Not So Big of a Tent
Not So Big of a Tent
By Lieutenant Colonel Gian P Gentile
The notion as presented in the article by Cullen Nutt “Petraeus’s Big Tent” that the construction and writing of the American Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 was based on wide-ranging debate within the American Army is fallacious.
The outcome of the manual was predetermined by a few key individuals like General Petraeus, General Mattis, retired Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, active Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, and neo-conservative analyst Fred Kagan, to name a few. The fact that a conference was held at Fort Leavenworth in February 2006 to “discuss” this pre-determined doctrine and even acknowledging that at this conference there was wide inclusiveness with civilian academics and analysts does not change the fact that the doctrinal outcome of the manual with its narrow use of historical lessons learned, theories, and principles of counterinsurgency warfare was predetermined.
This is not to say that there was not good reason for the outcome of the manual to be pre-determined. The American Army and Marine Corps were at war and needed a revised counterinsurgency doctrine immediately. It did not have the luxury to debate the doctrine extensively over the course of many years.
But to claim that FM 3-24 was built on wide-ranging debate within our institution is fallacious and does not square with the facts. We should call a spade a spade, acknowledge this to be the case, and then move on to a real debate within the Army toward the new COIN doctrine, and more importantly the Army’s new operational doctrine, FM 3-0, as well.
Between 1977 and 1982 there were at least 110 articles published in Military Review that fundamentally questioned the Army’s operational doctrine that became known as “Active Defense.” This true, wide-ranging criticism did not just hover around the edges of the “Active Defense” doctrine but cut right to its core by challenging its assumptions, historical premises, and theories. Emblematic articles from Military Review from this period that come to mind and should be used as models for debate today are:
William S. Lind–“Some Doctrinal Questions for the US Army“–March 1977; this was the first article in Military Review that began the “Great Debate.”
COL Robert E. Wagner–“Active Defense and All That“–August 1980; an interesting and strident critique from a serving officer in the field army.
COL Wayne A. Downing–“Maneuver: US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond“–January 1981; This was an example of the tone of the critique of Active Defense.
Consider the lead sentence to Downing’s critique: “The US Army is currently pursuing a general warfare doctrine which is bankrupt–it will not work in practice.” Aside from Ralph Peters has there been anything close to this level of criticism of FM 3-24 and the new FM 3-0?
The value of this wide-ranging criticism of the Active Defense doctrine was that it spurred a re-evaluation of the doctrine which ultimately produced the 1986 version of FM 100-5 known as Air Land Battle.
The authors of FM 3-24 provided a valuable service in getting a counterinsurgency doctrine out to the field quickly. But it is necessary now to accept the truth that there was not wide-ranging debate within the Army and from that premise start one over our Counterinsurgency and Operational doctrine that is truly based on wide-ranging criticism in a “big tent.” After all, as one of the finest military historians and theorists of our time, Dr. Roger Spiller, has said: “doctrine is how an Army thinks out loud about operations now and in the future”
It is time to start thinking out loud.
