obviously, our definition of IO is different from the definition officially in use. And I suspect our definition has more in common with the way Hizballah or the Taliban thinks about IO than the way in which the lexicographers of the Pentagon think about IO. (That, by the way, is a good thing.) So who out there can propose an alternate definition, and one which we can offer to those in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan? And is “information operations” even an appropriate term for that to which we’re referring?
Andrew Exum is pursuing his doctorate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He served in the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2004, leaving active duty as a captain. He was decorated for valor in 2002 while leading a platoon of light infantry in Afghanistan. Subsequently, he led a platoon of Army Rangers into Iraq in 2003 and into Afghanistan in 2004. After leaving the Army, Exum earned a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut. In 2006-2007, he was a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused on contemporary Middle Eastern insurgencies and counter-insurgency strategies. He is the author of This Man’s Army: A Soldier’s Story from the Front Lines of the War on Terrorism (2005) and Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment (2006). Exum is also the founder of the counterinsurgency-related blog Abu Muqawama
