counterinsurgency

If we ignore village life – or try to bend it to our view of what it should be – we will fail in Afghanistan as we did in Vietnam.

Unlike a certain mathematical solution counterinsurgency is a laden with human error and complexity.

Good stories trump doctrine for effecting cultural change because they reach us emotionally; they inspire.  Consider America's first battle and what we can glean its many relevant...

Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.

The issue of the reach of the state needs to be put into a wider focus by including women and gender issues as part of the narrative.

The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.

The study demonstrates the naivety of a superpower that allows an alleged ally to receive billions of dollars with which Pakistan financed groups that kill American soldiers almost on a daily basis.

While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.

When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.

From 13-14 May 2010, the COIN shura took place in Kabul aboard Camp Julien, the COIN Academy in Afghanistan to refocus the Surge's forces on COIN.

An economic approach to understanding the nature of rural corruption in Afghanistan suggests that ISAF anti-corruption measures should focus directly, not indirectly, on this issue.