Do timetables work? So asks Small Wars Council member TROUFION on this Council thread.

The Wall Street Journal also addresses the issues surrounding the House's micromanagement of the war and the implications -- with a spot-on editorial today titled 'A Triumph for Pelosi':

That's how the Associated Press described yesterday's vote by the House to demand a U.S. retreat from Iraq, and in the perverse calculus of Capitol Hill we suppose it was. Speaker Nancy Pelosi has demonstrated she can pile on enough pork to bribe enough Democrats to cobble together a bare, partisan majority to "send a message" that has no chance of becoming law. Congratulations.

"Today is an historic day," Ms. Pelosi said on the House floor. "The new Congress will vote to end the war in Iraq." But of course the bill does nothing of the sort. If she truly wanted to end the war, the Speaker and her fellow Democrats could simply have used their power of the purse to refuse to fund it. But that would have meant taking some responsibility for what happens in Iraq, which is the last thing Democrats want to do. So they have passed a bill that funds the war while claiming it ends the war.

The bill's "benchmarks" and deadlines certainly have nothing to do with achieving victory in Iraq, or assisting General David Petraeus's campaign to secure Baghdad. They are all about the war inside the Democratic Caucus. On the one hand, they appease the antiwar left by pretending to declare the war illegal if certain goals aren't met by Iraqis or U.S. forces. But on the other, they allow "moderates" from swing districts to claim they are nonetheless "supporting the troops." Acts of Congress don't get much more cynical than that...

'General Pelosi's' triumph is surely hailed in all quarters of the West's adversaries as a win-win proposition. Thank you Pelosi, Murtha, etal for snatching defeat from the jaws of any possibility of victory. It's a 'Long War' -- remember? -- you left the field in the 2nd inning. The opposition will be looking for a rematch -- bet on it.

Professor Colin Kahl of the University of Minnesota's Political Science Department has been kind enough to permit the Small Wars Journal to post an e-mail of his that was widely circulated. This e-mail concerns U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Iraq and a briefing presented by Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments titled The "New" Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Baghdad Surge: Formula for Success?

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There is a lot of confusion about precisely what approach to COIN the U.S. military has pursued since the fall of Saddam's regime. The [widely disseminated] Krepinevich briefing [discussing the evolution of the surge] is very helpful in this regard, although the bullet points, by their nature, only tell a surface level story. Part of the problem in generalizing about U.S. COIN in Iraq is that the approach the U.S. military has taken to COIN has varied by region and commander, and changed over time. That said, at the broadest level of generality, I think U.S. COIN efforts can be usefully divided into 4 phases.

Phase 1: Denial. This period lasted from the fall of the regime until April 2004. During this time, DoD civilians and some within the military denied that there was an insurgency or, if there was one, that it was growing in support and lethality. CJTF-7 under Sanchez had no campaign plan to conduct successful COIN ops, and division, brigade, and battalion commanders were left to "wing it" in their areas of responsibility. Some made attempts to engage and provide security for the population, like the 101st under Petraeus in Mosul (and, to a lesser degree, the 1st AD in Baghdad under Dempsey), while others, like the 4th ID under Odierno (and, to a lesser degree, the 82nd Airborne out west under Swannack) used overly aggressive, enemy-centered search-and-destroy tactics that proved counterproductive and alienated the Iraqi population in their areas. Denial began to erode from the late summer of 2003 (after the bombing of the UN and the substantial uptick in insurgent attacks), but it lingered until the simultaneous Fallujah and Sadr uprising happened in April 2004.

Phase 2: Learning curve. From the spring of 2004 to the late summer of 2005, the U.S. military woke up to the seriousness of the insurgency. CJTF-7 was replaced by MNF-I/MNC-I, a COIN campaign plan was finally developed, efforts were made to rapidly rebuild the Iraqi Security Forces, and American units employed a mix of direct, harder approaches ( e.g., the Marines in Fallujah -- but note: the Marines originally intended to adopt a softer approach, but after the butchering of four contractors in Fallujah in late March 2004, they were overruled and forced by the White House to lay siege to the city), and indirect, softer approaches ( e.g., Task Force Baghdad under Chiarelli and the 1st Cav). Overall, however, the U.S. approach to COIN during this period was still overwhelmingly enemy-centric/search-and-destroy/kill-capture. Only in 2005 does the military appear to really start systematically learning from its mistakes (and some successes), gradually figuring out that the Iraqi population is the center of gravity.

Phase 3: Getting it. By the late summer and early fall of 2005, the mindset of the U.S. military had changed substantially. Training back home was being altered, education revamped, doctrine reworked, etc. In Iraq, the U.S. military began to move gradually to focus more on the Iraqi population and indirect, less-kinetic approaches to COIN. The poster child for this shift was Tal Afar in September 2005, but similar approaches were taken in Anbar, especially by the joint Marine-Army task force in Ramadi, in 2006. Still, despite some limited efforts to implement this new approach in a handful of areas and the November 2005 announcement by the White House of a new "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" designed around the intent to "clear, hold, and build" Iraqi population centers, the ability to effectively implement these changes in much of the country was complicated by a number of factors.

First, beginning in 2004, an effort was made to reduce the American military footprint by removing smaller bases within many Iraqi cities and villages and consolidating into larger Forward Operating Bases in outlying areas. The goal was to lessen the perception of occupation thought to be driving the Sunni insurgency while also improving force protection. The military's conceptual shift to population security failed to reverse this process. Throughout 2006, most American forces remained hunkered down in large bases rather than nested within communities to provide local security, and plans were made to consolidate forces further.

Second, insufficient troop levels devoted to the "hold" portion of the administration's strategy also thwarted implementation. For political reasons, the Bush administration had long resisted sending more troops to Iraq. At the same time, knowing that a large influx of U.S. forces was politically untenable and that pressure was building for withdrawal, Casey and Abizaid increasingly focused on substituting American forces with Iraqi ones. Iraqi army and police units were thus given the responsibility of providing local security in areas cleared by American forces. Indeed, coterminous with the administration's announced intent to shift toward population security was a determination to hand ever larger swaths of Iraq over to Iraqi Security Forces, and significant U.S. force reductions in Iraq were expected by 2007-2008. But, due to a mix of incompetence and infiltration by insurgent and militia groups, Iraq's fledgling security forces were not up to the task. The resulting security vacuum, especially in Baghdad, accelerated the action-reaction spiral between Sunni insurgents and Shia militias that tipped Iraq into all-out sectarian warfare in the spring of 2006.

Phase 4: Doing it. None of this changed until January 2007, when Bush announced his intention to "surge" 17,500 additional forces to Baghdad (and 4,000 more to Anbar). More support troops have since been tapped to also go to Iraq. But, it is vital to remember, the surge is not the strategy -- it is a means to implement a strategy. The strategy is to to provide actual population security, tamp down sectarian violence, and create space for national reconciliation and reconstruction. To implement this strategy, Bush replaced Casey with Petraeus, who appears committed to implementing the COIN manual he co-sponsored, spreading American troops out into smaller bases from which they can work with Iraqi forces to provide local security. Moreover, even Odierno, the new MNC-I commander, appears to have learned something from his early mistakes, and he seems to be committed to treating the Iraqi population as the focus of operations.

As the Krepinevich briefing makes clear, this shift makes sense from the perspective of COIN best practices and the new COIN field manual. There are other successful approaches to COIN, including what the briefing calls "the Roman Strategy" ("make a desert and call it peace"), which was basically the approach Saddam used to prevent sustained insurgency in Iraq. But, as the briefing properly notes, adopting this approach (or even somewhat softer, but still highly coercive COIN practices, such as those used by the Americans effectively in the Philippines between 1899-1902), is incompatible with norms against targeting civilians embraced by the U.S. military and political leadership. So, with the Roman strategy off the table, that leaves the "clear, hold, and build" option. However, as the briefing makes clear, this strategic shift may simply be too little, too late. What the briefing doesn't say is that it is also unclear whether employing COIN best practices will work in the context of not only a raging insurgency (in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala), but also a sectarian civil war (in Baghdad, Diyala, and increasingly Kirkuk), diffuse criminal anarchy and militia rivalry (in the South), and endemic separatist tendencies (in Kurdistan).

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Update and a Hat Tip (where I first ran across Colin Kahl's essay): Juan Cole at Informed Comment: Kahl: The US Military and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.

Update: Badger at Missing Links addresses COIN in Iraq and the Krepinevich brief in his post Flim-flam.

When Andrew Krepinevich briefed senior congressional staff on the government/military thinking behind the current "surge" at the end of February, what he left with them by way of "materials" was only a bullet-point outline. Colin Kahl tried to flesh out the presentation in his listserve essay that Juan Cole excerpted...

That's the flim-flam. If you say "civil war" enough times, you create the illusion that America doesn't have a dog in the fight, and staying would be the only morally-right thing to do.

Who can we expect to beat the drum for this? That's what Krepinevich wanted to know. As he said on page 18 of his presentation: "The administration has lost control of the narrative, and lost popular confidence--who can/should explain the war to the American people?" That's easy, really: start with political scientists.

Much more at the link...

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Read more by Colin Kahl:

How We Fight at Foreign Affairs

Time for a National Debate on Plan B at Foreign Policy

I've been on Jim Guirard's (TrueSpeak.org) e-mail list for years and have found his discussion of 'the power of words' quite fascinating, to say the least. Jim is an 'out of the box' thinker in regards to information operations and has taken on the West's choice of Arabic terms and the message they convey as a life-mission.

For those interested in Jim's work I recommend beginning with the following as an introduction and reference point for further research.

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Mini Glossary For Fellow Word Warriors

At the request of several "word warriors" on my lists, here is an update of a late-2006 memo which lists quite a number of the Arabic and Islamic words we will need to break out of the habit-of-language box which today makes makes us the "bad guys" and the "infidels" and so falsely anoints the al Qaeda-style suicide mass murderers as the so-called jihadi "holy guys" and shahidi "martyrs."

Importantly, the ubiquitous (it's everywhere! it's everywhere!!) word Jihad is entered four times in order to more clearly define its several meanings and to deprive al Qaeda killers of its halo.

irhab (eer-HAB) -- Arabic for terrorism, thus enabling us to call the al Qaeda-style killers irhabis, irhabists and irhabiyoun rather than the so-called "jihadis" and "jihadists" and "mujahideen" and "shahideen" they so badly want to be called. (Note: "Here we are, more than five years into a Global War on Terrorism, and most of us do not even know this basic Arabic word for terrorism.)

Hirabah (hee-RAH-bah) -- Unholy War and forbidden "war against society" or what we would today call crimes against humanity. Among the many al Qaeda-style crimes and sins which constitute this most "unholy war" are such willful, and unrepented transgressions as those listed in the next section of this memo.

Jihad al Akbar (gee-HAHD ahl AHK-bar) -- this "Greater Jihad" is a personal and spiritual struggle or striving to become closer and more faithful to Allah and his teachings as set forth in the Qur'an.

Jihad al Saghir (gee-HAHD ahl Sahg-HEER) -- "Lesser Jihad" is a physical -- and even a military -- struggle to protect or to free Muslims and non-Muslims from oppression, but only in strict accordance with reasonable, compassionate and non-terroristic standards set forth in the Qur'an, which provides that only the Caliph (or head-of-state?) can legally declare such a Jihad. (Note: UBL was neither and had no authority whatever to issue his 1996 and 1998 faux fatwas of purported "Jihad Against America and the West.")

Jihad al Kabir (gee-HAHD ahl kha-BEER) -- the spiritual and intellectual quest to promote common knowledge of Divine Revelation through all of Allah's Prophets and to carry out what is called ijtihad (consultative efforts throughout the Umma) in applying both Revelation and Natural Law to human affairs.

"Jihad" (gee-HAHD, so called) -- al Qaeda's false label for Hirabah, which is at heart an anti-Islamic, apostate and forbidden "war against society" and a satanic assortment of "crimes against humanity," such as the many ruthless and willful violations of Qur'anic standards listed below.

mufsiduun (moof-see-DOON) -- Islam's word for evildoers, sinners and corrupters whose criminality and sinfulness, unless ended and sincerely repented, will incur Allah's ultimate condemnation on Judgment Day; Islam's optimum antonym for al Qaeda's so-called "mujahideen."

muharibuun (moo-hah-ree-BOON) -- barbarians and ruthless transgressors who are guilty of the heinous crimes and mortal sins of irhab and Hirabah (terrorism and forbidden "war against society").

munafiquun (moon-ah-fee-KOON) - hypocrites to Islam who pretend to be faithful to the Qur'an but who willfully violate many of its basic rules, mandates and prohibitions. Once again, please refer to the ten AQ-style transgressions listed below.

hizb (hizb) - a political party, as in Hizballah (Party of God), or as the senior Saudi cleric Sheik Jafar Hawali recently called this radical and arguably apostate Shi'a organization Hizb al-Shaitan (Party of Satan, Party of the Devil).

Jahannam (jyah-HAH-nahm) -- Islam's antonym for Paradise and meaning the Eternal Hellfire to which Allah on Judgment Day condemns unrepentant, unforgiven evildoers and hypocrites of the unholy war variety.

khawarij (kha-WAH-reej) -- outside-the-religion and outside-the-community individuals and activities; derived from the ancient al Qaeda-like militant Khawar or Kharajite sect, eventually suppressed and expelled as apostates and enemies of authentic, Qur'anic Islam.

istihlal (eesh-tee-LAHL) -- Islam's cardinal sin of "playing God," as Osama bin Laden is doing when he attempts to pervert Islam into his own suicide mass murderous image, and turning it into nothing but a perpetual killing machine -- of all Christians, all Jews and all Muslims who happen to disagree.

murtadd (muur-TAHD) -- apostasy, a certifiably correct conviction for which is punishable by death in this life and by Allah's eternal damnation in the next, with al Qaeda's murderous extremism eventually to be labeled "The al Qaeda Apostasy."

takfir (takh-FEER) -- the Wahhabi and al Qaeda-style practice of making wholesale (and largely false and baseless) accusations of apostasy and disbelief toward Allah and the Qur'an. Those who engage in this divisive practice of false witness are called "takfiri."

Shaitan and shaitaniyah (shy-TAHN and shy-TAHN-ee-yah) -- Islam's Arabic words for Satan and satanic [example: Osama Abd' al-Shaitan, Osama Slave or Servant of Satan]

So, what is the point of this new and improved mini-lexicon of Arabic and Islamic words and frames of reference? In terms of the vital hearts, minds and souls aspects of the Long War on AQ-style Terrorism, the rewards could be great, indeed.

Just for starters, imagine the al Qaeda killers' great difficulty in winning the approval of any truly devout and faithful Muslims whatever once these genocidal irhabis (terrorists) come to be viewed by the Umma (the Muslim World) as mufsiduun (evildoers) engaged in Hirabah (unholy war) and in murtadd (apostasy) against the Qur'an's God of Abraham and surely on their way to Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire), instead.

TrueSpeak Institute

Jim Guirard, President

1129 Cameron Road

Alexandria, Virginia 22308

703-768-0957 Justcauses@aol.com (Truespeak.org)

Even the liberal-leaning and oft anti-war Los Angeles Times has concerns, as expressed in an editorial this morning - Do We Really Need a Gen. Pelosi?

Though the focus is on the surge, the LA Times - in their own way - seems to be reaching an understanding that the surge is not the strategy. And if Congress overwhelmingly confirmed General Dave Petraeus to lead our efforts in Iraq, then it makes sense to give him the time and tools to do his job and, more importantly, not micro-manage the war from inside the beltway.

... But if Congress accepts Bush's argument that there is still hope, however faint, that the U.S. military can be effective in quelling the sectarian violence, that U.S. economic aid can yet bring about an improvement in Iraqi lives that won't be bombed away and that American diplomatic power can be harnessed to pressure Shiites and Sunnis to make peace -- if Congress accepts this, then lawmakers have a duty to let the president try this "surge and leverage" strategy.

By interfering with the discretion of the commander in chief and military leaders in order to fulfill domestic political needs, Congress undermines whatever prospects remain of a successful outcome. It's absurd for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) to try to micromanage the conflict, and the evolution of Iraqi society, with arbitrary timetables and benchmarks.

Congress should not hinder Bush's ability to seek the best possible endgame to this very bad war. The president needs the leeway to threaten, or negotiate with, Sunnis and Shiites and Kurds, Syrians and Iranians and Turks. Congress can find many ways to express its view that U.S. involvement, certainly at this level, must not go on indefinitely, but it must not limit the president's ability to maneuver at this critical juncture...

Congress is getting trapped by many members' foolish mantra that they support the troops but not the war. Their current course could well get more troops killed or wounded and sabotage any chance of reversing the current state of affairs in Iraq.

Otherwise, just stop the funding now and get the troops out as soon as possible. Congress must not be permitted to have one's cake and eat it too.

Vice President Cheney made reference to this sad state of affairs today -- he called it a "slow bleed".

The U.S. war effort in Iraq is being undercut by members of Congress calling for deadlines and funding restrictions that simply encourage the enemy to "wait us out," Vice President Dick Cheney said on Monday.

"When members of Congress pursue an anti-war strategy that's been called slow bleed, they're not supporting the troops, they're undermining them,"...

UPDATE: Tuesday's Washington Post editorial - The Pelosi Plan for Iraq.

... The only constituency House Speaker Nancy Pelosi ignored in her plan for amending President Bush's supplemental war funding bill are the people of the country that U.S. troops are fighting to stabilize. The Democratic proposal doesn't attempt to answer the question of why August 2008 is the right moment for the Iraqi government to lose all support from U.S. combat units. It doesn't hint at what might happen if American forces were to leave at the end of this year -- a development that would be triggered by the Iraqi government's weakness. It doesn't explain how continued U.S. interests in Iraq, which holds the world's second-largest oil reserves and a substantial cadre of al-Qaeda militants, would be protected after 2008; in fact, it may prohibit U.S. forces from returning once they leave.

In short, the Democratic proposal to be taken up this week is an attempt to impose detailed management on a war without regard for the war itself...

Tuesday's National Review editorial - The "Let's Lose Now" Caucus.

... Although this doesn't go as far as John Murtha's proposal for readiness requirements that would have kept troops from deploying to Iraq, it is still a brazen attempt by the legislature to occupy executive territory. Congress hasn't the power -- and was not intended -- to supervise the execution of military objectives, nor is its approval necessary for the commander-in-chief to use the armed forces as he sees fit. Congress can cut off funding from the military, and Pelosi has inched in that direction with this bill. Yet the bill does not actually exercise Congress's power of the purse. It would expire at the end of September, and any actual defunding of Iraq operations -- whether this year or next spring -- would require the passage of additional legislation.

The bill does succeed in showing the emptiness of Pelosi's claim that her Democrats support U.S. troops even as they oppose the war. The message is: We don't believe you should be there; we don't believe you can win (even as the surge shows early signs of progress); so be warned that we mean to pull the rug out from under you as soon as we can get away with it...

Just below the 24/7 "if it bleeds it leads" MSM headlines there is another story -- an encouraging story -- concerning our worldwide counterinsurgency efforts. What follows is a sampling of recent reporting on COIN efforts in the Philippines.

First up, a Stars and Stripes special report series:

Officials Say Philippine Fight Much Different Than Iraq, Afghanistan

It's unfair to compare the Iraq or Afghanistan insurgencies with the one being battled in the southern Philippines, officials stressed during recent interviews.

U.S. troops with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines provide "assistance and advice" to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. troops are fully engaged in combat operations. Recently, the Philippine military has killed several high-value targets and appears to have the Abu Sayyaf Group on the ropes on Jolo Island. Soldiers told Stars and Stripes that Abu Sayyaf hasn't been able to mount any sort of attack in months...

Finding the Root of Home-grown Terrorism

There is no magic fix when fighting an insurgency, according to officials who are working that problem now in the southern Philippines. Col. David Maxwell, commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, briefed Stars and Stripes about the issue during recent interviews in Manila and at his headquarters compound on Mindanao Island.

Key to countering an insurgency is understanding that it is a political problem first and foremost, with implications for the military, Maxwell said. "An insurgency will be defeated if the underlying political and socioeconomic causes are properly addressed," Maxwell said.

"You've got to be here and engaged, which we are, as a country ... as a country team," Maxwell said. "You've got to have patience. This takes a long time."...

Special Forces Lend Hand to Counterparts

Dozens of U.S. Special Forces soldiers, many fresh from combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq, have found themselves in a new role fighting the war on terror in the southern Philippines.

As one soldier with experience in Afghanistan explained, it's tough to transition from actively fighting an enemy downrange to "advising and assisting" the Philippine military in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf terror group in the steamy jungles of Jolo, Mindanao and Basilan islands. But, he added, he understands the local population has to learn to trust its own government and military.

The U.S. soldiers -- National Guardsmen with the 19th Special Forces Group -- are part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. They are not allowed to actively engage the enemy, and they can return fire only if attacked.

They're organized into 12-man "Liaison Command Element" teams and they eat, live and work with their Armed Forces of the Philippines counterparts...

Making Friends in Abu Sayyaf's Territory

A tiny two-room school that sits off a dusty road in the middle of the jungle on Jolo Island could play a role in the battle between Abu Sayyaf terrorists and the Philippine government.

With its cracked foundation, peeling paint and major structural damage, it looks like hundreds of other rural schools scattered across the southern Philippines. But what makes the Tayungen Elementary School special is its location.

"The school is smack dab in the middle" of a north-south migration route used by Abu Sayyaf terrorists, said U.S. Army Capt. Steve Battle, a civil affairs officer with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. Battle runs a four-man Army civil affairs team in a strategically important location on the kidney-shaped island, where the land pinches together into just a three-mile strip from shore to shore...

Civil Affairs Team Members Roughing It at Remote Camps

When civil affairs soldiers with Team 761 head home after a day's work on the island, it's hard to tell if they're on a military camp or the set of "Survivor."

They live on Jolo's "Seit Poblasion" Philippine marine base overlooking a volcanic crater lake, surrounded by a beautiful jungle and monkeys that screech through the night. Most of the buildings are bamboo with thatched roofs, though the team's house is a bit sturdier.

U.S. Army Capt. Steve Battle, the team leader, lives there with a sergeant, a medic and an engineer. And recently they've added a U.S. Marine staff sergeant who is gathering information on a mission that will help the Marine Corps work on setting up its own civil-affairs teams...

Navy Helps Philippine's Sea Defense

U.S. Navy Special Warfare sailors are helping the Philippine navy learn to control the waters around islands where they're fighting Abu Sayyaf terrorists.

Special Warfare Combatant Craft crew and their MK V special operations craft and rigid inflatable boats have followed the Philippine navy on more than 4,000 "visit, board, search and seizures" since arriving in the Philippines in October, said Chief Petty Officer Michael Andre, a RIB detachment commander.

The crewmen and an accompanying group of Navy SEALs are based at Coronado, Calif., and are supporting the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines by training counterparts in the Philippine naval special operations units...

Christian Science Monitor - Where U.S. is Helping to Make Gains Against Terrorism

Gaining the trust of residents in Panamao, a stricken village on the edge of a combat zone, is why US and Philippine troops are dug in here. In counterterrorism jargon, this Muslim community is a "center of gravity" that can be swayed with targeted projects -- a new well, a school classroom, or a toilet. "It's not the amount of people that you affect. It's who you affect," says Captain Battle, a civil-affairs officer.

At a time when success stories in the US-led war on terror have been all but eclipsed by failures in Iraq, recent developments in the southern Philippines offer a degree of hope to Pentagon planners. But they also show the complexity of waging war in a contested, chaotic area, as well as the long slog needed to stand up a national army equal to sure-footed militants...

USA Today - In Philippines, U.S. Making Progress in War on Terror

Thousands of miles from the bazaars of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan, U.S. military forces are quietly helping defeat terrorists in the jungles of the southern Philippines, a forgotten front in the global war on terrorism.

Working behind the scenes with a rejuvenated Philippine military, U.S. special forces have helped kill, capture or rout hundreds of Abu Sayyaf guerrillas who have links to the Islamic terror groups Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, Philippine and U.S. military commanders say...

Voice of America - Southern Philippine Island Plays Out Drama in War on Terror

Far from the headlines and the rest of the world a drama in the global war on terror is playing out on Jolo island in the southern Philippines. A Muslim guerrilla group called Abu Sayyaf is on the run from the Philippine military while U.S. water, road, and health projects are making life better for the people. But is it yet time to declare victory? Douglas Bakshian recently traveled to Jolo for a look at things.

There is much talk these days in Philippine and U.S. military circles about winning the war on terror on Jolo island, and ending a long struggle against the Abu Sayyaf Islamic terrorist group.

Years of fighting the guerrillas failed to produce peace. So the Philippine military, with the help of U.S. advisers, began addressing civilian needs - roads, schools, water systems and medical care.

By alleviating some of the desperate poverty on Jolo, the military defused some of the anger and frustration that fuels violent movements.

General Juancho Sabban, commander of the Philippines Marines who are in the forefront of the operation, says this is all about winning public support...

The Smithsonian - Waging Peace in the Philippines

"They'll slit your throat on Jolo," people told Col. Jim Linder, head of a U.S. military task force in the Philippines. He recalled the prediction as we buzzed toward Jolo Island in a helicopter. Linder, a 45-year-old South Carolina native who has the remnants of a Southern drawl, has led Special Forces operations in the Middle East, Central and South America, Eastern Europe and Africa for the past 20 years. His latest assignment is the remote 345-square-mile island at the southernmost edge of the vast Philippines archipelago. Jolo is a known haven for Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups, including Abu Sayyaf, or "Bearer of the Sword," which has used the island for 15 years to train terrorists and to coordinate attacks.

Curiously, Jolo was also one of the first places where the United States ever battled Muslim insurgents. On March 7, 1906, less than a decade after the United States seized the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, the people of Jolo—known as Moros, after the Spanish for Moors—revolted, among other reasons because they feared that the American effort to enroll their children in schools was part of a plan to convert them to Christianity. The Moros, armed with little more than swords, launched an insurgency against U.S. troops.

"They chased a bunch of Moros up that old volcano and killed them," Linder said to me, pointing out of the helicopter window. Below, the island rose into a series of steep volcanic ridges, each one glowing a lush green against the silvered surface of the Sulu Sea. In the Battle of the Clouds, as the confrontation on Jolo 100 years ago is called, U.S. forces killed 600 to 1,000 people. "It was commonly referred to as a massacre," Linder added quietly.

Today, a crucial but little-known battle in the expanding war on terror is under way on Jolo Island. Designed to "wage peace," as Linder says, it's an innovative, decidedly nonviolent approach by which U.S. military personnel—working with aid agencies, private groups and Philippine armed forces—are trying to curtail terrorist recruitment by building roads and providing other services in impoverished rural communities. The effort, known to experts as "the Philippines model," draws on a "victory" on the Philippine island of Basilan, where U.S. forces in 2002 ended the dominance of Abu Sayyaf without firing so much as a single shot. "It's not about how many people we shoot in the face," Linder said. "It's about how many people we get off the battlefield."...

For top-notch blog coverage on PI COIN efforts go here ---> The Belmont Club.

Maybe there is an advantage to not being the only show in town...

In the April 2007 edition of Vanity Fair - The Night of the Generals by David Margolick.

The six retired generals who stepped forward last spring to publicly attack Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's handling of the Iraq war had to overcome a culture of reticence based on civilian control of the military. But while each man acted separately, all shared one experience: a growing outrage over the administration's incompetence, leading some of the nation's finest soldiers to risk their reputations and cross a time-honored line.

The six generals are LtGen Greg Newbold (USMC), MG Paul Eaton (USA), MG John Batiste (USA), LTG John Riggs (USA), MG Charles Swannack Jr. (USA) and LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC).

The 16 page (printed) article provides a brief background on each of the generals' careers, some background on their thoughts while on active duty (excepting Van Riper) concerning the lead-in and the war in Iraq, reasoning behind their decision (or in one case another's decision) to retire, what prompted them to speak out and any regrets they may have in doing so.

LtGen Greg Newbold

Newbold began reviewing the plan to invade Iraq, several years old by that point, which called for 500,000 troops—a figure Rumsfeld summarily dismissed. Surely 125,000 would suffice, he said, and with a little imagination, you could probably get away with far fewer than that.

MG Paul Eaton

Among the six, Paul Eaton has one clear distinction. He was dealt the worst hand: to create a new Iraqi Army from scratch.

MG John Batiste

John Batiste, 54, may bear the greatest burden of the group. In the middle of Iraq, in the midst of the war, Batiste actually met with Donald Rumsfeld, who asked him point-blank whether there was anything that he, the commander of the First Infantry Division, had asked for that he had not in fact received. Batiste did not answer his question.

LTG John Riggs

Three-star general John Riggs, 60, should have been Donald Rumsfeld's kind of guy. He was the head of the army's Objective Force Task Force, the group charged with developing a lighter, lither army, built around "Future Combat Systems" of high-tech armored vehicles, drones, and sensors.

MG Charles Swannack Jr.

Swannack had all of the usual gripes, about troop shortages, de-Ba'thification, underestimating the insurgency, problems equipping Iraqi soldiers. Sometimes, at press conferences, he aired his complaints.

LtGen Paul Van Riper

At 68, Van Riper is the oldest of the six generals, old enough to have had two tours in Vietnam, where he left behind his spleen and a piece of his intestines. He is also the most famous, highlighted in Malcolm Gladwell's Blink, and, on martial matters, the most erudite.

While the Vanity Fair article presents the generals views it also touches on another issue - does such dissent undermine civilian control of the military?

Some scholars of military-civilian affairs said that the six had imperiled civilian control, undermined military mores and morale, jeopardized the military meritocracy and the trust between senior and junior officers. The time for these men to have spoken out, these critics said, was while they were still in uniform, through the chain of command; past retired generals with bones to pick had had the decency to wait for administrations to change before writing books, rather than popping off against incumbents in real time, practically before the ink on their retirement papers had dried.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld plays heavily in the article to include his styles of management and leadership.

I recommend this as a must read. I'm glad I did not have to "walk a mile" in their shoes. The decision to go or not to go public in dissent, either on active duty or in retirement, was not a decision these men made lightly.

Based upon a February 2007 trip revisiting locales in Anbar and Baghdad that I had tracked for years, permit me to offer the following observations.

Overview. What is shaping up in Iraq? There are four ongoing wars. 1) Shiite mafias in the south, 2) Anbar Sunni extremists 3) Shiite ethnic cleansing around Baghdad 4) Sunni extremist car bombings in Baghdad.

1. In the South the U.S. is doing little. The energy sector funnels billions to corrupt officials, criminals, militias and insurgents. The Brits weren't able to impose control. The hope is that the south remains a long-term mafia-type mess, and does not spill north to Baghdad.

2. In Anbar about 60% of the tribes are tilting toward the Marines and fighting the al-Qaeda types. Police ranks are swelling with tribal members. Anbar is improving, but how the Sunni tribes will work with the Iraqi Army, let alone the central government, is moot.

Prognosis for the next six months: Progress but no breakthroughs. The central government has to woo the sheiks and offer terms, figure out how police chiefs and Iraqi army commanders share power in the cities, and crack down on the insurgents captured in Anbar (put them away for life). Jails in Anbar are filling up, and the central government is not stepping up.

3. In Baghdad, as the Shiite ethnic cleansing advances, the front lines are easily marked by the blocks of abandoned houses. Checking the cleansing can be done by military means -- barriers, patrols and the like. The Americans are likely to stop this and turn around the trend.

4. Also in Baghdad, the Sunni extremists strike with suicidal murderers and car bombs. It is unlikely, given a million cars, that a technique will be developed to curtail this inside six months. In most countries, bombers are stopped by effective policing and spy networks, and Iraq is years away from that. This is the Achilles Heel. No matter the progress on other fronts, the persistence of gore and Shiite mass deaths is likely to continue to fuel hatred.

What, then, is the biggest problem? How the Americans can infuse into the Iraqi army and police in Baghdad a sense of mission and even-handedness such that the Americans can withdraw from neighborhoods in eight to twelve months without backsliding.

Existing American military tactics and techniques are adequate to staunch the ethnic cleansing; to transfer those conops or to design substitute techniques that the Iraqi army and police can use -- and to meld the army and police into a unity of effort -- is a far more problematic task. On the other hand, I've seen enough examples of tough Iraqi leadership at the battalion and police chief level to believe that some leadership is emerging. Right now, though, the glue is the presence of the American troops. They have to be out on the streets first, then the Iraqi forces fall in behind them.

The places in Baghdad where I saw clean streets, open shops, and guards on every corner were the Shiite areas. It's too early to tell whether we're dealing with a rope-a-dope feint by the Shiite politicians. It is in their short-term interests for them to help us purge bad elements, and restore order and services. But whether they believe a compromise with the Sunnis is possible or necessary -- who knows?

Specific Observations and Comments.

1. Open disclosure of Iraqi pay. At every joint US-Iraqi ops/intell update, one slide should address the advisors' update of payroll, equipment and food support for IP/IA. The higher up the US chain I moved, the more I heard how dramatically Iraqi ministries had improved. If so, terrific. If not so, then embarrassment is deserved at this late time.

2. Erratic standards of patrolling. The patrol is the basic tool in the US military inventory. Without patrols, there is no US presence or influence. The variation in the size and duration of patrols from location to location is astounding. One MiTT persuades an IA battalion to conduct twelve patrols a day; another in the same locale does six. One US company runs 15/day; another, 5. The variation is not caused by the actual threat; some of the toughest locales have the most patrolling. It is caused by an extreme variation in intuitively assessing the threat and setting the balance between force protection and mission accomplishment. A little ops analysis by experienced infantry of how often we are really on the streets and how one determines patrol size and mounted vs. dismounted would go a long ways.

3. Persistence of lack of population identification. It is impossible to reduce an insurgency if the insurgents cannot be identified. Most of our rifle companies, after several months in the same area, begin their own census and ID programs. I am a broken record on this, but I do urge that we systematically fingerprint and take census in critical locales, and provide the Iraqis with simple gear and templates to do likewise. OpSec firewalls can be built in to avoid subversion.

4. "Catch and release" swells the ranks of the opposition. Every battalion I spoke with was convinced the "rules of law" for arrest, imprisonment and release favor the insurgent. The Iraqi judiciary system cannot be straightened out for another five years. At higher levels, this is disputed. I remain on the side of the battalions. We must lock up tens of thousands until the violence subsides.

4. Under-utilized information tool. The loud speakers linked to news broadcasts several times a day in Ramadi is a terrific innovation that should be immediately installed at IA, IP and JSS locales.

5. A sound early warning system. In the Red Zones in Baghdad where ethnic cleansing is creeping forward, provide several cell phones per block and pay for the calling time. Each side will call in when threatened and provide the best early warning system.

6. Stop ethnic cleansing for profit. JAM systematically evicts Sunnis and moves Shiites into houses complete with furniture and electronics. The suddenly rich occupants then have great incentive to push Sunnis farther away so that the original owner can never come back to that neighborhood. We should take away this enormous economic incentive to cleanse neighborhoods. On a photomap in every JSS and COP, mark every abandoned house and refuse new occupancy JAM will lose adherents if the economic gain is removed. This step can be taken immediately, with substantial effect. It also insures that our patrols interact constantly with the people, who are sure to offer their opinions and tips.

7. Combat pay for the jundis in Anbar is essential. The tribes are encouraging local police enlistment. But the jundis have it much harder, and the strain will tell over the next year.

8. Anbar sheik movement merits US resources. In Anbar, the Awakening movement by the sheiks merits a crash program to pay, equip and advise what might be called a 'rural constabulary'. Analogies to the 2004 "Fallujah Brigade" -- a total disaster -- are misplaced. The Fallujah Brigade was controlled by the enemy and refused to cooperate. The Awakening is cooperating, although Anbar can only be resolved by political compromise on the part of the central government.

9. Negative habit of fixed positions. IA and IP devote >50% of resources to fixed positions. Given their aversion to unity of command and to patrolling, it is not clear what TTPs will allow them to control their own battle space, once Americans are not present. The counter that they "know the locals" is simply not true. The IA is as blind in many locales as we are, while the IP are years away from being trusted in many areas.

On the other hand, given that Iraq is a Rubik's cube, my discomfit may reflect only my own cultural bias. I measure by practical conops on the ground, and that may not be the right measure of effectiveness. As I was leaving a new Combat Outpost, an interpreter who had served with US units since 2003 told me, "The new strategy may work. It's a mental thing. We're out here. It's set them (Sunni insurgents and JAM) back."

10. Improving metrics for a police war. In essence, Iraq is now a police war. Yet our briefings, our metrics and our frame of reference -- how we organize, analyze and solve problems -- are military. Our basic tool to combat this insurgency and sectarian war is the patrol, too often mounted. In contrast, a police station -- the equivalent of our Combat Outpost -- is divided into patrolmen and detectives (of which we are woefully short because we have not thought in those terms.)

It would be interesting to invite a few senior cops from the States to visit, say, Ramadi and three districts in Baghdad. Then ask them to present how they would organize their daily brief -- what metrics they would demand from their police subordinates and what conops they would put in place.

11. Trust will decide this war. We know the essence of the problem: Whether the Iraqi central government and security forces are led by deceivers who tell us they believe in a stable federation with power-sharing, while they abet sectarian division. In my most recent visit, there was the pervasive, open acknowledgement by the police, IA and the residents that they trusted the Americans, but not each other.

Today's Guardian article ("Military Chiefs Give US Six Months to Win Iraq War") misrepresents the Baghdad advisers. So much so, it makes me doubt the reliability of the single, unidentified source responsible for much of the article's reporting.

I hope SWJ colleagues will forgive this more "personal" post than usual, but as Senior Counterinsurgency Adviser I have a duty to set the record straight on this.

There is a real country called Iraq, where a real war is going on, with real progress but very real challenges. We are not going to "win the war" in six months -- nor would anyone expect to. But the Guardian seems to be describing some completely different, (possibly mythical) country, and some imaginary group of harried and depressed advisers bearing no resemblance to reality. As counterinsurgency professionals, we take an evidence-based approach and we are well aware of the extremely demanding task we face. That makes us cautious realists -- but we are far from pessimists, as the Guardian's anonymous source seems to imply.

The article is littered with inaccuracies:

• The "advisers" are not bunkered down in the Green Zone, but in another location, and frequently out on the ground.
• The article (incorrectly) describes me as a serving military officer -- I'm a civilian diplomat, as any source truly familiar with the team's thinking would be well aware.
• While recognizing the severity of the challenge, the team's mood is far from pessimistic. Success will take months or years, not weeks or days, and although early signs are somewhat encouraging it's really far too early to say how things will play out. The war has been going for four years, the new strategy for less than four weeks. Give it time.
• The State department is not failing to meet its personnel targets. On the contrary, more than 90 % of civilian positions in Iraq are filled, and we will grow to 20 Provincial Reconstruction Teams soon.
• The coalition is far from disintegrating -- British redeployment from the South reflects improved security, not lack of will, and the same day the British announced their move the Australians announced a force increase in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
• The plan is not "unclear" or "constantly changing" -- we all know exactly what the plan is. The article seems to be mistaking the freedom and agility which have been granted to us, allowing us to respond dynamically to a dynamic situation, for vacillation.

Yes, of course, there are still car bombings. But several recent bombings have been Sunni-on-Sunni, rather than sectarian, with extremists targeting moderates to discourage them from cooperating with the government. That means sectarian violence, overall, is down, and that extremists are worried they are losing support from their base -- both good things, despite the appalling violence against innocents we have come to expect from these extremists.

And yes, there is a risk that home-front political will might collapse just as we are getting things right on the ground. Given some commentators' overall negativity, one suspects that their efforts may be directed to precisely that end. You may not like the President, you may be unhappy about the war. But whose side are you on? The Iraqis trusted us, and this is their fight. They deserve our support.

Buried in the article, though, are some references to real-world progress:

• Progress has been made on oil-wealth sharing legislation -- a major development.
• Joint operations are beginning in Baghdad, and are going well so far.
• Iraqi community leaders are reporting somewhat improved morale and public confidence among the civilian population, though this is tempered by previously unmet expectations.
• Numbers of political murders have fallen (precipitously) since the operation began, though these are still too high in absolute terms.
• Iraqi forces are turning up, and performing well, though not always at 100% strength
• In al-Anbar, tribal leaders have realized extremists have nothing to offer them -- a huge development, as influential community leaders have "flipped" from AQ's side to support the Iraqi government.
• Regional diplomatic efforts, including with Iran and Syria, are apparently underway.

Unfortunately most of these developments are buried in the last paragraph of a long article.

The Guardian is entitled to its own view of the war, and reasonable people can differ on these issues. But the Guardian's view is not ours, and the anonymous source misrepresents our views. It is really too soon to tell how things will play out, though early signs are encouraging so far, and the advisers as a group remain cautious realists, not pessimists.

(As ever, though I have "permission to post", these are my own personal views and were not screened or vetted by anyone).

[Note: While I have received official approval to offer personal comment at SWJBlog, the following post has not been vetted or screened in any way. It represents personal opinion only, and is strictly Unclassified and based solely on open source material.]

It has been a busy few weeks. Operation Fadr al-Qanoon (which the media calls the "Baghdad security plan") is shaping up. Progress is measurable, but this is a marathon, not a sprint, and it's still too early to know how it will turn out.

The message for all of us, as professionals who do this for a living, is patience, patience, patience. The war has been going for nearly four years, the current strategy less than four weeks. We need to give it time.

It will take time to provide security to the population. To do this right, we need to build trust with the people, engage community leaders closely, develop intelligence and trusted networks, then work our way in and compete with the insurgents and death squads to deny them access to their targets -- their own people, whom they cynically exploit and kill. All these things we are doing, but the process cannot be rushed, and requires detailed local understanding: so we move at the pace the Iraqis can sustain.

Patience and stamina are vital. Political reconciliation -- at the grass roots -- is what will make this work, with security as breathing space. Needless to say, we are not leaving this to chance: some commentators have focused on the troop surge, but the main effort is the political effort, by Iraqis with our support, to reconcile at the local level. This is going to be a lot like heavy peace enforcement or police work, not so much like classical counterinsurgency, let alone conventional combat.

Our task is to stay alert and read the situation, ready to modify our approach as things develop. In outline (and at the unclassified level, of course) these are the major trends:

Muqtada al-Sadr has run off to Iran, leaving some of his people scratching their heads and wondering if they have been Persian stooges all along.

Iraq outside Baghdad remains relatively quiet, as it has been for much of the past year. At least half the incidents in Iraq still happen within Baghdad city limits.

Al Qa'ida in Iraq is increasingly marginalized, with alliances of local Sunni leaders, and some other jihadist groups, opposing its brutality or contesting its self-styled leadership.

Increased targeting of helicopters has led to several shoot-downs (out of hundreds of flights every day) -- a Baghdad helicopter ride is still safer than a cab ride in some major cities, but this is a trend to watch carefully.

Security in certain key neighborhoods of Baghdad shows signs of improving, as Americans and Iraqis partner at the grass roots to reduce violence and insurgent influence.

Terrorists have used car bombs against innocent bystanders in several markets and public places -- a sign that they know where the danger lies (loss of influence with the population) and are trying to sink the "surge" using negative publicity.

Some sectarian and insurgent groups have "come out of the woodwork" to attack outposts, local communities working with the government, and security forces.

This last trend is the most professionally interesting. In counterinsurgency killing the enemy is never difficult, if only you can find them. But finding them, and distinguishing them from the innocent population, can be forbiddingly difficult. By shifting our approach away from directly hunting down insurgents, and towards protecting the population, we have undercut their influence -- they know it, and their options are to flee, wait us out, or come into the open to contest control of the neighborhoods. The fact that some are coming into the open suggests they realize that waiting us out is not an option. It also makes the job of finding the enemy far easier. This is encouraging, as long as we can protect the people.

On this score, again, it's too early to say for sure but initial signs are encouraging. One indicator that's not very useful is car bombs -- we can expect these to be one of the last insurgent tactics to diminish, for two reasons. First, it takes an entire community partnering with its own local security forces to defeat a clandestine suicide bomber, and it will take a while to build effective networks to do this. Secondly, insurgent tactics are driven by the need to make a media splash, and nothing does this better than a big bomb. So the enemy will cling to this method as long as the news media reward it.

Overall, then, though early signs are encouraging, prudence and professional judgment counsel patience. There will be tough days ahead; the problems remain immense, complex and deeply embedded in the social and political structures we deal with. The violence will ebb and flow, and there will be lethal "spikes". But over time, if the strategy works, we should see a downward trend in violence and an increase in trust and reconciliation at the street level -- while remaining ready, as we certainly are, to refine our approach if needed.

The one thing we must not do is to confuse the real country of Iraq, where there is a real war, a real population, and a real obligation to protect them, with the parallel-universe "quagmire Iraq" of popular imagination. As professionals we have a duty to be clear-headed, to analyze and constantly re-assess the situation in a hard nosed fashion, adapting our approach as needed. And we have a duty of care to our people, their families, and the Iraqis, to give this time, take it carefully, and not rush either to judgment or failure. Insh'Allah together with the Iraqis we will run this race to its finish.

I'll lead off with two short excerpts from the new Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual, FM 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5:

- Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources.

- At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment is critical.

Which leads us to an excerpt from a 21 February NY Post article that appeared on the DoD Current News (Early Bird) and linked to from the Small Wars Council discussion board - America Says Let's Win War by Andy Soltis:

In a dramatic finding, a new poll shows a solid majority of Americans still wants to win the war in Iraq - and keep U.S. troops there until the Baghdad government can take over.

Strong majorities also say victory is vital to the War on Terror and that Americans should support President Bush even if they have concerns about the way the war is being handled, according to the survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies.

The poll found that 57 percent of Americans supported "finishing the job in Iraq" - keeping U.S. troops there until the Iraqis can provide security on their own. Forty-one percent disagreed.

By 53 percent to 43 percent they also believe victory in Iraq over the insurgents is still possible...

And brings us to the beginning (hopefully) of a debate at the Small Wars Council:

Tequila - Note that POS (illustrative acronym) is a Republican house polling firm that often does "push polling" as well as normal opinion polling. The NY Post is a right-wing Rupert Murdoch rag that is widely regarded as the worst newspaper in the NY market, exceeded only in its hackery by the neocon-favoring NY Sun. More details on the poll here.

John T. Fishel - If you look at the information about the poll and the questions asked, it is both pretty solid and quite conventional. The questions are clear. The same thing is asked several times in a variety of ways and the answers are consistent. And the margin of error is stated relatively conservatively. As one who has done some survey research, I have no problem with this.

Tequila - That's why I included the poll data itself, so folks can judge. I thought some of the questions betray some push-poll stuff, and also the demographics of the poll lean heavily white, but otherwise not terrible. Nonetheless the origins of the poll are worth noting.

Merv Benson - Actually party polling is usually kept in house and is considered much more accurate than newspaper polls, because more is at stake. One of the problems with most of the media polls is they tend poll "satisfaction" instead of what results people want. Similar misleading polling was done after the Tet offensive, and when more details were added it turned out that a majority were either "satisfied" with the war policy or wanted a more aggressive policy. Those who wanted to lose were in a minority. I think that is still the case with the Iraq war. My poll question would be real simple -- "Do you want to lose the war in Iraq?"

Tequila -- Merv, there are two types of polling done. One is normal opinion polling, whose goal is to ascertain the true state of public opinion. The other is "push polling", where questions are asked similar to the one you ask, whose goal is to elicit a defined response and shape opinion rather than understand it.

Stratiotes - Such results are not uncommon in time of war. Similar results were often obtained to the very end of the Vietnam war. Few will go out on a limb and say they'd like to just give up.... even if they did not agree with the war to begin with.

John T. Fishel - The first thing to note about the demographics of the sample is that it is of "likely" voters. This means that there will almost certainly be some deviation from the percentages of selected groups among the population as a whole. In this case, blacks are represented fairly closely to their proportion of the population at large, but Hispanics are seriously underrepresented as, it appears, are Asians. But, then, Hispanics have been much less likely to vote, hence the over-representation of whites. The upper income groups and more highly educated are also over-represented but again, they are more likely voters.

As I indicated earlier, I did not see questions that appeared to predispose the respondents toward a particular answer and, more importantly, because there were multiple questions seeking to get at the same variables I am comfortable with the results.

It is interesting that the polls taken post-Tet showed general dissatisfaction with the course of the war but when the questions asked what people wanted to do about it, they were all over the map. If I recall correctly, however, the bottom line was do what it takes to win or get out now. "Deja vu all over again"?

What say you? Comment here or join the discussion at the Small Wars Council.